Partly allowed¶¶60

Raju Yadav v. State of Chhattisgarh

Chhattisgarh HC16 Feb 2025CRA/718/2019

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

Chhattisgarh HC Bilaspur | CRA 718/2019 | decided 17.02.2025 | Raju Yadav v. State of Chhattisgarh | S.302 IPC murder conviction for burning wife altered to S.304 Part-II IPC culpable homicide | 10 years RI | applied Kalu Ram v. State of Rajasthan AIR 2000 SC 3630; relied on Dattatraya v. State of Maharashtra 2024 SCC OnLine SC 223; Sanjay v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2016) 3 SCC 62 referred by counsel | dying declaration Ex.P-39 | appeal partly allowed.

What did the court decide?

Appeal partly allowed: conviction altered from Section 302 IPC to Section 304 Part-II IPC; sentence reduced from life imprisonment to 10 years rigorous imprisonment; certified copy and original record to be transmitted to the trial Court and a copy to the Jail Superintendent. ¶¶60

Raju Yadav Vs State of Chhattisgarh — Murder and Culpable Homicide | Chhattisgarh HC (2025)

What the court decided

AI extract

Outcome

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Issue for consideration

Whether the trial Court rightly recorded a finding that the appellant caused the burn injuries from which the deceased died after 11 days of treatment. +1 more

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Court's answer

Affirming the trial Court's finding (considering dying declaration Ex.P-39 proved by Ganpati Nayak PW-17), the Court held that it was the appellant who caused the burn injury to the deceased on 31.10.2016, on account of which she died during treatment on 12.11.2016.

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Ratio / Principle

Applying the principles in Kalu Ram (supra) followed in Dattatraya (supra): the deceased's dying declaration implicated the appellant; the appellant took her to hospital and suffered a 2% burn injury (Ex.P-6) while extinguishing the fire, so he had knowledge but no intention that death was likely — the case falls under Section 304 Part-II IPC, not Section 302 IPC.

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Key takeaways

Conviction of the appellant under Section 302 IPC altered to Section 304 Part-II IPC and he is sentenced to 10 years rigorous imprisonment.ratio¶¶59

Detailed headnote1 paragraphs

CRA No. 718 of 2019 | High Court of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur (Division Bench: Sanjay K. Agrawal & Sanjay Kumar Jaiswal, JJ.; judgment by Sanjay K. Agrawal, J.) | decided 17.02.2025. Criminal appeal under Section 374(2) Cr.P.C. against judgment dated 02.03.2019 of the Sixth Additional Sessions Judge, Durg (Sessions Trial No.09/2017) convicting the appellant under Section 302 IPC (life imprisonment + Rs.1000/- fine) for pouring kerosene oil on his wife Asha Yadav and setting her ablaze by match-stick (prosecution case: 30.10.2016; the Court's finding records 31.10.2016); she died on 12.11.2016 of septicemia and shock due to extensive antimortem flame burn; dying declaration Ex.P-39 recorded by Executive Magistrate (PW-17). The Court affirmed the finding that the appellant caused the burns, but, bearing in mind Kalu Ram v. State of Rajasthan (AIR 2000 SC 3630) as followed with approval in Dattatraya v. State of Maharashtra (2024 SCC OnLine SC 223), held that since the appellant took the deceased to hospital and suffered a 2% burn injury (Ex.P-6) while extinguishing the fire, he had knowledge but no intention of death: conviction altered to Section 304 Part-II IPC with 10 years rigorous imprisonment. Appeal party (partly) allowed.

2025:CGHC:8089-DB

ASHOK SAHU

Digitally signed by ASHOK SAHU Date: 2025.02.19 11:12:02 +0530

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NAFR

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HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

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CRA No. 718 of 2019

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{Arising out of judgment dated 02.03.2019 passed in Sessions Trial No.09/2017 by the learned Sixth Additional Sessions Judge, Durg}

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Raju Yadav, S/o. Late Deenu Ram Yadav, Aged About 40 Years, R/o. Borsi Basti, Bajrang Chowk, Police Station Pulgaon, District Durg, Chhattisgarh.

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... Petitioner

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versus

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State Of Chhattisgarh, Through Police Station Pulgaon, District Durg, Chhattisgarh.

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... Respondent

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(Cause Title taken from Case Information System)

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For Appellant : Mr. Arvind Sinha, Advocate For Respondent : Mr. Arvind Dubey, Govt. Advocate

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(Division Bench)

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Hon'ble Shri Justice Sanjay K. Agrawal

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Hon'ble Shri Justice Sanjay Kumar Jaiswal

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Judgment on Board

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(17.02.2025)

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Sanjay K. Agrawal, J.

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This criminal appeal preferred by the appellant under Section 374(2) of Cr.P.C. is directed against the impugned judgment dated 02.03.2019, passed by the learned Sixth Additional Sessions Judge, Durg, in Sessions Trial No.09/2017, by which, the appellant herein has been convicted for the offence under Section 302 of Indian Penal Code and sentenced to undergo life imprisonment and fine of Rs.1000/-, in default of payment of fine, 6 months additional rigorous imprisonment.

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Case of the prosecution, in brief, is that on 30.10.2016 at 7:00 P.M. at village Borsi, Police Station- Pulgaon, District Durg, the appellant herein poured kerosene oil over the body of his wife Asha Yadav (now deceased) and set her ablaze by match-stick, by which, she suffered severe burn injuries and died during course of treatment on 12.11.2016. Furthermore, during the course of treatment on 09.11.2016, deceased has given dying declaration to the Executive Magistrate (PW-17) vide Ex.P-39 after having certified by treating Doctor that she was in a fit mental and physical state of mind to record the dying declaration. Zero Merg Intimation was registered vide Ex.P-22, Merg Intimation was registered vide Ex.P-27, FIR was registered

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vide Ex.26, Inquest was conducted vide Ex.P-13 and dead body of deceased Asha Yadav was subjected to postmortem, which was conducted by Dr. P.Akhtar (PW-8), who proved the post-mortem report Ex.P-9, in which, cause of death was stated to be septicemia and shock due to extensive antimortem flame burn. Pursuant to memorandum statement of the appellant Ex.P-14, kerosene oil and match box along-with clothes of deceased were seized vide Ex.P-15, which were sent for chemical examination to FSL and as per the FSL report (Ex.P-33), kerosene oil was found on the seized articles. MLC of the appellant was also conducted vide Ex.P-6, by which superficial burn injury was found. After due investigation, appellant was charge-sheeted for the aforesaid offence under Section 302 of I.P.C. before the jurisdictional criminal court, which was ultimately committed to the Court of Sessions for hearing and disposal in accordance with law, in which the appellant abjured his guilt and entered into defence stating that he has not committed any offence and he has been falsely implicated.

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In order to bring home the offence, prosecution examined as many as 18 witnesses and exhibited 39 documents and

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the appellant-accused in support of his defence has neither examined any witness nor exhibited any document.

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The trial Court, after appreciation of oral and documentary evidence on record, convicted the appellant herein for the offence under Section 302 of Indian Penal Code and sentenced him to undergo life imprisonment against which the present appeal has been preferred.

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Mr. Arvind Sinha, learned counsel for the appellant, would submit that the prosecution has failed to bring home the offence beyond reasonable doubt and even otherwise, at the most, the offence under Section 304 Part-II of I.P.C. is made out against the appellant, as he tried to extinguish the fire and he himself has taken the deceased to the hospital as per the statement of Bhukhan Lal Yadav (PW-2). Furthermore, as per the document i.e. Emergency Assessment Slip, it has been stated that the appellant has brought the deceased for treatment and even as per the document of Government District Hospital Durg (Ex.P-37), it has been clearly stated that the appellant has brought the deceased for her treatment. Furthermore, the incident was of 31.10.2016 and the deceased died during the course of treatment on 12.11.2016 on account of septicemia. Therefore, in light of the decision rendered by the Supreme

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Court in the matter of Kalu Ram v. State of Rajasthan 1 & Sanjay v. State of Uttar Pradesh 2 the conviction of the appellant for offence under Section 302 of I.P.C. be altered to Section 304 Part-II of I.P.C. and he be sentenced to the period already undergone, as he is in jail since 12.11.2016 and the appeal be allowed in part.

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Mr. Arvind Dubey, learned State counsel, would support the impugned judgment and submit that the prosecution has been able to bring home the offence beyond reasonable doubt and the trial Court has rightly convicted the appellant for offence under Section 302 of I.P.C. He further submits that it is not a case where the sentence of appellant can be converted to Section 304 Part-II of I.P.C., therefore, the appeal deserves to be dismissed.

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We have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival submissions made herein-above and went through the records with utmost circumspection.

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The trial Court after appreciating the oral and documentary evidence on record clearly recorded a finding at para 14 of the judgment that the deceased has died on account of burn injury after undergoing treatment for 11 days in the hospital. Considering the dying declaration (Ex.P-39)

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1 AIR 2000 SC 3630

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2 (2016) 3 SCC 62

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proved by Ganpati Nayak (PW-17) and the finding recorded by the trial Court, we are of the considered opinion that the trial Court has rightly recorded a finding that it is the appellant who had caused the burn injury to the deceased on 31.10.2016, on account of which, she died during treatment on 12.11.2016.

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The aforesaid finding brings us to the next question for consideration, which is, whether the learned trial Court is justified in convicting the appellant herein for offence under Section 302 of I.P.C. or same is liable to be converted to offence under Section 304 (Part-I or Part-II) of I.P.C. in light of decision of the Supreme Court in the matter of Kalu Ram (supra), as contended by learned counsel for the appellant ?

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The Supreme Court in the matter of Kalu Ram (supra), held in paragraphs 7 and 8 as under :-

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“ 7. But then, what is the nature of the offence proved against him. It is an admitted case that appellant was in a highly inebriated stage when he approached the deceased when the demand for sparing her ornaments was made by him. When she refused to oblige he poured kerosene oil on her and wanted her to lit the match-stick. When she failed to do so he collected the match box and ignited one match-stick but when flames were up he suddenly and frantically poured water to save

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her from the tongues of flames. This conduct cannot be seen divorced from the totality of the circumstances. Very probably he would not have anticipated that the act done by him would have escalated to such a proportion that she might die. If he had ever intended her to die he would not have alerted his senses to bring water in an effort to rescue her. We are inclined to think that all what the accused thought of was to inflict burns to her and to frighten her but unfortunately the situation slipped out of his control and it went to the fatal extent. He would not have intended to inflict the injuries which she sustained on account of his act. Therefore, we are persuaded to bring down the offence from the first degree murder to culpable homicide not amounting to murder.

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8. We, therefore, alter the conviction from Section 302, I.P.C. to Section 304, Part II of the I.P.C. Both sides conceded that appellant is continuing in jail. We impose a sentence of rigorous imprisonment for seven years on him. It is for the jail authorities to count whether the period he had already undergone would be sufficient to complete the period of sentence imposed by us and if so, the jail authorities shall release him from jail. Otherwise he will continue in jail until completion of the period of seven years of imprisonment. The appeal is disposed of accordingly.”

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Similarly, in the matter of Dattatraya v. State of Maharashtra 3, the principles of law laid down in Kalu Ram (supra) have been followed with approval and in paras 23 & 24, it has been held as under: -

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3 2024 SCC OnLine SC 223

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“23. In the above case, the appellant who in an inebriated state was pressurizing his wife to part with some ornaments so that he could buy some more liquor. On her refusal he poured kerosene on her and set her on fire by lighting a matchstick. But then he also tried to pour water on her to save her. This Court was thus of the opinion that :

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“7….Very probably he would not have anticipated that the act done by him would have escalated to such a proportion that she might die. If he had ever intended her to die he would not have alerted his senses to bring water in an effort to rescue her. We are inclined to think that all that the accused thought of was to inflict burns to her and to frighten her but unfortunately the situation slipped out of his control and it went to the fatal extent. He would not have intended to inflict the injuries which she sustained on account of his act. Therefore we are persuaded to bring down the offence from first degree murder to culpable homicide not amounting to murder.

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We therefore alter the conviction from Section 302 IPC to Section 304 Part II IPC…”

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The facts of the present case, as we have already discussed above, by and large reflect the same situation, nature of crime as well as the act of the accused and the consequences of his action. We are inclined to accept the arguments raised by the learned senior counsel for the appellant, Mr. Sudhanshu S. Choudhari that under the present circumstances it would indeed be a case of culpable homicide not amounting to murder as given in Section 304 Part II in as

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much as, though the accused had knowledge of the consequences of the act he was committing, yet there was no intention to cause death.”

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Bearing in mind the aforesaid principles of law laid down

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by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Kalu Ram (supra) followed in Dattatraya (supra) and reverting to the facts of the case, it is quite vivid that the deceased has given dying declaration vide Ex.P-39 clearly implicating the appellant herein, as the appellant had seen the deceased along-with Toman Lal Sahu (PW-3) watching dance program (Raut-Nacha) and then he became angry and brought the deceased into the house and thereafter poured kerosene oil over her body and set her ablaze. Thereafter, the deceased was taken to the hospital by the appellant, which is clear from the medical records as well as from the statement of Bhukhan Lal Yadav (PW-2) and she died during course of treatment after 11 days due to septicemia and furthermore, the appellant has also suffered 2% burn injury vide Ex.P-6 while extinguishing the fire. As such, the appellant must have no intention, but knowledge that the injury is likely to cause death. Therefore, in our considered opinion, the case of appellant would fall under Section 304 Part-II of I.P.C.

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In view of the aforesaid discussion, conviction of appellant for offence punishable under Section 302 of I.P.C. is altered to Section 304 Part-II of I.P.C. and the appellant is now sentenced to 10 years rigorous imprisonment.

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Accordingly, the criminal appeal is party allowed to the extent indicated herein-above.

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Let a certified copy of this judgment along with the original record be transmitted forthwith to the concerned trial Court for necessary information & action, if any. A copy of the judgment may also be sent to the concerned Jail Superintendent forthwith wherein the appellant is suffering the jail sentence.

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Sd/Sd/- (Sanjay K. Agrawal) (Sanjay Kumar Jaiswal) Judge Judge

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Ashok

Raju Yadav v. State of Chhattisgarh

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

Raju Yadav v. State of Chhattisgarh

Case brief

What is this about?

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