Narayan Vs State of Chhattisgarh — Bail and Remand | Chhattisgarh HC (2025)

Narayan Vs State of Chhattisgarh — Bail and Remand | Chhattisgarh HC (2025)

What the court decided

AI extract

Outcome

Appeal allowed; impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence set aside; appellant Narayan (A-1) acquitted of the charges under Sections 304-B and 498-A IPC by extending benefit of doubt; bail bonds to remain in operation for six months in view of Section 437-A CrPC; trial Court record with copy of judgment to be sent back immediately.

Issue for consideration

Whether the prosecution proved that the deceased Khikh Bai was subjected to cruelty or harassment by the accused for, or in connection with, a demand of dowry soon before her death, so as to sustain the convictions under Sections 304-B and 498-A IPC and invoke the presumption under Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act. +1 more

Court's answer

Although the death of Khikh Bai occurred otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage, the prosecution utterly failed to prove cruelty or harassment by the husband or his relatives for, or in connection with, any demand of dowry soon before her death; the pre-requisites for invoking the presumption under Section 304-B IPC or Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act were not fulfilled.

Ratio / Principle

Neighbouring/independent witnesses (PW/3, PW/4 and PW/6) did not support the prosecution and admitted the suggestion of defence that the deceased was living happily with the accused/appellant Narayan and her in-laws in the matrimonial home.

Key takeaways

The statements of the mother (PW/12), father (PW/1) and other relative witnesses (PW/2, PW/5, PW/13) were recorded on 08.12.2004, i.e. about six months after the death on 03.06.2004, and there is nothing on record to substantiate the allegation of demand of dowry; the trial Court did not appreciate the prosecution witnesses' statements in their true perspective.ratio¶¶91
Recording a conviction under Section 304-B IPC together with a conviction under the alternative charge of Section 306 IPC is not according to law.ratio¶¶91

Detailed headnote1 paragraphs

Dowry-death conviction set aside; acquittal on benefit of doubt — High Court of Chhattisgarh, Bilaspur (Smt. Justice Rajani Dubey, J.), CRA No. 447 of 2005, decided 14.01.2025, allowed the appeal against the 29.04.2005 judgment in S.T. No. 332/2004 (ASJ, Bilaspur) convicting Narayan under Sections 498-A and 304-B IPC for the death of his wife Khikh Bai on 03.06.2004 after consuming pesticide. Marriage about two years before the death was undisputed, but the Court held the prosecution failed to prove cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, dowry 'soon before death': the father (PW/1) and grand-mother (PW/2) alleged dowry demand (motorcycle, colour TV, C.D.) only in court, contradicting their earlier statements (Ex.D/1, Ex.D/2); statements of the mother, father and other relatives were recorded only on 08.12.2004, about six months after the death; independent/neighbour witnesses (village Kotwar PW/3, Sarpanch PW/4, neighbour PW/6) did not support the prosecution and admitted the couple lived happily. The pre-requisite to invoke the presumption under Section 304-B IPC / Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act was thus absent. The Court further held that convicting under Section 304-B IPC while simultaneously recording conviction under the alternative charge of Section 306 IPC 'is not according to the law'. Appeal allowed, conviction and sentence set aside, appellant acquitted with benefit of doubt; bail bonds continued for six months under Section 437-A CrPC. Precedents relied on: Major Singh (AIR 2015 SC 2081), Ramaiah (AIR 2014 SC 3388), Shoor Singh (Cr.A.No. 249/2013, decided 20.09.2024), Charan Singh (2023 SCC Online SC 454). Co-appellant Juhru Ram (A-2) died during the appeal; appeal against him abated vide order dated 23.09.2024.

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2025:CGHC:2232

NAFR

HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

CRA No. 447 of 2005

Judgment Reserved on : 20/11/2024

Judgment Delivered on : 14 /01/2025

Narayan S/o Juhru Ram Satnami, Aged About 24 Years, R/o Village Darang, P.S. Champa, District Janjgir Champa Chhattisgarh.

Juhru Ram (Died And Abated) As Per Honble Court Order Dated 23/09/2024

... Appellants

versus

State Of Chhattisgarh

... Respondents

For Appellants : Mr. Neeraj Mehta, Advocate For : Ms. M. Asha, Panel Lawyer.

Respondent/State

(Hon’ble Smt. Justice Rajani Dubey)

(C A V Judgment)

This Criminal appeal is directed against the judgment of conviction and order of sentenced dated 29.04.2005 passed in Session Trial No. 332/2004 whereby the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Bilaspur has convicted the appellants under Sections 498-A and 304-B of IPC and sentenced them to undergo R.I. for 02 years with fine of Rs.500/-, R.I. for 10 years with fine of Rs.500/- each, with default stipulation.

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During the pendency of appeal, accused/appellant Juhru Ram (A-2) died and the appeal in respect of the said accused/appellant abated vide order dated 23.09.2024. Now, the present appeal is being contested on behalf of accused/appellant Nos. 1 only .

In the present case, name of deceased is Khikh Bai, whose marriage was solemnized with accused/appellant No.1 - Narayan, son of accused/appellant Jhuru Ram (who died during the pendency of appeal) according to Hindu customs.

According to the prosecution, accused/appellant Narayan along with village Kotwar Shiv Prasad, Mekhram Bareth, Vijay Banjare all resident of village Darang went to police station and informed that on 03.06.2004 at around 4.00 am, he (accused) (A-1) had gone to bring the thrashed paddy which was given by him in village Kadari. His wife Khikh Bai (since deceased) was working in the house. At around 11.30 am, when he came back to house after threshing paddy, he saw his wife sleeping in the room. He tried to wake her up but she did not wake up. At that time, his father Juhru Ram (A-2), Makhni Bai, Laxmin Bai, Kanti Bai, Chhatram etc. were present whom he informed that deceased Khikh Bai was not waking up. After calling the neighbours and upon checking, accused Narayan brought his wife Khikh Bai to Champa hospital, where after checking by nurse, Khikh Bai was declared brought dead. Thereafter, accused/appellant Narayan (A-1) brought his wife deceased Khikh Bai back home. Then the people of the locality told him to report the matter to the police station. Foam was coming out of from the mouth of deceased and it was suspected that she might have died due to some poison. On the basis of above information, meg was registered under section 174 of the Cr.P.C. and during merg inquiry, J. S. Raklhra, D.S.P. summoned panch witnesses

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and sent the body of deceased to B.D.M. Hospital, Champa for postmortem examination to ascertain the exact cause of death and from inside the house, soil in which some substance like half broken pill wrapped in a paper wrapper was seized in presence of Kotwar and Ratanlal and from Rohit Bareth’s field, a small tin box on which Ucidin 20 E was written, were seized in front of witnesses and after inquest, crime was registered under Section 306, 498-A of IPC and the case was taken up for investigation. After due investigation, charge sheet was filed before the jurisdictional Court at Janjgir.

After filing of the charge sheet, the trial Court framed the charges against accused/appellants under Sections 498-A, 304-B alternatively under Section 306 of IPC.

So as to hold the accused/appellants guilty, the prosecution has examined as many as 13 witnesses. Statements of the accused/appellants were also recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. in which they denied the charges levelled against them and pleaded innocence and false implication in the case.

After hearing counsel for the parties, the learned trial Court has convicted and sentenced the accused/appellant as mentioned above in para 1 of this judgment. Hence this appeal.

Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the impugned judgment and finding of the learned trial Court is not only bad and perverse in law but also manifestly wrong leading to a great and grave miscarriage of justice. The learned trial Court ought to have judicially scrutinized and appreciated the evidence adduced by the prosecution which has not been done. Learned counsel also submits that the learned trial Court has only discussed the evidence which goes against the appellant. The

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views which were favourable to the appellant (accused) have not been considered properly. The evidence of Ramlal (PW/1), father of the deceased is not a trustworthy being interested witness. He has fully developed and exaggerated the story as per his own choice before the trial Court and has tried to implicate the present appellant. Panchanama (EX-P-1) totally differs from his statement. In para 11 of his testimony, he developed a new story of cruelty, demand of motor cycle, cooler etc., which was not at all stated in his statement recorded under Section 161 of Cr.P.C. It is one of the crucial point that he has stated very clearly in para 3 that there was no demand of dowry at the time of marriage, which also infer that dowry was not a motive for committing the offence. Further, Anup Bajpai (PW/10), A.S.I. has also corroborated this fact in para 2 of his statement that no report or statement regarding torture and cruelty by any member of the deceased's family was made.

Learned counsel also submits that likewise the statement of Kairo Bai (PW-2) also differs from her statement recorded under Section 161 of Cr.P.C.. All the facts stated by her in Court statement totally found missing in her case diary statement. She developed a new story and narrated a manipulated story before the trial Court. The major and vital omission reveals that she was not a witness of worth reliance being interested witness. Her testimony should have also been scrutinized judiciously by the learned trial Court keeping in view the statement of J.S. Rakhra (PW-11), D.S.P., wherein in para 7, this witness clearly stated that not a single person from the family of deceased had lodged report against the appellant. Further, Shiv Prasad Chouhan (PW-3), the village Kotwar has specifically stated in para 8 of his statement that the father of the deceased had never stated regarding torture or

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harassment to the deceased by the appellants. He is an independent witness and his statement ought to have been given weightage by the trial Court in determining the 'Motive' factor in this case. Learned counsel also submits that Samaru Ram Baghel (PW-4), an independent witness, has also supported the fact of cordial relation between the deceased and appellant Narayan, which finds corroboration from the evidence of Dil Sai (PW/5) who has also stated that the deceased and appellant Narayan were peacefully working altogether as labourers. Learned counsel further submits that according to the statement of K.P. Rathore (PW/7) who is a Medical Officer, has stated in para 3 of his evidence, that a person may die in case of excessive consumption of any medicine without consulting the physician. Likewise Dr. Chandel (PW/8) in para 4 of his statement has also stated that there was no mark of any injury or abrasion on the body of the deceased. Learned counsel also submits that according to statement of P.S. Rakhra (PW/11), the parents of deceased were residing separately from the deceased. The poison named Ucidin was seized from an open field near bushes. Learned counsel also submits that in this way if the statement of all the witnesses examined by the prosecution is properly, minutely, microscopically and judicially scrutinized, makes it clear that PW-1 and PW-2 are the close relatives of the deceased (father and grand mother) and they have tried their level best to develop and exaggerate their statement by creating a different story only in order to falsely implicate the appellant on false allegations and manipulation. The conviction can not be based on the false statement of these witnesses. Thus, in totality of the evidence present on record, the appellant deserve to be acquitted.

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10. Reliance has been placed on the decisions of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Major Singh & Another V. State of Punjab reported in AIR 2015 SC 2081 , Ramaiah alias Rama V. State of Karnataka reported in AIR 2014 SC 3388 and Shoor Singh & Anr. V. State of Uttarakhand [Cr.A.No. 249/2013] decided on 20.09.2024.

On the other hand, learned State counsel supporting the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence submits that the learned trial Court minutely appreciated the oral and documentary evidence and convicted the appellant. So, the appeal being without any merit is liable to be dismissed.

Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record.

It is clear from the record of the learned trial Court that it has framed charges under Sections 498-A, 304-B in alternate Section 306 of IPC against the accused persons and after appreciation of oral and documentary evidence, the learned trial Court acquitted co-accused Laxmin Bai and convicted the accused/appellant Narayan (A-1) and Jhuru Ram (A-2 against whom appeal stands abated) under Section 498-A, 304-B in alternate Section 306 of IPC and sentenced them under Sections 498-A and 304-B of IPC.

It is not disputed before the learned trial Court that the deceased Khik Bai was married with accused/appellant Narayan (A-1) before two years of incident and she died on 03.06.2004 after consuming pesticide.

Ramlal (PW/1) is father of deceased Khik Bai. He has stated that after one year of marriage, when he went to his daughter’s house to meet her, she said that she would come with him (this witness), on which, he

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said accused/appellant Narayan to sent her deceased daughter with him, whereupon the accused/appellant denied to send her and slapped her saying that he (accused) was not given any articles like motorcycle, colour TV and C.D. In cross-examination, this witness admitted that at the time of preparing inquest memo and at the time of funeral, he did not lodge any complaint or FIR against the accused persons. He has also admitted that prior to death of his daughter he did make any complaint before the Mahasabha of his society. This witness, in para 17, has stated that he had narrated the whole incident to police in his statement (Ex.D/1) that accused/appellant Narayan slapped his daughter, he used to say that he (this witness) did not give motorcycle, colour T.V. C.D. etc in dowry and that he is poor person and can’t afford this but he cannot tell the reason if the above statement is not written in his statement (Ex.D/1).

Kairo Bai (PW/2) is grand-mother of deceased Khik Bai. She has also stated what has been stated by Ram Lal (PW/1). She further states in para 2 that accused persons killed her grand-daughter due to dowry. In cross-examination, she has stated that she informed the police about the torture being committed by the accused persons in her statement (Ex.D/2) but she cannot tell the reason if the above statement is not written in her statement (Ex.D/2).

Shiv Prasad Chouhan (PW/3) is the village Kotwar. He has admitted his signature in seizure panchanama (Ex.P/1), seizure memo (Ex.P/2), inquest memo (Ex.P/3) and Nazri Naksha (Ex.P/4) but he stated that he did not hear about any quarrel between accused and deceased Khik Bhai. In cross-examination, this witness has admitted the suggestion of defence that father of deceased Khik Bai never complained with him about the torture by accused persons and agony of his deceased

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daughter. This witness has also admitted this suggestion that accused/appellant Narayan and deceased Khik Bai were living happily.

Samaru Ram Baghel (PW/4) is Sarpanch of village. He has also stated that accused/appellant Narayan and his deceased wife Khik Bai were living happily. The prosecution has declared this witness hostile and in cross-examination this witness had denied the suggestion of prosecution.

Dilsai Baghel (PW/5) is relative of deceased. He has stated that accused persons committed maarpeet with deceased but in crossexamination, he admitted that he was not visiting the house of accused/appellant and he did not file any report about maarpeet by appellant Narayan with deceased Khik Bai.

Nanki Ram (PW/6) is neighbour of accused/appellant. He has stated that he had heard the noise of quarrel between accused/appellants and deceased Khik Bai, but in cross-examination, this witness has admitted that that he never had any conversation with the deceased and that at the time of incident, the sound of quarrel was coming from inside the house, therefore, he is guessing that it was the sound of deceased Khik Bai. This witness has also admitted that he cannot tell with certainty that it was the voice of deceased Khik Bai.

Janki (PW/12) is mother of deceased. She has stated in para 2 that the marriage of his daughter Khik Bai was solemnized with accused/appellant Narayan (A-1) and after marriage, on 2-3 occasions the deceased had come to the house and informed that the accused/appellants and her sister-in-law (Nanad) used to harass her for demand of dowry. In cross-examination, this witness, in para 9, has admitted that during the life time of deceased Khik Bai, she had never

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informed the police about the harassment and beating to the deceased by accused persons. This witness has also admitted that the accused/appellant Narayan and her deceased daughter were daily wage labourer.

Maniram (PW/13) uncle (Mama) of deceased Khik Bai. He has stated in para 3 that accused/appellant Narayan and his niece deceased Khik Bai had visited his house 2-3 times for first time deceased Khik Bai had stayed in his house for 8-10 days and during her stay she had told him that her in-laws used to harassed her for demand of dowry but in crossexamination, this witness has admitted that he has no personal knowledge about the harassment of deceased and he is telling so as he has heard this from others.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Major Singh (supra), held in para 9 and 10 as under :-

“9. To sustain the conviction under Section 304B IPC, the following essential ingredients are to be established :-

(i) The death of a woman should be caused by burns or bodily injury or otherwise than under a normal circumstance -

(ii) such a death should have occurred within seven years of her marriage;

(iii) she must have been subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband;

(iv) such cruelty or harassment should be for or in connection with demand of dowry and

(v) such cruelty or harassment is shown to have been meted out to the woman soon before her death.”

If any death is caused in connection with dowry demand, Section 113B of the Evidence Act also comes into play. Both these Sections 304B IPC and Section 113B of the Evidence Act were inserted by the Dowry Prohibition (Amendment ) Act 43 of 1986 with a view to combat the increasing menace of dowry deaths. Section 113B reads as follows :

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‘113B: Presumption as to dowry death. - When the question is whether a person has committed the dowry death of a woman and it is shown that soon before her death such woman has been subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, the Court shall presume that such person had caused the dowry death.

Explanation – For the purposes of this Section, ‘dowry death – shall have the same meaning as in Section 304B, of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860)

It is imperative to note that both these sections set out a common point of reference for establishing guilt of the accused person under Section 304B, which is ‘the woman must have been’ soon before her death – subjected to cruelty or harassment’ for or in connection with the demand of dowry -”

Further, in the matter of Ramaiah (supra), Hon’ble Apex Court held in para 18 as under :-

“18. We are conscious of the fact that in such cases, sometimes there may be delay in lodging the FIR for various valid reasons. However, it is important that those reasons come on record. There is no explanation worth the name given by the complainant as to why the complainant maintained stoic silence. In this backdrop, the testimony of these witnesses alleging dowry demand has to be tested more stringently and with some caution. On that touchstone, when we analyse the statements, we find the contradictions therein, as pointed out by the learned trial court, become very appealing and meaningful.”

In Shoor Singh (supra) , Hon’ble the Apex Court held in para 12 and 13 as under :-

“12. To constitute a ‘dowry death’, punishment under Section 304-B IPC, following ingredients must be satisfied :

i. death of a woman must have been caused by any burns or bodily injury or it must have occurred otherwise than under normal circumstances;

ii. such death must have occurred within seven years of her marriage;

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iii. Soon before such death, she must have been subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband; and

iv. such cruelty or harassment must be in connection with any demand for dowry.

The phrase ‘otherwise than under normal circumstances’ is wide enough to encompass a suicidal death.”

When all the above ingredients of ‘dowry death’ are proved, the presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act is to be raised against the accused that he has committed the offence of ‘dowry death’. What is important is that the presumption under Section 113-B is not in respect of commission of an act of cruelty, or harassment, in connection with any demand for dowry, which is one of the essential ingredients of the offence of ‘dowry death’. The presumption, however, is in respect of commission of the offence of ‘dowry death’ by the accused when all the essential ingredients of ‘dowry death’ are proved beyond reasonable doubt by ordinary rule of evidence, which means that to prove the essential ingredients of an offence of ‘dowry death’ the burden is on the prosecution.”

The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Charan Singh @ Charanjit Singh Vs. The State of Uttarakhand reported in 2023 SCC Online SC 454 held in para 11 as under :-

“11. The interpretation of Sections 304B and 498A IPC came up for consideration in Baijnath's case (supra). The opinion was summed up in paras 25 to 27 thereof, which are extracted below:

"25. Whereas the offence of dowry death defined by Section 304-B of the Code, the ingredients thereof are:

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(i) death of the woman concerned is by any burns or bodily injury or by any cause other than in normal circumstances, and

(ii) is within seven years of her marriage, and

(iii) that soon before her death, she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of the husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry.

The offence under Section 498-A of the Code is attracted qua the husband or his relative if she is subjected to cruelty. The Explanation to this Section exposits "cruelty" as:

(i) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical), or

(ii) harassment of the woman, where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawfula demand for any property or valuable security ora is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand.

Patently thus, cruelty or harassment of the lady by her husband or his relative for or in connection with any demand for any property or valuable security as a demand for dowry or in connection therewith is the common constituent of both the offences.

The expression "dowry" is ordained to have the same meaning in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. The expression "cruelty", as explained, contains in its expanse, apart from the conduct of the tormentor, the consequences precipitated thereby qua the lady subjected thereto. Be that as it may, cruelty or harassment by the husband or any relative of his for or

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in connection with any demand of dowry, to reiterate, is the gravamen of the two offences”.

In the light of aforesaid judgments of Hon’ble Apex Court, it is clear in this case also that deceased Khik Bai died otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage but the prosecution has utterly failed to prove this fact that the deceased being subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband appellant Narayan and his relatives soon before her death in connection with any demand of dowry. It is also clear that the date of death of deceased is 03.06.2004 and statement of mother (PW/12), father (PW/1), and other relatives (PW/2, PW/5 and PW/13) were recorded on 08.12.2004 i.e. after six months of the incident. It is also clear that neighbours (PW/3, PW/4 and PW/6) of deceased have not supported the case of the prosecution and they admitted the suggestion of defence in their evidence that the deceased was living happily with accused/appellant Narayan and her in-laws in her matrimonial home. There is no evidence regarding demand of dowry or cruelty and also there is no evidence that the deceased was subjected to dowry or harassment soon before her death. Evidence led by the prosecution does not fulfill the pre-requisite to invoke presumption under Section 304-B IPC or Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act. There is nothing on record to substantiate with the allegation of demand of dowry but the learned trial Court did not appreciate statement of all the prosecution witnesses in its true perspective and convicted the appellant. It is also very surprising that the learned trial Court framed charges under Section 304-B IPC and in alternate 306 IPC but in para 25 of the impugned judgment, the learned trial Court convicted the present appellant in both the Sections 304-B and in alternate under Section 306 IPC, which is not according to the law.

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On the basis of aforesaid analysis, I am of the view that the finding of the learned trial Court convicting the present appellant under Sections 304-B and 498-A of IPC is not based on proper appreciation of evidence and the benefit of doubt must be credited to the appellant and he deserve to be acquitted of the charges leveled against him.

In the result, the appeal succeeds and is, accordingly, allowed. The impugned judgment is hereby set aside and the appellant Narayan (A1) is acquitted of the charge under Sections 304-B and 498-A of IPC by extending him benefit of doubt.

30. The appellant is on bail, therefore, his bail bonds shall remain in operation for a period of six months in view of provisions of Section 437-A of CrPC.

31. The trial Court record along with a copy of this judgment be sent back immediately to the trial Court concerned for compliance and necessary action.

Sd/-

(Rajani Dubey) Judge

Digitally signed by VIJAY BHARATRAO PEKDEpekde Date: 2025.01.16 10:47:08 +0530