Bhagwan Lal And Ors. Vs State Of Chhattisgarh

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AFR

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Digitally VISHAKHA signed by BEOHAR VISHAKHA BEOHAR

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HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

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CRA No. 201 of 2015

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Judgment Reserved on 04.09.2025 Judgment Delivered on 07.10.2025

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1 - Bhagwan Lal And Ors. S/o Jagiram Dahariya Aged About 40 Years R/o Pamgarh, Police Thana Pamgarh, District Janjgir Champa C.G. , Chhattisgarh

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2 - Umesh Kumar S/o Bhagwan Lal Dahariya Aged About 18 Years R/o Pamgarh, Police Thana Pamgarh, District Janjgir Champa C.G. , District : Janjgir-Champa, Chhattisgarh

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3 - Mahesh Kumar S/o Bhagwan Lal Dahariya Aged About 20 Years R/o Pamgarh, Police Thana Pamgarh, District Janjgir Champa C.G. , District : Janjgir-Champa, Chhattisgarh

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4 - Bhaskar Bharti S/o Sahdev Bharti Aged About 22 Years R/o Pamgarh, Police Thana Pamgarh, District Janjgir Champa C.G. , District : Janjgir-Champa, Chhattisgarh

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5 - Amar Jangde S/o Uttam Kumar Jangde Aged About 25 Years R/o Pamgarh, Police Thana Pamgarh, District Janjgir Champa C.G. , District : Janjgir-Champa, Chhattisgarh

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6 - Dev Kumar S/o Baliram Lahre Aged About 29 Years R/o Pamgarh,

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Police Thana Pamgarh, District Janjgir Champa C.G. , District : JanjgirChampa, Chhattisgarh

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7 - Dayakrishna S/o Govindram Lahre Aged About 27 Years R/o Pamgarh, Police Thana Pamgarh, District Janjgir Champa C.G. , District : Janjgir-Champa, Chhattisgarh

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8 - Santosh Kumar S/o Balakram Khande Aged About 23 Years R/o Pamgarh, Police Thana Pamgarh, District Janjgir Champa C.G. , District : Janjgir-Champa, Chhattisgarh

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9 - Preetam Kumar S/o Rajendra Prasad Aged About 24 Years R/o Pamgarh, Police Thana Pamgarh, District Janjgir Champa C.G. , District : Janjgir-Champa, Chhattisgarh

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10 - Sanjay Kumar S/o Shyamlal Suryavanshi Aged About 19 Years R/o Pamgarh, Police Thana Pamgarh, District Janjgir Champa C.G. , District : Janjgir-Champa, Chhattisgarh

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11 - Sonu @ Chandra Prakash S/o Harekrishna @ Chini Aged About 18 Years R/o Pamgarh, Police Thana Pamgarh, District Janjgir Champa C.G. , District : Janjgir-Champa, Chhattisgarh

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12 - Vijay S/o Chandram Dinkar Aged About 28 Years R/o Pamgarh, Police Thana Pamgarh, District Janjgir Champa C.G. , District : JanjgirChampa, Chhattisgarh

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13 - Faguram @ Bholo S/o Mohit Ram Suryavanshi Aged About 38 Years R/o Pamgarh, Police Thana Pamgarh, District Janjgir Champa C.G. , District : Janjgir-Champa, Chhattisgarh

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14 - Brijbhushan S/o Nokhram Kurre Aged About 23 Years R/o

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Kutarbod, Thana Pamgarh Distt. Janjgir Champa C.G., District : JanjgirChampa, Chhattisgarh

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--- Appellants

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versus

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1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through P.S. Pamgarh, Distt. Janjgir Champa C.G. , Chhattisgarh

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--- Respondent(s)

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CRA No. 324 of 2015

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1 - Radheyshyam And Ors. S/o Derharam Tandan Aged About 55 Years R/o Village Pamgarh Tahsil And Thana Pamgarh Civil And Revenue District Janjgir Champa C.G. , Chhattisgarh

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2 - Amit Kumar S/o Radheyshyam Tandan Aged About 25 Years R/o Village Pamgarh Tahsil And Thana Pamgarh Civil And Revenue District Janjgir Champa C.G. , District : Janjgir-Champa, Chhattisgarh

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3 - Amar S/o Radheyshyam Tandan Aged About 22 Years R/o Village Pamgarh Tahsil And Thana Pamgarh Civil And Revenue District Janjgir Champa C.G. , District : Janjgir-Champa, Chhattisgarh

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4 - Vijay S/o Narayan Dahriya Aged About 24 Years R/o Village Pamgarh Tahsil And Thana Pamgarh Civil And Revenue District Janjgir Champa C.G. , District : Janjgir-Champa, Chhattisgarh

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5 - Kamla Prasad S/o Puniram Khare Aged About 40 Years R/o Village Pamgarh Tahsil And Thana Pamgarh Civil And Revenue District Janjgir Champa C.G. , District : Janjgir-Champa, Chhattisgarh

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6 - Sanat Kumar S/o Dujeram Tandey Aged About 32 Years R/o Village Pamgarh Tahsil And Thana Pamgarh Civil And Revenue District Janjgir Champa C.G. , District : Janjgir-Champa, Chhattisgarh

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7 - Rakesh S/o Bhairav Prasad Khunte Aged About 25 Years R/o Village Pamgarh Tahsil And Thana Pamgarh Civil And Revenue District Janjgir Champa C.G. , District : Janjgir-Champa, Chhattisgarh

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8 - Ramkrishna S/o Hari Ram Khandey Aged About 29 Years R/o Village Pamgarh Tahsil And Thana Pamgarh Civil And Revenue District Janjgir Champa C.G., District : Janjgir-Champa, Chhattisgarh

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---Appellants

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Versus

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1 - State Of Chhattisgarh S/o Through Police Station Pamgarh District Janjgir Champa C.G. , Chhattisgarh

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... Respondent

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(Cause-title taken from CIS system)

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For respective	: Mr. Kishore Bhaduri, Mr. G.R. Miri, Senior
appellants	Advocates, appear along with Mr. Pawan
	Kesharwani, Ms. Aditi Diwan, Mr. Abhishek
	Banjare, Mrs. Meena Sahstri, Mr. Leekesh
	Kumar, Mr. Rahil Arun Kochar, Mr. U.R.
	Koshaley, Mr. D.D. Mahant & Mr. Rishi
	Rahul Soni, Advocates
For Respondent/State	: Mr. Ranbir Singh Marhas & Mr. Ashish
	Shukla, Additional Advocate General.

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Division Bench

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Hon'ble Smt. Justice Rajani Dubey, J. & Hon'ble Shri Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad, J.

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CAV Judgment

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Per, Amitendra Kishore Prasad, J.

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1. Since both the above-captioned appeals arise from the same impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated

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10.02.2015, they are being heard together and decided by this common judgment.

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2. Both these criminal appeals preferred by the respective appellants herein under Section 374(2) of the Cr.P.C. are directed against the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 10.02.2015 passed in Sessions Trial No.40/2006 by the Special Sessions Judge, Jajgir-Champa, by which the appellants stand convicted & sentenced as under:-

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	Conviction		S	entence
U/s. 302	read with Sec. 149 of	Imprison	men	t for life and fine of
Indian P	enal Code (for short,	Rs.1,000	/- e	ach, in default of
‘IPC’)		payment	of	fine amount to
		undergo	a	dditional rigorous
		imprison each app	men ella	t for one year to nts
U/s.147 IPC	read with Sec. 149 of	Rigorous year and	Im fine	prisonment for one of Rs.500/- each, in
		default amount rigorous months t	of to imp o ea	payment of fine undergo additional risonment for three ch appellant
U/s. 148 IPC	read with Sec.149 of	Rigorous year and	Im fine	prisonment for one of Rs.500/- each, in
		default	of	payment of fine
		amount rigorous months t	to imp o ea	undergo additional risonment for three ch appellant
U/s. 452	of IPC	Rigorous	Im	prisonment for three

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	years and fine of Rs.1,000/-
	each, in default of payment of fine amount to undergo additional rigorous imprisonment for one year to each appellant
U/s. 427 of IPC	Rigorous Imprisonment for six months and fine of Rs.500/- each, in default of payment of
	fine amount to undergo additional rigorous imprisonment for two months to each appellant
U/s. 435 of IPC	Rigorous Imprisonment for one year and fine of Rs.1,000/- each, in default of payment of fine amount to undergo additional rigorous imprisonment for three months to each appellant
U/s. 323 read with Sec. 149 of IPC	Rigorous Imprisonment for six months and fine of Rs.500/- each, in default of payment of fine amount to undergo additional rigorous imprisonment for two months to each appellant

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(All sentences were directed to run concurrently)

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3. Case of the prosecution, in brief, is that on 09.12.2004, a local fair (Raut Madai Bazaar) was being held at Chandipara, Pamgarh. On that night, Mahesh Khare (Guruji), along with Tulsi and Surendra Singh (a liquor distillery employee), went to the distillery to consume liquor. The next day, 10.12.2004, Mahesh

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Khare (Guruji) went missing, which caused considerable concern among his relatives and the local community. As a result, a large number of people gathered at Pamgarh Police Station. Police started investigating by questioning Tulsi, Surendra Singh, and other distillery employees. During this process, Mahesh Khare’s torch and cap were recovered from Paswan, the helper of the distillery. Subsequently, a rumour spread that a dead body was found in a nearby pond. Upon inspection, the dead body was identified as that of Mahesh Khare (Guruji). On 10.12.2004, at about 4:00 PM, while the manager of the Pamgarh liquor distillery Santosh Singh along with Vijay Prasad Soni, Vishnu Tiwari, Changur Yadav and driver Bhim Singh, were in the distillery office, a large mob arrived in an enraged state. The mob, led by accused- Kamala Khunte, was shouting slogans such as “beat them up” and “set them on fire.” People from the crowd began pelting stones and several accused, including Rakesh Khunte, Manoj Bharti, Bhaskar Bharti, Radheshyam, Amar Jangde, Bhagwanlal, and others, armed with sticks, forcefully entered the distillery premises. The mob vandalized the distillery office, destroyed jeeps and motorcycles parked outside, broke oil tanks, and deliberately set them on fire. AccusedManoj Bharti wetted a cloth with oil and placed it on the rear part of a jeep, which was then set on fire by accused- Rakesh Khunte. The fire spread to other vehicles, engulfing them in flames. Several accused, including Bhagwanlal’s son Devkumar

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and Dr. Ram Sagar, attempted to set fire to the distillery office itself. Upon breaking the office’s front door, the manager of the liquor shop, Bhola Gupta, was recognized by the accused. He was chased and brutally assaulted by accused persons namely Manoj Bharti, Bhaskar Bharti, Bhagwanlal, Radheshyam, Dr. Ram Sagar, Amit, and others, using sticks, and was left for dead. Thereafter, the police arrived shortly and rescued the victims by breaking open the back door of the office. The accused persons namely Kamala Khunte, Rakesh Khunte, Manoj Bharti, Bhaskar Bharti, Radheshyam, Santosh, Amit, Amar, Devkumar, Baliram Patwari, Chhotu, Dr. Ramsagar, Vijay, Mahesh, Umesh Dileram, Bhuru Driver, Sonu, Sanat, Brijbhushan, Ratan, Bhagwanlal, and approximately 25-30 others collectively participated in the attack. They caused extensive damage to the distillery office, brutally assaulted Sanoj Kumar Paswan (helper) and other individuals namely, Manoj Kumar, Ashok Singh, Prem Singh, Surendra Singh, Anil Kumar, Jaisingh, and Kartar Singh who were later hospitalized for treatment. The deceased - Bhola Gupta succumbed to his injuries during treatment. In addition, the accused persons looted ₹3,70,000 from the distillery office cupboard, comprising a bundle of ₹500 notes, 22 bundles of ₹100 notes, 22 bundles of ₹50 notes, and loose change amounting to approximately ₹3,000–₹4,000. Furthermore, they stole two out of three bicycles parked in the corridor of the distillery office. Then, on 10.12.2004 at 4:25 PM, the distillery

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manager- Santosh Singh lodged a Dehati Nalishi (Exhibit P-34) at Pamgarh Police Station. Subsequently, an FIR (Exhibit P-72) was registered by Station In-charge B.S. Khuntia and merg intimation (Ex.P-74) was recorded. After that, the injured persons and police personnel were sent for medical examination.

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4. During investigation, spot map of the liquor shop was prepared vide Ex.P-38. Multiple accused were taken into custody. Memorandum statements of accused persons were recorded vide Exs.P-1 to 3, 10, 14, 16, 18, 20, 22, 24, 26, 28, 30 & 32 respectively, wherein accused persons admitted to their involvement in vandalism, arson, assault, and theft. Accused - Vijay Kumar Dinkar admitted setting fire to vehicles and taking a bicycle vide Ex.P-1. Accused- Sonu (alias Chandraprakash) admitted taking a bicycle from the distillery premises vide Ex.P-2 Accused- Sanjay Kumar Suryavanshi admitted to looting Rs. 18,000 from the cupboard of the liquor distillery office vide Ex.P-3. Several accused persons admitted hiding the sticks used for the assault in their houses, and these sticks were recovered as per the seizure memos vide Exs.-P15, P17, P19, P21, P23, P25, P27, P29, P31 respectively. Accused- Ramkrishna Khande admitted involvement in looting Rs. 18,000 and distributing portions of it among co-accused vide Ex.P-32. Accused- Manoj Bharti admitted to breaking the cupboard, looting Rs. 5,000, and hiding the stick used in the assault vide Ex.P-10. Thereafter, the body of the deceased Bhola Gupta was sent for postmortem

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which was conducted by PW-21 Dr. Brijesh Kumar Shukla, who has proved the postmortem report Ex.P-48. According to PW-21 Dr. Brijesh Kumar Shukla, cause of death of deceased- Bhola Gupta was due to the head injuries and mode of death of deceased was homicidal in nature. Seized articles (blood-stained soil, hair of the deceased, sticks, rods, and a piece of brick) were sent to FSL for chemical examination and as per FSL report (Ex.P-81), blood has been found on the articles marked as Articles ‘A, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, J, K1, K2, L, M, N1, N2, N3, N4, O and P’.

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5. After due investigation, appellants were charge-sheeted before the jurisdictional Criminal Court and the case was committed to the trial Court for hearing and disposal in accordance with law, in which, appellants abjured their guilt and entered into defence by stating that they have not committed the aforesaid offences.

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6. The prosecution in order to bring home the offence, examined as many as 23 witnesses in support of its case and exhibited 121 documents Exs.P-1 to P-121. However, the appellants in support of their defence have examined none, but exhibited 18 documents i.e. Exs.D-1 to D-18.

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7. The trial Court, after completion of trial and upon appreciation of oral and documentary evidence, by its impugned judgment, convicted and sentenced the appellants as mentioned in the paragraph 2 of this judgment, against which, they have preferred these appeals under Section 374(2) of the Cr.P.C.

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8. Learned counsel for the appellants would submit that the learned trial Court is absolutely unjustified in convicting and sentencing the appellants for the aforesaid offences as the prosecution has failed to prove the offences beyond reasonable doubt. They would further submit that the entire case of the prosecution rests upon untrustworthy and unreliable evidence, and there is not even an iota of credible material to show that the accused persons were present at the spot or that they had caused any injuries to the complainant party or assaulted the deceasedBhola Gupta, who later succumbed to injuries. They would also submit that there is nothing on record to establish the identity of the accused persons, and none of the witnesses have been able to convincingly identify them as perpetrators of the alleged offences. They would further contend that the story put forth by the prosecution is highly improbable and appears to have been concocted without proper identification of the accused persons. In fact, the Dehati Nalishi (Ex.P-34) contains the names of the accused persons along with 25–30 other individuals, and in some places, it has been stated that as many as 200 persons were part of the mob, thus making it impossible to ascertain the specific acts of any individual accused. Even if the entire case of the prosecution is taken at its face value, it does not disclose the individual role or overt act of each accused, which is essential for fastening criminal liability. They would also contend that the appellants, along with other villagers, were only agitating against

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the suspicious death of Mahesh Khare (Guruji), in which there was a general suspicion against the complainant party, and in order to shield themselves and to teach a lesson to the villagers, a false case has been foisted against the appellants. They would also contend that the evidence brought by the prosecution is not only contradictory but also highly doubtful and incapable of inspiring confidence. The trial Court itself has observed that the alleged loot of ₹3,70,000/- has not been proved, and therefore, the charge of house-trespass, loot and mischief against the liquor shop cannot be sustained. In the absence of cogent evidence connecting the appellants to the commission of murder of deceased- Bhola Gupta or to any overt act of causing injuries to the witnesses, the conviction recorded by the trial Court cannot be upheld. The prosecution has miserably failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt, and therefore, it is prayed that appeals filed by the appellants be allowed and the appellants be acquitted of the charges leveled against them on the basis of benefit of doubt. Reliance has been placed upon the decisions of Supreme Court in the matters of Javed Shaukat Ali Qureshi vs. State of Gujarat reported in 2023 (9) SCC 164, Ranvir Singh and Others vs. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in (2023) 14 SCC 41, Taijuddin vs State of Assam and others reported in (2022) 1 SCC 395 & Dhirubhai Bhailalbhai Chauhan & Ors. vs. The State of Gujarat and Ors. reported in 2025 INSC 381.

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9. Learned counsel for the State would support the impugned judgment and submit that the prosecution has succeeded in proving its case beyond all reasonable doubts by leading cogent and reliable evidence. They would further submit that from the material collected during investigation and duly proved during trial, the active involvement of the accused person has been established beyond any shadow of doubt. The accused persons, being members of an unlawful assembly, had trespassed into the liquor shop in an illegal and violent manner, caused extensive damage to property, assaulted the complainant party, and further inflicted severe injuries upon the deceased- Bhola Gupta, as a result of which, he succumbed during treatment. The evidence on record clearly demonstrates the individual as well as collective participation of the accused persons in the commission of the offences, and the prosecution has sufficiently proved their overt acts. They would also contend that no individual or group of persons can be permitted to take the law into their own hands. If there was any suspicion or grievance in relation to the death of Mahesh Guruji, the accused persons ought to have approached the law-enforcing authorities or filed an appropriate report before the police, but instead they chose to indulge in violence, arson, loot, and murder, thereby disturbing public peace and order. The trial Court, upon a proper appreciation of oral and documentary evidence, has rightly convicted the accused persons, and the impugned judgment passed by the learned trial Court is well-

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reasoned and does not suffer from any infirmity warranting interference by this Court. Accordingly, the both the appeals deserve to be dismissed. Reliance has been placed upon the decision of Supreme Court in the matters of Sheikh Sintha Madhar @ Jaffer @ Sintha and others vs State represented by Inspector of Police reported in (2016) 11 SCC 265 & Roy Fernandes vs State of Goa and others reported in (2012) 3 SCC 221.

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10. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and considered their rival submissions made herein-above and also went through the record with utmost circumspection.

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11. The first question for consideration would be whether the death of the deceased- Bhola Gupta was homicidal in nature which has been answered by the trial Court in affirmative relying upon the postmortem reports (Ex.P-48) proved by PW-21 Dr. Brijesh Kumar Shukla, which is a finding of fact based on evidence available on record, it is neither perverse nor contrary to the record and we hereby affirm the said finding.

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12. Now, the question would be whether the appellants are the authors of the crime in question?

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13. We will now examine the evidence presented by the prosecution one by one. PW-1 Sukh Sagar and PW-8 Umed Das are cited as witnesses to the memorandum and seizure proceedings marked as Exhibits P-1 to P-3 and Exhibits P-4 to

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P-6, respectively. However, in their depositions, both witnesses denied that these documents were executed in their presence. They specifically stated that neither the memorandum were recorded nor the seizures made in their presence, although they did admit that the signatures appearing on the documents are theirs. Both witnesses were declared hostile by the prosecution, and even during cross-examination, nothing substantive was elicited to support the prosecution’s case or to connect the appellants with the alleged offence. Therefore, the testimonies of PW-1 and PW-8 do not, in any manner, advance the prosecution’s version of events.

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14. PW-2 Vashudev Rajput, Constable No. 98, has deposed that on receiving information, he went to the spot where a mob had gathered in front of the liquor shop and was pelting stones. He has, however, denied having recorded or identified accused persons stating that he does not know them. This witness was also declared hostile by the prosecution on certain aspects of his testimony. Nevertheless, he has confirmed that in the said incident, both the parties had sustained injuries. Beyond this limited admission, nothing incriminating has been brought out against the present appellants from the testimony of PW-2, and his evidence does not specifically attribute any overt act to the accused persons.

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15. PW-3 Kaushal Kumar Sidar, Constable No. 109, has stated in his deposition that he does not know the persons who had set

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ablaze the jeep during the incident. He has further stated that when the accused persons were arrested, they were subsequently sent to Palmgarh, Police Station. Apart from this, nothing incriminating has emerged from the testimony of this witness so as to connect the accused persons with the alleged offences. Thus, the evidence of PW-3 is also of no assistance to the prosecution.

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16. PW-4 Resham is cited as a witness to the seizure memo marked as Exhibit P-8. In his testimony, he categorically stated that he signed the document solely because he was instructed to do so, and further affirmed that the seizure was not carried out in his presence. This witness was also declared hostile by the prosecution, and no material facts could be elicited from him during cross-examination. Accordingly, the testimony of PW-4 does not support the prosecution's case in any manner, and no evidentiary value can be attached to his statement in furtherance of the prosecution’s version.

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17. PW-5 Ganesh Ram Khare is cited as a witness to the seizure memo (Ex.P-8). He admits that he has signed the said document; however, in his deposition, he has categorically stated that no cycle was seized before him. Thus, his evidence does not support the alleged seizure proceedings. As such, the testimony of PW-5 also does not advance the case of the prosecution in any manner.

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18. PW-6 Tehaldas, the Kotwar of the village, has been examined as a witness to the seizure memo (Ex.P-9). He admits his signature appearing on the said document, but in his deposition, he has denied the factum of seizure having been effected in his presence. This witness was also declared hostile by the prosecution.

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19. PW-7 Dulendra Singh has been examined as a witness to the memorandum (Ex.P-10) and seizure proceedings (Exs.P-11 and P-12). He has admitted his signatures upon the said documents, but has not supported the prosecution version with respect to the alleged memorandum or seizure.

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20. PW-9 Bhim Singh, the driver of the liquor shop, deposed that on the date and time of the incident, he had parked the jeep outside the shop and, while having lunch, saw the accused persons, including Kamla Khunte and Manoj Bharti, along with approximately 50 others, approaching the distillery. He has further stated that he saw accused- Manoj Bharti and his companions assaulting the deceased- Bhola Gupta with sticks. He has also stated that, out of the fifty people present, he could specifically recognize only Manoj Bharti and Kamla Khunte, who were present in Court on the date of his testimony. However, he did not identify or recognize any of the other accused persons. On the contrary, in cross-examination, PW-9 admitted that the police did not record his statement after the incident, nor did he make any statement before the Magistrate in Court. He also

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admitted that he was not interrogated by the police while he was in lockup. When confronted with Exhibit D-1, he admitted that he could not confirm whether it mentioned that people from Pamgarh, including Kamla Khunte, Manoj Bharti, and about 50 others, were proceeding towards the liquor distillery and office with sticks. If their names were not mentioned in Exhibit D-1, he could not explain the omission. He also claimed to have stated in Exhibit D-1 that he knew Kamla Khunte and Manoj Bharti, but also affirmed that he had no personal or official association with Kamla Khunte or Manoj Bharti. Additionally, PW-9 admitted that he had not received any court summons to appear as a witness prior to the date of his deposition. In light of these admissions and inconsistencies, particularly the absence of any prior recorded statement, the lack of mention of key details in Ex. D-1, and his inability to identify most of the alleged participants, the testimony of PW-9 Bhim Singh does not lend credible support to the prosecution’s case.

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21. PW-10 Vishnu Tiwari, an employee of the liquor shop, stated that on the date of the incident, approximately 200–250 people had gathered in front of the office and began pelting stones at the building. While the police were escorting the employees to the police station, he saw the deceased- Bhola Gupta, lying injured. However, he categorically stated that he did not know who had inflicted those injuries or who was responsible for the death of Bhola Gupta. In paragraph 5 of his deposition, he

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specifically denied the suggestion that he had witnessed the deceased being beaten with sticks while watching from behind the office door. He further denied having seen Bhola Gupta being assaulted at all. During cross-examination, PW-10 admitted that the crowd was very large, prompting them to move from the office into the middle room. He also stated that they only came out when the police arrived. Thus, the testimony of PW-10 clearly indicates that he neither witnessed the assault nor identified any of the assailants. His evidence does not, in any manner, support the prosecution’s case or implicate the accused in the alleged offence.

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22. PW-11 Narendra Tiwari is cited as a witness to the memorandum and seizure proceedings marked as Exs. P-14 to P-33. However, in his deposition, he admitted that the items stated to have been seized were already lying openly at the police station. This admission casts serious doubt on the genuineness of the alleged recovery. Consequently, the recovery is not duly proved and does not support the prosecution’s case.

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23. PW-12 Vijay Soni stated that he did not identify the accused persons who assaulted the deceased- Bhola Gupta. He further deposed that although his statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. was recorded and has been exhibited as Ex.D-5, but the names of appellants Deokumar, Dayakrishna, Phaguram, and Brijbhushan were not mentioned therein. Notably, the names of appellants Sanjay, Ramkrishna and Santosh were disclosed by

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him for the first time during his deposition before the trial court. These omissions and improvements render the testimony of PW12 unreliable. Accordingly, his evidence does not inspire confidence and fails to support the prosecution’s case.

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24. PW-12 Santosh Singh has not specifically stated in his deposition who assaulted the deceased on the date of the incident, nor has he identified any of the assailants involved in the alleged offence. Thus, his testimony does not support the prosecution’s case.

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25. PW-14 R. Pramod Kumar, Constable; PW-15 Arun Kumar Singh, Constable; PW-16 Komal Prasad, Photographer; PW-17 Darshan Singh @ Tulsi; PW-18 Anupdas Mahant, Driver; PW-19 Praveen Chand Roy; PW-22 B.S. Khutiya, Investigating Officer; and PW-23 Shyamlal Kathe, Patwari, have been examined as witnesses in this case. However, none of these witnesses have specifically stated in their depositions the identity of any person who assaulted the deceased on the date of the incident. Moreover, none of them have identified any of the alleged assailants involved in the offence. Their failure to identify the perpetrators or provide any direct evidence implicating the accused significantly undermines the prosecution’s case. In particular, the testimonies of the police personnel and official witnesses, who are expected to provide factual and investigatory support, are notably silent on the critical question of who committed the assault. Similarly, the statements of other

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witnesses, including the photographer and the patwari, do not contribute any substantive evidence pointing to the culpability of the accused.

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26. PW-20 Sanoj Kumar Paswan initially stated that at the time of incident, all the employees of the wine shop, including the deceased, were inside the shop. However, he later contradicted himself by stating that at the time of the incident, all the employees were inside the office while the deceased was outside. Subsequently, he further stated that he, along with the deceased, was outside the office, while the other employees were inside. These contradictory versions raise serious doubts regarding the prosecution’s case.

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27. PW-21 Dr. Brijesh Kumar, who conducted the MLC of the injured persons and the post-mortem of the deceased, has specifically stated that the deceased-Bhola Gupta, had received simple injuries

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28. From the perusal of the evidence adduced by the prosecution, it appears that a mob comprising nearly 200 to 250 persons had gathered outside the liquor shop/distillery, protesting the alleged murder of one villager and teacher, namely Mahesh Khare (Guruji), in which suspicion was directed towards the employees of the liquor shop. The evidence suggests that the mob became violent and, in the course of agitation, attacked the liquor shop as well as the vehicles parked outside the premises.

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It further appears that while the shop was damaged and the Manager of liquor shop- Bhola Gupta, sustained injuries to which he later succumbed, and several others also received injuries, the witnesses have not been able to depose with certainty as to who among the mob caused the fatal blows or inflicted specific injuries. The accused persons have been named largely on the basis of suspicion and general allegations, rather than from clear and cogent identification. From the evidence adduced, it also appears that the witnesses have made material improvements in their statements and have attempted to implicate the accused persons by exaggerating the role attributed to them. It further emerges that Kamla Khunte and others were admittedly opposed to the liquor shop, and in order to give them a lesson their names appear to have been included right from the stage of Dehati Nalishi as well as in the FIR so as to falsely implicate them in the case. The depositions of the witnesses reveal several inconsistencies which do not tally with the documents annexed to the charge-sheet. The allegation regarding hurling of abuses by accused- Kamla Khunte has also not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. The participation of the accused persons, particularly in showing or pointing towards themselves for their individual acts, remains doubtful. In a case of mob violence, the mere presence of a large number of persons cannot by itself establish the culpability of each accused unless there are

¶112

23

¶113

specific and reliable allegations pointing to the individual role of every person concerned.

¶114

29. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Javed Shaukat Ali Qureshi (supra) has held in paras 13 & 15 which read as under:-

¶115

“13………..It is well settled that a mere innocent presence in an assembly of persons, as for example a bystander, does not make the accused a member of an unlawful assembly, unless it is shown by direct or circumstantial evidence that the accused shared the common object of the assembly. Thus, a court is not entitled to presume that any and every person who is proved to have been present near a riotous mob at any time or to have joined or left it at any stage during its activities is in law guilty of every act committed by it from the beginning to the end, or that each member of such a crowd must from the beginning have anticipated and contemplated the nature of the illegal activities in which the assembly would subsequently indulge. In other words, it must be proved in each case that the person concerned was not only a member of the unlawful assembly at some stage, but at all the crucial stages and shared the common object of the assembly at all these stages. Such an evidence is wholly lacking in this case where the evidence merely shows that some of the accused were members of the unlawful assembly at one particular stage but not at another. In these circumstances, therefore, the accused who were not present or who did not share the common object of the unlawful

¶116

24

¶117

assembly at other stages cannot be convicted for the activities of the assembly at those stages. In view of this error committed by the High Court it has become necessary for us to examine the evidence on the limited question as to which of the accused had actually participated in the incidents at the Engineering College, Bharat Lodge and the chawl of Jogendra Singh where acts of incendiarism had taken place. It is also common ground that the occurrence had taken place at night and the evidence of the witnesses identifying the accused had to be examined with great caution.” (emphasis added).

¶118

XXXX XXXX XXXX

¶119

15.When there is similar or identical evidence of eyewitnesses against two accused by ascribing them the same or similar role, the Court cannot convict one accused and acquit the other. In such a case, the cases of both the accused will be governed by the principle of parity. This principle means that the Criminal Court should decide like cases alike, and in such cases, the Court cannot make a distinction between the two accused, which will amount to discrimination.”

¶120

30. Further, in the matter of Ranvir Singh (supra), the

¶121

Supreme Court has held in paras 38 & 39 which read as under:-

¶122

“38. The witnesses clearly speak about the presence of a large group of persons belonging to the side of the accused. In fact, the evidence is to the effect that they also participated in the occurrence. In a case involving the applicability of Section 149 IPC, a little more scrutiny is

¶123

25

¶124

required on the part of the Court as there may be a tendency to implicate persons along with the actual accused who committed the offence. The Courts will have to be very circumspect while sifting through the evidence in such cases. In the case on hand, we find that it would be unsafe to implicate the accused persons under Section 149 IPC which obviously deals with an element of vicarious liability, as held by this Court in Arvind Kumar vs State of Rajasthan, (2022) 16 SCC 732 :( SCC pp.756-57, para 52) “Scope of Section 149

¶125

52. Section 149 of the Code deals with a common object. To attract this provision there must be evidence of an assembly with the common object becoming an unlawful one. The concept of constructive or vicarious liability is brought into this provision by making the offence committed by one member of the unlawful assembly to the others having the common object. It is the sharing of the common object which attracts the offence committed by one to the other members. Therefore, the mere presence in an assembly per se would not constitute an offence, it does become one when the assembly is unlawful. It is the common object to commit an offence which results in the said offence being committed. Therefore, though it is committed by one, a deeming fiction is created by making it applicable to the others as well due to the commonality in their objective to commit an offence. Thus, it is for the prosecution to prove the factors such as the existence of the assembly with a requisite number, the common object for everyone, the object being unlawful,

¶126

26

¶127

and an offence committed by one such member. The court will have to be more circumspect and cautious while dealing with a case of accused charged under Section 149 IPC, as it involves a deeming fiction. Therefore, a higher degree of onus is required to be put on the prosecution to prove that a person charged with an offence is liable to be punished for the offence committed by the others under Section 149 IPC. The principle governing the aforesaid aspect is taken note of by this Court in Ranjit Singh v. State of Punjab, (2013) 16 SCC 752: (SCC pp. 766-67, paras 35-37 & 39)

¶128

‘35. Baladin v. State of U.P., 1955 SCC Online SC 18 was one of the early cases in which this Court dealt with Section 149 IPC. This Court held that mere presence in an assembly does not make a person a member of the unlawful assembly, unless it is shown that he had done or omitted to do something which would show that he was a member of the unlawful assembly or unless the case fell under Section 142 IPC. Resultantly, if all the members of a family and other residents of the village assembled at the place of occurrence, all such persons could not be condemned ipso facto as members of the unlawful assembly. The prosecution in all such cases shall have to lead evidence to show that a particular accused had done some overt act to establish that he was a member of the unlawful assembly. This would require the case of each individual to be examined so that mere spectators who had just joined the assembly and who were unaware of its motive may not be branded as members of the unlawful assembly.

¶129

27

¶130

36. The observations made in Baladin case (supra) were considered in Masalti v. State of U.P., 1964 SCC OnLIne SC 30 where this Court explained that cases in which persons who are merely passive witnesses and had joined the assembly out of curiosity, without sharing the common object of the assembly stood on a different footing; otherwise it was not necessary to prove that the person had committed some illegal act or was guilty of some omission in pursuance of the common object of the assembly before he could be fastened with the consequences of an act committed by any other member of the assembly with the help of Section 149 IPC. The following passage is apposite in this regard: (Masalti case (supra), SCC OnLine SC para 17)

¶131

“17...The crucial question to determine in such a case is whether the assembly consisted of five or more persons and whether the said persons entertained one or more of the common objects as specified by Section 141. While determining this question, it becomes relevant to consider whether the assembly consisted of some persons who were merely passive witnesses and had joined the assembly as a matter of idle curiosity without intending to entertain the common object of the assembly. It is in that context that the observations made by this Court in Baladin36 assume significance; otherwise, in law, it would not be correct to say that before a person is held to be a member of an unlawful assembly, it must be shown that he had committed some illegal overt act or had been guilty of some illegal omission in pursuance of

¶132

28

¶133

the common object of the assembly. In fact, Section 149 makes it clear that if an offence is committed by any member of an unlawful assembly in prosecution of the common object of that assembly, or such as the members of that assembly knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution of that object, every person who, at the time of the committing of that offence, is a member of the same assembly, is guilty of that offence; and that emphatically brings out the principle that the punishment prescribed by Section 149 is in a sense vicarious and does not always proceed on the basis that the offence has been actually committed by every member of the unlawful assembly."

¶134

37. Again in Bajwa v. State of U.P., (1973) 1 SCC 714, this Court held that while in a faction-ridden society there is always a tendency to implicate even the innocent with the guilty, the only safeguard against the risk of condemning the innocent with the guilty lies in insisting upon acceptable evidence which in some measure implicates the accused and satisfies the conscience of the court.

¶135

xxxx xxxx xxxx

¶136

39. That in a faction-ridden village community, there is a tendency to implicate innocents also along with the guilty, especially when a large number of assailants are involved in the commission of an offence is a matter of common knowledge. Evidence in such cases is bound to be partisan, but while the courts cannot take an easy route to rejecting out of hand hand such evidence only on that ground, what ought to be done is to approach the depositions carefully and

¶137

29

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scrutinise the evidence more closely to avoid any miscarriage of justice." " (emphasis in original)

¶139

39. This Court in Binay Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar, (1997) 1 SCC 283, observed that: (SCC p. 296, para 31)

¶140

"31. ...There is no rule of evidence that no conviction can be based unless a certain minimum number of witnesses have identified a particular accused as a member of the unlawful assembly. It is axiomatic that evidence is not to be counted but only weighed and it is not the quantity of evidence but the quality that matters. Even the testimony of one single witness, if wholly reliable, is sufficient to establish the identification of an accused as a member of an unlawful assembly. All the same, when the size of the b unlawful assembly is quite large (as in this case) and many persons would have witnessed the incident, it would be a prudent exercise to insist on at least two reliable witnesses to vouchsafe the identification of an accused as a participant in the rioting. In Masalti v. State of U.P.37 a Bench of four Judges of this Court has adopted such a formula. It is useful to extract it here: (SCC OnLine SC para 16)

¶141

‘16. ... where a criminal court has to deal with evidence pertaining to the commission of an offence involving a large number of offenders and a large number of victims, it is usual to adopt the test that the conviction could be sustained only if it is supported by two or three or more witnesses who give a consistent account of the incident."

¶142

31. Similarly, in the matter of Taijuddin (supra) , the Supreme Court has held in paras 10 & 12 which read as under:-

¶143

30

¶144

“10. The learned counsel for the appellant sought to rely upon the judgment of this Court in Subal Ghorai v. State of W.B. (2013) 4 SCC 607, more specifically paras 42 and 53 to canvas that constructive liability cannot be stretched to lead to the false implication of innocent bystanders. This Court considered the possibility of often people gathering at the scene of offence out of curiosity but that did not make them share the common object of the assembly. The Court must guard against the possibility of convicting mere passive onlookers who did not share the common object of the unlawful assembly. There must be reasonable direct or indirect circumstances which lend assurance to the prosecution case that they shared common object of the unlawful assembly. Not only should the members be part of the unlawful assembly but should share the common object at all stages. This has to be based on the conduct of the members and the behaviour at or near the scene of the offence, the motive for the crime, the arms carried by them and such other relevant considerations.

¶145

xxxx xxxx xxxx

¶146

12. The learned counsel for the appellant also referred to the judgment g of this Court in Ranjit Singh v. State of Punjab4. Specifically, para 39, where the Court referred to the aspect of factionridden village community having a tendency to implicate innocents along with the guilty especially when a large number of assailants are involved in commission of the offence which is a matter of common knowledge. The depositions have to be carefully scrutinised in such a scenario.”

¶147

31

¶148

32. Likeswise, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Dhirubhai Bhailalbhai Chauhan (supra) has held in para 13 which reads as under:-

¶149

“13. In cases of group clashes where a large number of persons are involved, an onerous duty is cast upon the courts to ensure that no innocent bystander is convicted and deprived of his liberty. In such type of cases, the courts must be circumspect and reluctant to rely upon the testimony of witnesses who make general statements without specific reference to the accused, or the role played by him4. This is so, because very often, particularly when the scene of crime is a public place, out of curiosity, persons step out of their home to witness as to what is happening around. Such persons are no more than bystander though, to a witness, they may appear to be a part of the unlawful assembly. Thus, as a rule of caution and not a rule of law, where the evidence on record establishes the fact that a large number of persons were present, it may be safe to convict only those persons against whom overt act is alleged.5 At times, in such cases, as a rule of caution and not a rule of law, the courts have adopted a plurality Busi Koteswara Rao & others v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2012) 12 SCC 711, paragraph 11. Nagarjit Ahir v. State of Bihar, (2005) 10 SCC 369, paragraph 14. test, that is, the conviction could be sustained only if it is supported by a certain number of witnesses who give a consistent account of the incident.”

¶150

32

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33. Thus, in the light of aforesaid decisions of Supreme Court coupled with the quality of evidence brought on record, it is apparent that the aforesaid witnesses are not coming forward with the true and correct facts of the case. The spot map and the stated position of the witnesses inside the liquor shop itself create serious doubt, indicating that the case has been converted from one of a mob incident into individual acts attributed to specific persons. The testimonies of above witnesses are not of sterling quality; rather, they are blemished with contradictions and inconsistencies, and reliance upon such evidence would be unsafe. There is no credible individual identification of the accused persons nor attribution of specific overt acts to them. Many of the witnesses are not residents of the local area, but belong to other States, and therefore, their claim of knowing the accused by face and name appears doubtful. No Test Identification Parade was conducted by the Investigating Agency to establish the identity of the assailants. The evidence of the doctor and the Investigating Officer also does not advance the case of the prosecution in any material respect. Even the evidence of PW-9 Bhim Singh, PW-10 Vishnu Tiwari, PW-12 Vijay Soni, PW-13 Santosh Singh and PW-20 Sanoj Kumar Paswan, upon close scrutiny, suffers from contradictions, omissions and material improvements. Their veracity is not trustworthy, and when the quality of evidence is not of such a standard as to

¶152

33

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inspire confidence of the Court, it would be wholly improper to base a conviction upon such testimony.

¶154

34. Apart from above, pursuant to the memorandum of the respective appellants, sticks, clubs, clothes etc. were seized and as per FSL report, blood has been found on the articles marked as ‘A, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, J, K1, K2, L, M, N1, N2, N3, N4, O & P”, however, blood group could not be ascertained on the seized articles and that apart, there is no evidence on record to show that the blood like stained found on the seized articles is similar to that of the blood of deceased. Therefore, the mere recovery of alleged seized articles, without any corroboration linking them directly to the offence or the deceased, is insufficient to establish guilt. Accordingly, the FSL (Forensic Science Laboratory) report does not support the prosecution's case. There is no conclusive forensic evidence linking the appellants to the crime scene or to the deceased through these recoveries.

¶155

35. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Raja Naykar vs. State of Chhattisgarh (2024) 3 SCC 481 has held as

¶156

under:-

¶157

“It can thus be seen that, the only circumstance that may be of some assistance to the prosecution case is the recovery of dagger at the instance of the present appellant. However, as already stated hereinabove, the said recovery is also from an open place accessible to one and

¶158

34

¶159

all. In any case, the blood found on the dagger does not match with the blood group of the deceased. In Mustkeem v. State of Rajasthans, this Court held that sole circumstance of recovery of bloodstained weapon cannot form the basis of conviction unless the same was connected with the murder of the deceased by the accused. Thus, we find that only on the basis of sole circumstance of recovery of bloodstained weapon, it cannot be said that the prosecution has discharged its burden of proving the case beyond reasonable doubt.”

¶160

36. Also, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Thakore Umedsing Nathusing vs. State of Gujarat 2024 SCC OnLine

¶161

SC 320 has dealt with the recovery and blood stains not found to be that of the deceased and the relevant para reads as under:-

¶162

“35. We have gone through the evidence of the concerned police officials associated with the recoveries and find their testimonies to be highly doubtful. The knife which was recovered at the instance of A3 was found from a nala which is a place open and accessible to all. The knife attributed to A4 was presented by one Shobhnaben wife of Kanji Chhara and thus it cannot be linked to A4. Thus, these recoveries in no manner can be treated to be incriminating in nature. In the case of Mustkeem alias Sirajudeen v. State of Rajasthan, reported in (2011) 11

¶163

35

¶164

SCC 724, this Court held that the solitary circumstance of recovery of blood-stained weapons cannot constitute such evidence which can be considered sufficient to convict an accused for the charge of murder. We thus find the recoveries to be highly doubtful and tainted. Even if it is assumed for a moment that such recoveries were effected, the same did not lead to any conclusive circumstance in form of Serological report establishing the presence of the same blood group as that of the deceased and hence they do not further the cause of prosecution. In addition thereto, we find that the prosecution failed to lead the link evidence mandatorily required to establish the factum of safe keeping of the muddamal articles and hence, the recoveries became irrelevant.”

¶165

37. In the matter of Debapriya Pal vs. State of West Bengal

¶166

(2017) 11 SCC 31, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held with the issue that even if blood stain was found, the blood group of accused or deceased was not ascertained. The relevant para reads as under:-

¶167

“For the sake of argument, we are presuming that they were present at the time when the appellant brought bloodstained clothes from his house and gave the same to the police. What is material is the reliance on these

¶168

36

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bloodstained clothes for the culpability of the appellant herein. As per the prosecution, the blood group on these bloodstained clothes matched with the blood on the bedsheet on which the body of one of the deceased persons was found. The record reveals that though blood of both the deceased persons was drawn and sent for examination, it is not known as to what was the report thereupon and what was the blood group of the deceased persons. No such blood report has been produced. So much so, blood group of the accused persons was also not ascertained. Even if we presume that the blood on the bedsheet was that of the deceased, the possibility cannot be ruled out that the same blood group as of the appellantaccused thereof. Therefore, mere matching of the blood group on the bloodstained clothes, which was even on the bedsheet, would not lead to the conclusion that it is the appellant who had committed the crime.”

¶170

38. In the matter of Shantabai and others vs. State of Maharashtra (2008) 16 SCC 354, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:-

¶171

“25. In support of the fifth circumstance, the prosecution has examined Dr. Hanumant, who performed post-mortem

¶172

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on the dead body of the deceased Gunwant on 15-8-1993. The doctor noticed as many as thirteen injuries on the body of the deceased as described in the postmortem report (Ext. 41). According to the opinion of the doctor, the cause of death was because of shock due to cardiorespiratory failure caused by injury to brain and brain haemorrhage. The chemical analyser's report would reveal that ethyl alcohol was found in the viscera contents of the deceased.

¶174

26. We may point out that the investigating officer has not cared to collect the fingerprints appeared on the stones and axe, the alleged weapons of offence, at the time of seizure of the articles nor had he taken the fingerprints of the appellants for comparison with the fingerprints, if any, detected on the alleged weapons of offence. The articles collected by the investigating officer from the spot were found lying in the open place which was accessible to all and sundry. The prosecution has not led any evidence to prove that axe, which was the alleged weapon of offence, found on spot in the open place belonged to A-1, A-2 and A-3. Thus, the prosecution has not established beyond reasonable doubt that A-1, A-2 and A-3 had used the recovered weapons of offence in the commission of the crime.

¶175

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28. The chemical analyser's report (Ext. 72) reveals that human blood of Group 'B' was detected on the clothes, which were seized by the police, allegedly belonging to the appellants. The blood group on those clothes did not tally with the blood of Group 'O', which was found on the clothes of the deceased and on the sample of soil, axe, stones, handles, etc, which were taken from the spot by the investigating officer. The investigating officer has categorically stated that when he along with A-1 and panch witnesses had gone in search of the clothes of the appellants, the lock to the door of the house of the appellants was kept with the Police Patil which was opened by them later on. In this view of the matter, the prosecution has not proved that d the clothes, which were allegedly seized by the police at the instance of A-1 and lying in the open place, were stained with Blood Group 'O' of the deceased found on the deceased's clothes and on the articles which were seized by the investigating officer from the place of occurrence. These circumstances are not proved by the prosecution by lending cogent, satisfactory and convincing evidence to hold A-1, A-2 and A-3 guilty of the offence.”

¶177

39

¶178

39. Also, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Dhananjay Shanker Shetty vs. State of Maharashtra (2002) 6 SCC 596

¶179

has held as under:-

¶180

“9. Another circumstance which was alleged against the appellant was that bloodstained clothes and weapon were recovered from his house, but the trial court as well as the High Court did not place any reliance upon this circumstance in view of the fact that according to the report of the chemical examiner, the blood group found thereon did not tally with that of the deceased.”

¶181

40. Upon perusal of the record and in light of the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, it is evident that although the prosecution has produced certain alleged articles, but there is a complete absence of forensic evidence establishing that the blood found on these articles matches the blood group of the deceased. The mere presence of bloodstains, without proof that it is human blood belonging to the deceased, renders the recovery inconsequential.

¶182

41. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has consistently held that such failure materially affects the evidentiary value of the alleged recoveries. In Kansa Behera v. State of Orissa, (1987) 3 SCC 480, the Court held:

¶183

40

¶184

“Unless the blood stains found on the clothes or weapons are proved to be that of the deceased, the discovery cannot be said to incriminate the accused beyond doubt.”

¶185

42. Similarly, in Sattatiya @ Satish Rajanna Kartalla v. State of Maharashtra, (2008) 3 SCC 210 , it was observed:

¶186

“In the absence of a serological report confirming that the blood on the clothes or weapon belonged to the deceased, the recovery is of no substantial help to the prosecution.”

¶187

43. Again, in Vijay Shankar v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2022) 10

¶188

SCC 353, the Apex Court reiterated:

¶189

“The prosecution’s failure to establish, through scientific evidence, that the blood found on the weapon or clothes matched that of the deceased creates a serious doubt about the veracity of the recovery and the guilt of the accused.”

¶190

44. These authoritative pronouncements make it abundantly clear that mere recovery of blood-stained articles, without scientific corroboration, is insufficient to sustain a conviction.

¶191

45. It is a settled principle of criminal law that suspicion, however grave it may be, cannot substitute for proof. The entire case of the prosecution is based on weak circumstantial evidence, and the chain of circumstances necessary to bring home the guilt of the accused has not been established.

¶192

41

¶193

46. Having gone through the judgments relied upon by learned counsel for the State and the principles of law laid down therein, in the given facts and circumstances of the present case, the aforesaid judgments, being distinguishable on facts, are of no help to the counsel for the State.

¶194

47. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court is of the considered opinion that the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. The evidence of the prosecution witnesses is neither cogent nor reliable, being fraught with material contradictions, omissions, and improvements, and does not inspire confidence so as to sustain the conviction of the appellants. In a case of mob violence, in the absence of specific attribution of overt acts to individual accused persons and without reliable identification, it would be highly unsafe to maintain their conviction. Accordingly, extending the benefit of doubt to the appellants, they are acquitted of the charges levelled against them.

¶195

48. Accordingly, the appeals are allowed , and the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 10.02.2015 passed by the learned trial Court is hereby set- aside. The appellants are acquitted of the aforesaid charges leveled against on the basis of benefit of doubt.

¶196

49. The appellants are reported to be on bail. Keeping in view the provision of Section 437-A of Cr.P.C., the appellants are directed to

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forthwith furnish personal bond in terms of Form No.45 prescribed in the Cr.P.C. of sum of Rs.25,000/- with one surety each in the like amount before the trial Court concerned which shall be effective for a period of six months along with an undertaking that in the event of filing of Special Leave Petition against the instant judgment or for grant of leave, the aforesaid appellant on receipt of notice thereof shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

¶199

50. Registry is directed to transmit the lower Court record along with a copy of this judgment to the trial Court forthwith for information

¶200

and necessary compliance.

¶201

Sd/- Sd/-

¶202

(Rajani Dubey) (Amitendra Kishore Prasad) Judge Judge

¶203

Vishakha

Bhagwan Lal And Ors. v. State Of Chhattisgarh

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Bhagwan Lal And Ors. v. State Of Chhattisgarh

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