Dismissed

Radheshyam Agrawal Died through Lrs v. Sanjeev Jain (Died) Through Legal Heirs

Chhattisgarh HC10 Sept 2025FA/112/2002

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

In a civil appeal against a judgment for possession and injunction, the High Court rejected the appellant's challenge claiming the trial court erred in allowing the suit without a title declaration. Upholding the trial court's findings based on the presumption of validity for registered sale deeds, the court dismissed the appeal as trial findings were not perverse or illegal.

What did the court decide?

First appeal dismissed; interim order vacated; decree to be drawn up.

Radheshyam Agrawal Died through Lrs Vs Sanjeev Jain (Died)… — Partition | Chhattisgarh HC (2025)

2025:CGHC:46534

NAFR

HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

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FA No. 112 of 2002

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Judgment reserved on 27.06.2025 Judgment delivered on 11.09.2025

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Radheshyam Agrawal Died Through Lrs Bilaspur

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1.1- Smt. Radha Devi Agrwal Wd/o Late Shri Radheshyam Agrawal Aged About 60 Years Resident of Malviya Road, Raipur.

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1.2- Abhishek Agrawal S/o Late Shri Rasheshyam Agrawal Aged About 30 Years Resident of Malviya Road, Raipur.

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... Appellants/Defendants

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versus

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Sanjeev Jain (Died) Through Legal Heirs As Per The Honble Court Order Dated 23-11-2021.

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1.1- Smt. Rekha Jain Wd/o Late Shri Sanjeev Jain Aged About 48 Years R/o Kumhari, Tahsil and District Durg Chhattisgarh., District : Durg, Chhattisgarh

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1.2 - Ku. Shruti Jain D/o Late Shri Sanjeev Jain Aged About 26 Years R/o Kumhari, Tahsil And District Durg Chhattisgarh.

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1.3 - Roshan Jain S/o Late Shri Sanjeev Jain Aged About 22 Years R/o Kumhari, Tahsil And District Durg Chhattisgarh.

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... Respondent(s)/ Plaintiff

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For Appellants/(s)	:	Mr. Sumesh Bajaj, Advocate
For Respondent(s)	:	Mr. Suresh Kumar Pandey, Advocate

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Digitally signed by SANTOSH SANTOSH KUMAR KUMAR SHARMA SHARMA Date: 2025.09.12 11:36:39 +0530

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Hon’ble Justice Shri Narendra Kumar Vyas

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CAV Judgment

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This first appeal under Section 96 CPC has been filed by defendant assailing the judgment and decree dated 12.07.2002 passed by learned District Judge, Raipur, District Raipur (CG) in Civil Suit No. 241-A/99, by which the trial Court has partly allowed the suit filed by the plaintiff and directed the defendant to demolish the constructed wall and hand over the vacant possession of the suit land to the plaintiff.

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For the sake of convenience, the parties shall be referred to in terms of their status shown in Civil Suit No. 241-A/1999 before the trial court.

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Brief facts as mentioned in the plaint are that plaintiff filed a suit on 21.06.1989 before the learned trial Court for permanent injunction and damages only. Subsequently, he has claimed possession of the suit property mainly contending that;

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(a) The defendant had purchased piece of land measuring 12102 sq feet bearing khasra No. 37/5, PH No. 110, situated at Shankar Nagar No. 3, Tahsil and District Raipur (hereinafter referred to as ‘the suit property’) through registered sale deed dated 27.07.1983 from Tekchand Chaturmal and Vasudeo for sale consideration of Rs. 96,816/-. It is contended that the suit land initially belong to Radheshyam Dubey as Bhumiswami. On 03.06.1965, he sold piece of land through registered sale deed to Ghyanchand, Gurdasmal, Prem Chand Meghani and Mulchand Meghani. On 15.05.1966, aforesaid purchasers sold the suit land to one Prem Chand Saraogi and thereafter Prem Chand Saraogi sold the suit land on 15.06.1966 to

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Tekchand, Chaturmal and Vasudeo. It is contended that on 06.10.1980, Tahsildar in a Revenue Case No. 28-A/6 of 78-79 had ordered for mutation of name of Tekchand, Chaturmal and Vasudeo in the revenue record thereafter khasra No. 37/5, was renumbered as Khasra No. 37/28. Thereafter, the plaintiff purchased the suit land from Tekchand, Chaturmal and Vasudeo through registered sale deed on 27.07.1983. The suit land is triangular in shape and was fenced with barbed wire from two sides; on the one side there was house of Mr. Batra who acquired the plot from Mr. Dutta.

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(b) It is alleged that the defendants on 29.12.1984 started digging the suit land and completed a trench i.e. digging the plinth shown as AB in map and started constructing brick wall shown as CD in the map with height of about five feet and also constructed a wall of about five feet on the road side shown as DE. Therefore, the plaintiff immediately sent a telegram on 31.12.1984 to the defendant asking him to stop the construction but he continued with the construction work which necessitated the plaintiff to file a suit.

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Defendant No.1 has filed his written statement denying the allegation made in the plaint mainly contending that the suit land was not fenced with barbed wire and land in question was not property of the plaintiff. It is contended that khasra No. 37/8 situated at PH No. 110, Shankar Nagar, Raipur belonged to Ramnarayan Fatechand More who has transferred 0.30 acres of land to defendant Bal Krishna Agrawal and Smt. Radha Devi Agrawal through power of attorney, as such,

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defendant No. 1 is the owner of the suit property and after obtaining prior permission from Municipal Corporation on 29.10.1984, he has done construction over the suit land and has prayed for dismissal of the suit.

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Defendant No. 2 and 3 have not filed written statement. Defendant No. 4 has filed his written statement denying the allegation made in the plaint mainly contending that the land in question was given to one Ramnarain Fatechand More of Tumsar, District Bhandara in exchange by the State of Madhya Pradesh vide memo No. 724/5103/7 dated 23.09.1972 and memo dated 29.10.1973 of Collector (Nazure), Raipur for possession through power of attorney of Shri More on 09.01.1974 and rest of the land consisting khasra No. 37/8 was allotted to M.P. Housing Board. Hence, there remained no vacant land in the entire khasra No. 37, which could have been further sub divided into Khasra No. 37/28. The sale deed demonstrates that the vendor had sold the land bearing khasra No. 37/8 and defendant No.1 has not constructed any construction over the suit land. It is also contended that the defendant No.4 has not removed the poles and barbed wires from the plaintiff’s land and he is in possession of entire land bearing khasra No. 37/8 admeasuring 2.00 acres on behalf of Shir More. It is further contended that the plaintiff has no legal interest over the land in question and suit is undervalued as proper court fees has not been paid by the plaintiff and has prayed for dismissal of the suit.

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On the pleading of the parties, learned trial court has framed as many

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as five issues which are as under:-

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1-	D;k jftLVMZ foØ; i= fnukad 27&7&83 ds v/khu oknh us oS/kkfud :i l s okn&xzLr IykV [kljk uacj& 37@28 {ks=Qy 12102 oxZQqV] tks uD’kk esa ,-ch-lh-Mh-,Q- ls vafdr gS] [kjhnk gS\|
2-	D;k [kjhnh fnukad dks gh foØsrk ds }kjk okn xzLr IykV dk dCtk oknh dks fn;k x;k\|
3-	D;k izfroknhx.k us voS/kkfud :i ls okn&xzLr tehu esa vfrØe.k dj nhoky dk fuekZ.k fd;k gS\ D;k oknh
4-v-	oknxzLr tehu dk dCtk ikus dk vf/kdkfjrk j[krk gS\|
c-	D;k vkKkId fu"ks/kkKk tkjh dj izfroknhx.k dks jksdk tkuk vko’;d gS\|
5-	lgk;rk ,oa O;;\|

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The plaintiff to substantiate his case has examined himself as (PW-1), D. D. Dadsena (PW-2), Inspector Satish Chand Sharma (PW-3), Retired Nayab Tahsildar Pramanidhi Patel (PW-4) and exhibited documents namely sale deed (Ex.P-1), Bhu Adhikar Rin Pustika of Tekchand (Ex.P-2), Bhu Adhikar Rin Pustika of Sanjeev (Ex.P-3), Sale deed (Ex.P-4),Sale deed (Ex.P-5), Order sheet of Tahsildar, Raipur (Ex.P-6), Amendment register (Ex.P-7), Report (Ex.P-8), Map (Ex.P-9), Khasra Map (Ex.P-10), Khasra (Ex.P-11). Defendant did not examined any witnesses in their support but exhibited documents Najul Patta as (DW-1).

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Sanjeev Jain (PW-1) has reiterated the stand taken by him in the plaint. In the cross examination, he admitted that Tahsildar has passed mutation order in favour of Tekchand (Ex.P-6) of the land bearing

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khasra No. 37/5 area 1202 Sq Feet. He has admitted that in Ex.P- 6 it has not been mentioned that khasra No. 37/5’s is part of khasra No. 37/28 and voluntarily stated that in the correction register (Ex.P-7) as well as Rin Pustika it has been mentioned. He has also admitted that he has not submitted any map to demonstrate that part of land bearing khasra No. 37/5 is near to 37/24, 37/25, 37/27 or suit land. He has also admitted that in Ex.P-5 it has not been mentioned that the property is purchased by him is surrounded by stones, wooden poles and fenced with barbed wire.

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Satish Chandra Sharma (PW-3) has stated that Patwari Halka No. 110, sheet No. 8 which was agricultural land and subsequently diverted as khasra No. 37/28, he has brought original map of it (Ex.P-10) and certified copy of Right of records of diversion is Ex.P-11. In the cross examination, he has admitted that in the map which he has brought does not bear signature of any person who has prepared it.

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Pramanidhi Patel (PW-4) retired Tahsildar has supported the case of the plaintiff and has stated in examination in Chief that he has done the demarcation of khasra No. 37/28 seat No. 8, P.H. No. 110. The witness was cross examined, wherein he has admitted that on behalf of defendant Shri M. M. Ansari, Advocate and the plaintiff himself were present on the date of demarcation fixed by office, therefore, no notice was given to anyone. He has also admitted that he has experience of preparing map and at the time of demarcation, he has taken all the records i.e. khasra, naksa, right of records and all the records of

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Patwari. He has stated that in the report he has clarified that since survey mark is not available, therefore, treating Khasra No. 37/12 Plot No. 6 as base, demarcation has been done.

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Learned trial Court after appreciating the oral and documentary evidence has partly allowed the suit of the plaintiff and directed the defendant to demolish the constructed wall and handover the vacant possession of the suit land to the plaintiff but has rejected the damages claimed by him. Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the trial court on 12^th July 2002, the defendant has preferred First Appeal under Section 96 CPC before this Court.

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Learned counsel for the appellants would submit that the finding recorded by the trial Court suffers from illegality and perversity, therefore, the same is liable to be set aside by this Court. He would further submit that learned trial court has erred in holding that possession of the suit land was delivered to the respondent on the date of purchase of land and has also committed illegality in holding that the map produced by the respondent (Ex.P-10) was true map of area. He would further submit that learned trial Court has disbelieved the map annexed with the lease-deed executed by the Collector (Nazul) in favour of Ram Narayan More (Ex.D-1) and has also committed illegally in recording its finding that the appellant has trespassed over the respondent’s land. He would further submit that there is cloud over the identity of the land in question and no cogent material was placed on record to identify the suit land. Thus, he would submit that when the

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defendant has raised genuine dispute with regard to the title and raised a cloud over the title of plaintiff then necessarily in those circumstances the plaintiff cannot maintain a suit for bare injunction and would pray for allowing the appeal on this count alone. He would further submit that in the present case when plaintiff’s title to property involves complicated question of facts and law, the court should relegate parties to exhaust remedy by way of comprehensive suit for declaration of title in a full fledge trial. To substantiate his submission, he would refer to judgments of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases of Anathula Sudhakar vs P. Buchi Reddy (Dead) By Lrs & Ors reported in 2008 (4) SCC 594, Jharkand State Housing Board vs. Didar Singh and Another reported in 2019(17) SCC 692, Sukulram Sahu and Ors vs Mahesh Ram Sahu And Ors reported in 2019 SCC Online Chh 190, Kayalulla Parambath Moidu Haji vs Namboodiyil Vinodan reported in 2020(20) SCC 310 and V.M.Shirke (Manager of Shree Ramkrishna Shikshan Mandal) and Others vs. Harikrishna Bhairavnath Tiwari (since dead) through LRs and others reported in 2022 SCC Opnline Bom 1069 and would pray for allowing the appeal.

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On the other hand learned counsel for respondents would submit that defendants No. 1 and 4 have filed their written statements but did not lead any evidence in their support and defendants No. 2 to 3 were remained ex-parte before the trial Court, as such, the defendants have not proved their case. He would further submit that the finding recorded by the trial Court or the impugned judgment does not suffer from

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perversity or illegality which warrants interference by this Court and would pray for dismissal of the appeal.

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I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record of the Court below with utmost satisfaction.

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From the above submissions made by the parties, the point emerged for determination by this Court is as under:-

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Whether the finding recorded by the trial Court is legal, justified, and does not suffer from perversity or illegality which warrants interference by this Court and the suit filed by the plaintiff for possession and injunction is maintainable without claiming declaration of title over the suit property.

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Discussion and finding.

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This Court is now considering the submission made by learned counsel for the appellant that the suit simplicitor for possession and injunction is not maintainable in absence of prayer for declaration of title over the suit property when a serious cloud has been raised over the title of the plaintiff.

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The record of the case would demonstrate that the plaintiff has also filed copy of the sale-deed executed between Gyanchand and Premchand Saraogi which is the sale deed (Ex.P-5) dated 15.05.1966 and subsequently vide Ex.P-4 dated 16.08.1966 the suit property was sold by Premchand Sarogi to Tekchand, from whom the plaintiff has purchased the suit property vide Ex.P-1 on 27.07.1983, as such, the plaintiff has placed on record sufficient material to establish that he has the title over the suit property. The record of the case would further demonstrate that defendant has not placed any material or evidence to

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raise cloud over the genuineness and correctness of the sale deeds placed on record by the plaintiff, as such merely on the basis of Ex.D-1 which is lease deed of 1987 he cannot raise any cloud over the suit property. Even otherwise, it is well settled legal possession of law that registered sale deed has presumption value unless so rebutted by leading cogent evidence by the defendant. In the present case, no such evidence or material was placed on record by the appellant. Therefore, it cannot be held that the suit was not maintainable before the trial Court. The Hon’ble Supreme court in the case of Jamila Begum vs Shami Mohd reported in 2019(2) SCC 727 has examined the presumptive value of registered sale deed and has held as under:-

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Sale deed dated 21.12.1970 in favour of Jamila Begum is a registered document and the registration of the sale deed reinforces valid execution of the sale deed. A registered document carries with it a presumption that it was validly executed. It is for the party challenging the genuineness of the transaction to show that the transaction is not valid in law. In Prem Singh and Others vs. Birbal and Others(2006) 5 SCC 353, it was held as under:-

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“27. There is a presumption that a registered document is validly executed. A registered document, therefore, prima facie would be valid in law. The onus of proof, thus, would be on a person who leads evidence to rebut the presumption. In the instant case, Respondent 1 has not been able to rebut the said presumption.” The above judgment in Prem Singh’s case has been referred to in Vishwanath Bapurao Sabale vs. Shalinibai Nagappa Sabale (2009) 12 SCC 101.

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Thus it is quite vivid that the defendant is unable to raise cloud over the

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title of the suit property of the plaintiff, therefore, the suit claiming possession, permanent injunction is very much maintainable thus, submission made by the counsel for the defendant that the suit merely

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for possession and injunction is not maintainable is liable to be rejected, accordingly it is rejected.

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From the lease-deed dated 10.08.1987 (Ex.D-1), it is quite vivid that the lease deed was executed in favour of Ramnarayan More for the land bearing khasra No. 37/8 admeasuring 2 acre but the defendant has not lead any evidence to demonstrate that which land is allotted to Ramnarayan More whereas sale deed (Ex.P-1) which was executed between the plaintiff and the Tekchand was executed on 27.07.1983 much prior to execution of alleged lease-deed dated 10.08.1987 which clearly establishes that before 1984 the defendant No. 4 was not in possession of the suit property. Even the defendants No. 1 to 4 have not placed any evidence on record as to how the land described in Ex.D-1 has been allotted to Ramnarayan More or defendant No. 4.

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Learned trial Court has also recorded its finding that in the sale deed dated 10.07.1983 it has been clearly mentioned that at the time of execution of sale-deed, possession of the suit property has been handed over to the plaintiff which has not been rebutted by the defendant by adducing cogent evidence on record. The witness PW-4 in his evidence has categorically stated that the demarcation was done in presence of defendant’s counsel and he has vast experience about the demarcation. This witness has categorically stated that he has done measurement of khasra no. 37/28, situated at P.H. No. 110, sheet No. 8. Other witness Revenue Inspector has also stated that the suit property is diverted land he also produced certified copy of original

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map of land bearing khasra No. 37/28 and also submitted Right of record as Ex.P-11. No cross examination to dilute the said evidence has been done by the defendant.

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From the appreciation of evidence and material on record, it is quite vivid, that the findings are based on a proper reading of evidence and not on perverse finding. It is equally well settled legal position of law that in first appeal the Court can interfere with trial Court judgment when the findings are based on misreading of evidence, are legally perverse i.e. no reasonable person could arrive at that conclusion or there is error of law. The perversity of finding has been the subject matter of umpteen number of decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. It is also settled by several decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the first appellate court, under Section 96 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, is the last court of facts and it can interfere only when the findings are not based on evidence or are perverse. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Malluru Mallappa (D) Thr Lrs vs Kuruvathappa reported in 2020 (4) SCC 313 has examined the power of Appellate Court while hearing the First Appeal and has held as under:-

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Section 96 the CPC provides for filing of an appeal from the decree passed by any court exercising original jurisdiction to the court authorized to hear the appeals from the decisions of such courts. In the instant case, the appeal from the decree passed by the trial court lies to the High Court. The expression ‘appeal’ has not been defined in the CPC. Black’s Law Dictionary (7th Edn.) defines an appeal as “a proceeding undertaken to have a decision reconsidered by bringing it to a higher authority.” It is a judicial examination of the decision by a higher court of the decision of a subordinate court to rectify any possible error in the order under appeal. The law provides the rem-

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edy of an appeal because of the recognition that those manning the judicial tiers too commit errors.

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In Hari Shankar v. Rao Girdhari Lal Chouwdhury AIR 1963 SC 698 it was held that a right of appeal carries with it a right of re-hearing on law as well as on fact, unless the statute conferring a right of appeal limits the re-hearing in some way as has been done in second appeal arising under the CPC.

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In Shankar Ramchandra Abhyankar vs. Krishnaji Dattatatreya Bapat 1969(2) SCC 74 was held thus:

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……….. In the well known work of Story on Constitution (of United States), Vol. 2, Article 1761, it is stated that the essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction is that it revises and corrects the proceedings in a cause already instituted and does not create that cause. The appellate jurisdiction may be exercised in a variety of forms and, indeed, in any form in which the Legislature may AIR 1963 SC 698 1969 (2) SCC 74 choose to prescribe. According to Article 1762 the most usual modes of exercising appellate jurisdiction, at least those which are most known in the United States, are by a writ of error, or by an appeal, or by some process of removal of a suit from an inferior tribunal. An appeal is a process of civil law origin and removes a cause, entirely subjecting the fact as well as the law, to a review and a retrial…….”

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It is a settled position of law that an appeal is a continuation of the proceedings of the original court. Ordinarily, the appellate jurisdiction involves a re-hearing on law as well as on fact and is invoked by an aggrieved person. The first appeal is a valuable right of the appellant and therein all questions of fact and law decided by the trial court are open for re-consideration. Therefore, the first appellate court is required to address itself to all the issues and decide the case by giving reasons. The court of first appeal must record its findings only after dealing with all issues of law as well as fact and with the evidence, oral as well as documentary, led by the parties. The judgment of the first appellate court must display conscious application of mind and record findings supported by reasons on all issues and contentions [see: Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (Deceased) By Lrs (2001) 3 SCC 179, Madhukar and others v. Sangram and others.2001(4) SCC 756, B.M. Narayana Gawda vs. Shanthamma (Dead) By Lrs. and Another (2014) 2 SCC (civ) 619, H. K. N. Swami v. Irshad Basith (Dead) By Lrs. 2005(10) SCC 243 and M/s. Sri Raja Lakshmi Dyeing Works vs. Rangaswamy Chettair 1980(4) SCC 259.

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Considering the above factual matrix, evidence, considering the law that sale deed has presumptive value and no cogent evidence was placed on record by the defendants to raise cloud over the title of the suit property, I am of the view that the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court does not suffer from perversity or illegality which warrants interference by this Court.

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Accordingly the first appeal is liable to be dismissed and it is dismissed. Interim order passed by this Court on 27.09.2002 is vacated. Decree be drawn up.

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Sd/-

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(Narendra Kumar Vyas)

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Judge

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santosh

Radheshyam Agrawal Died through Lrs v. Sanjeev Jain (Died) Through Legal Heirs

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

Radheshyam Agrawal Died through Lrs v. Sanjeev Jain (Died) Through Legal Heirs

Case brief

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What did the court decide?

What the court decided

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