Partly allowed¶¶145

Ramesh Paikra v. State of Chhattisgarh

Chhattisgarh HC7 Jul 2025CRA/346/2024

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

Chhattisgarh High Court 2025 criminal appeal CRA No. 346 of 2024; alteration of conviction from Section 302 r/w Section 34 and Section 201 IPC to Section 304 Part-II IPC; Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC; sudden fight; no premeditation; heat of passion; culpable homicide not amounting to murder; knowledge without intention to cause death; son-in-law/father-in-law dispute; assault with Danda; Ramesh Paikra; Lakhan Paikra; Balodabazar; Sessions Trial No. 24 of 2020; sentence already undergone almost five years; appeal under Section 415(2) BNSS 2023; Bench: Ramesh Sinha CJ and Bibhu Datta Guru J.

What did the court decide?

Conviction altered from Section 302 r/w Section 34 and Section 201 IPC to Section 304 Part-II IPC with sentence of rigorous imprisonment for 07 years; criminal appeal allowed in part. ¶¶145

Ramesh Paikra Vs State of Chhattisgarh — Murder and Culpable Homicide | Chhattisgarh HC (2025)

What the court decided

AI extract

Outcome

Conviction altered from Section 302 r/w Section 34 and Section 201 IPC to Section 304 Part-II IPC with sentence of rigorous imprisonment for 07 years; criminal appeal allowed in part.

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Issue for consideration

Whether the trial Court's finding that the appellant/accused caused the injuries over the body of the deceased and caused his death is sustainable on the prosecution evidence. +2 more

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Court's answer

The finding of the trial Court that the appellant/accused caused the injuries over the body of the deceased and caused his death is affirmed.

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Ratio / Principle

The appellant did not have any intention to cause the death of the deceased, but by causing such injuries he must have had knowledge that the injuries inflicted by him were likely to cause death.

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Key takeaways

The act of the appellant completely satisfies the four necessary ingredients of Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC (sudden fight; no premeditation; act committed in heat of passion; no undue advantage or cruel or unusual manner), and his case falls within the purview of that Exception.ratio¶¶141
Where the evidence does not disclose any intention to cause death but it is clear that the accused had knowledge that his acts were likely to cause death, the accused can be held guilty under the second part of Section 304 IPC.ratio¶¶67

Detailed headnote1 paragraphs

CRA No. 346 of 2024, High Court of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur (Division Bench: Chief Justice Ramesh Sinha with Justice Bibhu Datta Guru; judgment per Justice Bibhu Datta Guru), decided 08.07.2025 — Criminal appeal under Section 415(2) of the Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 against the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 17.01.2024 passed by the First Additional Sessions Judge, Balodabazar in Sessions Trial No. 24 of 2020, convicting the appellant under Section 302 r/w Section 34 IPC (life imprisonment and fine of Rs. 3,000/-) and Section 201 IPC (rigorous imprisonment for seven years and fine of Rs.1,000/-) for the death of his father-in-law Lakhan Paikra, who had been missing since 21.06.2020. Post-mortem by Dr. A.S. Chauhan disclosed multiple fractures (nasal, cheek, skull, chest bone, ribs) and the opinion that death could have been caused by severe head injury from hard or blunt objects. The Court affirmed the trial Court's finding that the appellant caused the fatal injuries, noting the appellant was fully dependent on the deceased and used to demand money, leading to disputes. Applying Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC — sudden fight, no premeditation, heat of passion, and no undue advantage or cruel or unusual manner — and the intention/knowledge distinction drawn from Rampal Singh, Basdev, Sukhbir Singh, Gurmukh Singh, State v. Sanjeev Nanda, Arjun, Rambir and Anbazhagan, the Court held that the appellant, who assaulted his father-in-law with a 'Danda', acted with knowledge that the injuries were likely to cause death but without intention to cause death; accordingly the conviction under Section 302 r/w Section 34 and Section 201 IPC was altered to Section 304 Part-II IPC with rigorous imprisonment for 07 years, having regard to his age (about 46 years) and the almost five years already undergone in jail since 15/07/2020. Criminal appeal allowed in part.

2025:CGHC:31245-DB

SOURABH BHILWAR

Digitally signed by SOURABH BHILWAR Date: 2025.07.10 10:41:25 +0530

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NAFR

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HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

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CRA No. 346 of 2024

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Ramesh Paikra S/o Guman Singh Paikra Aged About 41 Years R/o Village Parsabhader, Ps City Kotwali, Balodabazar, Dist.- BalodabazarBhatapara, C.G.

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... Petitioner

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versus

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State Of Chhattisgarh Through S. H. O., P.S.- Kasdol, Dist.- BalodabazarBhatapara, C.G.

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		...Respondent(s)
For Appellant For Respondent/State	: :	Ms. Anuja Sharma, Advocate. Mr. Shashank Thakur, Dy. Advocate General.

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Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Bibhu Datta Guru, Judge

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Judgment on Board

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Per Bibhu Datta Guru , Judge

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08.07.2025

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1. Heard Ms. Anuja Sharma, learned counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Shashank Thakur, learned Dy. Advocate General, appearing for the respondent/State.

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2. This criminal appeal filed by the appellant/accused under Section 415(2) of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (for short, ‘B.N.S.S.’) is directed against the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 17.01.2024, passed by the learned First Additional Sessions Judge, Balodabazar (C.G.) in Sessions Trial No. 24 of 2020, whereby the appellant has been convicted and sentenced as under:

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Conviction under Section	Sentence
U/s 302 r/w Section 34 of the	Life Imprisonment and fine of Rs.
Indian Penal Code	3,000/-, with default stipulation.
U/s 201 of the Indian Penal	Rigorous Imprisonment for seven
Code	years and fine of Rs.1,000/-, with default stipulation.

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3. Case of the prosecution, in brief, is that on 14.07.2020, the grandson of the deceased Lakhan Lal Paikra namely; Davis Paikra, informed the Police Station In-charge Kasdol about the disappearance of his grandfather stating therein that his grandfather Lakhan Paikra was living with his daughter and son-in-law (appellant herein) and he has been missing from home since 21.06.2020, and despite inquiring about his whereabouts among relatives and around the village, he could not be traced. On the basis of the report, case was registered in the Police Station Kasdol.

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4. Based on this, since the incident occurred within the jurisdiction of the Kasdol Police Station, District Balodabazar, a First Information Report (FIR) was registered (Ex.P/47). A spot map (Ex. P/01) was prepared.

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5. After due investigation, the Police filed charge-sheet against the

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appellant before the jurisdictional criminal Court and the case was committed to the Court of Session for trial from where the learned First Additional Sessions Judge, District Balodabazar (C.G.) received the case on transfer for trial and for hearing and disposal in accordance with law.

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6. The trial Court has framed charges against the appellant for the offences punishable under Section 302 r/w Section 34 and Section 201 of the IPC and proceeded on trial. The appellant abjured the guilt and entered into defence stating that he has not committed any offence and he has been falsely implicated.

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7. In order to bring home the offence, the prosecution examined as many as 19 witnesses and exhibited 49 documents.

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8. The trial Court upon appreciation of oral and documentary evidence available on record, by its judgment dated 17.01.2024, convicted the accused/appellant for the offence punishable under Section 302 r/w Section 34 and Section 201 of the IPC and sentenced him as aforementioned, against which, this criminal appeal has been filed.

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9. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the learned trial Court is absolutely unjustified in convicting the appellant, as the prosecution has failed to prove the offence beyond reasonable doubt. He would submit that, the learned trial Court has not taken into consideration the evidence available on record in its proper prospective and thereby committed grave error in being selective in appreciating those piece of evidence which are incriminatory to the appellant/accused and discarded those piece of evidence which are favourable to the appellant. The learned trial Court has failed to see that there is no eyewitness to the incident and there are material omission and contradiction in statements of prosecution

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witnesses. He would further submit that the conviction of appellant is purely based on the evidence adduced by the police officials during investigation which is highly unreliable, though their evidence has not been duly corroborated by the independent witness. He would further contend that the appellant without any basis has been falsely roped in the present case as the learned trial Court has failed to consider that the prosecution could not prove any incident against the accused. He further submits that there was no motive or intention on the part of the appellant to cause death of the deceased and only on account of sudden quarrel, under heat of passion and in anger, the appellant caused injuries to the deceased, which caused his death. Therefore, the case of the present appellant falls within the purview of Exception 4 to Section 300 of the IPC and the act of the appellant is culpable homicide not amounting to murder, and therefore, it is a fit case where the conviction of the appellant for the offence punishable under Section 302 r/w Section 34 and Section 201 of the IPC can be converted/altered to an offence under Section 304 (Part-I or Part-II) of the IPC. Further, the appellant is in jail since 15/07/2020 and has completed almost 05 years of jail sentence, and therefore, considering the period he had already undergone, he be awarded the sentence of the period already undergone by him. Hence, the present appeal deserves to be allowed in full or in part.

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10. Per contra, learned State counsel supported the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence and submits that the prosecution has proved the offence beyond reasonable doubt by leading evidence of clinching nature. He further submits that the learned trial Court has rightly convicted the appellant for offence under Section 302 r/w Section 34 and

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Section 201 of the IPC. It has been contended that the appellant has committed heinous crime of murder and in such circumstances, it is not the case where conviction of the appellant for the offence under Section 302 r/w Section 34 and Section 201 of IPC requires to be altered to Section 304 Part-I or Part-II of IPC. Thus, the present appeal deserves to be dismissed.

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11. We have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties, considered their rival submissions made hereinabove and also went through the records with utmost circumspection.

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12. From the evidence of the prosecution witnesses, it is crystal clear that the accused person is not doing any work and he fully dependent upon his father-in-law (deceased) and used to demand money from him, time to time for which dispute has been occurred.

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13. The informant PW/2- Davis Paikra who is grandson of the deceased’s brother stated in his deposition that there was a dispute between accused Ramesh Paikra and deceased Lakhan Paikra. He stated that his grandfather Lakhan used to ask accused Ramesh Paikra to do some work and there used to be disputes between the two regarding this. He further stated that in the month of June last year, there was a fight occurred between accused Ramesh and his grandfather Lakhan and the accused Ramesh Paikra murdered his grandfather Lakhan. He stated that he came to know 15-20 days after the incident that his grandfather has been murdered. At this stage, this witness declared hostile as he did not support the prosecution case. PW/3 stated in his deposition that Saraswati Paikara is the daughter of deceased Lakhan. She was married to accused Ramesh Paikara. After marriage, they lived in Parsabhader. Since 02

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years before the incident of murder of deceased Lakhan, accused Ramesh Paikara lived with his wife Saraswati in the house of deceased, but there used to be frequent disputes between father-in-law and son-in-law regarding farming work. He stated that he does not know what happened due to the dispute. He also stated that he did not get any information about any other incident from his relatives.

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14. PW/16 – Dr. A. S. Chauhan who conducted post-mortem upon the body of the deceased stated in his deposition that several injuries were found on the body of the deceased which were deposed as follows :-

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“(i) The nasal bone of the dead body was broken.

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(ii) The cheek bones on both sides of the dead body were broken.

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(iii) The left eye bone of the dead body was found broken and sunken.

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(iv) The skull bone on the left side of the head of the dead body was broken.

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(v) The chest bone of the dead body was broken from the middle part.

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(vi) The third, seventh and eighth ribs on the right side of the chest of the dead body were broken and the second and fifth ribs on the left side were broken.

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(vii) The muscles inside the skull of the dead body were shrunken and all the internal muscles were shrunken and the stomach was also shrunken and there was a smell of putrefaction. The liver, kidneys of the deceased were giving out a smell of putrefaction.

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(viii) There was a smell of putrefaction from the lungs, throat and windpipe of the dead body.

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(ix) There was a smell of putrefaction coming from the large intestine and small intestine of the dead body.

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(x) Thigh bone from right side of the carcass and collar bone and lungs from left side, the kidneys, stomach and the sand found on his body were preserved and handed over to the constable for chemical examination.”

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15. Further, the doctor gave his opinion after conducting the medical examination of the body of the deceased which deposed as follows :-

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“(i) The death of the deceased could have been caused due to severe head injury.

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(ii) The death of the deceased may have been due to injuries caused to him by hard or blunt objects.

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(iii) It was not possible to ascertain the exact time of injuries sustained by the deceased and the time of death due to excessive decomposition and decay of the body.

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(iv) The nature and time of death of the deceased depends on the police investigation and evidence found.”

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16. From the material available on record, we are of the considered view that the learned trial Court has rightly held that it is the appellant/accused who have caused injuries over the body of the deceased and caused his death. Accordingly, we hereby affirm the said finding.

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17. The aforesaid finding brings us to the next question for consideration, whether the case of the appellant is covered within Exception 4 to Section 300 of the IPC vis-a-vis culpable homicide not amounting to murder and their conviction can be converted to Section 304 Part-I or Part-II of the IPC, as contended by learned counsel for the appellant ?

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18. It is a trite law that “culpable homicide” is a genus and “murder” is its species and all “murders” are “culpable homicides, but all “culpable homicides are not “murders” as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Rampal Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh¹ . The intention of the accused must be judged not in the light of actual circumstances, but in the light of what is supposed to be the circumstances.

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19. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Basdev v. State of Pepsu² has made the following observations :

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“Of course, we have to distinguish between motive, intention and knowledge. Motive is something which prompts a man to form an intention and knowledge is an awareness of the consequences of the act. In many cases intention and knowledge merge into each other and mean the same thing more or less and intention can be presumed from knowledge. The demarcating line between knowledge and intention is no doubt thin but it is not difficult to perceive that they connote different things. Even in some English decisions, the three ideas are used interchangeably and this has led to a certain amount of confusion.”

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20. It requires to be borne in mind that the test suggested in the aforesaid decision and the fact that the legislature has used two different terminologies, ‘intent’ and ‘knowledge’ and separate punishments are provided for an act committed with an intent to cause bodily injury which is likely to cause death and for an act committed with a knowledge that his act is likely to cause death without intent to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, it would be unsafe to treat ‘intent’ and ‘knowledge’ in

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1 (2012) 8 SCC 289

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2 AIR 1956 SC 488

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equal terms. They are not different things. Knowledge would be one of the circumstances to be taken into consideration while determining or inferring the requisite intent. Where the evidence would not disclose that there was any intention to cause death of the deceased but it was clear that the accused had knowledge that his acts were likely to cause death, the accused can be held guilty under second part of Section 304 of the IPC. It is in this background that the expression used in Indian Penal Code namely “intention” and “knowledge” has to be seen as there being a thin line of distinction between these two expressions. The act to constitute murder, if in given facts and circumstances, would disclose that the ingredients of Section 300 are not satisfied and such act is one of extreme recklessness, it would not attract the said Section. In order to bring a case within Part 3 of Section 300 of the IPC, it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular bodily injury which in the ordinary course of nature was sufficient to cause death. In other words, that the injury found to be present was the injury that was intended to be inflicted.

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21. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Sukhbir Singh v. State of Haryana³ has observed as under:-

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“ 21. Keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the opinion that in the absence of the existence of common object Sukhbir Singh is proved to have committed the offence of culpable homicide without premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel and did not act in a cruel or unusual manner and his case is covered by Exception 4 of Section 300 IPC which is punishable under Section 304 (Part I) IPC. The finding

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3 (2002) 3 SCC 327

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of the courts below holding the aforesaid appellant guilty of offence of murder punishable under Section 302 IPC is set aside and he is held guilty for the commission of offence of culpable homicide not amounting to murder punishable under Section 304 (Part I) IPC and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 10 years and to pay a fine of Rs.5000. In default of payment of fine, he shall undergo further rigorous imprisonment for one year. ”

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22. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Gurmukh Singh v. State of Haryana⁴ has laid down certain factors which are to be taken into consideration before awarding appropriate sentence to the accused with reference to Section 302 or Section 304 Part II of the IPC, which state as under :-

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“ 23. These are some factors which are required to be taken into consideration before awarding appropriate sentence to the accused. These factors are only illustrative in character and not exhaustive. Each case has to be seen fro its special perspective. The relevant factors are as under :

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(a) Motive or previous enmity;

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(b) Whether the incident had taken place on the spur of the moment;

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(c) The intention/knowledge of the accused while inflicting the blow or injury;

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(d) Whether the death ensued instantaneously or the victim died after several days;

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(e) The gravity, dimension and nature of injury;

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(f) The age and general health condition of the accused;

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4 (2009) 15 SCC 635

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(g) Whether the injury was caused without premeditation in a sudden fight;

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(h) The nature and size of weapon used for inflicting the injury and the force with which the blow was inflicted;

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(i) The criminal background and adverse history of the accused;

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(j) Whether the injury inflicted was not sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death but the death was because of shock;

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(k) Number of other criminal cases pending against the accused;

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(l) Incident occurred within the family members or close relations;

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(m) The conduct and behaviour of the accused after the incident.

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Whether the accused had taken the injured/the deceased to the hospital immediately to ensure that he/she gets proper medical treatment ?

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These are some of the factors which can be taken into consideration while granting an appropriate sentence to the accused.

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24. The list of circumstances enumerated above is only illustrative and not exhaustive. In our considered view, proper and appropriate sentence to the accused is the bounded obligation and duty of the court. The endeavour of the court must be to ensure that the accused receives appropriate sentence, in other words, sentence should be according to the gravity of the offence. These are some of the relevant factors which are required to be kept in view while convicting and sentencing the accused. ”

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23. Likewise, in the matter of State v. Sanjeev Nanda⁵ , their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held that once knowledge that it is likely to cause death is established but without any intention to cause death, then jail sentence may be for a term which may extend to 10 years or with fine or with both. It has further been held that to make out an offence punishable under Section 304 Part II of the IPC, the prosecution has to prove the death of the person in question and such death was caused by the act of the accused and that he knew that such act of his is likely to cause death.

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24. Further, the Supreme Court in the matter of Arjun v. State of Chhattisgarh⁶ has elaborately dealt with the issue and observed in paragraphs 20 and 21, which reads as under :-

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“ 20. To invoke this Exception 4, the requirements that are to be fulfilled have been laid down by this Court in Surinder Kumar v. UT, Chandigarh [(1989) 2 SCC 217 : 1989 SCC (Cri) 348], it has been explained as under : (SCC p. 220, para 7)

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“7. To invoke this exception four requirements must be satisfied, namely, (I) it was a sudden fight; (ii) there was no premeditation; (iii) the act was done in a heat of passion; and (iv) the assailant had not taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel manner. The cause of the quarrel is not relevant nor its I relevant who offered the provocation or started the assault. The number of wounds caused during the occurrence is not a decisive factor but what is important is that the occurrence must have been sudden and unpremeditated and the offender

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5 (2012) 8 SCC 450

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6 (2017) 3 SCC 247

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must have acted in a fit of anger. Of course, the offender must not have taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel manner. Where, on a sudden quarrel, a person in the heat of the moment picks up a weapon which is handy and causes injuries, one of which proves fatal, he would be entitled to the benefit of this exception provided he has not acted cruelly.”

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21. Further in Arumugam v. State [(2008) 15 SCC 590 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 1130], in support of the proposition of law that under what circumstances Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC can be invoked if death is caused, it has been explained as under : (SCC p. 596, para 9)

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“9. …. '18. The help of exception 4 can be invoked if death is caused (a) without premeditation; (b) in a sudden fight; (c) without the offender's having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner; and (d) the fight must have been with the person killed. To bring a case within Exception 4 all the ingredients mentioned in it must be found. It is to be noted that the “fight” occurring in Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC is not defined in the Penal Code, 1860. It takes two to make a fight. Heat of passion requires that there must be no time for the passions to cool down and in this case, the parties had worked themselves into a fury on account of the verbal altercation in the beginning. A fight is a combat between two or more persons whether with or without weapons. It is not possible to enunciate any general rule as to what shall be deemed to be a sudden quarrel. It is a question of fact and whether a quarrel is sudden or not must necessarily depend upon the proved facts of each case. For the application of

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Exception 4, it is not sufficient to show that there was a sudden quarrel and there was no premeditation. It must further be shown that the offender has not taken undue advantage or acted in cruel or unusual manner. The expression “undue advantage” as used in the provisions means “unfair advantage ”.

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25. In the matter of Arjun (supra), the Supreme Court has held that if there is intent and knowledge, the same would be case of Section 304 Part-I of the IPC and if it is only a case of knowledge and not the intention to cause murder and bodily injury, then same would be a case of Section 304 Part-II of the IPC.

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26. Further, the Supreme Court in the matter of Rambir v. State (NCT of Delhi)⁷ has laid down four ingredients which should be tested to bring a case within the purview of Exception 4 to Section 300 of IPC, which reads as under:

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“ 16. A plain reading of Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC shows that the following four ingredients are required:

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(i) There must be a sudden fight; (ii) There was no premeditation; (iii) The act was committed in a heat of passion; and

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(iv) The offender had not taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner. ”

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27. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in a recent judgment in the case of

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7 (2019) 6 SCC 122

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Anbazhagan v. The State represented by the Inspector of Police in Criminal Appeal No. 2043 of 2023 disposed off on 20.07.2023 has defined the context of the true test to be adopted to find out the intention or knowledge of the accused in doing the act as under:

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“60. Few important principles of law discernible from the aforesaid discussion may be summed up thus:

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(1) When the court is confronted with the question, what offence the accused could be said to have committed, the true test is to find out the intention or knowledge of the accused in doing the act. If the intention or knowledge was such as is described in Clauses (1) to (4) of Section 300 of the IPC, the act will be murder even though only a single injury was caused. To illustrate: ‘A’ is bound hand and foot. ‘B’ comes and placing his revolver against the head of ‘A’, shoots ‘A’ in his head killing him instantaneously. Here, there will be no difficulty in holding that the intention of ‘B’ in shooting ‘A’ was to kill him, though only single injury was caused. The case would, therefore, be of murder falling within Clause (1) of Section 300 of the IPC. Taking another instance, ‘B’ sneaks into the bed room of his enemy ‘A’ while the latter is asleep on his bed. Taking aim at the left chest of ‘A’, ‘B’ forcibly plunges a sword in the left chest of ‘A’ and runs away. ‘A’ dies shortly thereafter. The injury to ‘A’ was found to be sufficient in ordinary course of nature to cause death. There may be no difficulty in holding that ‘B’ intentionally inflicted the particular injury found to be caused and that the said injury was objectively sufficient

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in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. This would bring the act of ‘B’ within Clause (3) of Section 300 of the IPC and render him guilty of the offence of murder although only single injury was caused.

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(2) Even when the intention or knowledge of the accused may fall within Clauses (1) to (4) of Section 300 of the IPC, the act of the accused which would otherwise be murder, will be taken out of the purview of murder, if the accused's case attracts any one of the five exceptions enumerated in that section. In the event of the case falling within any of those exceptions, the offence would be culpable homicide not amounting to murder, falling within Part 1 of Section 304 of the IPC, if the case of the accused is such as to fall within Clauses (1) to (3) of Section 300 of the IPC. It would be offence under Part II of Section 304 if the case is such as to fall within Clause (4) of Section 300 of the IPC. Again, the intention or knowledge of the accused may be such that only 2nd or 3rd part of Section 299 of the IPC, may be attracted but not any of the clauses of Section 300 of the IPC. In that situation also, the offence would be culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 of the IPC. It would be an offence under Part I of that section, if the case fall within 2nd part of Section 299, while it would be an offence under Part II of Section 304 if the case fall within 3rd part of Section 299 of the IPC.

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(3) To put it in other words, if the act of an accused person falls within the first two clauses of

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cases of culpable homicide as described in Section 299 of the IPC it is punishable under the first part of Section 304. If, however, it falls within the third clause, it is punishable under the second part of Section 304. In effect, therefore, the first part of this section would apply when there is ‘guilty intention,’ whereas the second part would apply when there is no such intention, but there is ‘guilty knowledge’.

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(4) Even if single injury is inflicted, if that particular injury was intended, and objectively that injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the requirements of Clause 3rdly to Section 300 of the IPC, are fulfilled and the offence would be murder.

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(5) Section 304 of the IPC will apply to the following classes of cases : (i) when the case falls under one or the other of the clauses of Section 300, but it is covered by one of the exceptions to that Section, (ii) when the injury caused is not of the higher degree of likelihood which is covered by the expression ‘sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death’ but is of a lower degree of likelihood which is generally spoken of as an injury ‘likely to cause death’ and the case does not fall under Clause (2) of Section 300 of the IPC, (iii) when the act is done with the knowledge that death is likely to ensue but without intention to cause death or an injury likely to cause death.

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To put it more succinctly, the difference between the two parts of Section 304 of the IPC is that

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under the first part, the crime of murder is first established and the accused is then given the benefit of one of the exceptions to Section 300 of the IPC, while under the second part, the crime of murder is never established at all. Therefore, for the purpose of holding an accused guilty of the offence punishable under the second part of Section 304 of the IPC, the accused need not bring his case within one of the exceptions to Section 300 of the IPC.

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(6) The word ‘likely’ means probably and it is distinguished from more ‘possibly’. When chances of happening are even or greater than its not happening, we may say that the thing will ‘probably happen’. In reaching the conclusion, the court has to place itself in the situation of the accused and then judge whether the accused had the knowledge that by the act he was likely to cause death.

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(7) The distinction between culpable homicide (Section 299 of the IPC) and murder (Section 300 of the IPC) has always to be carefully borne in mind while dealing with a charge under Section 302 of the IPC. Under the category of unlawful homicides, both, the cases of culpable homicide amounting to murder and those not amounting to murder would fall. Culpable homicide is not murder when the case is brought within the five exceptions to Section 300 of the IPC. But, even though none of the said five exceptions are pleaded or prima facie established on the evidence on record, the prosecution must still be required under the law to bring the case under

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any of the four clauses of Section 300 of the IPC to sustain the charge of murder. If the prosecution fails to discharge this onus in establishing any one of the four clauses of Section 300 of the IPC, namely, 1stly to 4thly, the charge of murder would not be made out and the case may be one of culpable homicide not amounting to murder as described under Section 299 of the IPC.

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(8) The court must address itself to the question of mens rea. If Clause thirdly of Section 300 is to be applied, the assailant must intend the particular injury inflicted on the deceased. This ingredient could rarely be proved by direct evidence. Inevitably, it is a matter of inference to be drawn from the proved circumstances of the case. The court must necessarily have regard to the nature of the weapon used, part of the body injured, extent of the injury, degree of force used in causing the injury, the manner of attack, the circumstances preceding and attendant on the attack.

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(9) Intention to kill is not the only intention that makes a culpable homicide a murder. The intention to cause injury or injuries sufficient in the ordinary cause of nature to cause death also makes a culpable homicide a murder if death has actually been caused and intention to cause such injury or injuries is to be inferred from the act or acts resulting in the injury or injuries.

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(10) When single injury inflicted by the accused results in the death of the victim, no inference, as a general principle, can be drawn that the

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accused did not have the intention to cause the death or that particular injury which resulted in the death of the victim. Whether an accused had the required guilty intention or not, is a question of fact which has to be determined on the facts of each case.

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(11) Where the prosecution proves that the accused had the intention to cause death of any person or to cause bodily injury to him and the intended injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, then, even if he inflicts a single injury which results in the death of the victim, the offence squarely falls under Clause thirdly of Section 300 of the IPC unless one of the exceptions applies.

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(12) In determining the question, whether an accused had guilty intention or guilty knowledge in a case where only a single injury is inflicted by him and that injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the fact that the act is done without premeditation in a sudden fight or quarrel, or that the circumstances justify that the injury was accidental or unintentional, or that he only intended a simple injury, would lead to the inference of guilty knowledge, and the offence would be one under Section 304 Part II of the IPC.”

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28. Reverting to the facts of the present case, in light of principles of law laid down by their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the abovestated judgments (supra), it is quite vivid that as per the medical evidence, it is evident that on the date of incident, the accused/appellant assaulted his father-in-law with the help of a ‘Danda’. There was no premeditation on

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the part of the appellant to cause death of deceased. The appellant did not had any intention to cause death of deceased, but by causing such injuries, he must had the knowledge that such injuries inflicted by him would likely to cause death of deceased, as such, his case would fall within the purview of Exception 4 of Section 300 of IPC, as the act of the appellant herein completely satisfies the four necessary ingredients of Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC i.e. (i) there must be a sudden fight; (ii) there was no premeditation; (iii) the act was committed in a heat of passion and (iv) the appellant had not taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner.

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29. Considering the above-stated facts, also considering the evidence of witnesses and taking into consideration that at prese nt appellant- Ramesh Paikra is aged about 46 years, and he is in jail since 15/07/2020 and has completed almost 05 years of his jail sentence, the conviction of the appellant under Section 302 r/w Section 34 and Section 201 of the IPC can be altered/converted to Section 304 Part-II of the IPC.

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30. Accordingly, conviction and sentence of the appellant under Section 302 r/w Section 34 and Section 201 of the IPC is set aside, however, he is convicted under Section 304 Part-II of the IPC and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 07 years.

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31. The appellant is in jail and he shall served out the sentence as modified above.

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32. The criminal appeal is allowed in part to the extent indicated herein-above.

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33. Registry is directed to send a certified copy of this judgment along with the original record of the case to the trial court concerned forthwith for necessary information and compliance and also send a copy of this judgment to the concerned Superintendent of Jail where the appellant is undergoing his jail sentence to serve the same on the appellant informing him that he is at liberty to assail the present judgment passed by this Court by preferring an appeal before the Hon’ble Supreme Court, if so advised, with the assistance of High Court Legal Services Committee or the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee.

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Sd/Sd/- (Bibhu Datta Guru) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice

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S. Bhilwar/ Gowri

Ramesh Paikra v. State of Chhattisgarh

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Ramesh Paikra v. State of Chhattisgarh

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