Vimal Chand Jain Vs State of Chhattisgarh

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2025:CGHC:29714-DB

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BABLU RAJENDRA BHANARKAR

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Digitally signed by BABLU RAJENDRA BHANARKAR Date: 2025.07.02 18:48:36 +0530

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HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

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NAFR

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CRMP No. 337 of 2023

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1 - Vimal Chand Jain S/o Late Manikchand Jain Aged About 69 Years 2 - Vaibhav Jain S/o Shri Vimal Chand Jain, Aged About 45 Years Both residents of 22B, South Avenu, Choubey Colony, Raipur, Tahsil And District Raipur Chhattisgarh.

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... Petitioners

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versus

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1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Its Secretary, Ministry Of Home, Secretariat, Capital Complex, Mahanadi Bhawan, Naya Raipur Chhattisgarh.

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2 - The Station House Officer, Police Station Station Urga, District Korba Chhattisgarh.

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3 - Anil Nachrani, S/o Late Mohan Lal Nachrani, Aged About 53 Years R/o Jal Vihar Colony, Raipur Chhattisgarh

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... Respondents

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For Petitioner(s) : Mr.B.P.Sharma, Advocate For Respondents : Mr.Malay Jain, Panel Lawyer No.1 and 2/State For Respondent : Mr.Anant Bajpai, Advocate No.3

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Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Bibhu Datta Guru, Judge

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Order on Board

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Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice

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2.7.2025

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1. Heard Mr.B.P.Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioners as well as Mr.Malay Jain, learned Panel Lawyer appearing for respondents No.1 and 2/State and Mr.Anant Bajpai, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.3.

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2. The petitioners have filed this petition with following prayer:

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“ It is therefore, prayed that this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to admit the petition; call for records of case from the respondents concerned and after hearing the parties in the matter, quash FIR No.0611/2021 dated 28.11.2021 (Annexure P-1) registered at Police Station Urga, District Korba and all subsequent proceedings thereon in the facts and circumstances of the case and in the interest of justice.”

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3. Brief facts necessary for disposal of this case are that allegedly an undated agreement has been entered into between Viacom Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. and respondent No.3 under which it has been stated that certain advance amount has been paid by respondent No.3 i.e. Rs. 10,000/- and a sum of Rs.30 lakhs has been paid by way of cheque No.916741. In fact, no such agreement has ever taken place and certain documents signed in support of altogether different transaction and in which as security, certain documents have been executed in which several columns were left blank, as agreed between the parties that if terms and

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conditions are materialized by and between the parties then only transaction will be proceeded further. In other words, no final agreement has been drawn by and between the parties and the matter was in liquid stage and only travux preporaties have taken place.

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4. It is the case of the petitioners that cheque number mentioned in FIR i.e. 916741, was not given towards any payment in respect of any transaction i.e. sale and purchase of land, but cheque has been given towards discharge of some other liability and transaction has been entered into in the account of respondent No.3 maintained in by Viacom Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. in regular course of business. It is further submitted that contents of the FIR will only reveal that alleged agreement has been entered into regarding which parties were at liberty either to invoke jurisdiction of civil Court or of Arbitrator as per the provisions contained in the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. However, it appears that neither jurisdiction of civil Court has been invoked nor of the Arbitrator and respondent No.3 has allowed time limit to pass within which rights may be enforced under the alleged agreement. It is submitted that knowing full well that any alleged claim of respondent No.3 in respect of the property in question has become barred by time in view of Article 56 of the Limitation Act according to which any suit for specific performance of contract can only be filed within a period of 03 years from the date of entering into agreement or as mentioned therein.

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5. It is further case of the petitioner that thereafter respondent No.3 has chosen to approach police authorities and firstly filed complaint in Police Station Civil Lines, Raipur and on lodging report, detailed investigation has been done by said police station and thereafter respondent No.3 has been advised to approach competent civil Court vide note sheet dated 2612.2018. Thereafter the petitioners have been tried to be implicated for commission of offence under Section 420/34 of the IPC by respondent No.3 by lodging FIR in Police Station Gole Bazar, Raipur and pursuant thereto, the petitioners were summoned by said police station and upon bringing the facts, as stated above, the said matter has also been closed.

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6. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that respondent No.3/complainant has earlier lodged similar complaint at the Police Station Civil Lines, Raipur for agreement to sell entered for Khasra Nos.323/5[k & 332/4[k, Village Barbuspur, Tehsil Korba. The Police Station Civil Lines, on 26^th December, 2018, has not taken cognizance, as the matter was purely civil in nature and suppressing the said fact, the complainant has lodged a fresh complaint on 28.11.2021 at Police Station Urga, District Korba. The said FIR has been registered without making any preliminary inquiry, though the matter is purely of commercial transaction, in violations of the guidelines issued by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Lalita Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh and Others {(2014) 2 SCC 1}, in which, at para-120.6, a direction has

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been made to the effect that in the cases relating to commercial offences where there is abnormal delay/laches in initiating criminal prosecution, for example, over 3 months’ delay in reporting the matter without satisfactorily explaining the reasons for delay, preliminary inquiry should be conducted. Learned counsel further submits that as per the averments made in the FIR, agreement was entered on 12^th April, 2015 for sale of the land. Considering all these aspects, the petition deserves to be allowed and quashed the FIR No.0611/2021 dated 28.11.2021 registered at Police Station Urga, District Korba for offence 420/34 of the IPC against the petitioners.

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7. On the other hand, learned State Counsel appearing for respondents No.1 & 2/State opposes the prayer. However, she fairly submits that in the impugned FIR, the fact that the complainant has earlier lodged similar complaint to the other Police Station, was not brought to the notice of the concerned Station House Officer.

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8. Learned counsel appearing for respondent No.3 submits that in March 2015, the petitioners showed their property to respondent No.2 located at village Barbaspur Patwari Halka No.13 Korba District Korba. Thereafter respondent No.3 agreed to purchase the aforesaid property/plot and the deal was finalized and respondent No.3 gave Rs. 10,000/- as advance of the aforesaid deal. It was also told by the petitioners to respondent No.3 to

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deposit Rs.30 lakhs in favour of their company namely Vicon Infrastructure Private Limited. Accordingly, the petitioners have deposited the aforesaid amount through Cheque No. 916741 of Punjab National Bank dated 31.03.2015. He further submits that after receiving the aforesaid amount, the petitioners have executed an agreement with respondent No.3 on 10.04.2015. In the aforesaid agreement vide Clause 7 the petitioners were agreed that the aforesaid land was not mortgaged in any bank. According to the aforesaid agreement dated 10.04.2015 the petitioners have to provide the documents of the land, such as Naksha, Khasra, B-1, P-II and no objection certificate issued by the competent authority, but the petitioners have never provided any documents of the aforesaid property/land to respondent No.3, therefore respondent No.3 repeatedly urged the petitioners to get the sale deed executed and registered, but the petitioners used to avoid it every time. Thereafter respondent No.3 also came to know that several cases of Cheating/Fraud were already registered against the petitioners at Raipur, Durg and Bilaspur. He further submits that the FIR discloses the prima facie offence. As such, the petition deserves to be dismissed.

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9. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents appended with these petitions.

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10. The Supreme Court in the matter of State of Haryana and others v. Bhajan Lal and others, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 in

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paragraphs 102 & 103 held as under: -

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“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.

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(1)Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.

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(2)Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.

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(3)Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.

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(4)Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation

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is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.

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(5)Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.

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(6)Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.

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(7)Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.

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We also give a note of caution to the effect that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases; that the court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the court to act according to its whim or caprice.”

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11. The Supreme Court in the matter of Manoj Kumar Sharma and others v. State of Chhattisgarh and others, ( 2016) 9 SCC 1 held as under:-

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“35. While discussing the scope and ambit of Section 482 of the Code, a similar view has been taken by a Division Bench of this Court in Rajiv Thapar and others vs. Madan Kal Kapoor (2013) 3 SCC 330 wherein it was held as under:-

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“29. The issue being examined in the instant case is the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 CrPC, if it chooses to quash the initiation of the prosecution against an accused at the stage of issuing process, or at the stage of committal, or even at the stage of framing of charges. These are all stages before the commencement of the actual trial. The same parameters would naturally be available for later stages as well. The power vested in the High Court under Section 482 CrPC, at the stages referred to hereinabove, would have far-reaching consequences inasmuch as it would negate the prosecution’s/complainant’s case without allowing the prosecution/complainant to lead evidence. Such a determination must always be rendered with caution, care and circumspection. To invoke its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC the High Court has to be fully satisfied that the material produced by the accused is such that would lead to the conclusion that his/their defence is based on sound, reasonable, and indubitable facts; the material produced is such as would rule out and displace the assertions contained in the charges levelled against the accused; and

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the material produced is such as would clearly reject and overrule the veracity of the allegations contained in the accusations levelled by the prosecution/complainant. It should be sufficient to rule out, reject and discard the accusations levelled by the prosecution/complainant, without the necessity of recording any evidence. For this the material relied upon by the defence should not have been refuted, or alternatively, cannot be justifiably refuted, being material of sterling and impeccable quality. The material relied upon by the accused should be such as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the actual basis of the accusations as false. In such a situation, the judicial conscience of the High Court would persuade it to exercise its power under Section 482 CrPC to quash such criminal proceedings, for that would prevent abuse of process of the court, and secure the ends of justice.

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Based on the factors canvassed in the foregoing paragraphs, we would delineate the following steps to determine the veracity of a prayer for quashment raised by an accused by invoking the power vested in the High Court under Section 482 CrPC:

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30.1. Step one: whether the material relied upon by the accused is sound, reasonable, and indubitable i.e. the material is of sterling

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and impeccable quality?

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30.2. Step two: whether the material relied upon by the accused would rule out the assertions contained in the charges levelled against the accused i.e. the material is sufficient to reject and overrule the factual assertions contained in the complaint i.e. the material is such as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the factual basis of the accusations as false?

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30.3. Step three: whether the material relied upon by the accused has not been refuted by the prosecution/complainant; and/or the material is such that it cannot be justifiably refuted by the prosecution/complainant?

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30.4. Step four: whether proceeding with the trial would result in an abuse of process of the court, and would not serve the ends of justice?

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30.5 If the answer to all the steps is in the affirmative, the judicial conscience of the High Court should persuade it to quash such criminal proceedings in exercise of power vested in it under Section 482 CrPC. Such exercise of power, besides doing justice to the accused, would save precious court time, which would otherwise be wasted in holding such a trial (as well as proceedings arisingt therefrom) specially when it is clear that the same would not conclude in the conviction of the accused.”

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12. In the matter of Paramjeet Batra v. State of Uttarakhand, (2013) 11 SCC 673 , the Supreme Court recognized that although the inherent powers of a High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure should be exercised sparingly, yet the High Court must not hesitate in quashing such criminal proceedings which are essentially of a civil nature. It was held as under:

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“12. While exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code the High Court has to be cautious. This power is to be used sparingly and only for the purpose of preventing abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure ends of justice. Whether a complaint discloses a criminal offence or not depends upon the nature of facts alleged therein. Whether essential ingredients of criminal offence are present or not has to be judged by the High Court. A complaint disclosing civil transactions may also have a criminal texture. But the High Court must see whether a dispute which is essentially of a civil nature is given a cloak of criminal offence. In such a situation, if a civil remedy is available and is, in fact, adopted as has happened in this case, the High Court should not hesitate to quash the criminal proceedings to prevent abuse of process of the court.”

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(emphasis supplied)

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13. Relying upon the decision in Paramjeet Batra (supra), the Supreme Court in Randheer Singh v. State of U.P., (2021) 14 SCC 626 , observed that criminal proceedings cannot be taken recourse to as a weapon of harassment. In Usha Chakraborty &

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Anr. v. State of West Bengal & Anr., 2023 SCC OnLine SC 90 , relying upon Paramjeet Batra (supra) it was again held that where a dispute which is essentially of a civil nature, is given a cloak of a criminal offence, then such disputes can be quashed, by exercising the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

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14. The Supreme Court in Lalita Kumari (supra) has observed in para 120.6 as under:-

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“120.6 As to what type and in which cases preliminary inquiry is to be conducted will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. The category of cases in which preliminary inquiry may be made are as under:

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(a) Matrimonial disputes/ family disputes

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(b) Commercial offences

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(c) Medical negligence cases

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(d) Corruption cases

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(e) Cases where there is abnormal delay/laches in initiating criminal prosecution, for example, over 3 months delay in reporting the matter without satisfactorily explaining the reasons for delay.

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The aforesaid are only illustrations and not exhaustive of all conditions which may warrant preliminary inquiry.”

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15. In the present case, it is an admitted position that respondent No.3/complainant has earlier lodged similar complaint at the Police Station Civil Lines, Raipur for agreement to sell entered for

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Khasra Nos.323/5[k & 332/4[k, Village Barbuspur, Tehsil Korba. The Police Station Civil Lines, on 26^th December, 2018, has not taken cognizance, as the matter was purely civil in nature and suppressing the said fact, the complainant has lodged a fresh complaint on 28.11.2021 at Police Station Urga, District Korba. The said FIR has been registered without making any preliminary inquiry, though the matter is purely of commercial transaction, in violations of the guidelines issued by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Lalita Kumari (supra), in which, at para-120.6, a direction has been made to the effect that in the cases relating to commercial offences where there is abnormal delay/laches in initiating criminal prosecution, for example, over 3 months’ delay in reporting the matter without satisfactorily explaining the reasons for delay, preliminary inquiry should be conducted.

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16. Considering the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the parties and in view of law laid down by the Supreme Court in the above-stated judgments (supra), we are of the considered opinion that the allegations made in the FIR are inherently improbable and the evidence collected in support of the same does not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the petitioners herein. In the case in hand, malicious prosecution was instituted by respondent No.3 against the petitioners.

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17. For the foregoing reasons, the impugned FIR registered in Crime No.611/2021 on 28.11.2021 at Police Station Urga, District Korba

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for offence under Section 420/34 of the IPC against the petitioners

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is hereby quashed.

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18. The petition under Section 482 CrPC is allowed to the extent

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indicated hereinabove.