Rajendra Prasad Agrawal Vs Shyam Sundar Sohanlal

Shyamsundar @ Sohanlal, S/o Godri Bava, Caste: Chandra, Occupation: Agriculture, R/o Village Khate Koni, Tehsil Dabhara, District Janjgir-Champa (C.G.).

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... Respondent

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(Cause title taken from Case Information System)

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For Appellant : Mr. Yashkaran Singh, Advocate For Respondent : Mr. Divyanand Patel, Advocate

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Hon'ble Shri Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge

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Judgment on Board

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03/11/2025

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The present first appeal under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 has been filed by the plaintiff against the impugned judgment and decree dated 30.07.2005, passed by learned 4^th Additional District Judge (FTC), Raigarh, in Civil Suit No. 14-A/2004, whereby the suit for specific performance of the contract has been dismissed.

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Digitally
signed byVED
VED PRAKASH
PRAKASH DEWANGAN
DEWANGAN Date:
2026.01.13
15:15:20
+0530

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The plaintiff/appellant Rajendra Prasad Agrawal has filed a civil suit for specific performance of the contract dated 24.02.1999 against the defendant with respect to the suit land bearing khasra No. 3/12, area

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0.93 acre, khasra No. 266/3, area 0.03 acre, khasra No. 269, area 0.30 acre, khasra No. 266/2, area 0.07 acre, khasra No. 267/2, area 1.02 acre, khasra No. 268/2, area 0.10 acre and khasra No. 491/2, area 0.25 acre, total area 2.70 acre, situated at Village Chhote Katekoni, Tahsil Dabhra, District Janjgir-Champa. It is pleaded in the plaint that, on 24.02.1999, an agreement was executed between the plaintiff and defendant with respect to the purchase of his land for the total consideration of Rs. 54,000/- and in presence of the witnesses and the Notary Mathura Prasad Darshan, Rs. 45,000/- was paid to the defendant as advance amount of the total sale consideration and he executed the agreement . For want of Rin Pustika at that time, the sale-deed could not be registered and it was the condition that, after obtaining the Rin Pustika, the sale-deed would be registered within three months. Despite repeated requests made by the plaintiff, the defendant has not executed the sale-deed and evaded every time. The plaintiff is ready to perform his part of the contract. On 26.06.2001, the plaintiff served a legal notice to the defendant through his counsel, which was served upon him on 03.07.2001, but he refused to accept the same and then the suit for specific performance of the contract has been filed on 02.01.2002.

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The defendant has been served through registered AD post mode of service, but he refused to accept the registered AD post and then ex parte proceeding was drawn against him and he remained ex parte throughout the proceeding.

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On the basis of pleadings of the plaintiff, the learned trial Court has observed that the plaintiff is required to prove that, the defendant has

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executed the agreement to sale and the plaintiff is required to prove his readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract.

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In order to prove his case, the plaintiff has examined himself as PW1, Baliram Agrawal /PW-2 and Mathura Prasad Darshan/PW-3 and relied upon the documents of Notary Register (exhibit P-1), counterfoil of the receipt (exhibit P-2), copy of agreement dated 24.02.1999 (exhibit P-3), Rin Pustika (exhibit P-4), B-1/Kistbandi (exhibit P-5).

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After appreciation of oral as well as documentary evidence led by the plaintiff, the learned trial Court though has found that, the defendant has executed the agreement to sale of his land for the total consideration of Rs. 54,000/- and obtained Rs. 45,000/- as advance amount, but the plaintiff was not ready and willing to perform his part of the contract and has dismissed the suit of the plaintiff vide judgment and decree dated 30.07.2005, hence this appeal.

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Learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff would submit that, the learned trial Court has committed an error in law and facts, while dismissing the suit of the plaintiff. The defendant remained ex parte and has not contested the suit, which amounts to an admission of the agreement as well as non-performing of his part of the contract. There is no rebuttal of the pleadings and evidence of the plaintiff, yet the learned trial Court held that the plaintiff is not ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. The major part of the sale consideration has been paid to the defendant, which has been found proved by the learned trial Court, and therefore, the decree for specific perform of the contract ought to have been passed in favour

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of the plaintiff. The learned trial Court has erroneously considered that the plaintiff has not filed the copy of the notice, which he allegedly served to the defendant for execution of the sale-deed and has not shown any effort, as to when he asked him for registration of the sale-deed, whereas, there is unrebutted evidence of the plaintiff that he asked the defendant many times for registration of the saledeed. Therefore, the impugned judgment and decree may be set aside and the decree for specific performance of the contract may be passed in favour of the plaintiff.

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****** In support of his submission, he would rely upon the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of “ Biswanath Ghosh (Dead) by LRs and others v. Gobinda Ghosh @ Gobindha Chandra Ghosh and others ” 2014 (11) SCC 605.

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Learned counsel appearing for the respondent supported the impugned judgment and decree and would submit that, the learned trial Court has rightly dismissed the suit of the plaintiff and his appeal is liable to be dismissed.

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I have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival submissions and gone through the record of the trial Court.

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In the present case, the defendant remained ex parte through the proceeding and has not filed his written statement and not produced any evidence in rebuttal. The learned trial Court has also found the execution of agreement proved and payment of advance amount of Rs. 45,000/- out of total sale consideration of Rs. 54,000/- with the condition that, after obtaining the Rin Pustika, the remaining amount

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of the sale consideration shall be paid within three months and saledeed would be executed in favour of the plaintiff. In absence of any challenge to that finding, the execution of the agreement by the defendant cannot be disturbed.

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The second question for determination would be, whether the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract and is entitled for decree of specific performance of the contract or not. In order to obtain a decree for specific performance of the contract the plaintiff has to prove his readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract and the same has to be shown throughout and has to be established by the plaintiff.

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In the matter of “ Manjunath Anandappa @ Shivappa v. Tammanasa and others ” 2003 (10) SCC 390, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that, the plaintiffs should not only plead, but to prove also his readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract and held in para 27 that:-

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“27. The decisions of this Court, therefore, leave no manner of doubt that a Plaintiff in a suit for specific performance of contract not only must raise a plea that he had all along been and even on the date of filing of suit was ready and willing to perform his part of contract, but also prove the same. Only in certain exceptional situation where although in letter and spirit, the exact words had not been used but readiness and willingness can be culled out from reading all the averments made in the Plaintiff as a whole coupled with the materials brought on record at the trial of the suit, to the said effect, the statutory requirement of Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act may be held to have been complied with.”

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In the matter of “ P. Ravindranath and another v. Sasikala and others ” 2024 SCC Online SC 1749, it was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that, Section 16(c) of the Act of 1963 requires the readiness and willingness to be pleaded and proved by the plaintiffs in the suit filed for specific performance of the contract and the provisions of Section 16(c) of the Act of 1963 are mandatory in nature. It has been held in para 22 of its judgment that:-

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“22. Having considered the submissions, our analysis is as follows:

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(i) Relief of specific performance of contract is a discretionary relief. As such, the Courts while exercising power to grant specific performance of contract, need to be extra careful and cautious in dealing with the pleadings and the evidence in particular led by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs have to stand on their own legs to establish that they have made out case for grant of relief of specific performance of contrac t. The Act, 1963 provides certain checks and balances which must be fulfilled and established by the plaintiffs before they can become entitled for such a relief. The pleadings in a suit for specific performance have to be very direct, specific and accurate. A suit for specific performance based on bald and vague pleadings must necessarily be rejected. Section 16(C) of the 1963 Act requires readiness and willingness to be pleaded and proved by the plaintiff in a suit for specific performance of contract. The said provision has been widely interpreted and held to be mandatory. A few of authorities on the point are referred hereunder:

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a) In the case of Man Kaur v. Hartar Singh Sangha, this Court held in paragraph 40 which is reproduced hereunder:

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“40………A person who fails to aver and prove that he has performed or has always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract which are to be performed by him (other than the terms the performance of which has been prevented or waived by the defendant) is barred from claiming specific performance. Therefore, even assuming that the defendant had committed breach, if the plaintiff fails to aver in the plaint or prove that he was always ready and willing to perform the essential terms of contract which are required to be performed by him (other than the terms the performance of which has been prevented or waived by the plaintiff), there is a bar to specific performance in his favour. Therefore, the assumption of the respondent that readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff is something which need not be proved, if the plaintiff is able to establish that the defendant refused to execute the sale deed and thereby committed breach, is not correct………….”

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b) In the case of U.N. Krishnamurthy (Since Deceased) Thr. Lrs. v. A.M. Krishnamurthy, following was held in paragraph 46:

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“46. It is settled law that for relief of specific performance, the Plaintiff has to prove that all along and till the final decision of the suit, he was ready and willing to perform the part of the contract. It is the bounden duty of the Plaintiff to prove his readiness and willingness by adducing evidence. This crucial facet has to be determined by considering all circumstances including

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availability of funds and mere statement or averment in plaint of readiness and willingness, would not suffice.”

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c) In the case of His Holiness Acharya Swami Ganesh Dassji v. Sita Ram Thapar, it was held under paragraph 2:

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“2. There is a distinction between readiness to perform the contract and willingness to perform the contract. By readiness may be meant the capacity of the plaintiff to perform the contract which includes his financial position to pay the purchase price. For determining his willingness to perform his part of the contract, the conduct has to be properly scrutinised. There is no documentary proof that the plaintiff had ever funds to pay the balance of consideration. Assuming that he had the funds, he has to prove his willingness to perform his part of the contract. According to the terms of the agreement, the plaintiff was to supply the draft sale deed to the defendant within 7 days of the execution of the agreement, i.e., by 27-2-1975. The draft sale deed was not returned after being duly approved by the petitioner. The factum of readiness and willingness to perform plaintiff’s part of the contract is to be adjudged with reference to the conduct of the party and the attending circumstances. The court may infer from the facts and circumstances whether the plaintiff was ready and was always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. The facts of this case would amply demonstrate that the petitioner/ plaintiff was not ready nor had the capacity to perform his part of the contract as he had no financial capacity to pay the consideration in cash as

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contracted and intended to bide for the time which disentitles him as time is of the essence of the contract.”

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(ii) In the present case, we find from a perusal of the plaint that, at the first instance, the plaintiffs failed to plead specifically with details about the restriction said to have been imposed by the State on registration of sale deeds relating to similar survey numbers and revenue sites. No details of the Government Order are mentioned. Neither the Government Order is placed on record as evidence to connect that such restriction was actually applicable to the land in question.

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(iii) Defendant nos.1 to 5 executed sale deeds in April and June, 1983 in favour of the appellant as also other purchasers. It is recorded by the Trial Court as also the High Court, that these sale deeds were executed by the defendants 1 to 5 after depositing some betterment charges, getting the land converted and then effecting the transfer. The plaintiffs do not seem to have ever approached the defendants to get this kind of a status change and, thereafter, get the sale deeds executed. It has not come either in pleadings or in evidence of the plaintiffs that the alleged ban imposed by the State Government had been lifted but still the sale deeds were executed in favour of the appellants and other purchasers in 1983.

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(iv) If the plaintiffs were actually keen, ready and willing to get the land transferred or get the agreement to sell enforced, they should have made an effort in that regard. Neither any specific date has been mentioned in the pleadings or in the evidence, on which date the plaintiffs tendered the balance amount with a request to the defendants 1 to 5 to get the land status changed and execute the sale deed, or otherwise also, request the defendants 1 to 5 to

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execute the sale deed with the same status of the land in suit.

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(v) Even before filing a suit, there is no evidence forthcoming on behalf of the plaintiffs to show that they tendered the balance consideration or a draft sale deed to the defendants 1 to 5 and requested for execution and registration of the sale deed.

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(vi) The Courts below have proceeded to hold that there was readiness and willingness primarily relying upon the restriction imposed by the State. According to them, as the restriction had not been lifted, there was no obligation on the part of the plaintiffs to have expressed any readiness or willingness. However, the Courts below failed to take into consideration that there was no evidence regarding the said ban. Further the Courts below also failed to take into consideration that a keen and a willing buyer would have found out a way for execution of the sale deed just as defendants 6 & 7 and C. Nagaraju.

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(vii) The Courts below also fell into error in recording a finding that the defendants 1 to 5 had committed breach of contract and had dishonestly proceeded to get the status of the land changed and, thereafter, execute the sale deed in favour of the appellant and other purchasers.

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(viii) It is clear from the record that the defendant no.1 had given a written notice in September, 1981, then legal notice in November, 1981 and also another communication in December, 1981 requesting for payment of balance sale consideration and, thereafter communicating that advance amount had been forfeited and the agreement to sell had come to an end as the plaintiffs failed to get the sale deed executed within three months. After December, 1981, the plaintiffs kept silent.

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They neither responded to the last communication of the defendant no.1 of December, 1981, nor did they take any steps to file the suit for specific performance of contract for more than one and a half years after the defendant no.1 had communicated forfeiture of the earnest money and the cancellation of the agreement to sell. There is no communication from the plaintiffs after December, 1981 till July, 1983 when they filed the suit. There is not even a notice by the plaintiffs before filing the suit of showing their readiness and willingness by tendering the amount of balance sale consideration and sending a draft sale deed for approval and fixing a date for execution and registration of the sale deed.

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(xi) We are thus unable to agree with the findings of the courts below that the plaintiffs were always ready and willing to get the sale deed executed and registered. As a matter of fact, the conduct of the plaintiffs throughout gives credence and strength to the contention of the defendant nos.1 to 5 that the plaintiffs never had the funds available with them to clear the balance sale consideration and that they were middlemen only interested in blocking the property and, thereafter, selling it on a higher price to third parties and make profit thereof. The plaintiffs were never the real purchasers interested in buying the land in suit for themselves.

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(x) Under such facts and circumstances as discussed above, we are of the confirmed view that the decree of specific performance was not warranted in the present case and ought to have been denied and the suit was liable to be dismissed.

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(xi) In view of the finding on the issue of readiness and willingness being decided against the plaintiffs in the facts of the present case, we are not inclined to enter into other

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arguments raised by the learned Senior Counsel for the parties.

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(xii). However, in order to adjust equities between the parties, as the plaintiffs made a payment of Rs.12,000/- as advance money on 24.05.1981 or before, that being an admitted position, they need to be suitably compensated for the same. About 43 years have passed since the date of the agreement to sell. According to the appellant as stated in the written brief, the value of the property is about four crores. The respondents have not given any such figure of the approximate value of the property in question. Considering the facts and circumstances, we direct that the appellant compensate the plaintiffs by paying an amount of Rs.24 lakhs in lieu of the advance and further Rs.6 lakhs as cost of litigation. Total amount of Rs.30 lakhs to be paid within a period of three months from today and file proof of such payment before this Court within the next four months. In the event, such proof is not filed, the Registry will list the matter before the Court immediately after expiry of the aforesaid period for further orders. ”

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Further, in the matter of “ Janardan Das v. Durga Prasad Agrawal ”

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2024 SCC Online SC 2937, the provisions of Section 16(c) of the Act of 1963 is again considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and held in para 8 and 9 that:-

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“I. Readiness and Willingness of the Plaintiffs to Perform the Contract .

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8. Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, mandates that a plaintiff seeking specific performance of a contract must aver and prove that they have performed or have always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract which are to be performed by them. This requirement is a condition precedent and must be established by the

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plaintiff throughout the proceedings. The readiness and willingness of the plaintiff are to be determined from their conduct prior to and subsequent to the filing of the suit, as well as from the terms of the agreement and surrounding circumstances. The rationale behind this provision is to ensure that a party seeking equitable relief has acted equitably themselves. Specific performance is a discretionary relief, and the plaintiff must come to the court with clean hands, demonstrating sincerity and earnestness in fulfilling their contractual obligations. Any laxity, indifference, or failure to perform their part of the contract can be a ground to deny such relief. The Importance of readiness and willingness for enforcement of specific performance has been summarized by this Court in U.N. Krishnamurthy v. A.M. Krishnamurthy, as follows:

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23. Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 bars the relief of specific performance of a contract in favour of a person, who fails to aver and prove his readiness and willingness to perform his part of contract. In view of Explanation (1) to clause (c) of Section 16, it may not be essential for the plaintiff to actually tender money to the defendant or to deposit money in court, except when so directed by the Court, to prove readiness and willingness to perform the essential terms of a contract, which involves payment of money. However, Explanation (II) says the plaintiff must aver performance or readiness and willingness to perform the contract according to its true construction.

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24. To aver and prove readiness and willingness to perform an obligation to pay money, in terms of a contract, the plaintiff would have to make specific statements in the plaint and adduce evidence to show availability of funds to make payment in terms of the contract in time, In other words, the plaintiff would have to plead that the plaintiff had

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sufficient funds or was in a position to raise funds in time to discharge his obligation under the contract. If the plaintiff does not have sufficient funds with him to discharge his obligations in terms of a contract, which requires payment of money, the plaintiff would have to specifically plead how the funds would be available to him. To cite an example, the plaintiff may aver and prove, by adducing evidence, an arrangement with a financier for disbursement of adequate funds for timely compliance with the terms and conditions of a contract involving payment of money.

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xxx xxx xxx

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45. It is settled law that for relief of specific performance, the plaintiff has to prove that all along and till the final decision of the suit, he was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. It is the bounden duty of the plaintiff to prove his readiness and willingness by adducing evidence. This crucial facet has to be determined by considering all circumstances including availability of funds and mere statement or averment in plaint of readiness and willingness, would not suffice."

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9. The Trial Court rightly concluded that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate continuous readiness and willingness to perform their part of the contract. The agreement dated 06.06.1993 explicitly required the plaintiffs to ensure that Defendant Nos, 6 to 8 would come to Baripada within three months to execute the sale deed. The plaintiffs, however, did not take any concrete steps to secure the consent or presence of the sisters within the stipulated period. They relied solely on Defendant No. 1 and late Soumendra to procure the sisters, despite knowing that the sisters were not signatories to the agreement and held a significant share in the property. The Trial Court observed that the plaintiffs did not issue any notices or correspondence to Defendant Nos. 6 to 8 during the three-month period, nor did they make any efforts to

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communicate with them directly to expedite the execution of the sale deed. This inaction on the part of the plaintiffs indicated a lack of diligence and earnestness in fulfilling their contractual obligations. Furthermore, the plaintiffs continued to operate their petrol pump on the suit land without taking proactive steps to complete the purchase, suggesting complacency and a lack of urgency. ”

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In the case of “ Ramashankar Rao and another v. Nandlal Occhwani ” judgment dated 08.08.2025, passed in FA No. 88 of 2022, the Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court has considered the distinction between readiness and willingness and in para 20 of its judgment, it has been held that:-

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“20. In light of principles of law flowing from the aforesaid judgments (supra) of the Supreme Court, there is distinction between the terms “readiness” and “willingness”. “Readiness” is the capacity of the plaintiff to perform the contract which includes his financial position to pay the sale consideration, whereas, “willingness” is the conduct of the party. The plaintiff must plead and establish that he is ready and willing to perform his part of contract from the date of agreement to sale till the date of decision in the suit.”

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In order to consider the readiness and willingness, when this Court examined the averments made in the plaint by the plaintiff, it appears that, the plaintiff has pleaded in para 4 of his plaint that:-

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“4. यहक�व ि ा �द�ቛ ी ኋ �र�त ा ी �नम�ह��अव ा ध ा �� ि i'pkr~ उकत ् ी व ा �द ी्ቇ सत ् ी भ ू� मम ि ा ��रज ा �स ि ቏ ् ኍ �व ा �द�� ी i{k म ा� क�ए��न ि � ह � त ी व ा �द�ቛ ी ኋ �र� ा कत ि ी व ा �द" स ी े� �ईब�र ा l a idZ क�य�गय� ि , परन ा त ् ी ्ቚ कत ि ी व ा �द� ी ges’kk रज ा �स ि ቏ ् ኍ ��र�न ा � ह � त ी - - ट ा �ल मट ा ा +लक�य��त ि ी �रह�त ा ी थ ा �व ा तम ी- �नम ा ा. भ� ू कत ि ी व ा �द�ቛ ी ኋ �र�ट ा ा �ल मट ा ा +लक�य��र ि ह�ह ा , �बक ा �व ि ा �द�उक ी त ् oknxzLr भ ू� मम ि ा �+ कव ि य �र�र ा न�म ा �द ा द ि ी न� 2 � 24/2/99 � � अनस े �र ा श े� षर ा �म ा अद��र ी ा ल � न � �+ तत ी पर ् ा ह। / ”

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The plaintiff Rajendra Prasad Agrawal in his evidence stated that, he asked the defendant many times for execution and registration of the sale-deed, but he evaded for the same and then he issued a legal notice on 03.07.2001 by registered AD post through his counsel. The said legal notice was refused to accept by the defendant and it was received back and then he filed the present suit. In the present case, the agreement was executed on 24.02.1999 and the legal notice was served to the defendant on 03.07.2001 i.e. after about 2 ½ years of the execution of the agreement. There was a condition in the agreement that sale-deed would be executed and registered within three months from the date of obtaining Rin Pustika. The plaintiff has filed the Rin Pustika as exhibit P-4 in the present case, but he has not disclosed, as to when and from where he obtained the Rin Pustika, which is the document of the defendant. When it has been mentioned in the agreement dated 24.02.1999 that for want of Rin Pustika, the sale-deed could not be registered and it could be registered only after obtaining the Rin Pustika, then he has to plead or disclose, as to when he obtained the Rin Pustika. Even, the plaintiff has not averred, as to when he asked the defendant for execution and registration of the sale-deed and no dates have been disclosed. Except the self served statement that, he asked the defendant to execute sale-deed on multiple occasion, no evidence has been produced by the plaintiff. The copy of the notice, which is allegedly served upon the defendant on 03.07.2001 has also not been produced by the plaintiff in the case.

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The learned trial Court has considered that the evidence produced by the plaintiff is not sufficient to show his readiness and willingness. PW-2/Baliram Agrawal and PW-3/Mathura Prasad Darshan are the witnesses of execution of the agreement (exhibit P-3) and not with respect to the readiness and willingness.

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In the matter of “ Pydi Ramana @ Ramulu v. Devarasetty Manmadha Rao ” 2024 (7) SCC 515, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that, the continuous readiness and willingness is a condition precedent to grant a decree for specific performance of the contract and held that the steps taken by the plaintiff from the date of agreement till the date of filing of the suit will have to be explained in the plaint to prove in evidence. In para 17, 18 and 20 it has been held that:-

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“17. As rightly pointed out by the trial court, the respondent-plaintiff has not produced any satisfactory evidence to prove his readiness and willingness. As regards "willingness" of the plaintiff to perform his part of the contract, the conduct of the plaintiff warranting the performance has to be looked into. The following conduct of the plaintiff warrants consideration:

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(a) Plaintiff got issued legal notice nearly after two years after the expiry of one year period as prescribed in the agreement.

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(b) Plaintiff has not brought anything on record to prove that he contacted the defendant after the expiry of one year period and was interested in finalising the deed.

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(c) There was total inaction of the plaintiff from 6-6-1994 (expiry of one year period) to 30-51996 (date of issuance of legal notice)

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(d) Suit was filed on 9-6-1997 i.e. after a period of more than one year from the date of issuing of legal notice. Said delay has not been sufficiently explained by the plaintiff.

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18. The continuous readiness and willingness is a condition precedent to grant the relief of specific performance. The trial court has rightly held that the plaintiff has not sufficiently explained and proved that he was always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. As such the High Court and the first appellate court had erred in holding that the plaintiff had proved his readiness and willingness.

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20. The long unexplained delay and silence on the part of the plaintiff in this regard while in the witness box would not entitle the plaintiff to a decree of specific performance and it is for this precise reason, the trial court as noticed supra has refused to grant the equitable relief which has been reversed by the appellate court without assigning proper and cogent reason and the one assigned are at tangent or in other words contrary to the facts. The resultant effect of filing the suit for specific performance on the verge of limitation coming to an end came to be examined by this Court in Rajesh Kumar v. Anand Kumar and held that the plaintiff would not be entitled to the equitable relief (vide paras 14, 15, 16, 17 and 18). ”

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In the matter of “ Rajesh Kumar v. Anand Kumar and others ” 2024

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(13) SCC 80, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 23 to 25 of its judgment has considered the effect of filing of the suit for specific performance at the fag end of the limitation period and held that:-

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“23. The effect of filing a suit for specific performance after long delay, may be at the fag end of period of limitation fell for consideration before this Court in K.S. Vidyanadam v. Vairavan 12 wherein this Court held thus in para 10: (SCC p. 7)

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"10. It has been consistently held by the courts in India, following certain early English

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decisions, that in the case of agreement of sale relating to immovable property, time is not of the essence of the contract unless specifically provided to that effect. The period of limitation prescribed by the Limitation Act for filing a suit is three years. From these two circumstances, it does not follow that any and every suit for specific performance of the agreement (which does not provide specifically that time is of the essence of the contract) should be decreed provided it is filed within the period of limitation notwithstanding the time-limits stipulated in the agreement for doing one or the other thing by one or the other party. That would amount to saying that the time-limits prescribed by the parties in the agreement have no significance or value and that they mean f nothing. Would it be reasonable to say that because time is not made the essence of the contract, the timelimit(s) specified in the agreement have no relevance and can be ignored with impunity? It would also mean denying the discretion vested in the court by both Sections 10 and 20. As held by a Constitution Bench of this Court in Chand Rani v. Kamal Rani13: (SCC p. 528, para 25).…"

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24. In Azhar Sultana v. B. Rajamani14, this Court held thus in para 28: (SCC p. 35)

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"28. The court, keeping in view the fact that it exercises a discretionary jurisdiction, would be entitled to take into consideration as to whether the suit had been filed within a reasonable time. What would be a reasonable time would, however, depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. No hard-and-fast law can be laid down therefor. The conduct of the parties in this behalf would also assume significance."

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25. In Saradamani Kandappan v. S. Rajalakshmi15, this Court held that every suit for specific performance need not be decreed merely because it is filed within the period of limitation by ignoring time-limits

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stipulated in the agreement. The courts will also frown upon suits which are not filed immediately after the breach/refusal. The fact that limitation is three years does not mean that a purchaser can wait for one or two years to file a suit and obtain specific performance. ”

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From the aforesaid consideration of the evidence led by the plaintiff and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, it cannot be said that, the plaintiff was ever ready and willing to perform his part of the contract from the date of execution of the agreement. Even after three months of execution of the agreement till the notice dated 07.02.2001, the efforts made by him is also not proved. Therefore, the evidence produced by the plaintiff does not demonstrate that, he was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract from the date of execution of the agreement till filing of the suit.

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Since, the plaintiff has not prayed for refund of the advance amount in his plaint and has not sought any relief for the same, in view of the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of “ K.R. Suresh v. R. Poornima and others ” 2025 SCC Online SC 1014, no order for refund of the advance amount can be passed.

¶116

The judgment of “ Biswanath Ghosh ” (supra) cited by the learned counsel for the appellant is distinguishable on the facts and consideration of the present case, and therefore, no benefit could be extended to the appellant/plaintiff by the said judgment.

¶117

From the foregoing considerations, this Court does not find any sufficient ground to interfere with the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court and to grant decree of specific performance of

¶118

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the contract in favour of the plaintiff. Accordingly, the appeal filed by the appellant/plaintiff is dismissed .

¶120