Ramesh Naag Vs State of Chhattisgarh

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Page No.1 of 9 IN CRA-1743-2018

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2025:CGHC:15474-DB

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Digitally signed by SAIFAN SAIFAN KHAN KHAN Date:2025.04.05 12:09:53 +0530

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NAFR

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HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

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Criminal Appeal No. 1743 of 2018

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[Arising out of judgment dated 29.09.2018, passed in Special Sessions Case No.04 of 2017 (State of Chhattisgarh v. Ramesh Naag) by the Special Judge (POCSO Act), Kondagaon (CG)]

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Ramesh Naag S/o Sukhlal Naag Aged About 48 Years R/o Jaamkot Para, Kondagaon, Thana- Kondagaon, District- Kondagaon, Chhattisgarh., District : Kondagaon, Chhattisgarh

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... Appellant

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Versus

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State Of Chhattisgarh Through Police Station- Kondagaon, DistrictKondagaon, Chhattisgarh., District : Kondagaon, Chhattisgarh

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... Respondent

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[Cause-title taken from Case Information System (CIS)]

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------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- For Appellant : Mr. A.K. Yadav, Advocate For Respondent : Mr. Amit Buxy, Panel Lawyer

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Division Bench

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Hon'ble Shri Justice Sanjay K. Agrawal and Hon'ble Shri Justice Deepak Kumar Tiwari

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Judgment on Board (02.04.2025)

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Sanjay K. Agrawal, J

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(1) This criminal appeal filed by the accused-appellant under Section 374(2) of CrPC is directed against the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 29.09.2018, passed in Special Sessions Case No.04 of 2017 (State of Chhattisgarh v. Ramesh Naag) by the Special Judge, constituted under the provisions of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences, Act,

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Page No.2 of 9 IN CRA-1743-2018

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2012 (for short the “POCSO Act”), Kondagaon, whereby he has been convicted and sentenced as under:

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Conviction	Sentence
U/s. 376 of IPC	Rigorous imprisonment fo fine of Rs.200/- and, payment of fine, addit imprisonment for 01 mont	r 10 years with in default of ional rigorous h.
U/s. 04 of the POCSO Act, 2012	Imprisonment for life Rs.200/- and, in default fine, additional rigorous for 01 month.	with fine of of payment of imprisonment

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[Both the sentences are directed to run concurrently]

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(2) The case of the prosecution, in short, is that on 17.02.2017, between 08:30 to 09:00 PM in the night, in the house of the victim (PW-1), situated at Jaamkot Para, which comes within the ambit of Police Station Kondagaon, District Kondagaon (CG), the accusedappellant herein has committed penetrative sexual assault with his minor daughter (victim [PW-01]), aged about 12 years and, thereby, said to have committed the aforesaid offences.

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(3) The further case of the prosecution is that when victim (PW01) herself reported the matter to the police by submitting written complaint (Ex.P/01), FIR (Ex.P/02) was registered against the appellant and wheels of investigation started running, in which, spot map was prepared vide Ex.P/23. After obtaining necessary consent vide Ex.P/03 and Ex.P/07, the victim (PW-01) was subjected to medical examination, which was conducted by Dr. Reeta Gedam (PW-12), who gave her MLC report (not exhibited),

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Page No.3 of 9 IN CRA-1743-2018

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whereby it has been opined that though no injuries were found over the body of the victim (PW-01), but her hymen was found tore and swelling and scratches were fond on her private parts. Further, valver swab, vaginal swab, anal swab, vaginal slides and urethral swab were also take from the victim and handed over to the police for analsyis alongwith one undergarment of the victim, which were seized vide Ex.P/10 & Ex.P/05 respectively. The accused-appellant was arrested vide Ex.P/17 and sent for medical examination. Appellant’s MLC report is Ex.P/15 and futher his undergarment was also seized vide Ex.P14. Thereafter, all the said seized articles were sent to FSL, Raipur and, as per FSL report (Ex.P/22), it has been opined not stains of human sperm/semen were found on any of the aforesaid seized articles.

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(4) Furthermore, in order to ascertain the exact age of the victim (PW-01), copy of school progress report (Ex.P/08) of the victim was seized vide Ex.P/09, wherein her date of birth has been mentioned/recorded as 28.12.2004, meaning thereby, the victim (PW-01) was minor aged about 12 years 01 month on the date of offence. Thereafter, statement of witnesses were recorded and, after due investigation, the appellant was charge-sheeted for offences mentioned hereinabove in the competent criminal Court having jurisdiction, which was thereafter committed to the Court of Sessions for hearing and trial in accordance with law, in which, the appellant abjured his guilt and entered into defence by stating that

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Page No.4 of 9 IN CRA-1743-2018

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he is innocent and has been falsely implicated.

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(5) The prosecution in order to prove its case examined as many as 12 witnesses and exhibited 24 documents, whereas the appellant in support of his defence has neither examined any witness nor exhibited any document.

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(6) The learned trial Court after appreciating the oral and documentary evidence available on record proceeded to convict the appellant for offences punishable under Section 376 of IPC and also under Section 04 of the POCSO Act, 2012 and sentenced him as mentioned in the opening paragraph of this judgment, against which this appeal has been preferred by the appellant-accused questioning the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence.

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(7) Mr. A.K. Yadv, learned counsel appearing for the appellant would submit that the learned trial Court is absolutely unjustified in convicting the appellant for the aforesaid offences. In view of questions framed and answers given by the victim (PW-01) in her statement before the Court, the learned trial Court has erred in law while holding the appellant guilty for the offences in question. In alternative, learned counsel for the appellant submits that in light of the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in the matter of Thongam Tarun Singh v. State of Manipur1 , considering that there is no other criminal antecedents reported against the

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1 (2019) 18 SCC 77

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Page No.5 of 9 IN CRA-1743-2018

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appellant herein and he have not committed any jail offence, his sentence for imprisonment for life be reduced to 10 years’ RI. Hence, the present appeal be allowed in full or in part.

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(8) Per-contra , learned State counsel would submit that prosecution has been able to prove the offences beyond reasonable doubt by leading evidence of clinching nature. It is further submitted on behalf of the respondent-State that in view of statement of the victim (PW-01), wherein she clearly narrated the incident and implicated her father (appellant herein) to be the author of the crime in question, coupled with other evidence available on record, the learned trial Court has rightly convicted the appellant for the offences mentioned herein-above. Learned State counsel by referring to a recent judgment of the Supreme Court rendered in the matter

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2 of Ravinder Singh v. State Government of NCT of Delhi ,

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submits that in an identical case, the Supreme Court has imposed sentence for a period of 20 years’ RI by modifying the same from imprisonment for life and, therefore, the appellant herein shall not be awarded sentence for a period less than 20 years RI. Therefore, the present appeal is liable to be dismissed.

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(9) We have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival submissions made herein-above and went through the records with utmost circumspection.

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(10) In the instant case, considering the statement of the victim

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2 (2024) 2 SCC 323

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Page No.6 of 9 IN CRA-1743-2018

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(PW-01), wherein he has clearly narrated the incident in question and implicated the appellant herein (her father) to be the author of the crime by stating that on the date and time of the offence while she was sleeping in her room alongwith her younger sister, the appellant came into the room, romved her leggings and committed sexual intercourse with her. The victim (PW-01) was also subjected to lengthy cross-examination, but he remained consistent in her version and, therefore, her testimony inspire confidence and can be relied upon to hold the appellant guilty for the offence. The said version of the victim (PW-01) is also supported by medical evidence available on record i.e. her MLC report (not exhibited), wherein it has clearly been pined that though no injuries were found over the body of the victim (PW-01), but her hymen was found torn and swelling and scratches were found on her private parts, which aspect is duly supported and proved by the statement of Dr. Reeta Gedam (PW-12), who has medically examined the victim (PW-01). Moreover, according to victim’s school progress report (Ex.P/08), her date of birth has been recorded as 28.12.2004, meaning thereby, the victim (PW-01) was minor aged about 12 years 01 month on the date of offence. As such, on the basis of aforesaid evidence available on record, the finding recorded by the learned trial Court that appellant is guilty of having committed penetrative sexual assault on her minor daughter (PW-01), is strictly in accordance with law and, for which, he has rightly been convicted by learned trial Court.

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Page No.7 of 9 IN CRA-1743-2018

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We do not find any illegality or perversity in findings recorded by the learned trial Court. Accordingly, we hereby affirm the said finding.

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(11) Now the question would be whether the learned trial Court is justified in imposing sentence of imprisonment for life on the appellant for having committed offence under Section 04 of the POCSO Act or same can be modified/reduced ?

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(12) In the matter of Ravinder Singh (supra) their Lordships of the Supreme Court while dealing with an identical case where the accused committed sexual assault with his minor daughter has held in Paras-23 to 25 as under:

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“ 23. The above observations manifest the applicability of the same principle in cases where the maximum punishment prescribed by law is imprisonment for life with nothing further. Even in such cases, it would be a parody of justice to allow the convicts so sentenced to avail the benefit of remissions and the like, liberally conferred by the State, and cut short the length of their life sentence to a mere 14 years. We are, therefore, of the considered opinion that the law laid down in Swamy Shraddananda (2) v. State of Karnataka [(2008) 13 SCC 767] and Union of India v. V. Sriharan [(2016) 2 SCC (Cri) 695] with regard to special category sentencing to life imprisonment in excess of 14 years by fixing a lengthier term would be available to the High Courts and this Court, even in cases where the maximum punishment, permissible in law and duly imposed, is life imprisonment with nothing further. We must, however, hasten to add that exercise of such power must be restricted to grave cases, where allowing the convict sentenced to life imprisonment to seek release after a 14-year-term would tantamount to trivialising the very punishment imposed on such convict. Needless to state, cogent reasons have to be recorded for exercising such

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Page No.8 of 9 IN CRA-1743-2018

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power on the facts of a given case and such power must not be exercised casually or for the mere asking.

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24. In the case on hand, the appellant was found guilty of one of the most monstrous and horrific of offences, viz. the physical violation of his own daughter, who was not even in the first flush of youth. In the event he secures release after putting in just 14 years in jail, his possible re-entry into his daughter's life, while she is still in her twenties, may cause her further trauma and make her life difficult. His incarceration for a sufficiently long period would not only ensure that he receives his just deserts but also allow his daughter more time and maturity to settle down and move on with her life, even if her villainous father is set at liberty. We are, therefore, of the opinion that this is a fit and deserving case for exercise of the power vesting in this Court to impose a modified special category sentence of fixed-term life imprisonment. As pointed out by this Court in Madan Gopal Kakkad v. Naval Dubey [(1992) 3 SCC 204] , Judges who bear the sword of justice should not hesitate to use that sword with utmost severity to the full and to the end, if the gravity of the offence so demands.

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25. The ends of justice would be sufficiently served if the life imprisonment of the appellant is for a minimum of 20 years of actual incarceration before he can seek remissions under the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure e 1973, or any other enacted law . We, accordingly, direct so. Imposition of fines and imprisonment in default of payment thereof shall stand confirmed.”

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[ emphasis supplied ]

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(13) In that view of the matter and considering the principles of law laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the matter of Ravinder Singh (supra) and further considering the facts and circumstances of the present case, while affirming the conviction of

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Page No.9 of 9 IN CRA-1743-2018

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the appellant for offence under Section 04 of POCSO Act, we deem it appropriate to sentence him for a period of 20 years’ rigorous imprisonment by modifying/reducing it from imprisonment for life. However, the fine sentence and default stipulation, as imposed upon the appellant by the learned trial Court, alongwith the direction that both the sentences to run concurrently, shall remain intact. Further, though the conviction of the appellant for offence under Section 376 of IPC, as awarded by the learned trial Court, is hereby affirmed, but in light of Section 42 of the POCSO Act, the appellant shall have to serve 20 years’ rigorous imprisonment for having committed offence under Section 04 of the POCSO Act, as the same is higher in degree..

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(14) Consequently, with aforesaid modification, this criminal appeal stands partly allowed .

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(15) Let a certified copy of this judgment alongwith the original record be transmitted to the trial Court concerned as well as to the Superintendent of Jail where the appellant is languishing for necessary information and action.

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Sd/Sd/- (Sanjay K. Agrawal) (Deepak Kumar Tiwari) Judge Judge

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s@if

Ramesh Naag v. State of Chhattisgarh

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Ramesh Naag v. State of Chhattisgarh

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