Executive Engineer (O and M)(Wrongly Mentioned in Impugned Order as Chief Executive Engineer) Vs Smt. Ramkumari

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Digitally signed by AVANISH KUMAR PATHAK Date: 2025.08.04 12:00:49 +0530

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2025:CGHC:38213

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NAFR

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HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

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FA No. 36 of 2022

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1 - Executive Engineer (O And M)(Wrongly Mentioned In Impugned Order As Chief Executive Engineer) Chhattisgarh State Power Distribution Company Limited, Seepat, Office At Tifra, P.S. Sirgitti, District Bilaspur Chhattisgarh.

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2 - Assistant Engineer (Wrongly Mentiones In Impugned Order As Assistant Executive Engineer) Torwa, Chhattisgarh State Power Distribution Company Limited, Seepat, Old Power House P.S. Torwa, District Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh.

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3 - Junior Engineer Seepat, Chhattisgarh State Power Distribution Company Limited, P.S. Seepat, District Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh.

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--- Appellants

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versus

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1 - Smt. Ramkumari W/o Chhanu Lal Mauwar Aged About 38 Years R/o Village Bitkula, P.S. Seepat, District Bilaspur Chhattisgarh.

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2 - Chhannu Lal Mauwar S/o Shri Saukhi Lal Aged About 42 Years R/o Village Bitkula, P.S. Seepat, District Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh.

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3 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through The District Collector, Tahsil District Bilaspur Chhattisgarh.

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--- Respondent(s)

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Forappellants	: Mr.JitendraPali,Adv.
For Respondents No. 1 and 2	: Mr. Aman Ansari, Adv.
For respondent No. 3	: Mr. Santosh Soni, Govt. Adv.

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(Hon’ble Mr. Naresh Kumar Chandravanshi, J) JUDGMENT ON BOARD

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30-7-2025

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1. The appellants/defendants No. 1 to 3 have preferred this first appeal under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (henceforth, referred to as ‘CPC’) against the judgment and decree dated 3-82021 passed by the District Judge, Bilaspur (CG) /trial Court in Civil Suit No. 03-B/2019, whereby the trial Court has allowed the civil suit filed by the respondents No. 1 and 2 /plaintiffs and granted decree of Rs. 6,24,800/- with interest at the rate of 9% per annum from the date of application till its payment, as compensation amount to them.

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(hereinafter, parties shall be referred as per their description before the trial Court).

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2. Facts of the case, in nutshell, are that, the plaintiffs filed a civil suit against the defendants stating inter alia that, on 1-6-2016 when deceased Neha had gone on roof of her house, and was poring water on lanter/slab, she came in contact with the electric wire drawn over the roof of house of the deceased, as a result of electrocution, she died on spot. The accident has occurred due to negligence on the part of appellants/defendants No. 1 to 3. The incident was reported on the same day at PS Seepat, on the basis of which, merg No. 38/2016 was registered. At the time of accident, the deceased was aged about 16 years and earned Rs. 2,000/- per month by work of labour. By filing

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the civil suit, the plaintiffs have prayed for grant of Rs. 10,56,000/towards loss of earning, Rs. 20,000/- towards expenses of last rites and Rs. 20,000/- towards mental agony and thus claimed total Rs. 10,96,000/- with interest at the rate of 18% per annum, from the defendants No. 1 to 3 jointly and severally.

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3. Defendants No. 1 to 3 have submitted joint written statement denying the pleading made in the plaint and pleaded that, plaintiffs have constructed new house in the year 2016 and lay lanter/slab on it. No LC line has been drawn above the house of plaintiffs, rather the line was drawn 20 years prior to the incident, which was 5 ft. far from the house. There was no any negligence on the part of defendants No. 1 to 3 in account of death of the deceased, rather the deceased died because of her own negligence.

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4. On the basis of pleading of both the parties, learned trial Court framed 5 issues, recorded evidence adduced by the parties and after considering the evidence and contention of the learned counsel for the parties, it partly allowed the civil suit granting decree in favour of plaintiffs and directed the appellants/defendants No. 1 to 3 to pay compensation of Rs. 6,24,800/- to the plaintiffs along with interest at the rate of 9% per annum. Being aggrieved by such judgment and decree, appellants/defendants No. 1 to 3 have filed instant first appeal.

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5. Learned counsel for the appellants would submit that, power line was drawn 20 years ago and the appellants have shown no negligence in

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maintaining the security. The plaintiffs had constructed their house in the year 2016 and were aware of the fact that wire line passes almost around 5 feet away from their house, thus it was their duty to construct their house with sufficient distance. The incident occurred when the deceased was poring water on newly constructed lanter/slab, for which she herself was responsible. The plaintiffs’ house was newly constructed, it was the duty of the plaintiffs to inform the defendants/appellants if they want to change the passage of power line. Hence, the trial Court ought to have dismissed the suit.

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6. Per contra, learned counsel for the plaintiffs/respondents No. 1 and 2 supported the impugned judgment and decree.

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7. Learned Govt. Adv. submits that, State is a formal party in this case.

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8. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record.

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9. Undisputedly, deceased died because of electric shock, which also gets support from the post mortem report Annexure P-4 of the deceased. It is also proved from the evidence adduced by the parties that, deceased Neha suffered electric shock when she was poring water on newly constructed slab of her house and came in contact of the electric wire and died at the spot.

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10. It is not a case of the defendants that the said electric connection was taken illegally or by hooking it from electric pole. It is the liability of appellant/defendants No. 1 to 3 to see that the power lines are drawn

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with a safe distance from a house, so that, possibility of any person to come into its contact may be eradicated. In instant case, Chhannu Lal, (P.W. 1), Umashankar Porte (P.W. 2) and Abhimanyu Singh (P.W. 3) have stated in their statement made under Order 18 Rule 4 of the CPC that, the electric wire was running over the house of the deceased. Though Vishnulal Dewangan (DW. 1), who is Assistant Engineer in appellants/defendants Power company, has stated that the electric line runs 5 meter away from the house of deceased, but from the evidence, it has been established that the deceased died at the time she was poring water on lanter/slab of her house, at that time, she came into contact of electric wire. As per cross-examination of plaintiffs’ witnesses, the house was newly constructed and the lanter/slab was newly laid, but Vishnulal Dewangan, Assistant Engineer of defendants company himself has stated in his deposition that, distance of LT line was 5 ft far from the lanter/slab, but the plaintiff Chhannulal (P.W. 1), who is father of the deceased, has stated in his deposition that, he had filed applications many times before defendants for removal of that LT line, but defendants ignored his request. In this regard, he has filed a copy of such application (Annexure P-5), which also contains stamp/seal of office of defendant No. 1, which has also been accepted by defendant No. 1 Vishnulal Dewangan. Aforesaid statement of Chhannulal (P.W. 1) has also been supported by Umashankar Porte (P.W. 2) and Abhimanyu Singh Mouwar (P.W. 3), which is uncontrovered in their cross-examination, therefore, negligence held proved by learned trial Court against the defendants No. 1 to 3, is not found to be perverse.

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11. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board v. Shail Kumari reported in (2002) 2 SCC 162 : (AIR 2002 SC 551) elaborated the doctrine of “strict liability” which has its origin in English common law, in cases of death of a citizen due to snap electrocution where a very limited scope of defence was left to an incumbent, who is obliged to adhere to the requisite safety measures. The said principle of strict liability has been applied irrespective of any negligence or carelessness on the part of the Managers / Operators of undertaking with activity involving hazardous or risky exposure to human life. Paras 8, 9 & 10 are relevant and quoted hereinbelow:-

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“8. Even assuming that all such measures have been adopted, a person undertaking an activity involving hazardous or risky exposure to human life, is liable under law of torts to compensate for the injury suffered by any other person, irrespective of any negligence or carelessness on the part of the managers of such undertakings. The basis of such liability is the foreseeable risk inherent in the very nature of such activity. The liability cast on such person is known, in law, as “strict liability”. It differs from the liability which arises on account of the negligence or fault in this way i.e., the concept of negligence comprehends that the foreseeable harm could be avoided by taking reasonable precautions. If the defendant did all that which could be done for avoiding the harm he cannot be held liable when the action is based on any negligence attributed. But such consideration is not relevant in cases of strict liability where the defendant is held liable irrespective of whether he could have

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avoided the particular harm by taking precautions.

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The doctrine of strict liability has its origin in English common law when it was propounded in the celebrated case of Rylands v. Fletcher, (1868) 3 HL330 : (1861/73) All ER Rep 1, Blackbur, J, the author of the said rule had observed thus in the said decision : (All ERp. 7E-F)

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“The true rule of law is that the person who, for his own purposes, brings on his land, and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it at his peril, and, if he does not do so, he is prima facie answerable for all the damages which is the natural consequences of its escape”.

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There are seven exceptions formulated by means of case-law to the doctrine of strict liability. It is unnecessary to enumerate those exceptions barring one which is this : “Act of stranger i.e., if the escape was caused by the unforeseeable act of a stranger, the rule does not apply”. (Vide P.535, Winfield on Tort, 15th Edn.)”

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At para 12 of Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board v. Shail Kumari reported in (2002) 2 SCC 162 : (AIR 2002 SC 551) , the law laid down in the case of M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, AIR 1987 SC 1086 : (1987) 1 SCC 395 was also taken note of by the Supreme Court in the following words :-

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“12. Where an enterprise is engaged in a hazardous or inherently dangerous activity and harm is caused on anyone on account of the accident in the operation of such activity, the enterprise is strictly and absolutely liable to compensate those who are affected by the accident; such liability is not subject to any of the

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exceptions to the principles of strict liability under the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher”.

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12. Having considered the facts and evidence of instant case, in which deceased Neha died when she was poring water on lanter/slab of her house and came into contact of electric wire, and the appellants/defendants No. 1 to 3 failed to fulfill their liability keep proper safety with respect to drawing electric wire, as a result of which, deceased came into contact of current and died, and in the light of the law laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court in above referred cases, I do not find any infirmity or illegality in fastening liability on the appellants /defendants No. 1 to 3 to pay compensation to the plaintiffs/respondents No. 1 and 2.

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13. So far as quantum of compensation is concerned, as per the pleading of the plaintiffs, deceased was 16 years of age at the time of incident, she was earning Rs. 2000/- per month, though her income, expenses, liability, etc have not been proved by them, but incident occurred in the year 2016 i.e. about 9 years ago, therefore, having considered totality of the facts and evidence, in the opinion of this Court, learned trial Court has not committed any error in assessing the yearly income of the deceased at Rs. 24,000/-, which cannot be said to be on higher side. After assessing compensation, learned trial Court has granted compensation of Rs. 6,24,800/- in favour of the plaintiffs, which in overall assessment, cannot be held to be on higher side.

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14. In view of above discussion, I do not find any perversity or illegality in

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the impugned judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court. Hence, the appeal being devoid of substance, deserves to be and is hereby dismissed.

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15. Pending interlocutory application(s), if any, stands disposed of.

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16. A decree be drawn accordingly.

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Sd/-

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(Naresh Kumar Chandravanshi)

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Judge

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Pathak

Executive Engineer (O and M)(Wrongly Mentioned in Impugned Order as Chief Executive Engineer) v. Smt. Ramkumari

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Executive Engineer (O and M)(Wrongly Mentioned in Impugned Order as Chief Executive Engineer) v. Smt. Ramkumari

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