Neha Pandey Vs Abhilasha Awasthi

1 - Abhilasha Awasthi W/o Samarth Awasthi Aged About 34 Years R/o Near M.I.G. - 56, Nehru, Nagar, Bilaspur, Tahsil And District - Bilaspur (Chhattisgarh)

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2 - Samarth Awasthi S/o Late Santosh Awasthi Aged About 35 Years R/o Senior Mig, Nehru Nagar, Bilaspur, Tahsil And District Bilaspur (Chhattisgarh)

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3 - Satyabhama Awasthi Wd/o Late Santosh Awasthi Aged About 63 Years R/o Senior Mig, Nehru Nagar, Bilaspur, Tahsil And District Bilaspur (Chhattisgarh)

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4 - State Of Chhattisgarh Thorugh Police Station Mahila Thana, Bilaspur, District - Bilaspur (Chhattisgarh)

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... Respondent(s)

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For Petitioners	Mr. TK Jha, Advocate
For Respondent No.1/wife	Ms. Neela Gupta, Advocate on behalf of Mr. KPS Gandhi, Advocate
For Respondent/State	Mr. KK Bahrani, PL.

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Hon’ble Mr. Arvind Kumar Verma, Judge

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Order on Board

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13/11/2025

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1. Petitioners have filed this petition with the following prayer:

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“It is therefore prayed that this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to allow this petition and set-aside the impugned order dated 25.06.2022 (Annexure P/1) and maintain the order of discharge passed by Judicial Magistrate First Class, Bilaspur (C.G.), in the interest of justice.”

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2. The facts, in brief, are that marriage of complainant (respondent No.1/Abhilasha Awasthi) was performed with Samarth Awasthi/respondent No.2 on 29.11.2013 according to Hindu custom and rituals. Respondent no.3/Satyabhama is mother-inlaw and petitioners (herein) are sister-in-law & brother-in-law of the complainant. Sometimes after the marriage, the relations between the husband and wife ran into rough weather and on the complaint of wife, the Police Station -Mahila Thana Bilaspur registered an FIR No.12/2017 u/s 498-A, 506 r/w 34 of Indian Penal Code against the husband, mother-in-law, sister-in-law and brother-in-law. After the investigation, chargesheet was filed in the

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court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Bilaspur. Learned Judicial Magistrate First Class perused the record and heard the parties before framing the charge and after hearing the parties, found that there is no prima facie evidence against the petitioners for framing the charge, therefore, the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class discharged the petitioners from the charges u/s 498-A, 506 r/w 34 of Indian Penal Code, however, learned Judicial Magistrate First Class framed the charges against the husband and mother-in-law of the complainant u/s 498-A of Indian Penal Code. Complainant/Smt. Abhilasha Awasthi filed the revision against discharge of the petitioners before the Sessions Court Bilaspur. The learned Fourth Additional Sessions Judge, Bilaspur after hearing the parties set-aside the order of discharge dated 18.11.2019 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Bilaspur, by passing an order dated 25.06.2022 (Annexure P/1). Hence, this petition.

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3. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that impugned order is illegal, perverse and contrary to the provisions of law. Learned Additional Sessions Judge has held that the complainant has no right to file the revision, however, he took the revision as exercising suo-moto jurisdiction which is misconception of law as the Additional Sessions Judge has no original jurisdiction to take cognizance, but he can exercise jurisdiction only when the case is made over to him by the learned Sessions Judge. The entire statement of the complainant and the charge sheet filed by the

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police don't disclose the role of the present petitioners in the so called offences and there is no prima facie case against the Petitioners. Learned Sessions Judge has not stated in its order that order of discharge by the trial Court is perverse or legal, therefore, interference by exercising suo-moto revisional Jurisdiction is unwarranted. Complainant had filed a petition for divorce against her husband (respondent no.2) and the learned family court Bilaspur has passed the decree of divorce between the parties vide judgment dated 13.01.2023, therefore, there is no need to interfere the order of discharge with regard to Petitioners. Hence, petitioners have came-up before this Court with aforesaid prayer.

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4. Learned State Counsel contended that once a complaint is received by the police and prima facie cognizable offence is made out, the police is bound to register the FIR and proceed in accordance with law. As such, the police has registered the FIR, investigated the matter and thereafter filed the charge-sheet against the petitioners before concerned trial Court.

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5. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent/wife submits that the petitioners are not entitled to get any relief as respondent/wife has been subjected to cruelty and harassment on the ground of demand of dowry and this petition deserves to be dismissed at the threshold.

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6. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents appended with petition.

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7. In the matter of Geeta Mehrotra and another v. State of Uttar Pradesh and another¹ , the Supreme Court has held that casual reference to the family member of the husband in FIR as coaccused particularly when there is no specific allegation and complaint did not disclose their active involvement. It was held that cognizance of matter against them for offence under Sections 498-A, 323, 504 and 506 of the IPC would not be justified as cognizance would result in abuse of judicial process.

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8. In the matter of K. Subba Rao and others v. State of Telangana represented by its Secretary, Department of Home and others² the Supreme Court delineated the duty of the criminal Courts while proceeding against relatives of victim's husband and held that the Court should be careful in proceeding against distant relatives in crime pertaining to matrimonial disputes and dowry deaths and further held that relatives of husband should not be roped in on the basis of omnibus allegations, unless specific instances of their involvement in offences are made out.

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9. In the matter of Rashmi Chopra v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another³ , it has been held by the Supreme Court relying upon the principle of law laid down in State of Haryana and others v. Bhajan Lal and others⁴ that criminal proceedings can be allowed to proceed only when a prima facie offence is disclosed and further held that judicial process is a solemn proceeding which

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1 (2012) 10 SCC 741

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2 (2018) 14 SCC 452

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3 2019 SCC OnLine SC 620

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4 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335

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cannot be allowed to be converted into an instrument of oppression or harassment and the High Court should not hesitate in exercising the jurisdiction to quash the proceedings if the proceedings deserve to be quashed in line of parameters laid down by the Supreme Court in Bhajan Lal (supra) and further held that in absence of specific allegation regarding anyone of the accused except common and general allegations against everyone, no offence under Section 498A IPC is made out and quashed the charges for offence under Section 498A of the IPC being covered by category seven as enumerated in Bhajan Lal (supra) by holding as under:-

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“24. Coming back to the allegations in the complaint pertaining to Section 498A and Section 3/4 of D.P. Act. A perusal of the complaint indicates that the allegations against the appellants for offence under Section 498A and Section 3/4 of D.P. Act are general and sweeping. No specific incident dates or details of any incident has been mentioned in the complaint. The complaint having been filed after proceeding for divorce was initiated by Nayan Chopra in State of Michigan, where Vanshika participated and divorce was ultimately granted. A few months after filing of the divorce petition, the complaint has been filed in the Court of C.J.M., Gautam Budh Nagar with the allegations as noticed above. The sequence of the events and facts and circumstances of the case leads us to conclude that the complaint under Section 498A and Section 3/4 of D.P. Act have been filed as counter blast to divorce petition proceeding in State of Michigan by Nayan Chopra.

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25. There being no specific allegation regarding any one of the applicants except common general allegation against everyone i.e. “they started harassing the daughter of the applicant demanding additional dowry of one crore” and the fact that all relatives of the husband, namely, father, mother, brother, mother’s sister and husband of mother’s sister have been roped in clearly indicate that application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. was filed with a view to harass the applicants.....”

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10. The Apex Court, in Payal Sharma v. State of Punjab & Another {Cr.A. No. 4773/2024, decided on 26.11.2024} had, relying on the decision in Geeta Mehrotra (supra), Kahkashan Kausar @ Sonam & Others v. State of Bihar & Others {(2022) 6 SCC 599}, Bhajan Lal (supra), and Umesh Kumar v. State of Andhra Pradesh & Another {(2013) 10 SCC 591}, had quashed the FIR and the consequential proceedings emanating therefrom.

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11. Very recently, the Apex Court, in Dara Lakshmi Narayan & Others v. State of Telangana & Another {Cr.A. No. 5199 of 2024, decided on 10.12.2024}, has observed as under:

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“ 25. A mere reference to the names of family members in a criminal case arising out of a matrimonial dispute, without specific allegations indicating their active involvement should be nipped in the bud. It is a wellrecognised fact, borne out of judicial experience, that there is often a tendency to implicate all the members of the husband’s family when domestic disputes arise out of a matrimonial discord. Such generalised and sweeping accusations unsupported by concrete evidence or particularised allegations cannot form the basis for

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criminal prosecution. Courts must exercise caution in such cases to prevent misuse of legal provisions and the legal process and avoid unnecessary harassment of innocent family members. In the present case, appellant Nos.2 to 6, who are the members of the family of appellant No.1 have been living in different cities and have not resided in the matrimonial house of appellant No.1 and respondent No.2 herein. Hence, they cannot be dragged into criminal prosecution and the same would be an abuse of the process of the law in the absence of specific allegations made against each of them.

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26. In fact, in the instant case, the first appellant and his wife i.e. the second respondent herein resided at Jollarpeta, Tamil Nadu where he was working in Southern Railways. They were married in the year 2015 and soon thereafter in the years 2016 and 2017, the second respondent gave birth to two children. Therefore, it cannot be believed that there was any harassment for dowry during the said period or that there was any matrimonial discord. Further, the second respondent in response to the missing complaint filed by the first appellant herein on 05.10.2021 addressed a letter dated 11.11.2021 to the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Thirupathur Sub Division requesting for closure of the said complaint as she had stated that she had left the matrimonial home on her own accord owing to a quarrel with the appellant No.1 because of one Govindan with whom the second respondent was in contact over telephone for a period of ten days. She had also admitted that she would not repeat such acts in future. In the above conspectus of facts, we find that the allegations of the second respondent against the appellants herein are too far-fetched and are not believable.

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27. xxx xxx xxx

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28. The inclusion of Section 498A of the IPC by way of an amendment was intended to curb cruelty inflicted on a woman by her husband and his family, ensuring swift intervention by the State. However, in recent years, as there have been a notable rise in matrimonial disputes across the country, accompanied by growing discord and tension within the institution of marriage, consequently, there has been a growing tendency to misuse provisions like Section 498A of the IPC as a tool for unleashing personal vendetta against the husband and his family by a wife. Making vague and generalised allegations during matrimonial conflicts, if not scrutinized, will lead to the misuse of legal processes and an encouragement for use of arm twisting tactics by a wife and/or her family. Sometimes, recourse is taken to invoke Section 498A of the IPC against the husband and his family in order to seek compliance with the unreasonable demands of a wife. Consequently, this Court has, time and again, cautioned against prosecuting the husband and his family in the absence of a clear prima facie case against them.

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29. We are not, for a moment, stating that any woman who has suffered cruelty in terms of what has been contemplated under Section 498A of the IPC should remain silent and forbear herself from making a complaint or initiating any criminal proceeding. That is not the intention of our aforesaid observations but we should not encourage a case like as in the present one, where as a counterblast to the petition for dissolution of marriage sought by the first appellant-husband of the second respondent herein, a complaint under Section

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498A of the IPC is lodged by the latter. In fact, the insertion of the said provision is meant mainly for the protection of a woman who is subjected to cruelty in the matrimonial home primarily due to an unlawful demand for any property or valuable security in the form of dowry. However, sometimes it is misused as in the present case.

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30. In the above context, this Court in G.V. Rao vs. L.H.V. Prasad, (2000) 3 SCC 693 observed as follows:

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“12. There has been an outburst of matrimonial disputes in recent times. Marriage is a sacred ceremony, the main purpose of which is to enable the young couple to settle down in life and live peacefully. But little matrimonial skirmishes suddenly erupt which often assume serious proportions resulting in commission of heinous crimes in which elders of the family are also involved with the result that those who could have counselled and brought about rapprochement are rendered helpless on their being arrayed as accused in the criminal case. There are many other reasons which need not be mentioned here for not encouraging matrimonial litigation so that the parties may ponder over their defaults and terminate their disputes amicably by mutual agreement instead of fighting it out in a court of law where it takes years and years to conclude and in that process the parties lose their “young” days in chasing their “cases” in different courts.”

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31. Further, this Court in Preeti Gupta vs. State of Jharkhand (2010) 7 SCC 667 held that the courts have to be extremely careful and cautious in dealing with these complaints and must take pragmatic realities into

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consideration while dealing with matrimonial cases. The allegations of harassment by the husband’s close relatives who had been living in different cities and never visited or rarely visited the place where the complainant resided would have an entirely different complexion. The allegations of the complainant are required to be scrutinized with great care and circumspection .

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32. We, therefore, are of the opinion that the impugned FIR No.82 of 2022 filed by respondent No.2 was initiated with ulterior motives to settle personal scores and grudges against appellant No.1 and his family members i.e., appellant Nos.2 to 6 herein. Hence, the present case at hand falls within category (7) of illustrative parameters highlighted in Bhajan Lal. Therefore, the High Court, in the present case, erred in not exercising the powers available to it under Section 482 CrPC and thereby failed to prevent abuse of the Court’s process by continuing the criminal prosecution against the appellants. ”

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Observing the aforesaid, the Apex Court quashed the FIR, the charge sheet and the consequential criminal proceedings pending before the learned trial Court.

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12. Considering facts and circumstances of the case, nature of allegation, submissions of the learned counsel for the parties, the fact that in the complaint so made, the respondent No.1/complainant has only made omnibus and general allegations against in-laws (petitioners) without being full particulars about date and place that they have treated her with cruelty for demand of dowry, further considering that the complainant had filed a petition for divorce against her husband (respondent no. 2) and the

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learned family Court Bilaspur has passed the decree of divorce between the parties vide judgment dated 13.01.2023, this Court is of the considered opinion that there is no need to interfere the order of discharge with regard to the Petitioners.

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13. Accordingly, the instant petition is allowed. Impugned order dated 25.06.2022 (Annexure P/1) is hereby set-aside and order of discharge of the petitioners passed by Judicial Magistrate First

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Class, Bilaspur (C.G.) is hereby maintained.

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14. In the result, present petition is allowed to the extent indicated hereinabove. No cost(s).

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Sd/(Arvind Kumar Verma) JUDGE

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J.

Neha Pandey v. Abhilasha Awasthi

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Neha Pandey v. Abhilasha Awasthi

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