Roshan Rajak Vs Hetan Rajak

1 - Hetan Rajak S/o Shri Bodhan Rajak Aged About 59 Years R/o Rajak Mohra Mangala P.S. Civil Line, Tahsil And District- Bilaspur (C.G.) (Plaintiff)

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2 - Murtaja Khan S/o Shri M. Khan Aged About 32 Years R/o Opposite Radheshyam Furniture, Beside Saga Lay Out Boundary, Shubham Vihar Mangala Bilaspur Tahsil And District- Bilaspur (C.G.) (Defendant)

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3 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Collector Bilaspur District- Bilaspur (C.G.)

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		... Respondent(s)
For Petitioner(s)	:	Mr. Praveen Kumar Tulsiyan, Advocate
For State	:	Ms. Sunita Sahu, Panel Lawyer
For Respondent	:	Mr. Ratnesh Kumar Agrawal, Advocate

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(Division Bench)

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Hon’ble Smt. Justice Rajani Dubey Hon’ble Shri Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad

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Order on Board

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(08.12.2025)

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Per, Amitendra Kishore Prasad, J.

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Heard on I.A. No.02/2025 – an application for permission to file the appeal.

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Learned counsel for the appellant has filed this appeal being aggrieved by the impugned judgment and decree passed in Civil Suit No.172A/2021 by 2^nd District Judge Bilaspur District Bilaspur (C. G.).

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Facts of the case :- The respondent No.1 instituted a civil suit for possession and permanent injunction before the learned 2nd District Judge, Bilaspur, concerning the suit land situated at Village Mangla, P.H.N. 21/34, Tahsil and District Bilaspur, bearing Khasra No. 1356/5 admeasuring 0.20 acre out of 0.32 acre, asserting that he is the original owner and had executed an agreement for sale of the suit land in favour of the appellant (Roshan Rajjak); however, as the appellant failed to complete the purchase within the stipulated time, the respondent issued a notice cancelling the agreement. It was further alleged that during the Covid-19 pandemic, defendant No.1 unlawfully constructed a boundary wall with a gate over the suit land and, upon being asked to remove the same, refused, stating that he had entered into an agreement with the appellant for purchase of the suit land. After issuance of notice and receipt of the defendant’s reply, the respondent filed the suit. Upon service of summons, defendant No.1 appeared, contested the claim, and asserted that he had executed an agreement with the appellant, paid advance consideration, obtained possession, and thereafter raised the

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boundary construction. The Trial Court framed seven issues, recorded the evidence of both parties, and ultimately, by judgment and decree dated 27.06.2025, decreed the suit in favour of the respondent. As the respondent had earlier executed an agreement dated 12.12.2017 with the appellant and delivered possession to him, and the appellant thereafter executed an agreement dated 15.01.2019 in favour of defendant No.1 and placed him in possession on the basis of which the disputed construction was raised, the appellant submits that the suit was filed on false allegations and that the impugned judgment gravely affects his valuable rights, necessitating the filing of the present first appeal against the judgment and decree dated 27.06.2025 passed in Civil Suit No. 172A/2021.

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The learned counsel for the appellant respectfully submits that the impugned judgment and decree suffer from serious errors of law and fact, as the Trial Court failed to properly appreciate the testimony of witnesses and the material evidence on record, thereby rendering its findings perverse and unsustainable. It is contended that the Trial Court erred in holding Issue No.1 proved, particularly when the plaintiff allegedly cancelled the sale agreement with the appellant without issuing any notice or affording an opportunity of hearing, which is in clear violation of principles of natural justice; further, the finding that defendant No.1 acquired possession of the suit land illegally is wholly untenable, as it is an admitted fact that possession was lawfully

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delivered by the plaintiff to the appellant under the agreement dated 12.12.2017 and thereafter transferred by the appellant to defendant No.1 under a subsequent agreement dated 15.01.2019. It is urged that the finding on Issue No.6 regarding non-joinder of necessary parties is equally unjustified, since the appellant, having derived possession from the plaintiff and having transferred it to defendant No.1, was not only a proper but a necessary party whose presence was indispensable for effective adjudication. Likewise, the finding on Issue No.5 relating to limitation is erroneous, as the plaintiff failed to produce any clinching evidence to prove that he first became aware of defendant No.1’s possession on 13.05.2021, and the Trial Court ignored the plaintiff’s categorical admission in paragraph 21 of his deposition that he had knowledge of defendant No.1’s possession since 2019. The Trial Court also misread the proviso to Order I Rule 9 CPC and delivered a non-speaking judgment without adequate reasoning and in disregard of settled legal principles. It is further submitted that the plaintiff, having executed an agreement dated 12.12.2017 in favour of the appellant and delivered possession accordingly, cannot now dispute subsequent possession taken by defendant No.1 under the agreement dated 15.01.2019; the instant suit was therefore filed on false and vexatious allegations. As the impugned judgment dated 27.06.2025 passed by the learned 2nd District Judge, Bilaspur in Civil Suit No.172A/2021 adversely affects the valuable rights of

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the appellant and was rendered without affording him an opportunity of hearing, the same is violative of natural justice and liable to be set aside. The appellant thus prays that this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to grant leave to file the present first appeal under Section 96 CPC and quash the judgment and decree dated 27.06.2025 in the interest of justice.

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The learned counsel for the respondent respectfully submits that the impugned judgment and decree dated 27.06.2025 have been passed after due appreciation of oral and documentary evidence and do not suffer from any perversity warranting interference by this Court. It is contended that the appellant, having failed to perform his obligations under the agreement dated 12.12.2017, cannot now question the plaintiff’s rightful cancellation of the said agreement, particularly when the appellant himself diverted possession to defendant No.1 without authority. The Trial Court has rightly held that defendant No.1’s possession and construction over the suit land were unauthorized, as no valid title or enforceable right flowed either to the appellant or to defendant No.1. The plea of non-joinder is misconceived, as the suit for possession against an unlawful occupant does not require impleading the appellant, whose agreement stood cancelled. The finding on limitation is also justified, the plaintiff having established the date of knowledge with cogent evidence. The impugned judgment is reasoned, lawful, and based on settled principles, and

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the appellant has failed to demonstrate any error apparent on record. Hence, the present appeal is frivolous, devoid of merit, and deserves to be dismissed with costs.

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We have listened to the learned counsel representing the parties and scrutinized the documents placed on record with careful attention.

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Upon a thorough consideration of the rival submissions and a careful perusal of the impugned judgment and decree, this Court finds no merit in the grounds urged by the appellant. The Trial Court has meticulously examined the pleadings, appreciated the oral and documentary evidence, and recorded findings that are neither perverse nor contrary to the material on record. The appellant’s contention that the cancellation of the agreement dated 12.12.2017 was effected without notice is unfounded, as the Trial Court has rightly held that the appellant failed to fulfil the essential terms of the agreement and, consequently, acquired no enforceable right to retain or transfer possession. The so-called possession delivered by the appellant to defendant No.1 under the subsequent agreement dated 15.01.2019 was itself without legal authority and incapable of conferring any right, title, or interest upon defendant No.1. The finding that defendant No.1’s possession was unauthorized is thus fully justified.

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Likewise, the plea regarding non-joinder of the appellant as a necessary party is misconceived. The Trial Court has correctly held that upon cancellation of the agreement with the appellant, his presence was not required for adjudicating a suit for possession against an unlawful occupant. The appellant has failed to demonstrate that his participation was indispensable or that any prejudice was caused to him. The argument relating to limitation also does not hold good. The Trial Court has, upon due appreciation of evidence, concluded that the suit was filed within the prescribed period, and the appellant has shown no perversity or illegality in this finding.

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The allegation that the judgment is non-speaking or contrary to settled legal principles is equally baseless. The impugned judgment reflects a reasoned analysis of the issues framed, supported by evidence and well-settled principles governing suits for possession and cancellation of agreements. The appellant has not been able to point out any material irregularity, legal infirmity, or misreading of evidence that would justify interference under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

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This Court further observes that the appellant has been unable to demonstrate any subsisting right, title, or interest in the suit land so as to maintain this appeal. On the contrary, the evidence overwhelmingly supports the respondent’s claim as the lawful owner who was dispossessed through an unauthorized

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construction raised during the Covid-19 pandemic. The Trial Court was, therefore, fully justified in decreeing the suit.

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The present appellants, who were admittedly not parties before the Trial Court, are at liberty to initiate independent legal proceedings to safeguard their interests. As they neither participated in the suit nor filed any written statement, granting leave to appeal would serve no useful purpose. The proper course available to them is to institute a separate suit before the competent Trial Court.

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The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of V. N. Krishna Murty & Anr. Vs. Ravikumar & Ors. reported in (2020) 9 SCC

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501 has held and relevant paragraphs are as under :-

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“10. The High Court while dismissing the application made by the appellants seeking leave to appeal has observed that: (Karnataka Khadi Gramodyog case [Karnataka Khadi Gramodyog v. Ravi Kumar, 2019 SCC OnLine Kar 3086] , SCC OnLine Kar para 7)

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“7. It is true that the trial court has granted a very peculiar declaratory relief which in my opinion the plaintiffs in the suit could have set up by way of defence, had they been sued by the Housing Society for specific performance. Be that as it may, all the applicants/appellants claim to be in possession of their respective sites on the strength of the

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sale deeds executed by the general power-of-attorney holders of the owners of the lands. What is stated is that the agreements of sale were executed in favour of the Housing Society and that power of attorney was executed in favour of some persons who are office-bearers of the Housing Society. If this is the position, I think that the applicants/appellants do have an independent right which they appear to have derived on the basis of the sale deeds executed by the owners of the land. It may be a fact that the sale deeds were executed by the power-of-attorney holders of the owners, but in reality those sale deeds were executed by the owners of the land and, therefore, it can be said that the nature of declaratory relief granted by the trial court in the suits does not affect the interest of the applicants/appellants.”

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The High Court further went on to observe that: (SCC OnLine Kar para 7)

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“7. if they are in possession of the sites purchased by them, they have to protect their possession by filing independent suits. I do not think they have a remedy by filing an appeal challenging the judgment in the suit.”

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11. The learned counsel for the appellants argues before us that the interest of the appellants is directly involved in the subject-matter of the suit. They have become absolute owners of the sites in question on the basis of sale deeds.

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The judgment of the trial court holding the sale agreements time-barred and granting a decree of permanent injunction actually affects their interests as they are in possession of the suit property.

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12. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondents vehemently contended that the claim of the appellants herein is based on the sale deeds executed on the strength of the general power of attorney executed by the recorded owners of the suit property. There is neither any reference of the sale deeds in the suit nor the sale deeds refer to any agreement to sell. Therefore, the relief claimed, if any, by the appellants based on sale deeds in their favour is entirely different, and there is no locus to challenge the decree passed by the trial court and their application for leave to appeal has rightly been dismissed.

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13. We have considered the rival submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties.

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14. In the backdrop of above facts, the question which arises for our consideration is as to whether the appellants held the locus to question the judgment and decree passed by the trial court and whether the High Court was justified in rejecting their leave to appeal.

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15. Sections 96 and 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure provide for preferring an appeal from any original decree or from decree in appeal, respectively. The aforesaid

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provisions do not enumerate the categories of persons who can file an appeal. However, it is a settled legal proposition that a stranger cannot be permitted to file an appeal in any proceedings unless he satisfies the Court that he falls within the category of aggrieved persons. It is only where a judgment and decree prejudicially affects a person who is not party to the proceedings, he can prefer an appeal with the leave of the appellate court. Reference be made to the observation of this Court in Jatan Kumar Golcha v. Golcha Properties (P) Ltd. [Jatan Kumar Golcha v. Golcha Properties (P) Ltd., (1970) 3 SCC 573] : (SCC p. 575, para 3)

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“3. … It is well settled that a person who is not a party to the suit may prefer an appeal with the leave of the appellate court and such leave should be granted if he would be prejudicially affected by the judgment.”

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16. This Court in State of Punjab v. Amar Singh [State of Punjab v. Amar Singh, (1974) 2 SCC 70] while dealing with the maintainability of appeal by a person who is not party to a suit has observed thus: (SCC p. 104, para 83)

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“83. Firstly, there is a catena of authorities which, following the dictum of Lindley, L.J., Securities Insurance Co., In re [Securities Insurance Co., In re, (1894) 2 Ch 410 (CA)] have laid down the rule that a person who is not a party to a decree or order may with the leave of the Court, prefer an

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appeal from such decree or order if he is either bound by the order or is aggrieved by it or is prejudicially affected by it.”

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17. In Baldev Singh v. Surinder Mohan Sharma [Baldev Singh v. Surinder Mohan Sharma, (2003) 1 SCC 34] , this Court held that an appeal under Section 96 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, would be maintainable only at the instance of a person aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the judgment and decree. While dealing with the concept of person aggrieved, it was observed in para 15 as under: (SCC pp. 39-40)

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“15. … A person aggrieved to file an appeal must be one whose right is affected by reason of the judgment and decree sought to be impugned.”

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18. In A. Subash Babu v. State of A.P. [A. Subash Babu v. State of A.P., (2011) 7 SCC 616 : (2011) 3 SCC (Civ) 851 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 267] this Court held as under: (SCC pp. 628-29, para 25)

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“25. … The expression “aggrieved person” denotes an elastic and an elusive concept. It cannot be confined within the bounds of a rigid, exact and comprehensive definition. Its scope and meaning depends on diverse, variable factors such as the content and intent of the statute of which the contravention is alleged, the specific circumstances of the case, the nature and the extent of the complainant's interest

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and the nature and the extent of the prejudice or injury suffered by the complainant.”

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19. The expression “person aggrieved” does not include a person who suffers from a psychological or an imaginary injury; a person aggrieved must, therefore, necessarily be one, whose right or interest has been adversely affected or jeopardised (vide Shanti Kumar R. Canji v. Home Insurance Co. of New York [Shanti Kumar R. Canji v. Home Insurance Co. of New York, (1974) 2 SCC 387] and State of Rajasthan v. Union of India [State of Rajasthan v. Union of India, (1977) 3 SCC 592] ).

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20. In K. Ponnalagu Ammani v. State of Madras [K. Ponnalagu Ammani v. State of Madras, 1952 SCC OnLine Mad 300 : (1953) 66 LW 136] , this Court laid down the test to find out when it would be proper to grant leave to appeal to a person not a party to a proceeding against the decree or judgment passed in such proceedings in the following words: (SCC OnLine Mad)

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“Now, what is the test to find out when it would be proper to grant leave to appeal to a person not a party to a proceeding against the decree or judgment in such proceedings? We think it would be improper to grant leave to appeal to every person who may in some remote or indirect way be prejudicially affected by a decree or judgment. We think that ordinarily leave to appeal should be

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granted to persons who, though not parties to the proceedings, would be bound by the decree or judgment in that proceeding and who would be precluded from attacking its correctness in other proceedings.”

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21. Applying the above tests, we are of the considered opinion that the appellants can neither be said to be aggrieved persons nor bound by the judgment and decree of the trial court in any manner. The relief claimed in the suit was cancellation of agreement to sell. On the other hand, the sale deeds which were the basis of the claim of the appellants were executed on the basis of general power of attorney, and had nothing to do with the agreement to sell which was subject-matter of the suit. The judgment and decree of the trial court is in no sense a judgment in rem and it is binding only as between the plaintiffs and the defendants of the suit, and not upon the appellants. ”

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Further, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in H. Anjanappa & Others

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v. A. Prabhakar & Others reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC

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183 , has observed in paragraph 43 as follows, which is reproduced herein below:

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"43. The principles governing the grant of leave to appeal may be summarised as under:

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i. Sections 96 and 100 of the CPC respectively provide for preferring an appeal from an original decree or decree in appeal respectively;

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ii. The said provisions do not enumerate the categories of persons who can file an appeal;

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iii. However, it a settled legal proposition that a stranger cannot be permitted to file an appeal in any proceedings unless he satisfies the court that he falls within the category of an aggrieved person;

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iv. It is only where a judgment and decree prejudicially affects a person who is not a party to the proceedings, he can prefer an appeal with the leave of the court;

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v. A person aggrieved, to file an appeal, must be one whose right is affected by reason of the judgment and decree sought to be impugned;

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vi. The expression “person aggrieved” does not include a person who suffers from a psychological or an imaginary injury;

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vii. It would be improper to grant leave to appeal to every person who may in some remote or indirect way be prejudicially affected by a decree or judgment; and

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viii. Ordinarily leave to appeal should be granted to persons who, though not parties to the proceedings, would be bound by the decree or judgment in that proceeding and who would be precluded from attacking its correctness in other proceedings.”

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In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court is of the considered opinion that the appeal is devoid of substance and deserves to be dismissed at the threshold. The application seeking permission to file the appeal (I.A. No. 02/2025) also does not disclose any cogent ground and is accordingly rejected.

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In light of the aforesaid pronouncements of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, it is respectfully submitted that the present appellant, who has filed the application for grant of leave, the impugned judgment is not binding upon them. They are not bound by the judgment

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and decree passed in the said proceedings and are not precluded from challenging its correctness in any other appropriate proceedings. They are, therefore, entitled to initiate separate proceedings for the redressal of their grievances.

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Consequently, the First Appeal, being meritless, is hereby dismissed , and the judgment and decree dated 27.06.2025 passed by the learned 2nd District Judge, Bilaspur in Civil Suit No.172A/2021 is affirmed . Parties shall bear their own costs.

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Accordingly, in view of the above nothing is required for further adjudication.

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Sd/-

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Sd/-

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(Rajani Dubey) (Amitendra Kishore Prasad) Judge Judge

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Saxena

Roshan Rajak v. Hetan Rajak

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Roshan Rajak v. Hetan Rajak

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