Ram Prasad @ Bhaku Lal Cherva, Vs State of Chhattisgarh

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2025:CGHC:55256-DB

The date when	The date when	The date when the
the judgment	the judgment is	judgment is uploaded on
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12.08.2025	13.11.2025	-- 13.11.2025

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NAFR

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HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

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Judgment reserved on: 12.08.2025 Judgment delivered on: 13.11.2025

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CRA No. 1723 of 2019

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1 - Ram Prasad @ Bhaku Lal Cherva, S/o Lagan Sai Cherva, Aged About 20 Years, R/o Village Baswani, Police Station Sonhat, DistrictKorea Chhattisgarh.

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... Appellant

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versus

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1 - State of Chhattisgarh Through: Police Station Sonhat, District Korea Chhattisgarh.

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... Respondent(s)

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For Appellant	:Mr. Abhishek Sinha, Sr. Advocate along
	with Mr. Praveen Dhurandhar, Advocate
For Respondent(s)/State	:Mr. Ashutosh Shukla, P.L.

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Hon'ble Smt. Justice Rajani Dubey

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Hon’ble Shri Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad

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CAV Judgment

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Per Rajani Dubey, Judge

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1 . This appeal under Section 374(2) of Cr.P.C. has been preferred by the appellant against the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 03.11.2017 passed by learned Sessions Judge, Baikunthpur, District- Korea (C.G.) in Sessions Trial No. 68/2016 whereby the appellant has been convicted and sentenced in the following manner:-

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Conviction		Sentence
Under Section 302 of the Indian	Life imp	risonment (Thrice) and
Penal Code (Thrice)	fine of	Rs.500/- (Three times)
	and in	default of each fine
	amount	additional R.I. for 3
	months

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2 . The case of the prosecution, in brief, is that on 24.04.2016, the

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complainant, Parmanand alias Banarasi, had gone to Khanda, Baikunthpur, in the morning along with his friend Suresh. When he returned to his village, Baswahi, at around 7:00 to 8:00 p.m. on the same day, he saw his younger brother, the accused Ramprasad, running away from his house. Upon entering the house, the complainant found his wife, Tarawati, and his two sons,

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Kamlesh and Viklesh, lying dead, with blood oozing from their bodies. An axe, allegedly belonging to the accused Ramprasad, was found lying near the dead bodies, and its handle and vent were stained with blood. It is alleged that the complainant had recently constructed a new house, dug a borewell, and was delaying the marriage of the accused Ramprasad, which caused resentment in the mind of the accused. Owing to this grudge, the accused Ramprasad allegedly assaulted and killed the complainant’s wife, Tarawati, and his sons, Kamlesh and Viklesh, with the said axe, and thereafter fled from the scene of occurrence.

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3 . On the basis of the written report lodged by the complainant Parmanand regarding the said incident, an FIR was registered at Police Station Sonhat on 24.04.2016 at 22:50 hours against the accused Ramprasad for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, and the investigation commenced.

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4 . During the course of investigation, after giving due notice to the witnesses, inquest proceedings were conducted in their presence, and the dead bodies were sent to the Government Hospital for postmortem examination. From the place of occurrence, bloodstained soil and plain soil near the bodies of each deceased were collected and seized. One iron axe, alleged to be the weapon of offence, was also seized from the spot, and seizure memos were duly prepared. After the postmortem examination, the doctor preserved and sealed the clothes of the deceased—namely, the

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T-shirt of deceased Kamlesh, the shirt of deceased Viklesh, and the blouse of deceased Tarawati—along with the blood samples of all three deceased, and the same were seized under a seizure memo. Footprints of the right and left feet found at the scene were also collected, and photographs of the scene of occurrence and the deceased were taken. Statements of the complainant Parmanand and other witnesses were recorded, a spot map of the place of occurrence was prepared, and the statement of witness Suresh Kumar was recorded under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Subsequently, the accused Ramprasad was apprehended by the police from Shivari forest on 27.04.2016. His memorandum statement was recorded in the presence of witnesses, and pursuant thereto, further seizures were made, for which corresponding seizure memos were prepared.

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5 . Upon completion of the investigation, and on the basis of the evidence collected, a charge-sheet was filed before the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Baikunthpur, District Korea. Since the offence was exclusively triable by the Court of Session, the case was committed to the Sessions Court, Baikunthpur for trial. The learned Trial Court framed charges against the accused Ramprasad under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (three counts) for the murders of the deceased, namely, Tarawati, Kamlesh, and Viklesh. The accused abjured his guilt and claimed to be tried.

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6 . So as to hold the accused/appellant guilty, the prosecution examined as many as 10 witnesses. Statement of the accused/appellant was also recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. in which he denied all the incriminating circumstances appearing against him in the prosecution case, pleaded innocence and false implication. In his defence, he examined one witness namely Dilkumar Gupta as D.W.-1.

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7 . The learned trial Court, upon due appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence available on record, vide its judgment dated 03.11.2017, found the evidence adduced by the prosecution to be credible and trustworthy, and accordingly convicted and sentenced the appellant as detailed in paragraph 1 of this judgment. Hence, this appeal.

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8 . Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence passed by the learned trial Court is contrary to law, facts, and the circumstances of the case and, therefore, liable to be set aside. T he impugned judgment is unsustainable as it suffers from errors of law and fact. The learned trial Court has failed to properly appreciate the evidence adduced by the prosecution, which is insufficient to establish the offence under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. The learned trial Court erred in relying upon the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Parmanand (P.W.-2) and Suresh Kumar (P.W.-3), whose statements are inconsistent and contradictory to each other, rendering them unreliable and unworthy of credence. The

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investigation in the present case was defective in nature. No Dehati Nalishi was registered, despite the complainant asserting that he made a report on the spot. The benefit of such defective investigation ought to have been extended to the appellant. The conviction of the appellant is based solely upon circumstantial evidence. The only circumstance relied upon by the prosecution is the alleged sighting of the appellant running from the house, as stated by Parmanand (P.W.-2) and Suresh Kumar (P.W.-3). There exists no direct evidence connecting the appellant with the alleged offence under Section 302 of IPC. The alleged weapon of offence ( Tangiya ) was not seized from the possession of the appellant. Moreover, the FSL report merely indicates the presence of human blood on the said weapon, without establishing whether the blood belonged to the deceased or to the appellant. Even though the learned trial Court recorded a finding that the motive was not proved, it nevertheless proceeded to convict the appellant, which is contrary to the settled principles of criminal jurisprudence.

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The learned trial Court failed to appreciate that Parmanand (P.W.-2) himself admitted that there were allegations of illicit relations between the appellant and the wife of another person, leading to strained relations, thereby creating serious doubt regarding the prosecution story. The prosecution has failed to establish an unbroken chain of circumstances so as to conclusively point towards the guilt of the appellant. The chain of evidence being incomplete, the appellant is entitled to benefit of

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doubt and consequent acquittal. There are material contradictions and omissions between the statements of prosecution witnesses recorded before the Court and their statements recorded in the case diary, which further weaken the prosecution case. The learned trial Court has failed to appreciate the evidence in its true perspective, and the circumstances of the case attract the exceptions provided under Section 302 of IPC.

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In view of the above submissions, the impugned judgment being illegal, erroneous, and contrary to the law is liable to be set aside and the appellant deserves to be acquitted of the charges framed against him.

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Reliance has been placed on the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Malappa Vs. State of Karnataka; (2021)5 SCC 572, Shankar Vs. State of Maharashtra; 2023 SCC OnLine SC 268, Sekaran Vs. State of Tamil Nadu; (2024) 2 SCC 176 and this Court’s judgment dated 25.10.2016 passed in CRA No. 704 of 2005 in the matter of Bhothar Ram Vs. State of Chhattisgarh and judgment dated 19.10.2023 passed in CRA No. 669 of 2015 in the matter of Santosh Kumar Vs. State of Chhattisgarh.

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9 . Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent/State submits that the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence passed by the learned trial Court is well reasoned, based on proper appreciation of evidence on record, and does not call for any

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interference by this Court. It is contended that the learned trial Court has rightly relied upon the testimonies of Parmanand (P.W.2) and Suresh Kumar (P.W.-3), who are eyewitnesses to the incident and whose depositions clearly establish the involvement of the appellant in the commission of the offence. It is further submitted that pursuant to the memorandum statement of the appellant/accused, seizure of the incriminating article was duly effected in accordance with law, and the same stands duly proved by the prosecution witnesses. The learned counsel further contends that the report of the Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) corroborates the prosecution version and lends assurance to the finding of guilt recorded by the learned trial Court. In view of the aforesaid submissions, it is urged that there is no illegality, infirmity, or perversity in the findings recorded by the learned trial Court, and the appeal, being devoid of merit, deserves to be dismissed.

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10. Heard counsel for the parties and perused the material placed on record.

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11. From the perusal of the record of the learned trial Court, it is evident that charges were framed against the appellant under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (thrice). Upon due appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence brought on record, the learned trial Court found the appellant guilty of the said offence under Section 302 of IPC (for three counts) and

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accordingly convicted and sentenced him as detailed in paragraph 1 of this judgment.

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12. The foremost issue that arises for consideration before this Court is whether the deaths of the deceased persons, namely, Tarawati, Viklesh, and Kamlesh, were homicidal in nature or not.

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13. Parmanand (P.W.-2) stated that on the date of the incident, he had gone to his sister’s residence situated in village Khara, accompanied by his neighbour Suresh. They departed from village Baswahi at about 10:00 to 11:00 a.m. and, thereafter they returned to Baswahi at around 7:00 to 7:30 p.m. Upon reaching near his house, he saw his brother, Ramprasad, jumping over the boundary wall of the house and fleeing from the spot.

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When he approached the house, Suresh remained standing outside. Upon entering inside, he found his wife, Tarawati, and his children Viklesh and Kamlesh, lying in a pool of blood. They had sustained grievous injuries and were found dead. Thereafter, he reported the said incident at the concerned police station. FIR was lodged vide Ex.P/2 and he admits his signature on it from A to A part.

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14. Sub-Inspector Rakesh Yadav (P.W.-8) stated that on 24.04.2016, the complainant Parmanand alias Banarasi, appeared at the Police Station and lodged a report regarding the incident, on the basis of which, he registered a First Information Report bearing Crime No. 40/2016 for the offence punishable under Section 302

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of the Indian Penal Code at Police Station Sonhat. The said First Information Report is marked as Ex.P/2 and he admits his signature on it from B to B part.

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Thereafter, he proceeded to the place of occurrence and served notices upon the witnesses for preparation of panchnamas in respect of the deceased persons, namely, Tarawati, Viklesh, and Kamlesh. The said notices are marked as Exs. P/3, P/4, and P/5 and admits his signatures on it from C to C part.

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In the presence of the witnesses, he prepared the inquest memos of the deceased persons. The said inquest memos are marked as Exs. P/6, P/7, and P/8 and he admits his signature on it from C to C part. Thereafter, he prepared requisitions for conducting the postmortem examination of the deceased persons and forwarded the same to the Government Hospital, Sonhat, through Constable No. 635, Nandlal Toppo, for necessary action. The said postmortem requisitions are marked as Exs. P/21, P/22 and P/23 and admits his signature on it from A to A part.

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15. Dr. Balwant Singh (P.W.-9), who conducted the postmortem examination of the deceased Tarawati and found multiple grievous injuries on her body. The injuries included a lacerated wound on the front of the neck severing the windpipe; a deep wound on the left temporal region; a cut injury over the left eye and cheekbone causing perforation of the eye; a wound on the forehead; a deep incised wound extending from the right ear to the left ear at the

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back of the neck, severing the skull; a stab wound on the right shoulder causing separation of the part; and additional incised wounds on the scalp and left elbow region.

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The postmortem examination revealed that the time elapsed between death and examination was approximately 12 to 16 hours. The nature of death was opined to be homicidal, and the cause of death was determined to be brain injury. He gave his report vide Ex. P/21 A in this regard and admitted his signature on it from A to A part.

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16. Upon conducting the postmortem examination of the deceased Viklesh, Dr. Balwant Singh (P.W.-9) found the following injuries on the body:-

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Injury No. 1 — A large wound on the right temporal, occipital, and left temporal regions of the head, extending to the left jawbone, measuring 12 x 3 x 4 cm.

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Injury No. 2 — A contusion on the left parietal region of the head, measuring 5 x 1 x 1 cm.

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Injury No. 3 — An incised wound extending from the right jaw to the right side of the mouth, measuring 3 x 1 x 1 cm.

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17. The time between death and postmortem examination was estimated to be between 12 to 16 hours. In the opinion of the doctor, the death was homicidal in nature, and the cause of death was brain injury. He gave his report vide Ex. P/22 A in this regard.

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18. Further, upon conducting the postmortem examination of the deceased Kamlesh, Dr. Balwant Singh (P.W.-9) observed the following injuries on the body:-

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Injury No. 1: A lacerated wound on the right temporal region of the head, measuring 3 x 1 x 2 cm.

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Injury No. 2: A lacerated wound on the temporal-occipital region of the head, measuring 3 x 1 x 1 cm.

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Injury No. 3: A deep incised wound extending from the right orbital region of the eye to the right jaw and down to the chin, measuring 7 x 1.5 x 1 cm, resulting in eversion of the right eye.

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Injury No. 4: A lacerated wound on the forehead above the right eyebrow, measuring 3 x 5 x 5 cm.

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Injury No. 5: A lacerated wound extending from the left temporal region to the left cheek, measuring 5 x 2.5 x 1 cm.

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Injury No. 6: A lacerated wound on the left parietal region of the head, measuring 3 x 1 x 3 cm.

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19. The time elapsed between death and the postmortem examination was approximately 12 to 16 hours. The death was opined to be homicidal in nature, and the cause of death was brain injury. He gave his report vide Ex. P/23 A in this regard.

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20. In his cross-examination, Dr. Balwant Singh (P.W.-9) admitted that the deceased persons, namely Tarawati, Kamlesh, and Viklesh, had sustained injuries on different parts of their bodies.

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The witness further deposed that he was unable to specify which of the injuries was inflicted first or which of the deceased persons had died first. He also stated that he could not say with certainty whether the injuries sustained by the deceased were caused by a single knife. The witness further admitted that the sickle used in the commission of the offence was likely to bear bloodstains.

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21. From the aforesaid evidence, it stands established that nothing material was brought out in the cross-examination to discredit the testimony of the witness or cast any doubt upon its reliability. Accordingly, the prosecution has successfully proved beyond reasonable doubt that all the deaths in question were homicidal in nature.

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22. Now, it is to be examined whether the accused/appellant is the perpetrator of the said offence.

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23. Parmanand (P.W.-2) is brother of the accused/appellant. He stated that on the day of the incident, upon reaching his residence, he saw his brother Ramprasad jumping over the boundary wall and fleeing from the spot. On entering the house, he found his wife and children lying dead. He further deposed that upon the arrival of the police, he narrated the incident to them at his residence and lodged a report accordingly. The FIR was lodged vide Ex.P/2.

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24. In FIR (Ex.P/2), he stated that he had reached his house at Baswadi at about 4:00 p.m. along with his friend Suresh, and

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upon arrival, had seen his brother, Rag Prasad, running away from the premises. It was further stated that on entering the house, he had found his wife, Tarawati, and his children, Viklesh and Kamlesh, lying dead. He also stated that an axe belonging to his brother had been lying near the dead bodies.

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25. In para 10 of his cross-examination, Parmanand (P.W.-2) deposed that a romantic relationship had developed between the accused Ramprasad, and his wife without his knowledge.

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26. In para 11, he further deposed that he had been distressed from the very inception upon coming to know that his brother, the accused, had surreptitiously maintained physical relations with his wife.

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In para 12, the witness further deposed that he had attempted to reason with his wife and the accused, his brother, but they did not heed his words.

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In para 14, the witness deposed that whenever the accused found that he was not present at home, the accused would visit his new residence and establish physical relations with his wife.

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In para 18, the witness denied the suggestion that on the date of the incident, his children had informed him about the arrival of the accused at the house. He further denied the suggestion that thereafter he, along with Suresh, had killed his wife and children.

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27. Suresh Kumar (P.W.-3) stated that he along with Parmanand (P.W.-2) went to Village- Khada and upon returning to the house of Parmanand, he witnessed the accused fleeing from the house of the Parmanand. He saw that Parmanand’s wife and their children were lying in a pool of blood in the veranda.

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In his cross-examination, he admitted that on the date of the incident, construction of a toilet had commenced at Parmanand’s house. He further denied the suggestion that Parmanand had conspired with the accused to murder his wife and children.

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Further in para 14, he stated that he had seen the accused, Ramprasad, near the road at about 9:30 a.m. on the date of the incident. He further stated that he had again seen the accused three days later, at the time of his arrest by the police. The witness also deposed that prior to the said incident, he had neither seen nor met or spoken to the accused.

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28. Ramgopal (P.W.-4) admits his signature from A to A part on seizure memo (Ex.P/11), identification memo (Ex.P/12) and memorandum statement (Ex.P/13). It was further stated by the accused Ramprasad before the police that he had concealed his clothes in the forest.

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29. Shubhlal (P.W.-6) also admits his signature on memorandum statement (Ex.P/13), seizure memo (Exs. P/11, P/17 and P/18) and identification memo (Ex.P/12).

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30. Shubhlal (P.W.-6) denied the suggestion that the police had recorded the memorandum statement of the accused in his presence. He further stated that a pant and a shirt were seized on the basis of the memorandum of the accused. The witness voluntarily stated that he was present at the spot when the shirt was recovered from the forest.

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The witness admitted that the police had reported the seizure of Ramprasad’s clothes from the Shivari forest. He further admitted that he had not accompanied the police to the police station or to any other place except the spot where the dead bodies of the deceased were lying. He also admitted that after affixing his signature on the documents, he had returned home.

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31. As per the FSL report (Ex. P/35), human blood was detected on the axe (Article A), soil samples (Articles B, D, and E), and the clothes of the deceased persons (Articles J, K, and L). Disintegrated bloodstains were, however, found on the clothes of the accused (Articles H and I); hence, the origin of the blood could not be determined as per the said FSL report (Ex. P/35).

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32. According to the prosecution, a tangi (axe) was recovered from the spot, and as per the identification memo (Ex. P/12). Witnesses Shubhlal (P.W.-6) and Rampgopal (P.W.-4) had stated that the said axe belonged to the accused Ramprasad. However, both the witnesses denied the prosecution’s suggestion that they had identified the axe as belonging to the accused.

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33. Rampgopal (P.W.-4) denied the prosecution’s suggestion that he had informed the police that the axe was used by the accused Ramprasad. Upon being questioned by the Court, he stated that the police had not shown the tangi to him and that he had only informed the police regarding the clothes.

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34. Both the witnesses denied the memorandum statement attributed to the accused. As per the memorandum (Ex. P/13), the accused disclosed that a blood-stained pant and shirt had been seized from the forest pursuant to his statement. However, as per the report of the Forensic Science Laboratory, no human blood was detected thereon. It further appears from the seizure memo (Ex. P/18) that an axe was recovered from the spot.

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35. As per the prosecution, the accused absconded from the spot on 24.04.2016. His memorandum statement was recorded on 27.04.2016, vide Ex. P/13, and pursuant thereto, his clothes were recovered on the same date, as per seizure memo Ex.P/11.

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36. In the matter of Shankar Vs. State of Maharashtra; 2023 SCC OnLine SC 268 , Hon’ble Apex Court held in paras 18 to 22 as under:-

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“18. There can be no doubt with respect to the fact that in a case where the conviction is based on circumstantial evidence, motive assumes great significance. A Three Judge Bench of this Court in Nandu Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh (now Chhattisgarh) [2022 SCC OnLine SC 1454] by

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its judgment dated 25.02.2022, after observing thus, held as under:-

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"It is not as if motive alone becomes the crucial link in the case to be established by the prosecution and in its absence the case of prosecution must be discarded. But, at the same time, complete absence of motive assumes a different complexion and such absence definitely weighs in favour of the accused."

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We may add here that just like complete absence of motive failure to establish motive after attributing one, should also give a different complexion in a case based on circumstantial evidence and it will certainly enfeeble the case of prosecution.

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In the decision in Nandu Singh's case an earlier decision of this Court in Anwar Ali v. State of Himachal Pradesh [(2020) 10 SCC 166], was quoted with agreement, thus:-

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"24. Now so far as the submission on behalf of the accused that in the present case the prosecution has failed to establish and prove the motive and therefore the accused deserves acquittal is concerned, it is true that the absence of proving the motive cannot be a ground to reject the prosecution case. It is also true and as held by this Court in Suresh Chandra Bahri v. State of Bihar (1995 Supp (1) SCC 80) that if motive is proved that would

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supply a link in the chain of circumstantial evidence but the absence thereof cannot be a ground to reject the prosecution case. However, at the same time, as observed by this Court in Babu (Babu v. State of Kerala, (2010) 9 SCC 189), absence of motive in a case depending on circumstantial evidence is a factor that weighs in favour of the accused. In paras 25 and 26, it is observed and held as under: (Babu case, SCC pp. 20001).

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"25. In State of U.P. v Kishanpal (2008) 16 SCC 73), this Court examined the importance of motive in cases of circumstantial evidence and observed (SCC pp. 87-88, paras 38-39)

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'38.... the motive is a thing which is primarily known to the accused themselves and it is not possible for the prosecution to explain what actually promoted or excited them to commit the particular crime.

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The motive may be considered as a circumstance which is relevant for assessing the evidence but if the evidence is clear and unambiguous and the circumstances prove the. guilt of the accused, the same is not weakened even if the motive is not a very strong one. It is also settled law that the motive loses all its importance in a case where direct evidence of eyewitnesses is available, because even if there may be a very strong motive for the accused persons to commit a particular crime, they cannot be convicted if the evidence of eyewitnesses is not convincing. In the same way, even if

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there may not be an apparent motive but if the evidence of the eyewitnesses is clear and reliable, the absence or inadequacy of motive cannot stand in the way of conviction.’

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This Court has also held that the absence of motive in a case depending on circumstantial evidence is a factor that weighs in favour of the accused. (Vide Pannayar v. State of T.N. (2009) 9 SCC 152)"

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In the decision in Shivaji Chintappa Patil v. State of Maharashtra [(2021) 5 SCC 626], after referring to the decision in Anwar Ali's case (supra), this Court observed thus:-

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"27. Though in a case of direct evidence, motive would not be relevant, in a case of circumstantial evidence, motive plays an Important link to complete the chain of circumstances."

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In the case on hand, the prosecution alleged a motive. According to the prosecution on 29.09.2001, the deceased along with his friend Parag Sukhdeve assaulted the brother of appellant in the latter appeal (the first accused in the Sessions Trial). It is also the case of the prosecution that after the accused persons entered the house of PW-8, Chintaman Giddu Gatey the first accused/the appellant in the latter appeal hurled abuses on the deceased and asked him why he along with his friend Parag Sukhdeve assaulted his brother. It is also the, case of the prosecution that though

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the deceased denied any such occurrence, the said appellant continued to say that the deceased had done dishonesty and assaulted his brother. After alleging motive as above, prosecution had failed to establish the same. In this context, it is to be noted that the Trial Court made a positive finding that the prosecution had miserably failed to establish the alleged motive. Despite the said finding of the Trial Court and despite that issue was pointedly raised before the High Court, obviously the High Court in the impugned judgment did not consider the said aspect at all. This failure on the part of the High Court is a ground specifically taken in this appeal. In the light of the decision in Anwar Ali's case (supra) and Shivaji Chintappa Patil's case (supra), and also based on what we held in respect of the impact of failure to establish the alleged motive in a case based on circumstantial evidence it can only be held that the said failure had weakened the case of the prosecution. This aspect should have been given proper weight by the courts below.”

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37. Vide judgment dated 19.10.2023, this Court in the matter of Santosh Kumar Vs. State of Chhattisgarh passed in CRA No. 669 of 2015 held in paras 12 and 13 as under:-

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“12. Admittedly, in the present case, no blood much less human blood has been found on the seized lungi and spade and the Supreme Court in the matter of Balwan Singh vs.

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State of Chhattisgarh and another [(2019) 7 SCC 781] held that there cannot be any fixed formula that the prosecution has to prove, or need not prove that the blood groups match. But it has been held that the Court should be satisfied both about the recovery and about the origin of the human blood and held in Paras- 23 & 24 as under:

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"23. From the aforementioned discussion, we can summarise that if the recovery of bloodstained articles is proved beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution, and if the investigation was not found to be tainted, then it may be sufficient if the prosecution shows that the blood found on the articles is of human congin though, even though the blood group is not proved because of disintegration of blood. The Court will have to come to the conclusion based on the facts Chandtisgarhstances of each case, and there cannot be any fixed formula that the prosecution has to prove, or Bilas peed not prove, that the blood groups match.

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In the instant case, then, we could have placed some reliance on the recovery, had the prosecution at least proved that the blood was of human origin. As observed supra, while discussing the evidence of PWs 9 and 16, the prosecution has tried to concoct the case from stage to stage. Hence, in the absence of positive material indicating that the stained blood was of human origin and

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of the same blood group as that of the accused, it would be difficult for the Court to rely upon the aspect of recovery of the weapons and tabbal, and such recovery does not help the case of the prosecution."

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In the matter of Raghav Prapanna Tripathi v. The State of Uttar Pradesh [AIR 1963 SC 74] , rendered by the Supreme Court, it has been held by a majority of their Lordships that it would be far-fetched to conclude from the mere presence of blood-stained earth that that earth was stained with human blood and that the human blood was that of the victims.”

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38. Vide judgment dated 22.07.2025 , this Court in the matter of Chandra Kumar Nagesh Vs. State of Chhattisgarh passed in CRA No. 1324 of 2024 held in para 42 as under:-

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Finally, reverting to the facts of the case in the light of aforesaid discussion, it is quite established that the accused had a love affair with his deceased and both of them used to talk to each other on the phone, the accused used to come home and talk to her as well. The conduct of Chitra Sen (PW5) and Kunjal Nagesh (PW-8) though cited as prosecution witnesses did not make any report to the police and those two witnesses also did not inform the police that they saw the accused fleeing from the house of the deceased. Further, the mother of victim (PW-07) has stated in para-13 that she did not see the accused going into her daughter's room and also

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did not see the accused hitting the victim. So far as the pregnancy of the deceased is concerned, Dr. Anju Sonwani (PW-13) has not said in her main examination that at the time of the postmortem of the victim, any symptom of the victim being pregnant or of her abortion was found. So far as the intention and motive of the accused to kill the deceased is concerned, learned counsel for the appellant has also argued that the main circumstantial evidence relating to the incident that the accused was seen entering or leaving the house of the deceased by the witnesses has not been proved beyond doubt that the deceased was last seen alive with the accused before or around the time of her death and some time thereafter the deceased was found dead. Therefore, merely saying that the accused was seen leaving the house of the deceased does not prove that the accused has murdered the deceased. The prosecution has not proved that the accused had any intention to kill the deceased, nor has any prosecution witness said that there was a dispute or enmity between the deceased and the accused due to which the accused killed the deceased.”

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39. In the matter of Sekaran Vs. State of Tamil Nadu; (2024) 2 SCC 176, Hon’ble Apex Court held in para 30 as under:-

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“30. Although not brought to our notice in course of arguments, it is revealed from the oral testimony of PW 11 that the appellant could be apprehended 3 (three) years after the incident from

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Puliyur road junction in (1 km away from Ambalakalai) in Kerala after vigorous search. However, abscondence by a person against whom an FIR has been lodged and who is under expectation of being apprehended is not very unnatural. Mere absconding by the appellant after alleged commission of crime and remaining untraceable for such a long time itself cannot establish his guilt or his guilty conscience. Abscondence, in certain cases, could constitute a relevant piece of evidence, but its evidentiary value depends upon the surrounding circumstances. This sole circumstance, therefore, does not enure to the benefit of the prosecution.”

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40. In the matter of Malappa Vs. State of Karnataka; (2021) 5 SCC 572 , Hon’ble Apex Court held in para 14 as under:-

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“14. Even if the prosecution version that PW 3. PW 5 and PW 6 could and did see the appellant running in front of Devendrappa's house from the respective positions they were in at the time of occurrence of the incident was accepted, the evidence we would have been left with would have been two accused persons being seen running away. That would have been too thin piece of evidence to convict someone under Section 302 of the Code, applying the principle of res gestae. The first court of facts on appreciation of evidence had acquitted the appellant. We do not find any major lacuna in its reasoning which would have warranted interference by the appeal court for reversing such finding into that of guilt.”

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41. In light of above, in the present case, it is evident that the complainant, Parmanand (P.W.-2), who is the brother of the accused, admitted that there existed a love affair between his wife and the accused. The alleged weapon of offence, an axe, was recovered from the spot; however, upon perusal of the statements of Parmanand (P.W.-2) and Suresh Kumar (P.W.-3), it is apparent that their testimonies are unreliable. No independent witness or neighbour of the deceased has supported the prosecution version. Furthermore, the witnesses to the memorandum and seizure did not support the alleged memorandum statement or the recovery of clothes, and as per the FSL report, no human blood was detected on the seized shirt and pant. Though the Investigating Officer prepared an identification memo (Ex.P/12) of the alleged weapon of offence, both the witnesses failed to support the said identification memo.

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42. In his cross-examination, the Investigating Officer, Rakesh Yadav (P.W.-8), in paragraph 51, admitted that none of the witnesses stated during investigation that the accused had used the seized tangi . He further admitted that, although the seized tangi might have belonged to the accused, no inquiry was conducted in this regard. Moreover, in paragraph 58 of his deposition, he conceded that the seized clothing items were not complete garments but merely torn pieces of a pant and a shirt.

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43. The learned trial Court, placing reliance upon the testimonies of Parmanand (P.W.-2) and Suresh Kumar (P.W.-3), as well as the

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memorandum and seizure proceedings, held the appellant guilty of the offence in question. However, keeping in view the overall facts, it is apparent that the conviction of the appellant cannot be sustained solely on the testimonies of Parmanand (P.W.-2) and Suresh Kumar (P.W.-3), who merely stated that they saw the accused running away from the house. The mere absconding of the appellant, after the alleged commission of the offence, cannot by itself be treated as conclusive proof of guilt or guilty conscience. The prosecution has failed to establish a complete chain of circumstances pointing unerringly towards the guilt of the accused, and the learned trial Court failed to properly appreciate these material aspects while convicting the appellant. Hence, it is evident that the prosecution has not proved its case beyond reasonable doubt, and the appellant is entitled to the benefit of doubt.

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44. For the foregoing reasons, the criminal appeal is allowed. Conviction and sentence of the appellant under Section 302 (three times) of the IPC are hereby set aside. The accused /appellant is acquitted of the said charge levelled against him. He is in jail since 27.04.2016. He be set at liberty forthwith if no longer required in any other criminal case.

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45. Keeping in view the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Now Section 481 of the Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023), the appellant is directed forthwith furnish a personal bond in terms of Form No.45

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prescribed in the Code of Criminal Procedure of sum of Rs.25,000/-with two reliable sureties in the like amount before the Court concerned which shall be effective for a period of six months along with an undertaking that in the event of filing of Special Leave Petition against the instant judgment or for grant of leave, the aforesaid appellant on receipt of notice thereof shall appear before the Hon'ble Supreme Court.

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46. Let a certified copy of this judgment along with the original record

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be transmitted to the trial Court concerned and to the Superintendent of Jail where he is lodged and suffering jail sentence, forthwith for information and necessary action if, any.

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Sd/Sd/-

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(Rajani Dubey) (Amitendra Kishore Prasad) Judge Judge

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Ruchi

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RUCHI YADAV Digitally signedby RUCHI YADAV

Ram Prasad @ Bhaku Lal Cherva, v. State of Chhattisgarh

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Ram Prasad @ Bhaku Lal Cherva, v. State of Chhattisgarh

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