Narayan Chouhan Vs State Of Chhattisgarh

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CRA No.152/2016

2025:CGHC:39847

NAFR

HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

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Digitally signed by AMARDEEP AMARDEEP CHOUBEY CHOUBEY Date: 2025.08.11 18:13:51 +0530

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CRA No. 152 of 2016

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Narayan Chouhan S/o Phoolsai Chouhan Aged About 30 Years R/o Subhash Block Jhopadi, In Front Of Post Office, Out Post Manikpur, Police Station Kotwali, Civil And Rev. District Korba, Chhattisgarh., Chhattisgarh

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... Appellant

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versus

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State of Chhattisgarh Through Station House Officer, Out Post Manikpur, Police Station Kotwali, District Korba, Chhattisgarh., Chhattisgarh

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Respondent For Appellant : Mr. Dharmesh Shrivastava, Advocate For Respondent/State: Mr. Shailendra Sharma, Panel Lawyer

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Hon'ble Shri Bibhu Datta Guru, Judge

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Judgment on Board

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08/08/2025

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This appeal is directed against the judgment of conviction and sentence dated 23/01/2016 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge(FTC) Korba, C.G. in Special Session Trial No.16/2014, whereby the appellant has been convicted and sentenced as under:-

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Conviction	Sentence
Under Section 363 of the IPC	Rigorous Imprisonment for 7 years & fine of Rs.3000/- in default of payment of fine,additional S.I. for 5 months.
Under Section 366-A of the IPC	Rigorous Imprisonment for 7 years & fine of Rs.3000/- in default of payment of fine,additional S.I. for 5 months
Under Section 376(1) of the IPC	Rigorous Imprisonment for 7 years & fine of Rs.3000/- in default of payment of fine,additional S.I. for 5 months
Under Section 4 of the POCSO Act, 2012	Rigorous Imprisonment for 7 years & fine of Rs.3000/- in default of payment of fine,additional S.I. for 5 months

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All the sentences are directed to run concurrently.

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Facts of the case, in brief, is that victim lives along with her mother (PW-2). It is alleged that on 18/12/2013, the victim went to work at the house of Sobha Verma PW-4 in the morning and then her mother came to house at about 5 p.m. and did not find her daughter/victim in the house, thereafter, she went to ask Sobha Verma, where she told that the victim did not come for work in the evening. Thereafter, after being searched, mother of victim informed at P.S. and later it came to the knowledge of mother of victim that neighbor Narayan Chouhan/appellant, who is a married person, took the victim with him on the pretext of marriage. Subsequently, FIR was lodged against the appellant. During the investigation, spot map was prepared vide Ex.P-4. The appellant was arrested vide Ex.P-17. With regard to ascertain the age of

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the victim, Dakhil Kharij Register Article-A was seized. After completing the investigation, the final report was prepared.

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1. In order to bring home the above-stated offence, the prosecution examined as many as 14 witnesses, whereas the accused/ appellant has examined. Statement of the appellant under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. was recorded, wherein he has pleaded his innocence and false implication in the matter.

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After appreciation of oral as well as documentary evidence produced by the prosecution, the learned trial Court has convicted the appellant and sentenced him as mentioned in opening paragraph of this judgment. Hence this appeal.

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Learned counsel for the appellant would submit that the appellant has been falsely implicated in the present case. He submits that the victim turned hostile and stated that she eloped with the appellant of her own consent, stayed at the house of sister of the appellant and engaged in a consensual physical relationship. She further claimed to have married the appellant and disclosed her age as 18 years. The prosecution failed to prove any element of force, coercion, or kidnapping, which is essential for conviction under Sections 363, 366-A, and 376 of the Indian Penal Code. The doctor opined that the victim was habitual to intercourse. The prosecution has miserably failed to prove the actual age of the victim and it was also not proved from the dakhil-kharij register that on what basis, date of birth of victim was registered in the

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register and the person who registered the date of birth of the victim in dakhil kharij, was not examined. It is submitted that the entire incident is highly doubtful, therefore, the conviction of the appellant is not sustainable and he may be acquitted of the charges framed against him.

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On the other hand, learned State counsel opposes the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant and has submitted that the statement of the victim and other witnesses are fully reliable. There are sufficient evidence available on record to hold that the appellant is guilty for the alleged offence and the learned trial Court has absolutely justified in passing the judgment of conviction and sentence against the appellant which does not require for any interference.

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I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.

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The first and foremost question arose for the consideration would be whether the victim was minor and less than 18 years of age on the date of incident or not.

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In order to ascertain the age of the victim, the prosecution has mainly relied upon statement of Smt. Kailash Kaur (PW-8), Teacher of the school where the victim was studying. In her statement, she stated that in the dakhil-kharij, the date of birth of victim has been mentioned as 05.06.1998. In cross-examination, she has admitted that the entries in the said register with regard to

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date of birth of the victim has been made on the oral information of her parents. She further stated that she was not posted in the school when the victim took admission. She also stated in para-5 of her cross-examination that there is overwriting in the photo copy of Dakhil-Kharij register.

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Mother of victim PW-2 stated in para 7 of her evidence stated that elder sister of victim is aged about 23-24 years. She further stated that the victim is about 2 years younger than her elder sister. Victim in her evidence at para 6 stated that her age is 18 years. PW-3 Aunt of the victim at para 7 of the cross-examination stated that the victim is aged about 18-20 years.

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The Hon’ble Supreme Court in paragraphs 40,42,43,44 and 48 of its judgment in Alamelu and Another Vs. State, represented by Inspector of Police, 2011(2) SCC 385 , the Supreme Court has observed as under:

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"40.Undoubtedly, the transfer certificate, Ex.P16 indicates that the girl's date of birth was 15th June, 1977. Therefore, even according to the aforesaid certificate, she would be above 16 years of age (16 years 1 month and 16 days) on the date of the alleged incident, i.e., 31st July, 1993. The transfer certificate has been issued by a Government School and has been duly signed by the Headmaster. Therefore, it would be admissible in evidence under Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act. However, the admissibility of such a document would be of not much evidentiary value to prove the age of the girl in the absence of the material on the basis of which the age was recorded. The date of birth mentioned in the transfer certificate would have no evidentiary value unless the person,

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who made the entry or who gave the date of birth is examined.

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Considering the manner in which the facts recorded in a document may be proved, this Court in the case of Birad Mal Singhvi Vs. Anand Purohit1, observed as follows:-

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"The date of birth mentioned in the scholars' register has no evidentiary value unless the person who made the entry or who gave the date of birth is examined....Merely because the documents Exs. 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12 were proved, it does not mean that the contents of documents were also proved. Mere proof of the documents Exs. 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 would not tantamount to proof of all the contents or the correctness of date of birth stated in the documents. Since the truth of the fact, namely, the date of birth of Hukmi Chand and Suraj Prakash Joshi was in issue, mere proof of the documents as produced by the aforesaid two witnesses does not furnish evidence of the truth of the facts or contents of the documents. The truth or otherwise of the facts in issue, namely, the date of birth of the two candidates as mentioned in the documents could be proved by admissible evidence i.e. by the evidence of those persons who could vouchsafe for the truth of the facts in issue. No evidence of any such kind was produced by the respondent to prove the truth of the facts, namely, the date of birth of Hukmi Chand and of Suraj Prakash Joshi. In the circumstances the dates of birth as mentioned in the aforesaid documents 1988 (Supp) SCC 604 have no probative value and the dates of birth as mentioned therein could not be accepted."

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The same proposition of law is reiterated by this Court in the case of Narbada Devi Gupta Vs. Birendra Kumar Jaiswal2, where this Court observed as follows:-

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"The legal position is not in dispute that mere production and marking of a document as exhibit by the court cannot be held to be a due proof of its contents. Its execution has to be proved by admissible evidence, that is, by the "evidence of those persons who can vouchsafe for the truth of the facts in issue"."

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In our opinion, the aforesaid burden of proof has not been discharged by the prosecution. The father says nothing about the transfer certificate in his evidence. The Headmaster has not been examined at all. Therefore, the entry in the transfer certificate can not be relied upon to definitely fix the age of the girl.

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We may further notice that even with reference to Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, a public document has to be tested by applying the same standard in civil as well as criminal proceedings. In this context, it would be appropriate to notice the observations made by this Court in the case of Ravinder Singh Gorkhi Vs. State of U.P.4 held as follows:-

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"The age of a person as recorded in the school register or otherwise may be used for various purposes, namely, for obtaining admission; for obtaining an appointment; for contesting election; registration of marriage; obtaining a separate unit under the ceiling laws; and even for the purpose of litigating before a civil forum e.g. necessity of being represented in a court of law by a guardian or where a suit is filed on the ground that the plaintiff being a minor he was not appropriately represented therein or any transaction made on his behalf was void as he was a minor. A court of law for the purpose of determining the age of a (2006) 5 SCC 584 party to the lis, having regard to the provisions of Section 35 of the Evidence Act will have to apply the same standard. No different standard can be applied in case of an accused as in a case of abduction or rape, or similar offence where the victim or the prosecutrix although might have consented with the accused, if on the basis of the

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entries made in the register maintained by the school, a judgment of conviction is recorded, the accused would be deprived of his constitutional right under Article 21 of the Constitution, as in that case the accused may unjustly be convicted."

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12. In case of Rishipal Singh Solanki Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh &

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Others, 2022 (8) SCC 602 , while considering various judgments, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed in para 33 as under:

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"33. What emerges on a cumulative consideration of the aforesaid catena of judgments is as follows:

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33.2. If an application is filed before the Court claiming juvenility, the provision of sub-section (2) of section 94 of the JJ Act, 2015 would have to be applied or read along with sub-section (2) of section 9 so as to seek evidence for the purpose of recording a finding stating the age of the person as nearly as may be.

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33.3. That when a claim for juvenility is raised, the burden is on the person raising the claim to satisfy the Court to discharge the initial burden. However, the documents mentioned in Rule 12(3)(a)(i), (ii), and (iii) of the JJ Rules 2007 made under the JJ Act, 2000 or sub- section (2) of section 94 of JJ Act, 2015, shall be sufficient for prima facie satisfaction of the Court. On the basis of the aforesaid documents a presumption of juvenility may be raised.

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33.4. The said presumption is however not conclusive proof of the age of juvenility and the same may be rebutted by

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contra evidence let in by the opposite side.

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33.5. That the procedure of an inquiry by a Court is not the same thing as declaring the age of the person as a juvenile sought before the JJ Board when the case is pending for trial before the concerned criminal court. In case of an inquiry, the Court records a prima facie conclusion but when there is a determination of age as per sub-section (2) of section 94 of 2015 Act, a declaration is made on the basis of evidence. Also the age recorded by the JJ Board shall be deemed to be the true age of the person brought before it. Thus, the standard of proof in an inquiry is different from that required in a proceeding where the determination and declaration of the age of a person has to be made on the basis of evidence scrutinised and accepted only if worthy of such acceptance.

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33.6. That it is neither feasible nor desirable to lay down an abstract formula to determine the age of a person. It has to be on the basis of the material on record and on appreciation of evidence adduced by the parties in each case.

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33.7 This Court has observed that a hyper technical approach should not be adopted when evidence is adduced on behalf of the accused in support of the plea that he was a juvenile.

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33.8. If two views are possible on the same evidence, the court should lean in favour of holding the accused to be a juvenile in borderline cases. This is in order to ensure that the benefit of the JJ Act, 2015 is made applicable to the juvenile in conflict with law.

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At the same time, the Court should ensure that the JJ Act, 2015 is not misused by persons to escape punishment after having committed serious offences.

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33.9. That when the determination of age is on the basis of evidence such as school records, it is necessary that the same would have to be considered as per Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, inasmuch as any public or official document maintained in the discharge of official duty would have greater credibility than private documents.

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33.10. Any document which is in consonance with public documents, such as matriculation certificate, could be accepted by the Court or the JJ Board provided such public document is credible and authentic as per the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act viz., section 35 and other provisions.

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33.11. Ossification Test cannot be the sole criterion for age determination and a mechanical view regarding the age of a person cannot be adopted solely on the basis of medical opinion by radiological examination. Such evidence is not conclusive evidence but only a very useful guiding factor to be considered in the absence of documents mentioned in Section 94(2) of the JJ Act, 2015."

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13. Recently, in case of P. Yuvaprakash Vs. State represented by

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Inspector of Police, 2023 (SCC Online) SC 846 , Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in para 14 to 17 as under :

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"14. Section 94 (2)(iii) of the JJ Act clearly indicates that the date of birth certificate from the school or matriculation or equivalent certificate by the concerned examination board has to be

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firstly preferred in the absence of which the birth certificate issued by the Corporation or Municipal Authority or Panchayat and it is only thereafter in the absence of these such documents the age is to be determined through "an ossification test" or "any other latest medical age determination test" conducted on the orders of the concerned authority, i.e. Committee or Board or Court. In the present case, concededly, only a transfer certificate and not the date of birth certificate or matriculation or equivalent certificate was considered. Ex. C1, i.e., the school transfer certificate showed the date of birth of the victim as 11.07.1997. Significantly, the transfer certificate was produced not by the prosecution but instead by the court summoned witness, i.e., CW-1. The burden is always upon the prosecution to establish what it alleges; therefore, the prosecution could not have been fallen back upon a document which it had never relied upon. Furthermore, DW-3, the concerned Revenue Official (Deputy Tahsildar) had stated on oath that the records for the year 1997 in respect to the births and deaths were missing. Since it did not answer to thedescription of any class of documents mentioned in Section 94(2)(i) as it was a mere transfer certificate, Ex C-1 could not have been relied upon to hold that M was below 18 years at the time of commission of the offence.

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In a recent decision, in Rishipal Singh Solanki vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. this court outlined the procedure to be followed in cases where age determination is required. The court was dealing with Rule 12 of the erstwhile Juvenile Justice Rules (which is in pari materia) with Section 94 of the JJ Act, and held as follows:

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"20. Rule 12 of the JJ Rules, 2007 deals with the procedure to be followed in determination of age. The juvenility of a person in conflict with law had to be decided

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prima facie on the basis of physical appearance, or documents, if available. But an inquiry into the determination of age by the Court or the JJ Board was by seeking evidence by obtaining: (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificates, if available and in the absence whereof; (ii) the date of birth certificate from the school (other than a play school) first attended; and in the absence whereof; (iii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat. Only in the absence of either (i), (ii) and (iii) above, the medical opinion could be sought from a duly constituted Medical Board to declare the age of the juvenile or child. It was also provided that while determination was being made, benefit could be given to the child or juvenile by considering the age on lower side within the margin of one year."

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Speaking about provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act, especially the various options in Section 94 (2) of the JJ Act, this court held in Sanjeev Kumar Gupta vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors that:

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"Clause (i) of Section 94 (2) places the date of birth certificate from the school and the matriculation or equivalent certificate from the 2021 (12) SCR 502 [2019] 9 SCR 735 concerned examination board in the same category (namely (i) above). In the absence thereof category (ii) provides for obtaining the birth certificate of the corporation, municipal authority or panchayat. It is only in the absence of (i) and (ii) that age determination by means of medical analysis is provided. Section 94(2) (a)(i) indicates a significant change over the provisions which were contained in Rule 12(3)(a) of the Rules of 2007 made under the Act of 2000.

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Under Rule 12(3)(a) (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificate was given precedence and it was only in the event of the certificate not being available that the date of birth certificate fromthe school first attended, could be obtained. In Section 94(2)(i) both the date of birth certificate from the school as well as the matriculation or equivalent certificate are placed in the same category.

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In Abuzar Hossain @ Gulam Hossain Vs. State of West Bengal, this court, through a threejudge bench, held that the burden of proving that someone is a juvenile (or below the prescribed age) is upon the person claiming it. Further, in that decision, the court indicated the hierarchy of documents that would be accepted in order of preference."

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In the dakhil-kharij register, victim’s date of birth recorded in the school is 05.06.1998, but PW-8, Teacher stated that the entries in the said register was not made by her as she was not posted in the school at the time of admission of victim. Birth certificate of victim was also not produced at the time of admission of victim in the school to register her date of birth in the dakhil kharij register. No witness has been examined with respect to the fact that on what basis, the date of birth of the victim has been registered in the dakhil-kharij register. Victim herself stated her age as 18 years.

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Looking to the statement of Mother of victim PW-2 that she has two daughters and her elder sister is aged about 23-24 years and victim is about 2 years younger than her elder sister.

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Except for these evidences, no other evidence like ossification

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test report have been produced by the prosecution to determine her age that on the date of incident, she was minor or less than 18 years of age. The author of the registration of birth in Dakhil Kharij Register has not been examined. No birth certificate was produced. There is no evidence that on what basis the date of birth of the victim was recorded in the said register. There is every possibility that the date of birth of the victim was recorded in the Dakhil Kharij on assumption otherwise, the prosecution must have produced the relevant record on the basis of which her date of birth recorded in the said register. Moreover, there is overwriting in the photo copy of the dakhil kharij register. The evidence produced by the prosecution with respect to the age of the victim are not of that sterling quality which is sufficient to determine the age of the victim. Therefore, there is lack of clinching and cogent evidence to hold her minor on the date of incident, yet the learned trial Court held her minor.

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The next question for consideration would be whether the appellant has committed the said offences mentioned in para-1.

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PW-1 Victim, stated in her evidence that she knows the appellant and she eloped with the appellant with her own consent that too without informing her parents. She went Amapali with the appellant by train and stayed there for seven days. In Amapali, both of them stayed for seven days in the house of appellant’s sister and made corporeal relation by her own consent for 3 days.

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PW-2 mother of victim stated in her evidence that on the date of incident, when she came after work at 6 p.m., her daughter was not there in the house then she went to the house of Sobha Verma, where victim works, then Sobha verma told that the victim did not come her house in the evening. Thereafter, she lodged a report. In para 8 of her cross-examination, she admits that there is love affair between the appellant and the victim since long time. She further stated that the appellant had come to her house with a marriage proposal and she asked the appellant to talk to his parents in this regard.

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PW-4 Sobha Verma stated in her evidence that the victim used to come to her house for work in the morning and evening. After the incident, she did not ask anything about the incident and victim too, did not disclose her about the incident.

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As per medical examination report, no injuries were found over the external part of the body of victim. On internal examination, her hymen was torn. Two fingers could enter easily in vagina. According to Doctor, the victim was habitual in sexual intercourse. No opinion was given about the recent intercourse.

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From the aforesaid evidence led by the prosecution, it is clear from the statement of victim (PW-1) that she knew the appellant and admits the fact that both of them were in love affair since long time. On the date of incident, the victim eloped with the appellant with her own consent without informing her parents. Thereafter,

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both of them stayed in the house of appellant’s sister for seven days and also accepted that she made physically relation with the appellant for three days. The mother of victim stated that the appellant and victim were in love affair and the appellant came to her house for marriage proposal.

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It is evident that the victim was consenting party because she never shout at the time when the appellant made physical relation with her. Had she been forcefully raped against her will or consent, she would definitely raised alarm or to make complaint to anyone. Apart from that, there is no proof of exact date of birth of victim. Since, it is held that the victim is not below the 18 years of age, she is capable to give her consent and therefore, it cannot be said that the appellant procured a minor girl with the intention to illicit intercourse or committed rape upon her.

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The law is well settled that in case of rape, conviction can be maintained even on the basis of sole testimony of the victim. However, there is an important caveat which is that the testimony of the victim must inspire confidence. Even though the testimony of the victim is not required to be corroborated, if her statement is not believable, then the accused cannot be convicted. The prosecution has to bring home the charges leveled against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt, which the prosecution has failed to do in the instant case.

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For the foregoing discussions, this Court is of the opinion that the

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prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt against the appellant and the appellant is entitled for benefit of doubt.

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In the result, the appeal is Allowed . The impugned judgment of conviction and sentence dated 23/01/2016 is set aside. The appellant is acquitted from all the charges leveled against him. The appellant is on bail. Surety and personal bonds earlier furnished by him at the time of suspension of sentence shall remain operative for a period of six months in view of the provisions of Section 481 of the BNSS. The appellant shall appear before the higher Court as and when directed.

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The trial Court record along with the copy of this judgment be sent back immediately to the trial court concerned for compliance and necessary action.

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SD/-

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(Bibhu Datta Guru) Judge

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Gowri/Amardeep

Narayan Chouhan v. State Of Chhattisgarh

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Narayan Chouhan v. State Of Chhattisgarh

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