Panku Ram Komra Vs State of Chhattisgarh

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Reserved on : 25.03.2025 Delivered on : 11.07.2025

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NAFR

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HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

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CRA No. 394 of 2019

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1. Panku Ram Komra S/o Manker Komra Aged About 29 Years R/o VillageMangta Salhebhat Kalendra Nagar, Police Station- Tadoki, District- North Bastar Kanker, Chhattisgarh., District : Kanker, Chhattisgarh

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2. Smt. Sagro Bai W/o Late Mansay Komra Aged About 35 Years R/o VillageKosronda, Police Station- Tadoki, District- North Bastar Kanker, Chhattisgarh., District : Kanker, Chhattisgarh

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... Appellants

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versus

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State Of Chhattisgarh Through Police Station- Tadoki, District- North Bastar Kanker, Chhattisgarh., District : Kanker, Chhattisgarh

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...Respondent

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For Appellants : Ms. Renu Kochar, Advocate For State : Ms. N. K. Kashyap, PL

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DB : Hon’ble Smt. Justice Rajani Dubey Hon’ble Shri Justice Sachin Singh Rajput

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C A V Judgment

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Per Sachin Singh Rajput, J.

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Here in this case the accused/appellants have been convicted for causing the death of Mansai by strangulating with the help of a scarf. Accused Panku happens to be the nephew whereas accused Sagro Bai happens to be the wife of deceased Mansai.

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Facts in brief: On 13.12.2016 one Raje Singh Patel (PW-1) gave merg intimation (Ex.P-1) to the police to the effect that son of the deceased namely Deepak (PW-3) had come to his house and informed that his father (deceased) committed suicide by hanging, and when he along with other villagers went to the spot, deceased was found hanging to the central beam (Myar) of the Deity Room with the help of scarf with both his feet touching the ground. Based on this merg, FIR (Ex.P-16) was registered on 08.01.2017 i.e. about 25 days after the incident. During investigation, inquest was conducted vide Ex. P-3, the accused persons were arrested vide Ex. P-17 and Ex. P-18 and the dead body was sent for postmortem examination. After completion of investigation, charge-sheet was filed before concerned JMFC for the offence punishable under Sections 302, 201, 34 IPC. On committal, the case was received by Additional Sessions Judge Bhanupratappur (“trial Court” henceforth) where the charge has been framed under Sections 302/34 and 201 IPC against both the accused persons, who however denied the same and claimed trial.

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Prosecution examined 14 witnesses to prove its case. Statements of the accused persons were also recorded under Section 313 CrPC where they pleaded their innocence and false implication in the case.

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Learned trial Court by judgment dated 13.02.2019 rendered in ST No. 27/2017 convicted the accused persons under Sections 302/34 and 201/34 IPC and sentenced each of them to undergo life imprisonment with fine of Rs. 500/- under section 302/34 and RI for seven years with fine of Rs. 500/under Section 201 IPC. Hence this appeal.

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Learned counsel for the appellants made the following submissions:-

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(I) That the conviction and sentence imposed on the accused/appellants is

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not based on proper appreciation of the evidence of the witnesses and therefore not sustainable in law.

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(ii) That the evidence of so-called eyewitness (PW-2) who at the relevant time was just six year old contains number of contradictions and omissions and therefore cannot be made the basis for conviction.

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(iii) That the child witness being of immature understanding is an easy prey to tutoring cannot be relied upon particularly when her testimony remains uncorroborated by any other piece of evidence.

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(iv) That there is 27 days delay in recording the police statement of the child witness and the prosecution has failed to offer any plausible explanation for such huge delay which renders the entire prosecution case doubtful.

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(v) That the FIR does not mention about the eyewitness (PW-2) and thus her subsequent inclusion as such is an afterthought. (vi) That the medical evidence does not support the case of the prosecution as there is nothing to show that the death was homicidal in nature.

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(vii) In support of his submissions, reliance is placed on the decisions of the Supreme Court in the matter of Pradeep v. The State of Haryana rendered on 05.07.2023 in Criminal Appeal No. 553 of 2012 and also in the matter of Chandrapal v. The State of Chhattisgarh (Earlier MP) reported in 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 529.

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On the other hand, supporting the impugned judgment learned counsel for the respondent/State submits that there is ample evidence to show the involvement of the accused/appellants in the crime in question and therefore the findings recorded by learned trial Court are fully justified. He submits that from the evidence on record it is manifest that at the time of incident the accused/appellants were the only inmates of the house in question and

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therefore, it is they who are supposed to have the special knowledge as to how the occurrence took place. She further submits that the six year old daughter of the deceased and accused/appellant Sagro Bai who has been examined by the prosecution as PW-2 has fully supported the case of the prosecution stating about the role played by the accused/appellants in causing the death of her father (deceased), the trial Court’s conclusion holding them guilty and imposing the sentence as described above, cannot be said to be illegal or contrary to the evidence on record warranting interference by this Court in this appeal.

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Heard counsel for the parties patiently and gone through the evidence of the witnesses thoroughly.

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Raje Singh (PW-1) is the witness who gave merg intimation (Ex.P-1) to the police on the basis of which FIR (Ex.P-16) was registered against the accused/appellants who has stated that on the following day of the occurrence in the morning son of deceased namely Pradeep had come to his house and informed about the death of his father (deceased) having taken place. On being asked by this witness as to how the death took place, Pradeep told it to be on account of hanging. When this witness along with the villagers went to the house of the deceased, his body was found hanging in his room to the central beam with the help of a scarf. Thereafter, this witness accompanied by accused/appellant No. 2 and the village Kotwar went to police station Tadoki and reported the matter. According to this witness, accused/appellant No.2 had asked the Sarpanch not to take the dead body for postmortem examination, and insisted for cremation thereof. This witness has further stated that accused/appellant No.1 had told him about having gone to the house of the deceased on the night of occurrence at about 11 PM

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and seen his dead body hanging. This witness has expressed his apprehension that as the accused/appellant No.1 had gone to the house of the deceased in the night of occurrence, it is he who killed Man Sai. He is also the witness to inquest (Ex.P-3) and seizure of clothes made under Ex. P- 4 which bear his signature. In cross examination also this witness has stated the same thing as in the examination-in-chief. In paragraph No. 23 he has stated that accused/appellant Sagro Bai herself had informed him that accused Panku had caused the death of Man Sai and she had held his feet.

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Now the important witness to the incident is Sanoti (PW-2) – the 6 year old daughter of accused/appellant No.2 and the deceased. By putting preliminary questions, learned trial Court satisfied itself about her capability to give evidence, and then proceeded to record the same. She has stated that on the date of incident accused/appellant No.1 had attacked her father on stomach. According to her, accused/appellant No.2 who at the relevant time was warming herself before the hearth did not kill her father. This witness has then clarified that accused/appellant No.1 had hit her father with shoe and also strangulated him with scarf, and not her mother (accused/appellant No.2). This witness has stated that the accused/appellant No.1 then took her father to the deity room and hanged him to the central beam. In crossexamination, she has admitted that in the night of occurrence it was dark, but as the light was on everything was visible to her. At that time, this witness and her mother (accused/appellant No.2) were warming themselves in the courtyard before the fireplace. She however has admitted that no disclosure was made by her to the police that accused/appellant No. 1 had hit her father with shoe. When her father was being hit by accused/appellant No.1, this witness had raised the cries. This witnesses has admitted to have told the

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police that accused/appellant No.1 had hanged her father in the deity room to the central beam, but if it is not written in her police statement, she could not tell the reason therefor. This witness has denied that after the incident she had gone to sleep in the house of her neighbour, rather she had slept in her house itself. Then she admits to have told the police that due to fear she had gone to sleep in the house of others. She has admitted that even the following day of the incident she had gone to school but did not tell anyone about the incident. She has admitted that police had recorded her statement on 15.01.2017.

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On being questioned by the Court as to on what date her statement was recorded, she expressed her ignorance about the same. On being further asked as to whether her statement was recorded by the police, she said “No”. Again on being questioned that at the time when her father was being hanged, her mother had cried, while answering the same she stated that her mother did not let her cry nor let her call anyone, but all this was not told by her to the police . To a question whether she wanted to meet her mother, she said “No”. At last also, this witness has reiterated that neither her mother nor accused/appellant No.1 allowed anyone to raise any alarm.

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Deepak (PW-3) another minor son of the accused/appellant No.2 and the deceased was also subjected to preliminary questioning to assess his understanding level to give evidence and then after being satisfied trial Court proceeded to record his evidence. This witness has stated that on the day of incident he was in the house of his maternal uncle and it is one Mahadev Kovdo (PW-4) who had informed him about the death of his father and after that when he went to his house, the body of his father was found hanging to the central beam. In cross examination, this witness has stated to be

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unaware as to how his father died, as he was not at home at that time. On being questioned by the Court whether this witness wanted to meet his mother, he answered saying “no” as she had killed his father. Mahadev Kavdo (PW-4) has stated that on the date of incident when he was sleeping, the accused/appellant No.2 and her daughter (PW-2) had come to his house and informed about Man Sai being hanged. This witness then went to the house of Chamar Singh to take back Deepak and Sandeep – the sons of the deceased, but being late in the night he had stayed there in the night. Next day, when he went to the house of the deceased, he saw his body hanging. This was then informed to the Kotwar and then to the Police. In crossexamination, he has admitted that his house is near the house of Mansai but he did not hear the cries of anyone in the night of incident. In crossexamination also this witness has stated almost the same thing as in the examination-in-chief.

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Sanjiv Koma (PW-5) has stated that on coming to know about the incident through Raje Singh (PW-1) on the following day, when he went to the house of the deceased, he saw his body hanging. He has further stated that the accused/appellants had asked not to take the matter to the police as they were poor people. Harilal (PW-6) has also made somewhat similar statement like PW-5. He stated that he knew nothing of the incident. Doodhraj Patel (PW-7) is a hearsay witness and has stated nothing about the incident. This witness has however been declared hostile. However, in cross examination he has stated that PW-1 had informed him about the fact that accused/appellant No.1 was insisting upon settling the matter in the village itself. Sandip Komra (PW-10) – another son of the accused/appellant No.2 and the deceased has also not supported the case of the prosecution and has been declared hostile. He has stated that he was not aware as to how his

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father died. Mo. Tareeq (PW-13) is the investigating officer who has duly supported the case of the prosecution. He has stated that he saw the body of the deceased hanging to the central beam and his feet were touching the ground.

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Dr. Sheetal Dugga (PW-14) is the witness who conducted postmortem examination on the body of the deceased and gave his report (Ex.P-21). He has stated that strangulation mark was present in the neck of the deceased, bone of the neck was dislocated, mark of antemortem injury was present on the stomach. While giving opinion, this witness has stated that death of Mansai depends on circumstances but it was within 12 to 48 hours of postmortem examination. To a question whether the dislocation of the neck bone was due to hanging with scarf to the central beam, this witness has stated in affirmative. According to this witness, the death of Mansai could be suicidal as well.

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Having thus discussed the evidence of the witnesses in depth, the fate of the appeal mainly appears to hinge on the testimony of child witness (PW2) and the doctor (PW-14) who conducted autopsy on the dead body. Since the age of the child witness at the time of incident has been stated to be six years, it can safely be said that she had optimum level of maturity of understanding. The trial Court also found her to be mature enough putting to her certain preliminary questions. From her deposition it is manifest that accused/appellant No.1 had hit her father with shoe and also strangulated him with scarf and then after taking him to the deity room hanged him to the central beam. Her deposition further shows that though it was dark in the night yet everything was visible as the light was on. Her deposition also goes to show that when her father was being hit by accused/appellant No.1, this

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witness tried to raise an alarm but her mother (appellant No.2) held her back from doing so. Furthermore, the body of the deceased was seen hanging to the central beam of the house by almost all the witnesses and according to some of them being PW-1 and PW-7 the accused/appellant No.1 was insisting upon disposing of the body without taking the matter to the police station and without postmortem examination. According to Sandip (PW-10), one of the sons of the deceased, accused/appellant No.1 used to visit his house and pick up quarrel with his father (the deceased). Of course, there are certain discrepancies in the testimony of the child witness (PW-2) but as on material particulars as to who did what, she remained consistent, such trivialities have to be sidelined.

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Medical evidence though does not unequivocally speak of the death being homicidal in nature yet the injuries noticed by him have been opined to be antemortem. The evidence of this witness also corroborates the testimony of child witness as regards an attack with shoe on the stomach of the deceased as he noticed an antemortem injury mark thereat. Further, to a question put by the Court whether dislocation of the bone of the neck could be due to hanging to a central beam with a scarf, this witness has answered the same affirmatively. Thus from the injury and other marks noticed on the body of the deceased, the death of the Mansai cannot be said to be suicidal, rather it was homicidal in nature juxtaposing the evidence of PW-2 and PW14. It is not a case where the case is totally based on the medical evidence, rather PW-2 – a child witness is there who has given graphic details of the incident as to how the accused/appellant No. 1 first attacked the deceased with shoe, then tied the scarf around his neck, took him to the deity room and hanged him to the central beam thereof. On this, she stood consistently and unflinchingly. The six year old child witness in the case in hand is thus found

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to be capable of understanding the questions put to it and able to give coherent and rational answers and therefore, there is no reason for this Court not to believe her testimony. Looking to the demeanor of the child witness noted by the trial Court her testimony appears voluntary and not borne out of the influence of others. In respect of such a witness it has time and again been held by the Supreme Court that there is no requirement or condition precedent that the evidence of a child witness must be corroborated before it is considered and that a child witness who exhibits the demeanour of any other competent witness and whose evidence inspires confidence can be relied upon without any need for corroboration and can form the sole basis for conviction. If the evidence of the child explains the relevant events of the crime without improvements or embellishments, the same does not require any corroboration whatsoever.

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The recent judicial pronouncement of the Supreme Court carrying in its fold previous other decisions, in the matter of State of Madhya Pradesh v. Balveer Singh reported in 2025 INSC 261 has held as under:-

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“57. To put it simply, in assessing the value of the evidence of the eyewitnesses, two principal considerations are whether, in the circumstances of the case, it is possible to believe their presence at the scene of occurrence or in such situations as would make it possible for them to witness the facts deposed to by them and secondly, whether there is anything inherently improbable or unreliable in their evidence. In respect of both these considerations, the circumstances either elicited from those witnesses themselves or established by other evidence tending to improbabilise their presence or to discredit the veracity of their statements, will have a bearing upon the value which a Court would attach to their evidence. Although in cases where the plea of the accused is a mere bald assertion of tutoring, yet the evidence of the prosecution witnesses has to be

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examined on its own merits, where the accused raises a definite plea or puts forward a positive case which is inconsistent with that of the prosecution, the nature of such plea or case and the probabilities in respect of it will also have to be taken into account while assessing the value of the prosecution evidence.

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We summarize our conclusion as under: -

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(I) The Evidence Act does not prescribe any minimum age for a witness, and as such a child witness is a competent witness and his or her evidence and cannot be rejected out-rightly.

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(II) As per Section 118 of the Evidence Act, before the evidence of the child witness is recorded, a preliminary examination must be conducted by the Trial Court to ascertain if the child-witness is capable of understanding sanctity of giving evidence and the import of the questions that are being put to him.

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(III) Before the evidence of the child witness is recorded, the Trial Court must record its opinion and satisfaction that the child witness understands the duty of speaking the truth and must clearly state why he is of such opinion.

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(IV) The questions put to the child in the course of the preliminary examination and the demeanour of the child and their ability to respond to questions coherently and rationally must be recorded by the Trial Court. The correctness of the opinion formed by the Trial Court as to why it is satisfied that the child witness was capable of giving evidence may be gone into by the appellate court by either scrutinizing the preliminary examination conducted by the Trial Court, or from the testimony of the child witness or the demeanour of the child during the deposition and cross-examination as recorded by the Trial Court.

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(V) The testimony of a child witness who is found to be competent to depose i.e., capable of understanding the questions put to it and able to give coherent and rational answers would be admissible in evidence.

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(VI) The Trial Court must also record the demeanour of the child witness during the course of its deposition and cross-examination and whether the evidence of such child witness is his voluntary expression and not borne out of the influence of others.

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(VII) There is no requirement or condition that the evidence of a child witness must be corroborated before it can be considered. A child witness who exhibits the demeanour of any other competent witness and whose evidence inspires confidence can be relied upon without any need for corroboration and can form the sole basis for conviction. If the evidence of the child explains the relevant events of the crime without improvements or embellishments, the same does not require any corroboration whatsoever.

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(VIII)Corroboration of the evidence of the child witness may be insisted upon by the courts as measure of caution and prudence where the evidence of the child is found to be either tutored or riddled with material discrepancies or contradictions. There is no hard and fast rule when such corroboration would be desirous or required, and would depend upon the peculiar facts and circumstances of each case.

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(IX) Child witnesses are considered as dangerous witnesses as they are pliable and liable to be influenced easily, shaped and moulded and as such the courts must rule out the possibility of tutoring. If the courts after a careful scrutiny, find that there is neither any tutoring nor any attempt to use the child witness for ulterior purposes by the prosecution, then the courts must rely on the confidence-inspiring testimony of such a witness in determining the guilt or innocence of the accused. In the absence of any allegations by the accused in this regard, an inference as to whether the child has been tutored or not, can be drawn from the contents of his deposition.

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(X) The evidence of a child witness is considered tutored if their testimony is shaped or influenced at the instance of someone else

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or is otherwise fabricated. Where there has been any tutoring of a witness, the same, may possibly produce two broad effects in their testimony; (i) improvisation or (ii) fabrication.”

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(i) Improvisation in testimony whereby facts have been altered or new details are added inconsistent with the version of events not previously stated must be eradicated by first confronting the witness with that part of its previous statement that omits or contradicts the improvisation by bringing it to its notice and giving the witness an opportunity to either admit or deny the omission or contradiction. If such omission or contradiction is admitted there is no further need to prove the contradiction. If the witness denies the omission or contradiction the same has to be proved in the deposition of the investigating officer by proving that part of police statement of the witness in question. Only thereafter, may the improvisation be discarded from evidence or such omission or contradiction be relied upon as evidence in terms of Section 11 of Evidence Act.

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(ii) Whereas the evidence of a child witness which is alleged to be doctored or tutored in toto, then such evidence may be discarded as unreliable only if the presence of the following two factors have to be established being as under: -

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▪ Opportunity of Tutoring of the Child Witness in question whereby certain foundational facts suggesting or demonstrating the probability that a part of the testimony of the witness might have been tutored have to be established.

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This may be done either by showing that there was a delay in recording the statement of such witness or that the presence of such witness was doubtful, or by imputing any motive on the part of such witness to depose falsely, or the susceptibility of such witness in falling prey to tutoring. However, a mere bald assertion that there is a possibility of the witness in question being tutored is not sufficient.

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▪ Reasonable likelihood of tutoring wherein the foundational facts suggesting a possibility of tutoring as established have to be further proven or cogently substantiated. This may be done by leading evidence to prove a strong and palpable motive to depose falsely, or by establishing that the delay in recording the statement is not only unexplained but indicative and suggestive of some unfair practice or by proving that the witness fell prey to tutoring and was influenced by someone else either by cross-examining such witness at length that leads to either material discrepancies or contradictions, or exposes a doubtful demeanour of such witness rife with sterile repetition and confidence lacking testimony, or through such degree of incompatibility of the version of the witness with the other material on record and attending circumstances that negates their presence as unnatural.

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(XI) Merely because a child witness is found to be repeating certain parts of what somebody asked her to say is no reason to discard her testimony as tutored, if it is found that what is in substance being deposed by the child witness is something that he or she had actually witnessed. A child witness who has withstood his or her cross-examination at length and able to describe the scenario implicating the accused in detail as the author of crime, then minor discrepancies or parts of coached deposition that have crept in will not by itself affect the credibility of such child witness.

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(XII) Part of the statement of a child witness, even if tutored, can be relied upon, if the tutored part can be separated from the untutored part, in case such remaining untutored or untainted part inspires confidence. The untutored part of the evidence of the child witness can be believed and taken into consideration or the purpose of corroboration as in the case of a hostile witness.”

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Furthermore, it has come in the evidence of the child witness (PW-2) that at the relevant time there were only three persons in the house excluding the deceased – she herself and the accused/appellants, and it is a settled legal position that in such a situation the accused/appellants are supposed to

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have the special knowledge as to how and by whom the death of Mansai was caused. The law concerning the invocation of shifting of onus under Section 106 of the Evidence Act casts a duty upon the accused to explain as to how the death occurred because they being the only inmates of the house in question, the occurrence is supposed to be within their exclusive knowledge. Law holding the field even as on date casts a duty on the accused to explain certain things taking place within the four walls of the house that too occupied by only the accused, which would be almost impossible for the prosecution to establish. Supreme Court has time and again reinforced its earlier view that Section 106 is a provision which must be considered in a commonsense way; and the balance of convenience and the disproportion of the labour that would be involved in finding out and proving certain facts balanced against the triviality of the issue at stake and the ease with which the accused could prove them, are all matters that must be taken into consideration. The section cannot be used to undermine the well established rule of law that save in a very exceptional class of case, the burden is on the prosecution and never shifts. Dealing with the applicability of Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act lately it has been held by the Supreme Court in the case of Nusrat Parween v. State of Jharkhand in Criminal Appeal No. 458/2012 rendered on 10.12.2014 reported in 2024 INSC 955 as under:-

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“9. This lays down the general rule that in a criminal case the burden of proof is on the prosecution and section 106 is certainly not intended to relieve it of that duty. On the contrary, it is designed to meet certain exceptional cases in which it would be impossible, or at any rate disproportionately difficult, for the prosecution to establish facts which are "especially" within the knowledge of the accused and which he could prove without difficulty or inconvenience. The word

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"especially" stresses that. It means facts that are preeminently or exceptionally within his knowledge. If the section were to be interpreted otherwise, it would lead to the very startling conclusion that in a murder case the burden lies on the accused to prove that he did not commit the murder because who could know better than he whether he did or did not. It is evident that that cannot be the intention and the Privy Council has twice refused to construe this section, as reproduced in certain other Acts outside India, to mean that the burden lies on an accused person to show that he did not commit the crime for which he is tried. These cases are Attygalle v. Emperor and Seneviratne v. R.

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We recognise that an illustration does not exhaust the full content of the section which it illustrates but equally it can neither curtail nor expand its ambit; and if knowledge of certain facts is as much available to the prosecution, should it choose to exercise due diligence, as to the accused, the facts cannot be said to be "especially" within the knowledge of the accused. This is a section which must be considered in a commonsense way; and the balance of convenience and the disproportion of the labour that would be involved in finding out and proving certain facts balanced against the triviality of the issue at stake and the ease with which the accused could prove them, are all matters that must be taken into consideration. The section cannot be used to undermine the well established rule of law that, save in a very exceptional class of case, the burden is on the prosecution and never shifts.”

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Thus having the prosecution duly proved its case that the dead body was found hanging with a scarf to the central beam of the house and that at that time no other person than the accused/appellants and a six year old witness (PW-2) were present in the house in question, the burden

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automatically shifts onto the accused to explain the things as to how the occurrence took place, which they have utterly failed to do so. Further, in view of the categorical statement of child witness describing the incident as to how the accused/appellant No.1 first attacked the deceased on his stomach, then tied scarf around his neck, took her to the deity room and hanged him to the central beam, and all throughout this how her mother (appellant No.2) did not make any effort to save her husband, rather she did not even let PW-2 raise an alarm or call the people, the argument of the counsel for the appellant that the doctor conducting postmortem examination has not mentioned about it being homicidal, is absolutely without substance and is hereby rejected. Even otherwise as already stated, it is not a case where apart from medical evidence, no other evidence is there. Child witness – who has witnessed the occurrence with her own eyes does not need any corroboration. The need for establishing the death being homicidal in nature by way of medical evidence is where the case is based entirely on circumstantial evidence and it can not be insisted upon where like in the present case a six year old eyewitness is there who has lucidly narrated the manner in which the death of the deceased has been caused. The Supreme Court in countless decisions has held that ordinarily there would be primacy of ocular evidence over the medical evidence. Thus the decision in Chandrapal (supra) sought to be relied upon by the counsel for the appellants being distinguishable on facts is not of much help to the accused/appellants in this case. So also would be the position with the decision in Pradeep (supra), as there is no trace of tutoring of the child witness (PW-2) rather she has put forth the things consistently and without budge.

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As regards the submission made by counsel for the appellants that there was inordinate delay in recording of the police statements of the

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witnesses, keeping in mind the consistent view of the Supreme Court that delay in lodging the FIR or recording the statements of the witnesses cannot be used as a ritualistic formula for doubting the prosecution case and discarding the same solely on the ground of delay in lodging FIR or recording the evidence of witnesses, it is hereby rejected as mere delay is not going to be fatal to the case of the prosecution.

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The analysis of facts and evidence made above in the light of the judicial pronouncements of the Supreme Court, this Court is of the opinion that the prosecution has successfully proved its case. So also the trial Court too has been fully justified in appreciating the evidence adduced by the prosecution in its proper perspective. The findings recorded by it thus being based on the evidence on record do not call for any interference by this Court, and being so they are hereby maintained.

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Appeal thus fails and is dismissed.

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The trial Court records along with the copy of this judgment be sent back for compliance and necessary action.

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Registry is directed to send a copy of this judgment to the concerned Superintendent of Jail where the appellants are undergoing the sentence so as to serve the same on the appellants informing them that they are at liberty to assail the same by preferring an appeal before Hon’ble Supreme Court with the assistance of High Court Legal Services Committee or the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee.

Sd/-

(Rajani Dubey)

Judge

Sd/-

(Sachin Singh Rajput) Judge

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Jyotshi/Pawan