Devlal @ Devalal Sahu Vs State of Chhattisgarh

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2025:CGHC:9447

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NAFR

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HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

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CRA No. 212 of 2019

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1 - Devlal @ Devalal Sahu S/o Shri Madan Lal Sahu Aged About 30 Years R/o Village Junwani, Police Station Pathriya, District Mungeli Chhattisgarh., District : Mungeli, Chhattisgarh

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... Appellant

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versus

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1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Police Station Jarhagaon District Mungeli Chhattisgarh., District : Mungeli, Chhattisgarh

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... Respondent

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For Appellant : Mr. Vipin Singh, Advocate For Res./State : Mr. Atanu Ghosh, Deputy Government Advocate

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Hon’ble Shri Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal Judgment on Board

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24.02.2025

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1. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 23.01.2019 passed by the learned Special judge of Protection of Children from sexual Offences Act, Mungeli (C.G.) in Special Criminal Case No. 05/2017 whereby the appellant has been convicted and sentenced as under:-

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Conviction	Senten	Fine	In default
U/S	ce		of
			payment
			of Fine
Under	Rigorous	Rs.	Rigorous

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2

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Section Rigorous 1000/- imprison
376(2)(f) imprison ment for
of Indian ment for 03
Penal 10 years months
Code
Under Rigorous Rs. R.I. for
Section 6 imprison 1,000/- 03
of the ment for months
Protection 10 years
of Children
from
Sexual
Offences
Act, 2012
Under No ……….. …………..
Section sentence
5(n) of the has been
Protection awarded
of Children
from
Sexual
Offences
Act, 2012

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All the sentences have been directed to run concurrently.

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2. Case of the prosecution, in brief, is that on 02.12.2016, PW02, the maternal uncle (mama) of the victim lodged a report to the police with the allegation that on 26.11.2016, he dropped his minor niece (i.e. victim) to the school on his motorcycle and in the evening when he returned back to his house he was informed that the victim was not returned back to her house. The incident was disclosed by the friend of the victim during the search of her whereabout,that the appellant has kidnapped her. On the report made by PW02, the offence under Section 363 and Section 366 of IPC has been registered against the appellant vide FIR Ex. P/6. During the course of investigation, the victim (PW01) was recovered on

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08.01.2017 at railway station- Bhatapara from the possession of the appellant and recovery Panchanama Ex. P/12 was prepared in presence of the witnesses. The victim was sent for her medical examination to District Hospital, Mungeli where Dr. Neha Smriti (PW12) has medically examined her and gave her report Ex. P/26. While medically examine the victim, the doctor has not found any external injuries on her body and opined that as hymen was old ruptured and she is habituated to sexual intercourse. Two slides of her vaginal swab were prepared, sealed and handed it over to police for its chemical examination. The victim was also referred to District Hospital Bilaspur for radiological examination for her age determination. The victim has also undergone for radiological examination which has been conducted by Dr. G. S. Kanwar who after her examination gave report Ex. P/28-C and according to the ossification test report the doctor has opined that the age of the of the victim is in between 15 to 17 years. With respect to the age and date of birth of the victim, the Police has also seized the School Register Ex. P/8 from Government Primary School, Kuagaon. After retaining the attested true copy of School register Ex. P/8C, the original Register Ex.P/8 was returned to the School. The spot map (Ex.P/4) was prepared by the Patwari and spot map (Ex. P/20) was prepared by the Police. The appellant was arrested on 09.01.2017 and he too was sent for medical examination to District Hospital, Mungeli where Dr. K. S. Kanwar (PW09) has medically examined him and gave his report Ex. P/18 and opined that the appellant is able to perform sexual intercourse. The Vaginal slides and clothes of the victim as well as clothes of the appellant were sent for chemical examination to Regional FSL, Bilaspur.

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3. The statement of witnesses were recorded under section 161 of Cr.P.C. Statement of the victim under Section 164 of Cr.P.C. have also been

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recorded. After completion of usual investigation, charge sheet was filed against the appellant before the learned trial Court for the offence under Section 363, 366, 376 of Indian Penal Code and Section 4 & 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (in short “POCSO Act, 2012”)

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4. The Trial Court has framed charges against the appellant namely- Devlal @Devalal Sahu for the offences under Sections 363, 366 376(2)(n) of IPC and Section 6 of POCSO Act, 2012. The appellant denied the charge and claimed trial.

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5. In order to establish the charge against the accused, the prosecution has examined as many as 12 witnesses. The statement of appellant was also recorded under section 313 of Cr.P.C. in which he denied the material appearing against him, plead innocence and submitted that he is innocent and has falsely been implicated in the case.

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6. After appreciation of oral & documentary evidence available on record, the learned trial court has convicted and sentenced the appellant as mentioned in the earlier part of this judgment. Hence this appeal.

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7. Learned counsel for the appellant would argue that the prosecution has failed to prove its case against the appellant beyond reasonable doubts. There are material omission and contradiction in the evidence of the prosecution witnesses, which cannot be made basis for his conviction. He would also submit that there is no legally admissible evidence with respect to the age and date of birth of the victim. The school record has not been proved in accordance with law by examining its author and the basis on which the entries have been made in the school Register have also not been proved by the prosecution. The ossification test report is only of an opinion of the Medical OfÏcer which cannot be considered to be substantive evidence without there being any corroboration. The birth

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certificate or Kotwari panji have not been produced by the prosecution and in absence of any cogent and clinching evidence, with respect to the age and date of birth of the victim it cannot be determined that she was minor on the date of incident. He would further submit that the victim herself eloped with the appellant without raising any objection. She traveled up to Delhi alongwith the appellant and have not made any complaint and not raised any objection during the travel up to Delhi. She resided with the appellant for about a month and has not made any complaint to the person of the vicinity where she was residing at Delhi. Even while making physical relation with the appellant she had not tried to protest and no sign of struggles have been found on her body. She being the consenting party no offence either kidnapping or rape are made out against the appellant and he is entitled for acquittal.

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8. On the other hand, learned counsel for the State while opposing the arguments advanced by the counsel for the appellant contended that the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. There is sufÏcient evidence with respect to the age of the victim that she was minor on the date of incident and from the school record as well as from the ossification test report it has been proved that the victim was aged about 15 years and she was minor. Due to her minority, she was not able to give her consent yet the appellant without obtaining consent from her parents took her to Delhi and kept her for about one month and made physical relation with her which does amount to offence of rape upon a minor girl. Even though no injuries have been found on the body of the victim that itself does not makes the prosecution case doubtful as injuries is not required to be found in every case and it depend upon facts of the each case. Therefore there are overwhelming evidence against the appellant that he committed rape upon the victim who was minor on

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the date of incident. Therefore, the learned trial court after considering the entire evidence available on record, by the impugned judgment has rightly convicted and sentenced the appellant which is absolutely justified and needs no interference.

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9. I have heard the counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record.

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10. The first and foremost question arises for consideration would be the age of the victim as to whether on the date of incident she was minor or not.

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11. The prosecution has mainly relied upon the school Register Ex. P/8C and ossification test report Ex. P/28C. The ossification test report Ex. P/ 28C has been admitted by the defence as provided under Section 294 of Cr. P.C. and for that reason the doctor who conducted ossification test has not been examined as the report Ex. P/28C has been admitted by the defence. According to the ossification test report the age of the victim is 15 to 17 years.

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12. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of J aya Mala Vs. Home secretary, Government of Jammu and Kashmir and Others reported in 1982 (2) SCC 538 , the Hon’able Supreme court in paragraph 9 has observed as under:-

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9…………………………. However, it is notorious and one can take judicial notice that the margin of error in age ascertained by radiological examination is two years on either side…………...”

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13. In the matter of Ramdev Chauhan Vs. State of Aasam reported in 2001 (5) SCC 714 in paragraph 51 and 52 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under :-

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“51. In his report the doctor has detailed all the data on which he reached his conclusion. I do not propose to extract all such data here except pointing out that such data collected by Dr

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B.C. Roy is in consonance with the guidelines provided in the textbooks on medical jurisprudence (vide Modi's Medical Jurisprudence and Jhala & Raju's Medical Jurisprudence). Ossification test is done for multiple joints, for which the radiological report was obtained. The margin of error according to authorities on medical jurisprudence can be two years either way as the maximum. In this context it is useful to extract the relevant passage from Jhala & Raju's Medical Jurisprudence (6th Edn., p. 198):

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"If ossification test is done for a single bone the error may be two years either way. But if the test is done for multiple joints with overlapping age of fusion the margin of error may be reduced. Sometimes this margin is reduced to six months on either side.

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" 52. Of course the doctor's estimate of age is not a sturdy substitute for proof as it is only his opinion. But such opinion of an expert cannot be sidelined in the realm where we grope in the dark to find out what would possibly have been the age of a citizen for the purpose of affording him a constitutional protection. In the absence of all other acceptable materials, if such opinion points to a reasonable possibility regarding the range of his age it has certainly to be considered.”

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14. The other piece of evidence with respect to the age of the victim is the School Register which is sought to be proved by (PW04) who is the Headmaster of the School. He has stated in his deposition that he is posted as Headmaster at Government Primary School, Kuagaon since 2008. The Police has seized the School Register with respect to the date of birth of the victim and after retaining the attested true copy of the

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School register Ex. P/8C, original School Register (Ex.P/9) was returned to the school which he brought with him. As per entries made in the School Register, the date of birth of the victim is mentioned as 15.12.2001. In cross-examination though he admitted that he has made entries in the school register Ex. P/9 but the father of the victim had not brought any document with respect to her date of birth. He further stated that the father of the victim might have recorded the date of birth in the school record on assumption. From the evidence of this witness though he has stated that he is author of the school register but the basis on which the entries have been made in the school register have not been produced by the prosecution.

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15. The admissibility and evidencery value of the School Register has been considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in paragraphs 40,42,43,44 and 48 of its judgment in Alamelu and Another Vs. State, represented by Inspector of Police, 2011(2) SCC 385 , in which the Supreme Court has observed as under:

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"40.Undoubtedly, the transfer certificate, Ex.P-16 indicates that the girl's date of birth was 15th June, 1977. Therefore, even according to the aforesaid certificate, she would be above 16 years of age (16 years 1 month and 16 days) on the date of the alleged incident, i.e., 31st July, 1993. The transfer certificate has been issued by a Government School and has been duly signed by the Headmaster. Therefore, it would be admissible in evidence under Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act. However, the admissibility of such a document would be of not much evidentiary value to prove the age of the girl in the absence of the material on the basis of which the age was recorded. The date of birth mentioned in the transfer certificate would have no evidentiary value unless the person, who made the entry or who gave the date of birth is examined.

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Considering the manner in which the facts recorded in a document may be proved, this Court in the case of Birad Mal Singhvi Vs. Anand Purohit1, observed as follows:-

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"The date of birth mentioned in the scholars' register has no evidentiary value unless the person who made the entry or who gave the date of birth is examined....Merely because the documents Exs. 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12 were proved, it does not mean that the contents of documents were also proved. Mere

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proof of the documents Exs. 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 would not tantamount to proof of all the contents or the correctness of date of birth stated in the documents. Since the truth of the fact, namely, the date of birth of Hukmi Chand and Suraj Prakash Joshi was in issue, mere proof of the documents as produced by the aforesaid two witnesses does not furnish evidence of the truth of the facts or contents of the documents. The truth or otherwise of the facts in issue, namely, the date of birth of the two candidates as mentioned in the documents could be proved by admissible evidence i.e. by the evidence of those persons who could vouchsafe for the truth of the facts in issue. No evidence of any such kind was produced by the respondent to prove the truth of the facts, namely, the date of birth of Hukmi Chand and of Suraj Prakash Joshi. In the circumstances the dates of birth as mentioned in the aforesaid documents 1988 (Supp) SCC 604 have no probative value and the dates of birth as mentioned therein could not be accepted."

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The same proposition of law is reiterated by this Court in the case of Narbada Devi Gupta Vs. Birendra Kumar Jaiswal2, where this Court observed as follows:-

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"The legal position is not in dispute that mere production and marking of a document as exhibit by the court cannot be held to be a due proof of its contents. Its execution has to be proved by admissible evidence, that is, by the "evidence of those persons who can vouchsafe for the truth of the facts in issue"."

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In our opinion, the aforesaid burden of proof has not been discharged by the prosecution. The father says nothing about the transfer certificate in his evidence. The Headmaster has not been examined at all. Therefore, the entry in the transfer certificate can not be relied upon to definitely fix the age of the girl.

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We may further notice that even with reference to Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, a public document has to be tested by applying the same standard in civil as well as criminal proceedings. In this context, it would be appropriate to notice the observations made by this Court in the case of Ravinder Singh Gorkhi Vs. State of U.P.4 held as follows:-

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"The age of a person as recorded in the school register or otherwise may be used for various purposes, namely, for obtaining admission; for obtaining an appointment; for contesting election; registration of marriage; obtaining a separate unit under the ceiling laws; and even for the purpose of litigating before a civil forum e.g. necessity of being represented in a court of law by a guardian or where a suit is filed on the ground that the plaintiff being a minor he was not appropriately represented therein or any transaction made on his behalf was void as he was a minor. A court of law for the purpose of determining the age of a (2006) 5 SCC 584 party to the lis, having regard to the provisions of Section 35 of the Evidence Act will have to apply the same standard. No different standard can be applied in case of an accused as in a case of abduction or rape, or similar offence where the victim or the

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prosecutrix although might have consented with the accused, if on the basis of the entries made in the register maintained by the school, a judgment of conviction is recorded, the accused would be deprived of his constitutional right under Article 21 of the Constitution, as in that case the accused may unjustly be convicted."

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16. In case of Rishipal Singh Solanki Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Others, 2022 (8) SCC 602 , while considering various judgments, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed in para 33 as under:

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"33. What emerges on a cumulative consideration of the aforesaid catena of judgments is as follows:

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33.2.2. If an application is filed before the Court claiming juvenility, the provision of sub-section (2) of section 94 of the JJ Act, 2015 would have to be applied or read along with sub-section (2) of section 9 so as to seek evidence for the purpose of recording a finding stating the age of the person as nearly as may be.

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XXXX

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XXXX XXX

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33.3. That when a claim for juvenility is raised, the burden is on the person raising the claim to satisfy the Court to discharge the initial burden. However, the documents mentioned in Rule 12(3)(a)(i), (ii), and (iii) of the JJ Rules 2007 made under the JJ Act, 2000 or subsection (2) of section 94 of JJ Act, 2015, shall be sufficient for prima facie satisfaction of the Court. On the basis of the aforesaid documents a presumption of juvenility may be raised.

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33.4. The said presumption is however not conclusive proof of the age of juvenility and the same may be rebutted by contra evidence let in by the opposite side.

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33.5. That the procedure of an inquiry by a Court is not the same thing as declaring the age of the person as a juvenile sought before the JJ Board when the case is pending for trial before the concerned criminal court. In case of an inquiry, the Court records a prima facie conclusion but when there is a determination of age as per sub-section (2) of section 94 of 2015 Act, a declaration is made on the basis of evidence. Also the age recorded by the JJ Board shall be deemed to be the true age of the person brought before it. Thus, the standard of proof in an inquiry is different from that required in a proceeding where the determination and declaration of the age of a person has to be made on the basis of evidence scrutinised and accepted only if worthy of such acceptance.

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33.6. That it is neither feasible nor desirable to lay down an abstract formula to determine the age of a person. It has to be on the basis of the material on record and on appreciation of evidence adduced by the parties in each case.

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33.7 This Court has observed that a hypertechnical approach should not be adopted when evidence is adduced on behalf of the accused in support of the plea that he was a juvenile.

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33.8. If two views are possible on the same evidence, the court should lean in favour of holding the accused to be a juvenile in borderline cases. This is in order to ensure that the benefit of the JJ Act, 2015 is made applicable to the juvenile in conflict with law. At the same time, the Court should ensure that the JJ Act, 2015 is not misused by persons to escape punishment after having committed serious offences.

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33.9. That when the determination of age is on the basis of evidence such as school records, it is necessary that the same would have to be considered as per Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, inasmuch as any public or official document maintained in the discharge of official duty would have greater credibility than private documents.

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33.10. Any document which is in consonance with public documents, such as matriculation certificate, could be accepted by the Court or the JJ Board provided such public document is credible and authentic as per the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act viz., section 35 and other provisions.

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33.11. Ossification Test cannot be the sole criterion for age determination and a mechanical view regarding the age of a person cannot be adopted solely on the basis of medical opinion by radiological examination. Such evidence is not conclusive evidence but only a very useful guiding factor to be considered in the absence of documents mentioned in Section 94(2) of the JJ Act, 2015."

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17. Recently, in case of P. Yuvaprakash Vs. State represented by Inspector of Police, 2023 (SCC Online) SC 846 , Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in para 14 to 17 as under :

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"14. Section 94 (2)(iii) of the JJ Act clearly indicates that the date of birth certificate from the school or matriculation or equivalent certificate by the concerned examination board has

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to be firstly preferred in the absence of which the birth certificate issued by the Corporation or Municipal Authority or Panchayat and it is only thereafter in the absence of these such documents the age is to be determined through "an ossification test" or "any other latest medical age determination test" conducted on the orders of the concerned authority, i.e. Committee or Board or Court. In the present case, concededly, only a transfer certificate and not the date of birth certificate or matriculation or equivalent certificate was considered. Ex. C1, i.e., the school transfer certificate showed the date of birth of the victim as 11.07.1997. Significantly, the transfer certificate was produced not by the prosecution but instead by the court summoned witness, i.e., CW-1. The burden is always upon the prosecution to establish what it alleges; therefore, the prosecution could not have been fallen back upon a document which it had never relied upon. Furthermore, DW-3, the concerned Revenue Official (Deputy Tahsildar) had stated on oath that the records for the year 1997 in respect to the births and deaths were missing. Since it did not answer to thedescription of any class of documents mentioned in Section 94(2)(i) as it was a mere transfer certificate, Ex C-1 could not have been relied upon to hold that M was below 18 years at the time of commission of the offence.

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In a recent decision, in Rishipal Singh Solanki vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. this court outlined the procedure to be followed in cases where age determination is required. The court was dealing with Rule 12 of the erstwhile Juvenile Justice Rules (which is in pari materia) with Section 94 of the JJ Act, and held as follows:

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"20. Rule 12 of the JJ Rules, 2007 deals with the procedure to be followed in determination of age. The juvenility of a person in conflict with law had to be decided prima facie on the basis of physical appearance, or documents, if available. But an inquiry into the determination of age by the Court or the JJ Board was by seeking evidence by obtaining: (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificates, if available and in the absence whereof; (ii) the date of birth certificate from the school (other than a play school) first attended; and in the absence whereof; (iii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat. Only in the absence of either (i), (ii) and (iii) above, the medical opinion could be sought from a duly constituted Medical Board to declare the age of the juvenile or child. It was also provided that while determination was being made, benefit could be given to the child or juvenile by considering the age on lower side within the margin of one year."

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Speaking about provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act, especially the various options in Section 94 (2) of the JJ Act, this court held in Sanjeev Kumar Gupta vs. The State of Uttar

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Pradesh & Ors that:

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"Clause (i) of Section 94 (2) places the date of birth certificate from the school and the matriculation or equivalent certificate from the 2021 (12) SCR 502 [2019] 9 SCR 735 concerned examination board in the same category (namely (i) above). In the absence thereof category (ii) provides for obtaining the birth certificate of the corporation, municipal authority or panchayat. It is only in the absence of (i) and (ii) that age determination by means of medical analysis is provided. Section 94(2) (a)(i) indicates a significant change over the provisions which were contained in Rule 12(3)(a) of the Rules of 2007 made under the Act of 2000. Under Rule 12(3)(a) (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificate was given precedence and it was only in the event of the certificate not being available that the date of birth certificate fromthe school first attended, could be obtained. In Section 94(2)(i) both the date of birth certificate from the school as well as the matriculation or equivalent certificate are placed in the same category.

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In Abuzar Hossain @ Gulam Hossain Vs. State of West Bengal, this court, through a three-judge bench, held that the burden of proving that someone is a juvenile (or below the prescribed age) is upon the person claiming it. Further, in that decision, the court indicated the hierarchy of documents that would be accepted in order of preference."

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18. The victim (PW01) has not disclosed her date of birth but she has stated that she is aged about 15 years. In her cross-examination she has stated that she did not know her date of birth.

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19. The mother of the victim (PW07) and the father of the victim (PW08) have also not disclosed any date of birth of the victim. The mother of the victim (PW07) has stated that she did not know as to what was the age of the victim on the date of incident.

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20. The father of the victim (PW08), has stated in his evidence that at the time of incident, his daughter was aged about 15 to 17 years. In crossexamination he admitted that he has got married since 24-25 years back after one and half year of marriage his first child was born and his two other children have born with the age gap of 1 and half year to 2 years.

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He has not registered the date of birth of his children in the Kotwari register and no birth certificate has been obtained by him.

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21. From the evidence with respect to the school register it is quite vivid that there is no cogent and clinching evidence with respect to the age of the victim. The victim herself did not know her date of birth and her parents have also not able to disclose any date of her birth. In view of the evidence produced by the prosecution it is very difÏcult to hold that the prosecution has proved that the victim was minor on the date of incident. From the ossification test report Ex. P/28C the victim’s age was determined between 15 to 17 years and by giving the error of margin of two years in positive side it cannot be said that she was minor on the date of incident yet the learned trial court has held her minor.

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22. So far as the offence of kidnapping and rape is concerned, I again examined the evidence of the victim.

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23. The victim (PW01) has stated in her evidence that at the time of death of her maternal uncle, the appellant came to her village Kuagaon and her maternal grand mother (Nani) introduced her that he is her maternal uncle ( mosha ). On the date of incident, when she was standing outside of her school the appellant came there asked her to accompany with him to visit places and then she alongwith her friend had gone to Amarkantak. He took her to Bilaspur Shopping Mall and thereafter, he left her friend at Gandhi Nagar. Thereafter the appellant took her to Busstand from where they had gone to Raipur Railway station and had gone to Delhi by train. They were residing at Delhi at a slum- hut (jhuggi) with the appellant and the appellant had made physical relation with her. Since the father of the appellant was arrested by the police, the appellant was compelled to take her back and when they were returning to their house, at Bhatapara the police has caught them. In cross-

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examination, she stated that she admitted the relationship with the appellant that he is her maternal uncle ( mosha ). She admitted that she alongwith her friend had gone to Amarkantak with the appellant by his motorcycle. After staying there for about two hours, they returned back to Bilaspur and went to Shopping Mall till that time her friend was also there with them. They also visited Kanan Pendari at Bilaspur thereafter, they proceeded to Raipur by bus and from there they had gone to Delhi by train. She admitted that at Delhi, the houses of other persons were there in the vicinity where she was residing with the appellant and she has not complained with the other persons of the vicinity that the appellant has committed forceful sexual intercourse with her. She stayed at Delhi with the appellant for about a month and used to go with him to work as a laborer. She further admitted that she used to cook food daily and she alongwith the appellant had gone to their work at the same place. She further admitted that they were resided at Delhi as husband and wife and she on her own will had not lodged any report to the police. From the evidence of this witness it is quite vivid that she had not made any complaint up to Delhi even while residing with the appellant at Delhi she has not lodged any report or not made any complaint to anyone of the persons of the vicinity. Even when the appellant had made physical relationship with her she has not protested or has not raised any objection. She had not tried to came out from the clutches of the appellant when she was subjected to sexual intercourse by the appellant. All that conduct of the victim clearly shows that she was the consenting party in eloping with the appellant and making physical relationship with him on her own will.

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24. The mother of the victim (PW07) does not disclosed anything against the appellant rather she has turned hostile and not supported the case of the prosecution likewise her father (PW08) has also turned hostile

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25. Dr. Neha Smriti (PW12) who medically examined the victim has not found any external injuries on her body and no sign of any struggle are present on her body.

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26. From all these evidences it would be very difÏcult for this Court to uphold the conviction of the appellant for the alleged offence.

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27. The version of the victim commands great respect and acceptability, but if there are some circumstances which cast some doubt in the mind of the court on the veracity of the victim’s evidence, then it will not be safe to rely on the said version of the victim. There is contradiction and omissions in the statement of the victim and her parents. The law is well settled that in case of rape, conviction can be maintained even on the basis of sole testimony of the victim. However, there is an important caveat which is that the testimony the victim must inspire confidence. Even though the testimony of victim is not required to be corroborated, if her statement is not believable then the accused cannot be convicted. The prosecution has to bring home charges levelled against the appellant beyond any reasonable doubt, which prosecution has failed to do in the instant case.

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28. In view of the aforesaid reasons this Court find force in the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant that no offence are made out against the appellant and this Court is also in agreement with the same.

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29. In the result, The appeal filed by the appellant is allowed . The appellant is acquitted from all the offences. The impugned judgment of conviction

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and sentences are set aside. The appellant is reported to be in jail since

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09.01.2017. He be released forthwith if not required in any other case.

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30. The trial court record along with a copy of this judgment be sent back immediately to the trial court concerned for compliance and necessary action.

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Sd/-

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Sd/-

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(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) Judge

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amita

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Digitally signed by AMITA DUBEY Date: 2025.04.01 16:11:25 +0530

Devlal @ Devalal Sahu v. State of Chhattisgarh

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Devlal @ Devalal Sahu v. State of Chhattisgarh

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