Bhagwan Kushwaha Vs Satyanarayan Died The Legal Heirs-Baijnath and Ors.

1 - Satyanarayan Died The Legal Heirs of Satyanarayan (Died) 1A. Baijnath, S/o. Late Satyanarayan, Aged About 50 Years R/o VillageSidhma, P.S. And Post- Rajpur, Distt. Balrampur-Ramanujganj C.G.

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1B - Ramnath S/o Late Satyanarayan Aged About 45 Years R/o Sidhma, P.S. And Post- Rajpur, Distt. Balrampur-Ramanujganj C.G.

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1C - Smt. Devanti (Died) Through Lrs As Per Honble Court Order Dated 11.07.2024.

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1CA - Shivlal H/o. Smt. Devanti Aged About 65 Years R/o. Shilphili, Police Station And Post Jainagar, Surajpur, District Surajpur (C.G.)

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1CB - Smt. Rama D/o. Shri Shivlal, W/o. Basant Aged About 45 Years R/o. Village Karva, Tehsil Karva, District Surajpur (C.G.)

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1CC - Savitri Devi D/o. Shivlal Aged About 40 Years R/o. Shilphili, Police Station And Post Jainagar, Surajpur, District Surajpur (C.G.)

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1CD - Parvati D/o. Shivlal Aged About 38 Years R/o. Shilphili, Police Station And Post Jainagar, Surajpur, District Surajpur (C.G.)

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1CE - Trishul S/o. Shivlal Aged About 35 Years R/o. Shilphili, Police Station And Post Jainagar, Surajpur, District Surajpur (C.G.)

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1CF - Matkudhari S/o. Shivlal Aged About 32 Years R/o. Shilphili, Police Station And Post Jainagar, Surajpur, District Surajpur (C.G.)

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1D - Smt. Rajkumari @ Nana W/o Ram Prasad Aged About 53 Years R/o Silpili, P.S. And Post- Jainagar, Distt. Surajpur C.G., District : Surajpur, Chhattisgarh

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1E - Smt. Laxmaniya W/o Ramchander Aged About 46 Years R/o Sidhma, P.S. And Post- Rajpur, Distt. Balrampur-Ramanujganj C.G., District : Balrampur, Chhattisgarh

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1F - Smt. Bhagmaniya W/o Rajkumar Aged About 43 Years R/o Silpili, P.S. And Post- Jainagar, Distt. Surajpur C.G., District : Surajpur, Chhattisgarh

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1G - Smt. Avlapati @ Munni W/o Bhola Aged About 36 Years R/o Silpili, P.S. And Post- Jainagar, Distt. Surajpur C.G., District : Surajpur, Chhattisgarh

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2 - Vijay Agrawal S/o Indrasen Agrawal Aged About 45 Years R/o School Road, Ambikapur, P.S. And Post- Ambikapur, Distt. Surguja C.G., District : Surguja (Ambikapur), Chhattisgarh

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3 - State Of Chhattisgarh S/o Thru- Collector, Surguja, Ambikapur, Distt. Surguja C.G., District : Surguja (Ambikapur), Chhattisgarh

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... Respondents

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(Cause title taken from Case Information System)

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For Appellant	: Mr. Manoj Paranjpe, Senior Advocate along with Mr. Sandeep Patel, Advocate
For Respective Respondents	: Mr. Dashrath Kushwaha, Advocate Mr. Rishi Rahul Soni, Advocate
For Respondent No.3/State	: Mr. Ajay Kumrani, Panel Lawyer

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Hon'ble Shri Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal

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Judgment on Board

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13/11/2025

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The present first appeal under Section 96 of the CPC has been filed by the plaintiff against the impugned judgment and decree dated 28-11-2014 passed by the learned Second Additional District Judge, Ambikapur, District Surguja, in Civil Suit No. 02-A/2014, whereby the civil suit filed by the plaintiff for declaration of title, permanent injunction and for declaring the sale deed dated 14-08-2007 as null and void, has been dismissed.

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For the sake of convenience, the status of the parties shown in the suit is being taken to refer to the respective parties in the present appeal.

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The plaintiff's pleading is that the parties are Hindus and belong to the Koir caste, and they are governed by the Mitakshara School of Hindu Law. The grandfather of the plaintiff and defendants, Kishun Koir, had acquired about 16 acres of land at Kedarpur, Ambikapur, and about 30 acres of land in the village Sidhma during the period of the Surguja princely state. Kishun Koir had three sons. As the family grew, he made a family arrangement during his lifetime and distributed the land among his sons and grandsons. The plaintiff’s father, Satyanarayan, had been living at the village Sidhma and cultivating the agricultural land there from the beginning. The plaintiff’s younger brother, Ramnath, also lived with his father at Sidhma and has been in possession and cultivation of the agricultural land there. However, the plaintiff Bhagwan Kushwaha had been living since the beginning with his grandfather Kishun Koir in

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the ancestral house situated in Kedarpur, Ambikapur. After the plaintiff got married, he separated from his father and other family members and built a separate house on the disputed land bearing Khasra No. 1944/1, area 0.567 hectares, situated in Kedarpur, Ambikapur, where he has been residing with his family. The plaintiff has also constructed structures and fenced the remaining land, and has been in possession of it.

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The plaintiff, Bhagwan Kushwaha, has been living separately from his father, Satyanarayan Kushwaha, and his paternal uncles. His grandfather, Kishun Koir, and his father, Satyanarayan Kushwaha, had given him certain agricultural land under a family arrangement. The plaintiff developed the said land and has been cultivating it. The plaintiff’s grandfather, Kishun Koir, also gave the disputed land bearing Khasra No. 1944/1, admeasuring 0.567 hectares, to the plaintiff under the said family arrangement. The plaintiff has constructed a house on the said land and is presently residing there with his family. This family arrangement was within the knowledge of his father, Satyanarayan Kushwaha, and he executed a memorandum of family arrangement dated 14.04.1975.

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It is further pleaded that the suit land bearing Khasra No. 1944, admeasuring 1.79 acres, was purchased by the plaintiff’s grandfather, Kishun Koir, in the name of his minor son Satyanarayan Kushwaha on 27.07.1951 for a consideration of Rs.170/- and his name was recorded in the revenue records. Since the land was purchased by Kishun Koir, under a family arrangement, Kishun Koir allotted the disputed land to

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the plaintiff, Bhagwan Kushwaha. This arrangement was also confirmed by Satyanarayan Kushwaha in the memorandum of family arrangement dated 14.04.1975. Subsequently, the plaintiff’s brothers, Baijnath and Ramnath, attained majority and started living with their respective families. During this period, Satyanarayan Kushwaha, along with Baijnath and Ramnath, developed strained relations with the plaintiff, Bhagwan Kushwaha. Consequently, Satyanarayan Kushwaha filed an application against the plaintiff before the Tehsildar, Ambikapur, under Section 145 of the Cr.P.C.; however, he was unsuccessful in the said proceedings. Thereafter, Satyanarayan Kushwaha instituted Civil Suit No. 75-A/1994 before the Court of the learned Fourth Civil Judge, Class-II, Ambikapur, seeking declaration of title and permanent injunction in respect of the suit land. In the said plaint, Satyanarayan Kushwaha admitted that out of Khasra No. 1944/1, admeasuring 0.567 hectares, only 0.20 acres of land had been promised to the plaintiff, Bhagwan Kushwaha, and he refused to give the remaining land. In the said suit, Satyanarayan Kushwaha also prayed for a decree of permanent injunction and denied the execution of the family arrangement document. The plaintiff, Bhagwan Kushwaha, appeared in the said suit and filed his written statement and counter-claim, asserting that the entire suit land had been allotted to him under the family arrangement. He further pleaded that the said arrangement had been confirmed by Satyanarayan Kushwaha through the memorandum of family arrangement executed on 14.04.1975, and that a permanent residential construction belonging to the plaintiff existed on the disputed land.

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It is also pleaded that during the pendency of Civil Suit No. 75-A/1994, Satyanarayan Kushwaha realised that he was not likely to succeed in the said suit, and therefore, he got the suit withdrawn. Consequently, Satyanarayan Kushwaha no longer had the right to challenge the title over the said land. After a considerable lapse of time, Satyanarayan Kushwaha filed an application before the Tehsildar, Ambikapur, seeking partition of the land into three shares, which was registered as Revenue Case No. 75/A-27/2006–2007. In that revenue proceedings, the plaintiff, Bhagwan Kushwaha, appeared and raised objections to the proposed partition, contending that the land belonged to him by virtue of the family arrangement and the memorandum executed in that regard, and that he was the owner and in possession of the said land. However, despite the objections raised by the plaintiff, the Tehsildar, Ambikapur, passed an order dated 16.04.2007 directing the partition of the suit land into four shares. Being aggrieved by the said order, the plaintiff, Bhagwan Kushwaha, preferred a revision before the Collector, Surguja, which is still pending. Thereafter, Satyanarayan Kushwaha sold 0.22 hectares of land out of the suit land bearing Khasra No. 1944/1, admeasuring 0.567 hectares, to defendant No. 2, Vijay Agrawal, by a registered sale deed dated 14.08.2007. However, the plaintiff, Bhagwan Kushwaha, has been in possession of the said land since the beginning, including the portion that was purportedly sold. Defendant No. 2, Vijay Agrawal, on the basis of the said sale deed, is attempting to get his name recorded in the revenue records and to take possession of the land. In fact, Vijay Agrawal is not in possession of the suit land. It is also pleaded that the suit land is a diverted land, and its transfer is

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prohibited without the permission of the District Collector. Therefore, the sale made in favour of defendant No. 2, Vijay Agrawal, is illegal and void, and no title accrues to him on the basis of the said invalid sale deed. Accordingly, the plaintiff, Bhagwan Kushwaha, has prayed for a declaration that he is the sole owner of the suit land bearing Khasra No. 1944/1, admeasuring 0.567 hectares, and that the sale deed dated 14.08.2007 executed in favour of defendant No. 2, Vijay Agrawal, is not binding upon him. The plaintiff has further prayed for a decree of permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with his possession of the suit land or from transferring the same.

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After service of summons, the defendants appeared in the proceeding, and the defendant Nos. 1(a), 1(b), 1(e) and defendant Nos. 1(d), 1(f), 1(g) filed their written statement separately. Both written statements are identical in nature. The said defendants, while denying the plaint averments, have pleaded in their written statement that their grandfather, late Kishun Koir, during the period of the Surguja princely state, had acquired 16.50 acres of agricultural land and Nazul land measuring 0.85 decimal in Mohalla Kedarpur, Ambikapur, and 9 acres of agricultural land in Village Govindpur, Tehsil Surajpur, District Surajpur. Out of the agricultural land situated at Ambikapur, Kishun Koir kept about 5 acres for himself and sold the remaining land to several persons through registered sale deeds. After the death of Kishun Koir, the remaining land was inherited by his legal heirs. Some land situated in Village Govindpur went into the coal area, and the remaining land was given to Kishun Koir’s second son, Nanhu Ram. The land situated in Village Sidhma was not acquired by Kishun Koir but was acquired by

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his brother late Kolai Koir. After the death of Kolai Koir, the land situated in Village Sidhma measuring about 7.333 hectares, came to Kishun Koir through inheritance. Kishun Koir entered the names of his first son, Satyanarayan, and third son, Ramdhani, in the revenue records and gave them the said land. Satyanarayan and Ramdhani cultivated and possessed the land during their lifetime. Satyanarayan Kushwaha bequeathed his share of land situated in Village Sidhma to his sons, Defendant Baijnath and Defendant Ramnath, through a will, and Baijnath and Ramnath are peacefully possessing and cultivating the land. During his lifetime, Kishun Koir did not make any formal arrangement of land among his sons and grandsons.

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It is also the pleading of the defendants that Satyanarayan had been living in his ancestral house since the beginning, along with the plaintiff Bhagwan Kushwaha and defendants Baijnath and Ramnath, and they used to cultivate agricultural lands situated in Village Sidhma and Ambikapur. In the year 1987-88, Bhagwan Kushwaha separated from his father, Satyanarayan. At that time, Satyanarayan gave him 0.080 acres (0.20 decimal) of land out of Khasra No. 1944/1 measuring 0.567 hectares, situated in Kedarpur, Ambikapur, for building a house and residence. Out of that land, Bhagwan Kushwaha constructed a house on about 4–5 decimals and resides there, and he uses about 15 decimals as a courtyard, while the remaining land remained in possession of Satyanarayan during his lifetime. In Khasra No. 1944/1 measuring 0.567 hectares, Satyanarayan had constructed a small house measuring 8 feet by 6 feet for keeping cows, and to its west, he had given 0.20 decimal land to the plaintiff Bhagwan

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Kushwaha for constructing a house and courtyard. Bhagwan Kushwaha has constructed his house and courtyard on that land. The plaintiff Bhagwan Kushwaha is not in possession of the entire suit land of Khasra No. 1944/1 measuring 0.567 hectares. Satyanarayan used to live both in the house at Village Sidhma and the house at Ambikapur and used to cultivate agricultural lands in both places.

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Further, the father of Satyanarayan, Kishun Koir, never gave the suit land Khasra No. 1944/1 measuring 0.567 hectares to the plaintiff Bhagwan Kushwaha under any family arrangement. Likewise, Satyanarayan also never transferred the said land to the plaintiff under any family settlement nor executed any settlement deed. The plaintiff Bhagwan Kushwaha has fabricated a false family settlement deed dated 14/04/1975, which does not bear the signature of Satyanarayan Kushwaha. Satyanarayan Kushwaha had purchased the disputed land Khasra No. 1944 measuring 0.744 hectares from Duragaiya Cherwa for Rs. 170/- through a registered sale deed dated 31/07/1951, after due permission from the Deputy Commissioner, Surguja. On the basis of this purchase, the name of Satyanarayan Kushwaha was recorded in the revenue records. Therefore, the disputed land is the self-acquired property of Satyanarayan Kushwaha. Out of Khasra No. 1944 measuring 0.744 hectares, 0.567 hectares remained with Satyanarayan. Satyanarayan executed a will dated 24/01/2013 in favour of the plaintiff Bhagwan Kushwaha and defendants Baijnath Kushwaha and Ramnath Kushwaha regarding the suit land Khasra No. 1944/1 measuring 0.567 hectares. The will was registered in the Registration Office, Ambikapur on 02/02/2013. Therefore, the plaintiff

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Bhagwan Kushwaha and defendants Baijnath Kushwaha and Ramnath Kushwaha have joint ownership rights over the suit land.

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It is also pleaded that Satyanarayan Kushwaha started construction on the remaining portion of the suit land on 16/05/1991, but the plaintiff Bhagwan Kushwaha raised an objection. Therefore, Satyanarayan Kushwaha filed an application on 27/05/1991 before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Ambikapur under Section 145 of the Cr.P.C. During the pendency of that application, in January 1993, the plaintiff Bhagwan Kushwaha started digging the foundation to construct a house on the disputed land with the intention of taking possession. Consequently, on 07/01/1993, Satyanarayan Kushwaha filed a civil suit before the Court of learned Fourth Civil Judge Class-II, Ambikapur for declaration of title and permanent injunction regarding the disputed land. Along with the suit, an application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure was also filed seeking temporary injunction to restrain the plaintiff Bhagwan Kushwaha from entering and taking possession of the remaining portion of the land. The trial Court allowed the application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC and restrained Bhagwan Kushwaha from interfering with the possession of the remaining land. Bhagwan Kushwaha filed an appeal before the learned Second Additional District Judge, Ambikapur (Civil Appeal No. 55/1996), which was dismissed on 17/12/1998. Against this order, Bhagwan Kushwaha filed a revision before the High Court, which was also dismissed.

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Satyanarayan Kushwaha never gave the disputed land Khasra No. 1944/1 measuring 0.567 hectares to the plaintiff Bhagwan Kushwaha

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through any family arrangement dated 14/04/1975. At that time, the plaintiff Bhagwan Kushwaha was only 14–15 years old, while defendant Baijnath was 10–12 years old and Ramnath was about 5–6 years old. Therefore, the question of executing any family settlement deed in favour of Bhagwan Kushwaha on that date does not arise. The civil suit filed by Satyanarayan Kushwaha (Civil Suit No. 75-A/1994) was later dismissed for non-appearance. Satyanarayan Kushwaha also filed an application before the Tehsildar, Ambikapur, under Section 178 of the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code for partition of the land, which was allowed on 16/04/2007, but the plaintiff Bhagwan Kushwaha filed a revision before the District Collector, Ambikapur, due to which the partition could not take place. Satyanarayan Kushwaha also sold 0.022 hectares of land from the suit land to Defendant No. 2 Vijay Agrawal through a registered sale deed and handed over possession. On that basis, the name of Vijay Agrawal was entered in the revenue records, and he is in possession of the land. Since the land is diverted land, permission of the District Collector was not required for the sale. The plaintiff Bhagwan Kushwaha, on the basis of the alleged forged family settlement deed dated 14/04/1975, filed an application before the Tehsildar, Ambikapur, for mutation of his name, but it was dismissed due to the absence of the plaintiff Bhagwan Kushwaha. Therefore, the plaintiff does not have exclusive ownership over the disputed land; rather, all three brothers, Bhagwan Kushwaha, Baijnath Kushwaha and Ramnath Kushwaha, have rights over it as per the registered will executed by Satyanarayan Kushwaha. The plaintiff has also not properly valued the suit nor paid the appropriate court fees. Therefore,

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the suit filed by the plaintiff deserves to be dismissed.

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The defendant No. 2 also filed his written statement and adopted the averments of the written statement filed by the defendant Nos. 1(a), 1(b), 1(e), and 1(d), 1(f), 1(g). The defendant No. 3 has not filed any written statement.

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Based on the pleadings of the parties, the learned trial Court framed following issued in the suit:-

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क्या�वा�दी�के�दी�दी�एवा�स्वा. सत्याना�रा�याणके�पि�ता�स्वा. पिकेशु�ना के�ईराना�स्वा. सत्याना�रा�याणके�बा�ल�नाेሰ �उसके�ना�ेሰ �रा��जी�के�ता पिवा्ቅया�्ቔ दिदीना��के 27/07/1951 के�ቛኋ�रा�ेሰ �हल्ल�के�दी�रा��रा नागराअቚኌ)बाके��राेሰ �ቝኌ+ताभू-मिेሰ खसरा�ना�बारा 1944/01 राकेबा� 1.79 एकेड़के� 170/- रु�या�ेሰ यापिकेया�ह2?

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क्या�स्वा. पिकेशु�नाके�ईराቛኋ�रा�खसरा�ना�बारा 1944 के�बाचता राकेबा�के4 भू-मिेሰ 0.567 ह�क्टे�याराके�स्वा. सत्याना�रा�याणके4 जी�नाके�रा�ेሰ ��रिरावा�रिराके्ቤ वा+�के�ताहता8 वा�दी�के�्ቚ दी�नापिकेया� जी�ना��रावा�दी�ना�उस�रारिराह�याशु�ेሰ के�नाके�पिनाेሰ�:णके�लिलया�था� जिजीसके�स�बा�धेሰ �वा�दी�के��्ቌेሰ �स्वा. सत्याना�रा�याणना�दिदीना��के 14/04/1975 के�्ቤ वा+��्ቔ भू�पिनाष्��दिदीतापिकेया�ह2?

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क्या�स्वा. सत्याना�रा�याणना�भू-मिेሰ खसरा�ना�बारा 1944/1 राकेबा� 0.567 ह�क्टे�याराके� अ�शुराकेबा� 0.22 ह�क्टे�याराके�दिदीना��के 14/08/2007 के��जी�के�तापिवा्ቅया�्ቔ के�ቛኋ�रा�अवा2धरू�स� ् . 02

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पितावा�दी� के��्ቌेሰ �पिनाष्��दिदीताकेरादिदीया�ह2?

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क्या�वा�दी�वा�दीभू-मिेሰ खसरा�ना�बारा 1944/1 राकेबा� 0.567 एवा� उस�राबाना�ेሰ के�ना, के�ए�, �क्के�शुBच�लयाके�स्वात्वा�मिधके�रा�एवा� आमिध�त्याध�रा�ह2?

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क्या�्ቚ पितावा�दी�्ቅेሰ ��के 1 केस� 1 छएवा�्ቚ पितावा�दी�्ቅ . 02 वा�दी�के�केब्जी�के4 भू-मिेሰ खसरा�ना�बारा 1944/1 राकेबा� 0.567 ह�क्टे�याराके�अ�शु 0.22 ह�क्टे�यारा�राअवा2धरू�स�हस्ता्ቌ केराराह� हF?

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सह�याता�एवा�वा�दी्ቤ या?

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In support of his case, the plaintiff Bhagwan Kushwaha examined himself as P.W. 1, Benjamin Kumar Lee, P.W. 2. He relied upon the documents of sale deed dated 27-07-1951 Ex. P-1, Rin-Pustika Ex. P-2, Rasid-Bahi Ex. P-3, Family settlement deed dated 14-04-1975 Ex. P-4, Electricity tax receipt Ex. P-5 to P-10, Order dated 01-07-1981 passed by SDO (Revenue), Ambikapur Ex. P-11, notice to Tahsildar Ex. P-12, Postal receipt Ex. P-13, News Paper clipping dated 04-04-1992 Ex. P- 14, copy of the written statement filed in Civil Suit No. 29-A/1996 Ex. P- 15, Municipal tax receipts Ex. P-16 and P-17, Electricity Bill Ex. P-18, copy of the order dated 23-02-2006 Ex. P-19, copy of the plaint Ex. P- 20, copy of the B-1 Kishta Bandi Ex. P-21, copy of Khasara Panch Sala Ex. P-22, copy of the sale deed dated 14-08-2007 Ex. P-23, copy of the complaint to police Ex. P-23, copy of the application Ex. P-25, copy of the affidavit Ex. P-26, copy of the plaint Ex. P-27, sketch map Ex. P-28, copy of the sale deed Ex. P-29, copy of the affidavit of Kishun Ex. P-30, copy of the order dated 04-01-1993 Ex. P-31, copies of municipal and electricity taxes receipts Ex. P-32 to P-46, copy of the sale deed Ex. P- 47.

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The defendant No. 1(b) Ramnath examined himself as D.W. 1. He relied upon the documents of the copy of the order dated 04-09-1996 Ex. D-1, copy of the order dated 16-04-2007 Ex. D-2, copy of order dated 03-05-1993 Ex. D-3, copy of the order dated 08-04-1993 Ex. D-4, copy of Will deed dated 21-04-2013 Ex. D-5.

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After appreciation of the evidence produced by the parties, the learned

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trial Court passed the judgment and decree on 28-11-2014 and dismissed the suit of the plaintiff by holding that the suit property of Kh. No. 1944, area 1.79 acres, is the self-acquired property of Satyanarayana and not the property acquired by Kishun Koir in the name of Satyanarayana, and also, the execution of the family settlement deed dated 14-04-1975 is suspicious. Hence, this first appeal.

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Learned counsel for the plaintiff would submit that the suit land, Khasra No. 1944/1 admeasuring 0.567 hectares, was originally purchased by his grandfather, Kishun Koir, during the period of the Surguja princely state and formed part of the ancestral property. Kishun Koir, in order to maintain family harmony, made a family arrangement during his lifetime whereby the land was distributed among his sons and grandsons. Under this arrangement, the plaintiff was allotted the suit land, and this allotment was confirmed by his father, Satyanarayan Kushwaha, through a memorandum of family arrangement dated 14-04-1975. The plaintiff has been in continuous possession of the land since that time, having constructed a residential house, fenced the land, and paid municipal and electricity taxes, thereby demonstrating both ownership and long-standing possession. The plaintiff further submits that the trial court erred in disregarding the family settlement, calling it suspicious, without properly appreciating the documentary evidence (Ex P-4) and the oral testimony of the plaintiff (P.W. 1), which clearly establish the allotment under the family arrangement.

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Learned counsel for the plaintiff further argues that the subsequent

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actions of his father, including the filing and withdrawal of Civil Suit No. 75-A/1994 and the later attempt to partition or sell the land, cannot defeat his prior rights established under the family arrangement. The withdrawal of the earlier suit signifies an acknowledgment of the plaintiff’s rights, and the subsequent partition proceedings before the Tehsildar and sale to Defendant No. 2, Vijay Agrawal, are both contrary to the plaintiff’s pre-existing possessory and equitable rights. The sale deed dated 14-08-2007 is further invalid because the land is diverted land, and its transfer without the permission of the District Collector is prohibited. In addition, the plaintiff had been in possession of the entire land, including the portion purportedly sold, making the transfer ineffective against him.

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It is also submitted that the learned trial court wrongly concluded that the suit land was self-acquired property of Satyanarayan Kushwaha. Documentary evidence, including the sale deed dated 27-07-1951 (Ex P-1), municipal and electricity tax receipts (Ex P-5 to P-10, Ex P-16 to P-18, Ex P-32 to P-46), and the family settlement deed (Ex P-4), all demonstrate that the land was purchased by the grandfather and later allotted to the plaintiff under a valid family arrangement. He would further submit that his minor age at the time of the family settlement does not invalidate the arrangement, as under the Mitakshara Hindu law, a minor’s interest in ancestral property is recognized and can be confirmed upon attaining majority. The trial court’s reliance on the plaintiff’s age and on the supposed self-acquisition by Satyanarayan Kushwaha amounts to a misappreciation of both fact and law.

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In view of the above, the plaintiff seeks a declaration of ownership over the entire suit land, a decree holding the sale deed in favour of Vijay Agrawal as null and void, and a permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with his possession. The plaintiff relies on the principle recognized by the Supreme Court in Kale v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, (AIR 1976 SC 1133), that family arrangements, even if not registered, are binding when executed to maintain family harmony and acted upon by the parties. The long possession, continuous development, payment of taxes, and prior acknowledgment of his rights by the father collectively establish that the plaintiff is the rightful owner of the suit land, and the trial court’s dismissal of the suit is, therefore, contrary to the evidence available in the case, and the impugned judgment and decree are liable to be set aside.

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Learned counsel appearing for the Respondent Nos. 1(C)(b), 1(C)(c), 1(C)(d) and 1(C)(f) would submit that the suit land bearing Khasra No. 1944/1, admeasuring 0.567 hectares, is not ancestral property but the self-acquired property of Satyanarayan Kushwaha. It is submitted that Satyanarayan Kushwaha had purchased the land through a registered sale deed dated 31-07-1951 from Duragaiya Cherwa after obtaining permission from the Deputy Commissioner, Surguja, and thereafter his name was duly recorded in the revenue records. Since the land was purchased by Satyanarayan Kushwaha in his own name through a valid registered sale deed, it constitutes his exclusive and self-acquired property, and the plaintiff cannot claim any right over it during his lifetime except to the extent that Satyanarayan may have permitted him

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to use a portion of the land. The defendants have further submitted that the plaintiff’s allegation that the land was purchased by Kishun Koir in the name of Satyanarayan is incorrect and unsupported by any reliable evidence. No family arrangement, as alleged by the plaintiff, ever took place, nor did Satyanarayan Kushwaha execute any memorandum of family settlement dated 14-04-1975. The alleged document relied upon by the plaintiff is a fabricated and forged document that does not bear the genuine signature of Satyanarayan Kushwaha. It is also submitted that at the time when the alleged family settlement is said to have been executed, the plaintiff was about 14–15 years old and his brothers were even younger; therefore, the question of executing any family arrangement granting exclusive ownership to the plaintiff does not arise. He would also submit that the plaintiff was permitted to construct a house only on a small portion of the land measuring about 0.20 decimal out of Khasra No. 1944/1 when he separated from his father around the year 1987–88. The plaintiff constructed his house on a part of that land and uses some portion as a courtyard, while the remaining land continued to remain in possession of Satyanarayan Kushwaha during his lifetime. It is therefore argued that the plaintiff has never been in possession of the entire suit land and his claim of exclusive ownership over the entire 0.567 hectares is wholly false and exaggerated. It is also submitted that Satyanarayan Kushwaha, being the absolute owner of the property, had full authority to deal with the land and accordingly sold a portion of the land to defendant No. 2, Vijay Agrawal, through a registered sale deed dated 14-08-2007 and delivered possession thereof. Subsequently, Satyanarayan Kushwaha also executed a

¶86

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¶87

registered will dated 24-01-2013 in favour of his sons, namely the plaintiff Bhagwan Kushwaha and defendants Baijnath Kushwaha and Ramnath Kushwaha, thereby granting them joint rights over the remaining property. In these circumstances, the plaintiff cannot claim exclusive ownership over the entire suit land and the sale made in favour of defendant No. 2 is valid and binding. The learned trial Court rightly dismissed the suit, and the appeal filed by the plaintiff has no merit and is liable to be dismissed. In support of his submissions, he would rely upon the judgment of “ Ravinder Kaur Grewal and Others v. Manjit Kaur and Others ” 2020 (9) SCC 706.

¶88

Learned counsel appearing for the Respondent No. 1(A), 1(B), 1(D), 1(E), 1(F), and 1(G), in addition to the submission made by the learned counsel for the Respondent Nos. 1(C)(b), 1(C)(c), 1(C)(d) and 1(C)(f), would submit that the suit land was the self-acquired property of Satyanarayan Kushwaha, who had purchased the same through a registered sale deed and whose name was duly recorded in the revenue records. The memorandum of family settlement dated 14-041975, relied upon by the plaintiff, is a fabricated and forged document that does not bear the signature of Satyanarayan Kushwaha, and it is an unregistered document. The plaintiff was permitted only to occupy a small portion of the land for residential purposes after his separation from the family, and he has no right or title over the entire suit land. The other defendants have also supported the validity of the sale deed executed by Satyanarayan Kushwaha in favour of defendant No. 2 and the will executed by him in favour of his sons. Accordingly, the other defendants have also prayed for dismissal of the appeal.

¶89

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¶90

I have heard learned counsel for the respective parties and perused the record of the trial Court as well as the present appeal and considered their rival submissions.

¶91

The core issue that arises for determination is whether the suit land bearing Khasra No. 1944/1, admeasuring 0.567 hectares, is the selfacquired property of late Satyanarayan Kushwaha or whether it formed part of ancestral property allegedly purchased by his father Kishun Koir in his name, and further, whether the plaintiff Bhagwan Kushwaha has acquired exclusive title over the same on the basis of the document dated 14.04.1975 (Ex. P-4) described as a family settlement deed. The burden to establish that the property was ancestral and that a valid family arrangement conferred title upon him lies upon the plaintiff.

¶92

The learned trial Court, upon consideration of the pleadings, oral and documentary evidence on record, found that the disputed land bearing Khasra No. 1944, admeasuring 0.567 hectares, was purchased through a registered sale deed dated 27/07/1951 in the name of Satyanarayan from the vendor Durgaia Cherwa. The plaintiff Bhagwan Kushwaha has contended that the said property was, in fact, purchased by his grandfather Kishun Koir in the name of Satyanarayan when he was a minor. However, the plaintiff has failed to produce any reliable evidence to prove that Satyanarayan was a minor at the time of the execution of the sale deed in the year 1951. Neither the age of Satyanarayan nor the name of any natural guardian is mentioned in the sale deed dated 2707-1951, which would ordinarily be reflected if the property had been purchased in the name of a minor. The mere recital in the document

¶93

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that the consideration amount was paid by Kishun Koir cannot by itself establish that the property was purchased by him. Therefore, the trial Court holds that the disputed land was purchased by Satyanarayan in his own capacity and constitutes his self-acquired property. It was also found by the learned trial Court that the family arrangement deed dated 14-04-1975 has not been proved to be executed by Satyanarayan. The said document does not mention other agricultural lands admittedly owned by Kishun Koir in different villages, nor does it contain the signatures of all family members, which are generally expected in a genuine family settlement intended to avoid future disputes. Moreover, Satyanarayan has specifically denied the execution of the said document and has alleged that it is a fabricated document. In these circumstances, the alleged family arrangement and the authenticity of the document dated 14/05/1975 remain doubtful and cannot be treated as proved in accordance with the law.

¶95

The learned trial Court further held in its judgment that since the disputed property was the self-acquired property of Satyanarayan, he had full authority to deal with and transfer the same according to his own will. Accordingly, the registered sale deed dated 14/08/2007 executed by Satyanarayan in favour of defendant No. 2, Vijay Agrawal, in respect of 0.22 hectares out of the disputed land cannot be held to be illegal or invalid. After the death of Satyanarayan, the remaining disputed property devolves upon all his legal heirs, namely the plaintiff Bhagwan Kushwaha and the other children of Satyanarayan, in equal shares. As no partition has taken place among the heirs, they shall be deemed to be in joint ownership and joint possession of the remaining

¶96

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property, subject to their respective legal rights.

¶98

When this court examines the pleading of the parties and evidence produced by the plaintiff, it is found that the plaintiff, in para 5 of his plaint, pleaded that the suit property of Kh. No. 1944, area 1.79 acres, was purchased by Kishun Koir through a registered sale deed dated 2707-1951, in the name of Satyanarayan when he was a minor and mutated his name in the revenue records. The defendants have denied in their written statement that the suit property of Kh. No. 1944 area 1.79 acres was purchased by Kishun Koir, but have pleaded that the said suit property was purchased by Satyanarayan himself after obtaining due permission from the Deputy Commissioner, and came into possession thereof. Out of 1.79 acres (0.744 Hect.) of the land, 0.177 Hect. Land was acquired by the State Government for public interest, and 0.080 Hect. of land was given to the plaintiff to construct his residential house. The remaining land is still in the ownership and possession of Satyanarayan.

¶99

The plaintiff Bhagwan Das (P.W. 1), admitted the relationship of the parties. They belong to the Koir caste and follow the Hindu religion. During the princely period, the Maharaja granted his grandfather about 16 acres of agricultural land and 4 acres of Nazul land in Kedarpur, Ambikapur, and about 30 acres in the village Sidhma. These lands were settled in the name of his grandfather, who remained in possession and cultivated them throughout his life. His grandfather had three sons Satyanarayan (his father), Nanhu, and Ramdhan. During his lifetime, the grandfather made arrangements to distribute the family properties

¶100

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¶101

among his sons and grandsons. His father lived in the village Sidhma and cultivated land there, whereas he resided in Ambikapur with his grandfather. After his marriage, he separated from the joint family and constructed his own house on land bearing Plot No. 1944/1 at Kedarpur, measuring about 1.42 acres, where he has been residing with his family. He claims that his grandfather and father allotted the said land to him in a family arrangement. He further stated that subject land was purchased by his grandfather in the name of his father, Satyanarayan, and his grandfather paid the entire sale consideration. The said land was given to him in family arrangement, but due to oversight, the revenue records continued in the name of his father. On 14.04.1975, his father executed a written family settlement deed in his favour, confirming his rights over the disputed land. He constructed a house and is in possession. His father and brothers never resided on the said land nor objected to his possession for a long time. His father initiated proceedings under Section 145 CrPC, which were decided in his favour, recognizing his possession. Thereafter, his father filed a civil suit claiming that only 20 decimals belonged to him, but later withdrew the suit.

¶102

He further states that in the year 2007, at the instance of his brothers, his father filed proceedings before the Tehsildar seeking partition of the disputed land into four shares. During this period, his father executed a sale deed of about 5.5 decimals of the disputed land in favour of Vijay Agrawal. He also stated that neither his father nor the purchaser ever had possession of the land and that no possession was delivered under the sale deed. The sale deed is merely a paper transaction, void, and

¶103

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¶104

not binding upon him.

¶105

In cross-examination, he denied that the subject land was purchased by his father in the year 1951. He voluntarily stated that it was purchased by his grandfather. He further stated that at the time of its purchase, Satyanarayan was only about 10 years of age. He denied that his father and uncles were living and cultivating separately. He also showed his ignorance about any will allegedly executed by Satyanarayan. He admitted that the subject land is not recorded in his name. He does not know whether, since 2004, the land has continuously been recorded in his father’s name. He admitted that his objection against mutation of the name of Vijay Agrawal was rejected by the Tahsildar. The appeal against the mutation order was also dismissed by the SDM, and a second appeal is pending before the Commissioner. He denied that his father was annoyed with him due to disputes. He further stated that he has not filed any application for mutation of his name in the revenue records on the basis of the said settlement deed dated 14-04-1975 (Ex. P-4).

¶106

In his further cross-examination, he stated that he had constructed his house over the suit land about 50 years back. His grandfather had given him 1.50 acres of land for his residence and cultivation. He did not know about the mention of 1.79 acres of land in the sale deed Ex. P-1. Some part of the land is vested with the Mission Hospital Road. His grandfather was having about 16 acres of Revenue land at Ambikapur and about 4 acres of Nazul land, and at the time of his death, only 5 acres of Revenue land and 1.5 acres of Nazul land remained. He did

¶107

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¶108

not know about remaining land. He denied the execution of sale deed in favour of his wife Pan Kumari, by his grandfather. He admitted that on the basis of the Will executed by Kishun, 0.45 acres of land of Gudri Chowk, Ambikapur, is mutated in his name, and the said land is sold by him to Kishori Soni. The sale consideration of the said land was kept by his father.

¶109

The document of Ex. P-4 was prepared by his grandfather and got the signature of his father. It was written by an old man, but he did not know about him. The said deed Ex. P-4 was executed in the presence of various persons and witnesses. He denied that only 20 dismil of land was given to him for the construction of his house. His father had prosecuted a case before SDM, and when got unsuccessful there, he filed the civil suit. He further stated that in the said civil suit filed by his father, he filed his written statement with the averment that his grandfather had purchased the suit land for him in the name of Satyanarayan. In the present case, he has not pleaded so in his plaint. In his further cross-examination, he admitted that his father Satyanarayan and uncle Ramdhani were cultivating the land of village Sidhma. He also admitted in para 37 of his cross-examination that in the document Ex. P-4, there is no mention of the settlement of property in favour of other members of the family.

¶110

The defendant’s witness Ramnath (D.W. 1) stated in his evidence that Late Satyanarayan acquired the suit property bearing Khasra No. 1944, admeasuring 1.79 acres (0.744 hectares), situated at Kedarapur, Ambikapur, in the year 1951 through the registered sale deed after

¶111

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¶112

obtaining due permission from the Deputy Commissioner, Surguja. He got his name recorded in the revenue records and remains in possession. He carried out agricultural operations on the land and also constructed a cowshed for maintaining cattle. Subsequently, out of the total land, an area of 0.177 hectares (0.44 acres) was acquired by the State for public purposes, leaving the remaining 0.567 hectares (1.40 acres) under his uninterrupted possession and enjoyment up to the year 1987–88. In the year 1987-88, when the plaintiff Bhagwan Das separated from his father, a portion of land admeasuring 0.080 hectares (0.20 acres) out of Khasra No. 1944/1 was given to him for residential and agricultural use. The plaintiff constructed a house over a small portion thereof and used the remaining part for cultivation, while the rest of the land continued to remain in possession of Late Satyanarayan. Disputes arose in 1991 when the plaintiff attempted to interfere with the remaining land, leading to proceedings under Section 145 CrPC and subsequent civil litigation. The competent Civil Court, by order dated 04.05.1996, restrained the plaintiff from interfering with the possession of Late Satyanarayan except to the extent of land already given to him. The said order was affirmed in appeal on 17.12.1998 and further upheld in revision by the High Court, thereby conclusively recognizing the possession of Late Satyanarayan over the remaining suit land. It is further stated by him that the alleged family settlement deed dated 14.04.1975 in favour of the plaintiff is forged and fabricated, for the reason that the plaintiff was minor at the relevant time and not living separately. Late Satyanarayan had, during his lifetime, initiated proceedings for the partition of the property among his sons; however,

¶113

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the same could not be implemented due to pending litigation. He also executed a registered Will dated 04.05.2012, and validly alienated a portion of land in favour of Vijay Agrawal.

¶115

In his cross-examination, he stated that Satyanarayan was his father, and at the time of his death, he was 85 years of age. At the time of registration of the sale deed of the suit land, he had not been born. His father had purchased the suit land for a total consideration of Rs. 170/-. He denied that his grandfather Ramkishun had acquired land from the Ruler of Surguja State. His grandfather and his brother had purchased the lands at village Sidhma and Ambikapur. After death of Kalai, his entire property was inherited by Ramkishun. Ramkishun had obtained 0.85 acres of Nazul land at Ambikapur, for Ruler. He has not filed any sale deed by which his father had purchased any property. he also admitted that his father had casting his electoral vote at village Sidhma and his name was not there in the voter list of Ambikapur. He denied that in the suit land, only the house of Bhagwan is situated, he voluntarily stated that the house of his father was also there.

¶116

The plaintiff, Bhagwan, has renovated the same cowshed and is now living there after converting it into a house. Bhagwan encroached upon the cowshed and constructed a house, for which his father had filed complaints with the police station, tehsil office, and the SDO. He also stated that no document was prepared regarding giving the 20 dismil of land to Bhagwan. He denied the execution of the document in the year 1977. He admitted that his father had filed a suit before the Civil Court, against Bhagwan Kushwaha. There is no document filed by him that

¶117

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¶118

except the 20 dismil of land; the other lands are in possession of Satyanarayan. He also admitted that in 145 Cr.P.C. proceedings, there was an inquiry on the spot, but he was not about its result. He had purchased 0.75 acres of land of Kedarpur from his grandfather. At that time, he was cultivating the fields of village Sidhma and Ambikapur. He was cultivating about 9 acres and his brother was cultivating 6 acres of the land which was of their father’s land. He also admitted that on the same day, another sale deed was executed with respect to 0.75 acres of land in favour of his brother. He admitted that in the year 1990, both brothers were separated.

¶119

His father has executed a Will Ex. D-5, which was given to them by their advocate. Pyarelal and Manbhajan are the witnesses to the said Will. He denied that Will deed is a fabricated document. He also denied that his father was not competent to execute the Will or to alienate part of the land to Vijay Agrawal. He further denied the execution of the settlement deed in the year 1975. He also could not tell as to how much land was remaining after the acquisition of part of the land for the road. He could not have the details of the earlier civil suit filed by his father, Satyanarayan. He also denied that they had grabbed the entire sale consideration of the sale deed executed in favour of Vijay Agrawal.

¶120

From the documentary evidence, particularly the registered sale deed dated 27.07.1951 (Ex. P-1), it is evident that the suit property was purchased in the name of Satyanarayan Kushwaha. The plaintiff has contended that at the time of purchase, Satyanarayan was a minor and the consideration was paid by his father, Kishun Koir; however, no

¶121

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cogent evidence has been adduced to substantiate that Satyanarayan was a minor at the relevant time. The sale deed does not reflect any such recital indicating minority or representation through a natural guardian, which would ordinarily be present in such a transaction. Furthermore, the plaintiff himself was not born at the time of purchase of the suit property, and the source of consideration and nature of the transaction are hearsay. In the absence of any convincing material, the presumption attached to a registered sale deed remains unrebutted, leading to the conclusion that the property was the self-acquired property of Satyanarayan Kushwaha.

¶123

The mere recital that the consideration was paid by his father does not convert the property into joint family property or render Satyanarayan incompetent to execute the deed. The presumption under law, as laid down in Section 55 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, is that a registered sale deed executed by the owner, for consideration, transfers the property to the purchaser validly. In the absence of evidence that Satyanarayan was a minor or that the property was purchased out of joint family funds with the intention to treat it as joint family property, the presumption under law is that the property is self-acquired by Satyanarayan. The recital regarding the father paying consideration does not alter the legal effect of the registered sale deed.

¶124

In the case of “ Valliammal v. Subramaniam ” 2004 (7) SCC 233, it has been observed by the Hon’ble supreme Court that:-

¶125

“16. In law, title to the property vests in the person in whose favour the sale deed has been executed. Therefore, Ramayee Ammal was the

¶126

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¶127

absolute owner of the property. ....”

¶128

The plaintiff has heavily relied upon the document dated 14.04.1975 (Ex. P-4), claiming it to be a memorandum of family settlement. However, a close scrutiny of the contents of the said document reveals that it does not partake the character of a family settlement but rather appears to be in the nature of a relinquishment and transfer of rights. The document does not include all co-sharers or family members, nor does it comprehensively deal with the entirety of the family properties, which is a typical feature of a genuine family arrangement intended to resolve disputes and maintain harmony. Additionally, the execution of the document has been specifically denied by Satyanarayan, and the plaintiff has failed to prove its execution in accordance with the law. The absence of signatures of other necessary parties and the lack of corroborative evidence further render the document doubtful. Importantly, the plaintiff never took any steps to get his name mutated in the revenue records on the basis of the said document, which significantly weakens his claim and casts serious doubt on its authenticity and enforceability.

¶129

It is necessary here to reproduce the contents of the alleged settlement deed dated 14-04-1975, which is as under:-

¶130

पा�रि�वा�रि�क्ቤ वाቝኋ�पा्ቔ

¶131

ेሰFसत्याना�रा�याण, पि�ता�रा�ेሰपिकेशु�ना, उ्቞ लगभूग 55 वा्ቧ:, जी�पिताके�इरा, पिनावा�स�के�दी�रा��रा, अ�पिबाके��राके�राहना�वा�ल�ूሺ K। आग�ेሰ F अ�ना�शु�मिेሰलभू-मिेሰ ቝኌ+ताके�दी�रा��रा, अ�पिबाके��राके�खसरा� ना�बारा 1944/1, राकेबा� 0.560 ह�क्टे�यारा, लग�ना 1.12 �2स�, चBहቌኍ�उ्ቈराएवा��-वा:ेሰ �रा�ड, दीቌኌ्ቌणेሰ �केईबा�ईके4 भू-मिेሰ , �ቌኌQेሰ पिकेशुनाके�अ�ना��्ቔ भूगवा�ना, पि�ता�सत्याना�रा�याणके��रिरावा�रिराके

¶132

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¶133

वा+�केराता�ूሺ K औरायाहइकेरा�राकेराता�ूሺ K पिकेभूपिवाष्याेሰ �रा� औराेሰ �रा�उ्ቈरा�मिधके�रिरायाS के�उक्ताभू-मिेሰ स�के�ईस�बा�धया� सरा�के�रानाहT राह�ग�।उ�रा�क्तावाቓኌणVताभू-मिेሰेሰ �रा�पि�ता�रा�ेሰपिकेशु�ना के�ቛኋ�रा�इगलिसया�, पि�ता�राघु�ना�दीना, स�पिकेनाअ�पिबाके��रास�्ቅ याके4 गईह2।

¶134

�रा��्ቔ भूगवा�नाके��रिरावा�रिराकेरू�स�उक्ताभू-मिेሰ के� अ�ना�ना�ेሰ �रासराके�रा�के�गजी�ताSेሰ �चढ़वा�ल�वा�।

¶135

F अ�ना��्ቔ भूगवा�नाके�इसके�गजीके�जीरिराएउ�रा�क्ता भू-मिेሰ के��-ण:ेሰ �लिलकेवास्वा�ेሰ�घु�पि्ቧताकेराता�ूሺ K।

¶136

�रा��्ቔ भूगवा�नाके�च�पिहएपिकेता�नाेሰ �हके�भू�ताराउक्ता +�ना�राअ�ना�स्वाया�के�ेሰ के�नाबाना�केराअ�ना��रिरावा�रासपिहता चल�जी�ए।याहके�गजीह�शु-हवा�सेሰ �राहकेरा, �ढ़वा�केरा, स�नाकेरा, सेሰझकेरादी�गवा�हS के�सेሰ्ቌ लिलख�दिदीया�ता�पिकेसेሰयावाक्ता�रा के�ेሰ आवा�, सनादीराह�।”

¶137

Upon a careful reading of the contents of the document, Ex. P-4 dated 14.04.1975, this Court finds that the said document does not qualify as a family settlement but, in substance, operates as a relinquishment/transfer of rights in immovable property. A true family settlement is intended to resolve existing or apprehended disputes among family members and ordinarily distributes properties among all stakeholders. However, Ex. P-4 does not reflect any comprehensive arrangement among all co-sharers, nor does it deal with the entirety of family properties. Instead, its recitals indicate that Satyanarayan Kushwaha purportedly gave or relinquished his rights in the suit property exclusively in favour of the plaintiff. Such a document, which creates or extinguishes rights in immovable property, squarely falls within the ambit of Section 17(1)(b) of the Registration Act, 1908, which mandates compulsory registration of instruments that create, declare,

¶138

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¶139

assign, limit or extinguish any right, title or interest in immovable property valued above Rs. 100/-. Since Ex. P-4 is admittedly unregistered; it cannot be received as evidence of title in view of the bar contained under Section 49 of the Registration Act, 1908, to establish the transfer of right or title in favour of the plaintiff.

¶140

Further, under Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, transfer of ownership in immovable property can only be effected by a registered instrument in cases where the value exceeds Rs. 100/-. The alleged document Ex. P-4, being unregistered, cannot operate to transfer title in favour of the plaintiff. The distinction between a family settlement and a document effecting transfer has been clearly laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kale & Ors. v. Deputy Director of Consolidation , (1976) 3 SCC 119, wherein it was held that a family arrangement may not require registration only if it is oral or if a written document merely records a past transaction; however, where the document itself creates or extinguishes rights in praesenti, it requires compulsory registration. In paragraph 10 to 18, it has been held that:-

¶141

“10. In other words to put the binding effect and the essentials of a family settlement in a concretised form, the matter may be reduced into the form of the following propositions:

¶142

(1) The family settlement must be a bona fide one so as to resolve family disputes and rival claims by a fair and equitable division or allotment of properties between the various members of the family;

¶143

(2) The said settlement must be voluntary

¶144

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¶145

and should not be induced by fraud, coercion or undue influence;

¶146

(3) The family arrangement may be even oral in which case no registration is necessary;

¶147

(4) It is well settled that registration would be necessary only if the terms of the family arrangement are reduced into writing. Here also, a distinction should be made between a document containing the terms and recitals of a family arrangement made under the document and a mere memorandum prepared after the family arrangement had already been made either for the purpose of the record or for information of the court for making necessary mutation. In such a case the memorandum itself does not create or extinguish any rights in immovable properties and therefore does not fall within the mischief of Section 17(2) of the Registration Act and is, therefore, not compulsorily registrable;

¶148

(5) The members who may be parties to the family arrangement must have some antecedent title, claim or interest even a possible claim in the property which is acknowledged by the parties to the settlement. Even if one of the parties to the settlement has no title but under the arrangement the other party relinquishes all its claims or titles in favour of such a person and acknowledges him to be the sole

¶149

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¶150

owner, then the antecedent title must be assumed and the family arrangement will be upheld and the courts will find no difficulty in giving assent to the same;

¶151

(6) Even if bona fide disputes, present or possible, which may not involve legal claims are settled by a bona fide family arrangement which is fair and equitable the family arrangement is final and binding on the parties to the settlement.

¶152

The principles indicated above have been clearly enunciated and adroitly adumbrated in a long course of decisions of this Court as also those of the Privy Council and other High Courts, which we shall discuss presently.

¶153

In Lala Khunni Lal v. Kunwar Gobind Krishna Narain the statement of law regarding the essentials of a valid settlement was fully approved of by their Lordships of the Privy Council. In this connection the High Court made the following observations which were adopted by the Privy Council:

¶154

The learned Judges say as follows:

¶155

"The true character of the transaction appears to us to have been a settlement between the several members of the family of their disputes, each one relinquishing all claim in respect of all property in dispute other than that falling to his share, and recognizing the right of the others as they had previously asserted it to the portion allotted to them respectively. It was in this

¶156

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¶157

light, rather than as conferring a new distinct title on each other, that the parties themselves seem to have regarded the arrangement, and we think that it is the duty of the courts to uphold and give full effect to such an arrangement.

¶158

Their Lordships have no hesitation in adopting that view."

¶159

This decision was fully endorsed by a later decision of the Privy Council in Mt Hiran Bibi v. Mt. Sohan Bibi.

¶160

In Sahu Madho Das v. Pandit Mukand Ram² this Court appears to have amplified the doctrine of validity of the family arrangement to the farthest possible extent, where Bose, J., speaking for the Court, observed as follows:

¶161

"It is well settled that a compromise or family arrangement is based on the assumption that there is an antecedent title of some sort in the parties and the agreement acknowledges and defines what that title is, each party relinquishing all claims to property other than that falling to his share and recognising the right of the others, as they had previously asserted it, to the portions allotted to them respectively. That explains why no conveyance is required in these cases to pass the title from the one in whom it resides to the person receiving it under the family arrangement. It is assumed that the title claimed by the person receiving the property under the arrangement had always

¶162

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¶163

resided in him or her so far as the property falling to his or her share is concerned and therefore no conveyance is necessary. But, in our opinion, the principle can be carried further and so strongly do the courts lean in favour of family arrangements that bring about harmony in a family and do justice to its various members and avoid in anticipation, future disputes which might ruin them all, and we have no hesitation in taking the next step (fraud apart) and upholding an arrangement under which one set of members abandons all claim to all title and interest in all the properties in dispute and acknowledges that the sole and absolute title to all the properties resides in only one of their number (provided he or she had claimed the whole and made such an assertion of title) and are content to take such properties as are assigned to their shares as gifts pure and simple from him or her, or as a conveyance for consideration when consideration is present."

¶164

In Ram Charan Das v. Girjanandini Devit this Court observed as follows:

¶165

"Courts give effect to a family settlement upon the broad and general ground that its object is to settle existing or future disputes regarding property amongst members of a family. The word 'family' in the context is not to be understood in a narrow sense of being a group of persons who are recognised in law as having a right of succession or having a claim to a share in

¶166

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the property in dispute The consideration for such a settlement, if one may put it that way, is the expectation that such a settlement will result in establishing or ensuring amity and goodwill amongst persons bearing relationship with one another. That consideration having been passed by each of the disputants the settlement consisting of recognition of the right asserted by each other cannot be permitted to be impeached thereafter."

¶168

In Tek Bahadur Bhujil v. Debi Singh Bhujil it was pointed out by this Court that a family arrangement could be arrived at even orally and registration would be required only if it was reduced into writing. It was also held that a document which was no more than a memorandum of what had been agreed to did not require registration. This Court had observed thus:

¶169

"Family arrangement as such can be arrived at orally. Its terms may be recorded in writing as a memorandum of what had been agreed upon between the parties. The memorandum need not be prepared for the purpose of being used as a document on which future title of the parties be founded. It is usually prepared as a record of what had been agreed upon so that there be no hazy notions about it in future. It is only when the parties reduce the family arrangement in writing with the purpose of using that writing as proof of what they had arranged and, where the arrangement is

¶170

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brought about by the document as such, that the document would require registration as it is then that it would be a document of title declaring for future what rights in what properties the parties possess."

¶172

Similarly in Maturi Pullaiah v. Maturi Narasimham it was held that even if there was no conflict of legal claims but the settlement was a bona fide one it could be sustained by the Court. Similarly it was also held that even the disputes based upon ignorance of the parties as to their rights were sufficient to sustain the family arrangement. In this connection this Court observed as follows:

¶173

"It will be seen from the said passage that a family arrangement resolves family disputes, and that even disputes based upon ignorance of parties as to their rights may afford a sufficient ground to sustain it. ***

¶174

Briefly stated, though conflict of legal claims in praesenti or in future is generally a condition for the validity of a family arrangement, it is not necessarily so. Even bona fide disputes, present or possible, which may not involve legal claims will suffice. Members of a joint Hindu family may, to maintain peace or to bring about harmony in the family, enter into such a family arrangement. If such an arrangement is entered into bona fide and the terms thereof are fair in the circumstances of a

¶175

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particular case, courts will more readily give assent to such an arrangement than to avoid it."

¶177

In Krishna Beharilal v. Gulabchand it was pointed out that the word "family" had a very wide connotation and could not be confined only to a group of persons who were recognised by law as having a right of succession or claiming to have a share. The Court then observed: [SCC p. 843, paras 7-8]

¶178

"To consider a settlement as a family arrangement, it is not necessary that the parties to the compromise should all belong to one family. As observed by this Court in Ram Charan Das v. Girjanandini Devi the word "family" in the context of a family arrangement is not to be understood in a narrow sense of being a group of persons who are recognised in law as having a right of succession or having a claim to a share in the property in dispute. If the dispute which is settled is one between near relations then the settlement of such a dispute can be considered as a family arrangement see Ram Charan Das case.

¶179

The courts lean strongly in favour of family arrangements to bring about harmony in a family and do justice to its various members and avoid in anticipation future disputes which might ruin them all."

¶180

In the recent decision of this Court in S. Shanmugam Pillai v. K. Shanmugam Pillai the entire case law was discussed and this Court

¶181

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observed as follows: [pp. 319, 321-322, paras 12, 24-25]

¶183

"If in the interest of the family properties or family peace the close relations had settled their disputes amicably, this Court will be reluctant to disturb the same. The courts generally lean in favour of family arrangements.

¶184

¶185

Now turning to the plea of family arrangement, as observed by this Court in Sahu Madho Das v. Pandit Mukand Ram the courts lean strongly in favour of family arrangements that bring about harmony in a family and do justice to its various members and avoid, in anticipation, future disputes which might ruin them all. As observed in that case the family arrangement can as a matter of law be inferred from a long course of dealings between the parties.

¶186

In Maturi Pullaiah v. Maturi Narasimham this Court held that although conflict of legal claims in praesenti or in future is generally a condition for the validity of family arrangements, it is not necessarily so. Even bona fide disputes present or possible, which may not involve legal claims would be sufficient. Members of a joint Hindu family may to maintain peace or to bring about harmony in the family, enter into such a family arrangement. If such an agreement is entered into bona fide and the terms thereto are fair in the circumstances of a

¶187

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particular case, the courts would more readily give assent to such an agreement than to avoid it."

¶189

Similarly, in “ Roshan Singh and Others v. Zile Singh and Others ” 2018 (14) SCC 814, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that a document styled as a family arrangement, but which in effect operates as a relinquishment of rights, requires registration, failing which it cannot confer title. In the present case, Ex. P-4 is not a mere memorandum of a past settlement but is the very foundation of the plaintiff’s claim, and in the absence of its registration, no right, title or interest could legally pass in favour of the plaintiff.

¶190

Even assuming for the sake of argument that Ex. P-4 dated 14.04.1975 is claimed to be a family settlement; it lacks the essential characteristics of a genuine family arrangement. A valid family settlement ordinarily encompasses all material properties of the family and includes all concerned members so as to resolve present or potential disputes comprehensively. However, the said document does not contain any description of other family properties admittedly existing in different villages, nor does it include or bear the consent/signatures of all cosharers or family members who would be affected by such an arrangement. This omission renders the document incomplete and inconsistent with the settled principles governing family settlements. In Kale (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court emphasized that a family arrangement must be bona fide, voluntary, and intended to resolve family disputes among all concerned parties. The absence of reference to other properties and the exclusion of necessary family members from

¶191

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the Ex. P-4 creates serious doubt about its nature and genuineness, and it cannot be accepted as a valid and binding family settlement.

¶193

The conduct of the plaintiff does not support his claim of exclusive ownership and possession over the entire suit land. In his crossexamination, he admitted that the land continued to be recorded in the name of his father and that he had not initiated mutation proceedings based on the alleged settlement deed. He further admitted that his objections against mutation in favour of defendant No. 2 were rejected by the competent authorities. These admissions indicate that the revenue records consistently recognized the claim of Satyanarayan Kushwaha. Moreover, the evidence on record, including prior litigation under Section 145 Cr.P.C. and civil proceedings, suggests that the plaintiff was, at best, in possession of a limited portion of land measuring about 0.20 acres, which was given to him for residential purposes after his separation from the family. Accordingly, the findings of the learned trial Court holding the suit property to be the self-acquired property of Satyanarayan Kushwaha do not suffer from any perversity or illegality and deserve to be affirmed.

¶194

Further, Satyanarayan has sold 0.22 hectares of the land of Kh. No. 1944/1, to Vijay Agrawal (Defendant No. 2), through registered sale deed dated 14-08-2007 (Ex. P-23). The evidence available on record clearly establishes that defendant No. 2, Vijay Agrawal, is a bona fide purchaser of the said land. The sale deed dated 14.08.2007 was executed by Satyanarayan Kushwaha, who has been held to be the absolute owner of the suit property, and thus fully competent to transfer

¶195

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the same. In terms of Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, a sale of immovable property is a transfer of ownership in exchange for a price paid or promised, and such transfer, when effected by a registered instrument, conveys a valid title to the purchaser. Further, there is no evidence on record to show that Vijay Agrawal had any notice, as contemplated under Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act, of any prior claim of the plaintiff. The transaction, having been completed through a registered instrument upon payment of valid consideration, carries a presumption of legality. In this context, reliance may be placed on the principle laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Hardev Singh v. Gurmail Singh , (2007) 2 SCC 404, wherein it has been held that a bona fide purchaser for value without notice is entitled to protection of his title. In para 15 and 19, it has been considered that:-

¶197

“15. The principle is based on an equitable doctrine that a person who promised to perform more than he can perform must make good his contract when he acquires the power of performance. The difference between the ambit of Sections 41 and 43 of the Act is apparent. Whereas Section 41 provides that a transfer by an ostensible owner cannot be avoided on the ground that the transferor was not authorised therefor, subject to the condition that the transferee should take reasonable care to ascertain that the transferor had power to make the transfer and to act in good faith before a benefit thereof is claimed by him. Section 43, on the other hand, enables the transferee to whom a transferor has made a fraudulent or erroneous representation to lay hold, at his option, of any

¶198

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interest which the transferor may subsequently acquire in the property, unless the right of any subsequent purchaser for value without notice is in effect.

¶200

In Jumma Masjid, speaking for a four-Judge Bench, Aiyar, J. opined: (AIR p. 850, para 7)

¶201

"Considering the scope of the section on its terms, it clearly applies whenever a person transfers property to which he has no title on a representation that he has a present and transferable interest therein, and acting on that representation, the transferee takes a transfer for consideration. When these conditions are satisfied, the section enacts that if the transferor subsequently acquires the property, the transferee becomes entitled to it, if the transfer has not meantime been thrown up or cancelled and is subsisting."

¶202

In the present case, Satyanarayan Kushwaha was not merely an ostensible owner, but the recorded and actual owner, and therefore, his authority to transfer the property cannot be doubted. Accordingly, Vijay Agrawal, having purchased the suit land through a valid registered sale deed for valuable consideration and without notice of any competing claim, has acquired a lawful title over the property, and the sale deed dated 14.08.2007 is valid and binding upon the plaintiff.

¶203

In view of the finding that the suit land is the self-acquired property of Satyanarayan Kushwaha, the claim of the plaintiff regarding possession over the entire suit land cannot be legally recognised. It is a settled

¶204

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principle of law that possession follows title, particularly in the case of vacant or open land, where physical possession is not always capable of clear demarcation. The true owner is deemed to be in possession unless there is clear and cogent evidence of hostile, continuous and exclusive possession by another. In this regard, reference may be made to Section 110 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, which embodies the principle that possession is presumed to follow ownership unless the contrary is proved. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in “ Anathula Sudhakar v. P. Buchi Reddy” , (2008) 4 SCC 594, has held that in cases of vacant land, possession is presumed to be with the person who holds the title. Similarly, in “ Rame Gowda v. M. Varadappa Naidu” , (2004) 1 SCC 769, it has been observed that where the property is open land, the possession ordinarily follows title and cannot be inferred merely from casual or limited use. In the present case, the plaintiff has failed to establish lawful, continuous and exclusive possession over the entire suit land, and therefore, the possession, in the eyes of law, must be deemed to be with the true owner, i.e., Satyanarayan Kushwaha and thereafter his legal heirs.

¶206

It is admitted by the Defendants that the plaintiff was allotted 20 dismals of land for the construction of his house during the lifetime of Satyanarayan. This Court, therefore, declares the plaintiff as the lawful title and possession holder of the said 20 dismals of land, over which he is in actual possession. As regards the portion of the suit land sold to defendant No. 2, Vijay Agrawal, the sale deed dated 14.08.2007 is held to be valid, binding, and not liable to be cancelled or declared null and void, as he is a bona fide purchaser for value without notice. In respect

¶207

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of the remaining portion of the suit land, the plaintiff has failed to prove that he is the sole title holder of the same; rather, all the legal heirs of late Satyanarayan Kushwaha have a right over his property. This disposition ensures that the rights of all parties are recognized in accordance with their lawful entitlements.

¶209

In view of the foregoing discussion and analysis, this Court finds no merit in the present appeal. The plaintiff has failed to establish that he has acquired exclusive title over the same on the basis of the alleged settlement deed dated 14.04.1975 (Ex. P-4), which is an unregistered document and does not convey title or interest. The suit land has been held to be the self-acquired property of late Satyanarayan Kushwaha, who was competent to transfer the same, and the sale deed dated 14.08.2007 executed in favour of defendant No. 2, Vijay Agrawal, being a bona fide purchaser for value without notice, is valid and binding. The plaintiff has also failed to prove his exclusive possession over the entire suit land. The findings recorded by the learned trial Court are based on proper appreciation of evidence and settled principles of law and do not suffer from any illegality or perversity warranting interference by this Court.

¶210

As a result, the appeal, being devoid of merits is hereby dismissed .

¶211

Parties shall bear their own costs.

¶212

An appellate decree be drawn accordingly.

¶213

Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) Judge

¶214

ved

Bhagwan Kushwaha v. Satyanarayan Died The Legal Heirs-Baijnath and Ors.

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Bhagwan Kushwaha v. Satyanarayan Died The Legal Heirs-Baijnath and Ors.

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