Ramji Patel and Others Vs State of Chhattisgarh

2^nd Additional Session Judge, Baloda Bazar in ST No.298/2004, whereby the appellants have been convicted under Section 304-B of IPC and sentenced to undergo RI for 7 years.

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The prosecution case, in brief, is that the deceased Shakuntala was married to appellant no.5 Surendra Kumar Patel in the year 2001 at Village Sothi. It was alleged that the in-laws of the deceased i.e. the appellants treated her with cruelty for pressing their demand for dowry, as a result of which deceased Shakuntala Bai Patel committed suicide. The incident was reported to the police station concerned, upon which a case was registered against the appellants and after completion of investigation, the charge sheet was filed before the Magistrate concerned.

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The prosecution examined 15 witnesses in its support, whereas the defence examined two defence witnesses. The learned Trial Court after appreciation of oral and documentary evidence available on record convicted and sentenced the appellants, as mentioned in para 1 of the judgment.

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Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court is contrary to law and material available on record. The Learned Trial Court failed to appreciate the evidence recorded in the case in its true and correct perspective and succumbed to conjectures and surmises in convicting and sentencing the appellants. The learned Trial Court failed to appreciate that the prosecution utterly failed to prove the

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guilt of the appellants beyond all reasonable doubts. The learned Trial Court failed to appreciate that at the first instance i.e. at the time of postmortam, the relatives of the deceased were present and did not suspect anything against the appellants and it was only after a period of about two months, the the First Information Report was lodged. The learned Trial Court further failed to appreciate that even during inquest investigations, the witnesses, who are relatives of the deceased, did not state anything against the appellants. The learned Trial Court failed to appreciate that that there was no allegations of any demand of dowry and the ingredients of section 304 (B) of IPC are not made out against the appellants. Therefore, the appeal deserves to be allowed. Reliance has been placed on the judgments rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matters of Charan Singh @ Charanjit Singh vs The State of Uttarakhand , reported in 2023 Live Law SC 341 and Shoor Singh and others vs State of Uttarakhand , reported in MANU/SC/1036/2024 .

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Per contra, learned State counsel supports the impugned judgment and submits that the learned Trial Court has minutely appreciated the evidence available on record and has rightly convicted the appellants. Therefore, the appeal deserves to be dismissed.

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Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record.

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It is clear from the record of the learned Trial Court that the learned Trial Court framed charges under Section 304-B of IPC against the appellants and after appreciation of oral and documentary evidence available on record, the learned Trial Court convicted the appellants under Section 304-B of IPC and sentenced them to undergo RI for 7 years.

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It is not disputed in this case that the marriage of the deceased Shakuntala and the appellant No.5 were solemnized in the year 2001 and Shakuntala died on 07.04.2004 due to burn injuries.

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Banshilal Patel (PW-1), father of the deceased, and Sukhbai (PW2), mother of the deceased stated that on 07.04.2004, they received information that Shakuntala got burnt due to outburst of cylinder.

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Dr. B. Chourasiya (PW-7) stated that on 07.04.2004, he examined Shakuntala, wife of Surendra, and found that she was unconscious and she was 100% burnt. He referred the patient immediately for medical college, Raipur and gave his report (ExP/6). R. G. Soni (PW-14) Investigating Officer stated that he informed the Executive Magistrate regarding panchnama and inquest memo was prepared by Tahsildar, Bhilaigarh and he gave application (Ex-P/9) for postmortem and he admitted signature on B to B Part and he also stated that he gave information/notice under Section 175 of CrPC.

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Dr. Santosh Sahu (PW-11) conducted the postmortem of the

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deceased on 08.04.2004 and opined that death was due to 100% burn injuries and nature of death seems to be accidental. He also opined that in body and clothes of the deceased, no smell of inflammable substance was found. He also opined that as the deceased was wearing nylon saree at the time of operating gas stove, as such the fire could have caught and he gave his report vide Ex-P/10.

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The defence witness Shantaram Sahu (DW-1) also stated that he was working as labourer at the time of accident in the accused’s house. The made ladder/stairs and he also made slab of gas stove in accused’s kitchen. When he was working in his house, wife of Surendra while crying came outside of the kitchen, as she was burning, upon which they tried to extinguish the fire by pouring water and blanket on her and after they extinguished the fire, then they asked the deceased who she got burnt, then she told that she was starting gas stove, then the fire caught up. Pradeep Kesharwani (DW-2) stated that when he heard some noise, he went at the place of occurrence and there also some persons including his wife were trying to extinguish the fire and they told him that she got burnt due to gas stove.

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The Hon’ble Apex Court in Charanjeet Singh held in para 11 as under:-

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“11. The interpretation of Sections 304B and 498A IPC came up for consideration in Baijnath’s case (supra). The opinion was summed up in paras 25 to 27 thereof, which are extracted below:-

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“25. Whereas in the offence of dowry death defined by Section 304-B of the Code, the ingredients thereof are:

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( i) death of the woman concerned is by any burns or bodily injury or by any cause other than in normal circumstances, and

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(ii) is within seven years of her marriage, and

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(iii) that soon before her death, she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of the husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry.

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The offence under Section 498-A of the Code is attracted qua the husband or his relative if she is subjected to cruelty. The Explanation to this Section exposits “cruelty” as:

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(i) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical), or

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(ii) harassment of the woman, where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand.

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Patently thus, cruelty or harassment of the lady by her husband or his relative for or in connection with any demand for any property or valuable security as a demand for dowry or in connection therewith is the common constituent of both the offences.

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The expression “dowry” is ordained to have the same meaning as in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. The expression “cruelty”, as explained, contains in its expanse, apart from the conduct of the tormentor, the consequences precipitated thereby qua the lady subjected thereto. Be that as it may, cruelty or harassment by the husband or any relative of his for or in connection with any demand of dowry, to reiterate, is the gravamen of the two offences.”

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The Hon’ble Apex Court in Shoor Singh (supra) held in paras 12

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& 13 as under:-

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“12. To constitute a ‘dowry death’, punishable under Section 304- B7 IPC, following ingredients must be satisfied:

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i. death of a woman must have been caused by any burns or bodily injury or it must have occurred otherwise than under normal circumstances;

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ii. such death must have occurred within seven years of her marriage;

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iii. soon before such death, she must have been subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband; and

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iv. such cruelty or harassment must be in connection with any demand for dowry.

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The phrase ‘otherwise than under normal circumstances’ is wide enough to encompass a suicidal death.

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When all the above ingredients of ‘dowry death’ are proved, the presumption under Section 113-B8 of the Evidence Act is to be raised against the accused that he has committed the offence of ‘dowry death’. What is important is that the presumption under Section 113-B is not in respect of commission of an act of cruelty, or harassment, in connection with any demand for dowry, which is one of the essential ingredients of the offence of ‘dowry death’. The presumption, however, is in respect of commission of the offence of ‘dowry death’ by the accused when all the essential ingredients of ‘dowry death’ are proved beyond reasonable doubt by ordinary rule of evidence, which means that to prove the essential ingredients of an offence of ‘dowry death’ the burden is on the prosecution.”

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In light of the above, in the present case also, it is an admitted position that the deceased died otherwise than under the normal circumstances within 7 years of her marriage, but it is not proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt that she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or his relatives soon before her death in connection with any demand of dowry. The relatives of the deceased mother, father and brother have not stated that any demand for dowry was made by the appellants

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either before or at the time of marriage of the deceased and it is also clear that they have alleged that they suspected that their son-in-laws and relatives could have burnt her, but postmortem report also suggests that death was accidental and not suicidal so the prosecution has failed to prove this fact that the deceased died due to some torture and harassment by the appellants for demand of dowry, whereas the learned Trial Court convicted the appellants under Section 304-B of IPC, as such the finding recorded by the learned Trial Court is not based on the proper appreciation of oral and documentary evidence available on record. Therefore, the conviction and sentence imposed upon the appellants by the learned trial Court is not sustainable.

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Ex consequenti , the appeal is allowed. The judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the learned trial Court is hereby set aside. The appellants are acquitted of the charges under Section 304-B of IPC.

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The appellants are on bail. Their bail bonds shall remain operative for a period of 6 weeks from today in view of provision contained in Section 437-A of CrPC.

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The trial Court record along with a copy of this judgment be sent back immediately to the trial Court concerned for compliance and necessary action.

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Sd/-

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Rajani Dubey Judge

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Nirala

Ramji Patel and Others v. State of Chhattisgarh

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Ramji Patel and Others v. State of Chhattisgarh

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