Harish Kumar Yadav Vs State Of Chhattisgarh

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CRA No. 1247 of 2016

2025:CGHC:55460

NAFR

Digitally signed by RAHUL RAHULJHA JHA Date:2025.11.14 16:29:50 +0530

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HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

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CRA No. 1247 of 2016

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Harish Kumar Yadav S/o Santosh Yadav, Aged About 20 Years Occupation Nothing, R/o Ward No. 1, Bhatapara Saja, Police Station Saja, District Bemetara, Chhattisgarh., Chhattisgarh

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Appellant(s)

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Versus

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State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Police Station Saja, District Bemetara, Chhattisgarh., Chhattisgarh

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Respondent(s)

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(Cause-title taken from Case Information System)

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For Appellant(s) : Mr. Suresh Kumar Verma, Advocate

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For Respondent(s) : Mr. R.C.S. Deo, PL

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Hon'ble Shri Justice Bibhu Datta Guru Judgment on Board

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13/11/2025

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This criminal appeal has been preferred under Section 374(2) of the Cr.P.C. against the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 29/09/2016 passed in Case No. 34/2016 by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Bemetara (FTC), District Bemetara (C.G.). By the impugned judgment, the appellant has been convicted for the offence

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punishable under Section 376 of the IPC and Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012. Considering the gravity of the offence under Section 6 of the POCSO Act, the trial Court sentenced the appellant to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 10 years and to pay a fine of Rs. 2,000/-, with a default stipulation.

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The prosecution case, in brief, is that the prosecutrix (PW-2), born on 07/04/2000, was residing with her family at Village Bhatapara (Saja) and was engaged in household work. The accused, a resident of the same locality, used to frequently visit her house. It is alleged that from March 2014 onwards, the accused established physical relations with the prosecutrix on the pretext of marriage, as a result of which she became pregnant. When the prosecutrix informed the accused about the pregnancy, he allegedly threatened her with a knife, warning that if she disclosed the incident to anyone, he would kill her. Out of fear, the prosecutrix did not reveal the matter to her parents.

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On 27/12/2015, the prosecutrix went to Raipur to her maternal aunt and disclosed the incident, after which she was taken for medical examination and was found to be eight months pregnant. On the next day, when she informed her parents, they asked her to leave the house, following which she went to the residence of the accused. However, the accused and his family refused to accept her. Consequently, the prosecutrix, along with her father, approached Police Station Saja, where Crime No. 407/2015 under Sections 376 and 506-B IPC was registered and investigation commenced. During the investigation, the prosecutrix

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gave birth to a female child. Medical examination was conducted, and as per FSL advice, DNA testing was carried out by collecting blood samples of the prosecutrix, the newborn child, and the accused, which were forwarded to CDFD, Hyderabad for analysis. Statements of the prosecutrix and other witnesses were recorded, and upon finding sufficient material, the accused was arrested and charge-sheeted.

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Upon consideration of the material on record, charges under Sections 376 and 506 Part-II IPC and Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 were framed against the accused, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. The prosecution examined 15 witnesses in support of its case. In his statement under Section 313 CrPC, the accused denied all incriminating circumstances and pleaded false implication. No defence evidence or document was produced.

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The trial Court after appreciating oral and documentary evidence available on record, by its judgment dated 29/09/2016 convicted and sentenced the appellant as mentioned in paragraph one of this judgment. Hence, this appeal.

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Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the appellant has been falsely implicated and that the case, at its core, is one of consensual relationship between two individuals residing in the same locality. It is further submitted that the evidence adduced by the prosecution is riddled with material contradictions and omissions, thereby rendering the prosecution version unreliable. Learned counsel argues that the

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prosecution has failed to establish that the prosecutrix was below 18 years of age at the time of the alleged incident, and in the absence of any cogent and admissible evidence regarding her age, the statutory presumption of minority does not arise. It is therefore contended that the conviction of the appellant, recorded without proof of age and despite the defence of consensual relationship, is legally unsustainable and liable to be set-aside.

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Per contra, learned Panel Lawyer appearing for the State opposes the submissions advanced on behalf of the appellant and contends that the conviction has been rightly recorded by the trial Court and warrants no interference. It is submitted that the prosecution has led clear and reliable evidence to establish the age of the prosecutrix, demonstrating that she was below 18 years at the relevant time, thereby rendering any alleged consent legally immaterial. As such, the findings of the trial Court are based on proper appreciation of evidence and suffer from no perversity, and hence the appeal deserves to be dismissed.

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I have heard learned counsel for the parties and considered their rival submissions made herein-above and also went through the record with utmost circumspection.

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The first and foremost issue that arises for determination before this Court is whether the prosecutrix (PW-2) was a minor on the date of the alleged occurrence, since the answer to this question has a direct bearing on the applicability of the provisions of the POCSO Act as well as on the validity of the defence plea of consent.

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PW1- Mother of the Victim stated that the Victim was aged about 15 years at the time of incident. The Victim (PW2) in her deposition stated that she has studied till 8^th Class and her date of birth is 07/04/2000.

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Assistant Teacher- Horilal (PW3) in his deposition has stated that the police has seized the photocopy of Dakhil Kharij Register (Ex.10/C) from him. He stated that as per serial no. 2951 registered in the said register, the date of birth of the Victim has been registered as 07/04/2000. However, in cross-examination, this witness has admitted that while the admission of the Victim was made in the School, he was not posted in the said school and the registration of the Victim in the school was made by Smt. Imla Bai Sahu. He admitted that he cannot tell that on what basis, the date of birth of the Victim (PW2) has been registered in the school.

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PW-12, Dr. B.N. Dewangan, stated that on 05.01.2016, Constable Sarla Bharti (No. 338), Police Station Saja, brought one Santoshi Yadav before him for age determination through X-ray. On examining the X-ray of the thigh region, he assessed her age to be between 17 to 18 years , based on the appearance and fusion of various epiphyses,

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Perusal of the aforesaid statements of the witnesses would show that the entry relating to the date of birth of the Victim in the Dakhil Kharij Register is not reliable, as it is unsupported by any foundational material. PW1 merely stated the age of the Victim as about 15 years; PW2 gave her date of birth as 07/04/2000; however, PW3, the Assistant Teacher, admitted that he was not posted in the school at the time of the Victim’s

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admission and could not state on what basis the date of birth was entered in the register. Thus, the entry appears uncorroborated and uncertain in nature. Moreover, the medical evidence of PW12, Dr. B.N. Dewangan, indicates the Victim’s age to be approximately 17–18 years, subject to a permissible margin of variation.

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The Hon’ble Supreme Court in paragraphs 40,42,43,44 and 48 of its judgment in Alamelu and Another Vs. State, represented by Inspector of Police, 2011(2) SCC 385 , the Supreme Court has observed as under:

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"40. Undoubtedly, the transfer certificate, Ex.P16 indicates that the girl's date of birth was 15th June, 1977. Therefore, even according to the aforesaid certificate, she would be above 16 years of age (16 years 1 month and 16 days) on the date of the alleged incident, i.e., 31st July, 1993. The transfer certificate has been issued by a Government School and has been duly signed by the Headmaster. Therefore, it would be admissible in evidence under Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act. However, the admissibility of such a document would be of not much evidentiary value to prove the age of the girl in the absence of the material on the basis of which the age was recorded. The date of birth mentioned in the transfer certificate would have no evidentiary value unless the person, who made the entry or who gave the date of birth is examined.

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42. Considering the manner in which the facts recorded in a document may be proved, this Court in the case of Birad Mal Singhvi Vs. Anand Purohit1, observed as follows:-

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"The date of birth mentioned in the scholars' register has no evidentiary value unless the person who made the entry or who gave the date of birth is examined....Merely because the documents Exs. 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12 were proved, it does not mean that the contents of documents were also proved. Mere proof of the documents Exs. 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 would not tantamount to proof of all the contents or the correctness of date of birth stated in the documents. Since the truth of the fact, namely, the date of birth of Hukmi Chand and Suraj Prakash Joshi was in issue, mere proof of the documents as produced by the aforesaid two witnesses does not furnish evidence of the truth of the facts or contents of the documents. The truth or otherwise of the facts in issue, namely, the date of birth of the two candidates as mentioned in the documents could be proved by admissible evidence i.e. by the evidence of those persons who could vouchsafe for the truth of the facts in issue. No evidence of any such kind was produced by the respondent to prove the truth of the facts, namely, the date of birth of Hukmi Chand and of Suraj Prakash Joshi. In the circumstances the dates of birth as mentioned in the aforesaid documents 1988 (Supp) SCC 604 have no probative value and the dates of birth as mentioned therein could not be accepted."

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43. The same proposition of law is reiterated by this Court in the case of Narbada Devi Gupta Vs. Birendra Kumar Jaiswal , where this Court observed

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as follows:-

"The legal position is not in dispute that mere production and marking of a document as exhibit by the court cannot be held to be a due proof of its contents. Its execution has to be proved by admissible evidence, that is, by the "evidence of those persons who can vouchsafe for the truth of the facts in issue"."

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44. In our opinion, the aforesaid burden of proof has not been discharged by the prosecution. The father says nothing about the transfer certificate in his evidence. The Headmaster has not been examined at all. Therefore, the entry in the transfer certificate can not be relied upon to definitely fix the age of the girl. 48. We may further notice that even with reference to Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, a public document has to be tested by applying the same standard in civil as well as criminal proceedings. In this context, it would be appropriate to notice the observations made by this Court in the case of Ravinder Singh Gorkhi Vs. State of U.P. held as follows:-

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"The age of a person as recorded in the school register or otherwise may be used for various purposes, namely, for obtaining admission; for obtaining an appointment; for contesting election; registration of marriage; obtaining a separate unit under the ceiling laws; and even for the purpose of litigating before a civil forum e.g. necessity of being represented in a court of law by a guardian or where a suit is filed on the

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ground that the plaintiff being a minor he was not appropriately represented therein or any transaction made on his behalf was void as he was a minor. A court of law for the purpose of determining the age of a (2006) 5 SCC 584 party to the lis, having regard to the provisions of Section 35 of the Evidence Act will have to apply the same standard. No different standard can be applied in case of an accused as in a case of abduction or rape, or similar offence where the victim or the prosecutrix although might have consented with the accused, if on the basis of the entries made in the register maintained by the school, a judgment of conviction is recorded, the accused would be deprived of his constitutional right under Article 21 of the Constitution, as in that case the accused may unjustly be convicted."

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In case of Rishipal Singh Solanki Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Others, 2022 (8) SCC 602 , while considering various judgments, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed in para 33 as under:

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"33. What emerges on a cumulative consideration of the aforesaid catena of judgments is as follows:

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33.2. If an application is filed before the Court claiming juvenility, the provision of sub-section (2) of section 94 of the JJ Act, 2015 would have to be applied or read along with sub-section (2) of section 9 so as to seek evidence for the purpose of recording a finding stating the age of the person as nearly as may be.

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XXXX XXXX XXXX

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33.3. That when a claim for juvenility is raised, the burden

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is on the person raising the claim to satisfy the Court to discharge the initial burden. However, the documents mentioned in Rule 12(3)(a)(i), (ii), and (iii) of the JJ Rules 2007 made under the JJ Act, 2000 or sub- section (2) of section 94 of JJ Act, 2015, shall be sufficient for prima facie satisfaction of the Court. On the basis of the aforesaid documents a presumption of juvenility may be raised.

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33.4. The said presumption is however not conclusive proof of the age of juvenility and the same may be rebutted by contra evidence let in by the opposite side.

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33.5. That the procedure of an inquiry by a Court is not the same thing as declaring the age of the person as a juvenile sought before the JJ Board when the case is pending for trial before the concerned criminal court. In case of an inquiry, the Court records a prima facie conclusion but when there is a determination of age as per sub-section (2) of section 94 of 2015 Act, a declaration is made on the basis of evidence. Also the age recorded by the JJ Board shall be deemed to be the true age of the person brought before it. Thus, the standard of proof in an inquiry is different from that required in a proceeding where the determination and declaration of the age of a person has to be made on the basis of evidence scrutinized and accepted only if worthy of such acceptance.

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33.6. That it is neither feasible nor desirable to lay down an abstract formula to determine the age of a person. It has to be on the basis of the material on record and on appreciation of evidence adduced by the parties in each case.

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33.7 This Court has observed that a hypertechnical

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approach should not be adopted when evidence is adduced on behalf of the accused in support of the plea that he was a juvenile.

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33.8. If two views are possible on the same evidence, the court should lean in favour of holding the accused to be a juvenile in borderline cases. This is in order to ensure that the benefit of the JJ Act, 2015 is made applicable to the juvenile in conflict with law. At the same time, the Court should ensure that the JJ Act, 2015 is not misused by persons to escape punishment after having committed serious offences.

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33.9. That when the determination of age is on the basis of evidence such as school records, it is necessary that the same would have to be considered as per Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, inasmuch as any public or official document maintained in the discharge of official duty would have greater credibility than private documents.

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33.10. Any document which is in consonance with public documents, such as matriculation certificate, could be accepted by the Court or the JJ Board provided such public document is credible and authentic as per the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act viz., section 35 and other provisions.

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33.11. Ossification Test cannot be the sole criterion for age determination and a mechanical view regarding the age of a person cannot be adopted solely on the basis of medical opinion by radiological examination. Such evidence is not conclusive evidence but only a very useful guiding factor to be considered in the absence of documents mentioned in Section 94(2) of the JJ Act, 2015."

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Recently, in case of P . Yuvaprakash Vs. State represented by Inspector

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of Police, 2023 (SCC Online) SC 846 , Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in para 14 to 17 as under :

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"14. Section 94 (2)(iii) of the JJ Act clearly indicates that the date of birth certificate from the school or matriculation or equivalent certificate by the concerned examination board has to be firstly preferred in the absence of which the birth certificate issued by the Corporation or Municipal Authority or Panchayat and it is only thereafter in the absence of these such documents the age is to be determined through "an ossification test" or "any other latest medical age determination test" conducted on the orders of the concerned authority, i.e. Committee or Board or Court. In the present case, concededly, only a transfer certificate and not the date of birth certificate or matriculation or equivalent certificate was considered. Ex. C1, i.e., the school transfer certificate showed the date of birth of the victim as 11.07.1997. Significantly, the transfer certificate was produced not by the prosecution but instead by the court summoned witness, i.e., CW-1. The burden is always upon the prosecution to establish what it alleges; therefore, the prosecution could not have been fallen back upon a document which it had never relied upon. Furthermore, DW-3, the concerned Revenue Official (Deputy Tahsildar) had stated on oath that the records for the year 1997 in respect to the births and deaths were missing. Since it did not answer to the description of any class of documents mentioned in Section 94(2)(i) as it was a mere transfer certificate, Ex C-1 could not have been relied upon to hold that M was below 18 years at the time of commission of the offence.

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15. In a recent decision, in Rishipal Singh Solanki vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. this court outlined the procedure to be followed in cases where age determination is required. The court was dealing with Rule 12 of the erstwhile Juvenile Justice Rules (which is in pari materia) with Section 94 of the JJ Act, and held as follows:

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"20. Rule 12 of the JJ Rules, 2007 deals with the procedure to be followed in determination of age. The juvenility of a person in conflict with law had to be decided prima facie on the basis of physical appearance, or documents, if available. But an inquiry into the determination of age by the Court or the JJ Board was by seeking evidence by obtaining: (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificates, if available and in the absence whereof; (ii) the date of birth certificate from the school (other than a play school) first attended; and in the absence whereof; (iii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat. Only in the absence of either (i), (ii) and (iii) above, the medical opinion could be sought from a duly constituted Medical Board to declare the age of the juvenile or child. It was also provided that while determination was being made, benefit could be given to the child or juvenile by considering the age on lower side within the margin of one year."

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16. Speaking about provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act, especially the various options in Section 94 (2) of the JJ Act, this court held in Sanjeev Kumar Gupta vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors that:

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"Clause (i) of Section 94 (2) places the date of birth certificate from the school and the matriculation or equivalent certificate from the 2021 (12) SCR 502 [2019] 9 SCR 735 concerned examination board in the same category (namely (i) above). In the absence thereof category (ii) provides for obtaining the birth certificate of the corporation, municipal authority or panchayat. It is only in the absence of (i) and (ii) that age determination by means of medical analysis is provided. Section 94(2) (a)(i) indicates a significant change over the provisions which were contained in Rule 12(3)(a) of the Rules of 2007 made under the Act of 2000. Under Rule 12(3)(a) (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificate was given precedence and it was only in the event of the certificate not being available that the date of birth certificate from the school first attended, could be obtained. In Section 94(2)(i) both the date of birth certificate from the school as well as the matriculation or equivalent certificate are placed in the same category.

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17. In Abuzar Hossain @ Gulam Hossain Vs. State of West Bengal, this court, through a three-judge bench, held that the burden of proving that someone is a juvenile (or below the prescribed age) is upon the person claiming it. Further, in that decision, the court indicated the hierarchy of documents that would be accepted in order of preference."

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Thus, the evidence brought on record by the prosecution with regard to the age of the victim cannot be held reliable in absence of the proposition laid down by the Supreme Court in the above judgment. Hence, in absence of cogent proof regarding the date of birth of the

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victim, the finding of the learned trial Court that the victim was a minor on the date of incident cannot be acceptable.

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Even if we consider the age of victim as 16 years, as has been pleaded by the prosecution, the Supreme Court in the matter of Jaya Mala v. Home Secretary, Govt. of Jammu & Kashmir and others¹ , has held that a judicial notice can be taken that the margin of error in age ascertained by Radiological examination is two years on either side. Relevant para of the said judgment states as under:-

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“9. Detenu was arrested and detained on Oct. 18, 1981. The report by the expert is dated May 3, 1982, that is nearly seven months after the date of detention. Growing in age day by day is an involuntary process and the anatomical changes in the structure of the body continuously occur. Even on normal calculation, if seven months are deducted from the approximate age opined by the expert, in Oct., 1981 detenu was around 17 years of age, consequently the statement made in the petition turns out to be wholly true. However, it is notorious and one can take judicial notice that the margin of error in age ascertained by radiological examination is two years on either side. Undoubtedly, therefore, the detenu was a young school going boy. It equally appears that there was some upheavel in the educational institutions. This young school going boy may be enthusiastic about the students’ rights and on two different dates he marginally crossed the bounds of law. It passes comprehension to believe that he can be visited with drastic measure of preventive detention. One cannot treat young people, may be immature, may be even slightly misdirected, may be a little

1 AIR 1982 SC 1297

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more enthusiastic, with a sledge hammer. In our opinion, in the facts and circumstances of this case the detention order was wholly unwarranted and deserved to be quashed.”

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Very recently in the matter of Tilku Alias Tilak Singh V. The State Of Uttarakhand, reported in 2025 INSC 226 , the Supreme Court has held that the victim, who is between 16 to 18 years of age is very much in the age of understanding as to what was right and wrong for her. Relevant para of the said judgment states as under:-

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“16. Even if the finding of the learned Single Judge of the High Court that the prosecutrix was between 16 to 18 years of age is to be accepted, in our view, the offence under Sections 363 and 366 IPC would still not be made out.

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17. This Court in the case of S. Vardarajan v. State of Madras, reported in 1964 SCC OnLine SC 36 had an occasion to consider almost similar facts that arise for consideration in the present case. This Court has observed thus:

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“7. …..It will thus be seen that taking or enticiting away a minor out of the keeping of a lawful guardian is an essential ingredient of the offence of kidnapping. Here, we are not concerned with enticement but what we have to find out is whether the part played by the appellant amounts to “taking” out of the keeping of the lawful guardian of Savitri. We have no doubt that though Savitri had been left by S. Natarajan at the house of his relative K. Nataranjan she still continued to be in the lawful keeping of the former but then the question remains as to what is it which the appellant did that constitutes in law “taking”. There is not a word in the deposition of Savitri from which an inference could be drawn that she left the

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house of K. Natarajan at the instance or even a suggestion of the appellant. In fact she candidly admits that on the morning of October 1st, she herself telephoned to the appellant to meet her in his car at a certain place, went up to that place and finding him waiting in the car got into that car of her own accord. No doubt, she says that she did not tell the appellant where to go and that it was the appellant himself who drove the car to Guindy and then to Mylapore and other places. Further, Savitri has stated that she had decided to marry the appellant. There is no suggestion that the appellant took her to the SubRegistrar's office and got the agreement of marriage registered there (thinking that this was sufficient in law to make them man and wife) by force or blandishments or anything like that. On the other hand the evidence of the girl leaves no doubt that the insistence of marriage came from her side. The appellant, by complying with her wishes can by no stretch of imagination be said to have taken her out of the keeping of her lawful guardian. After the registration of the agreement both the appellant and Savitri lived as man and wife and visited different places. There is no suggestion in Savitri's evidence, who, it may be mentioned had attained the age of discretion and was on the verge of attaining majority that she was made by the appellant to accompany him by administering any threat to her or by any blandishments. The fact of her accompanying the appellant all along is quite consistent with Savitri's own desire to be the wife of the appellant in which the desire of accompanying him wherever he went was course implicit. In these circumstances we find nothing from which an inference could be drawn that the appellant had been guilty of taking away Savitri out of the

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keeping of her father. She willingly accompanied him and the law did not cast upon him the duty of taking her back to her father's house or even of telling her not to accompany him. She was not a child of tender years who was unable to think for herself but, as already stated, was on the verge of attaining majority and was capable of knowing what was good and what was bad for her…….”

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18. It is thus clear that the prosecutrix, who according to the learned Single Judge of the High Court, was between 16 to 18 years of age was very much in the age of understanding as to what was right and wrong for her.

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19. From the evidence of the prosecutrix itself, it will be clear that she had voluntarily gone along with the appellant herein, travelled to various places and also resided as husband and wife at Dehradun.”

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Thus, the evidence brought on record by the prosecution with regard to the age of the victim cannot be held reliable in absence of the proposition laid down by the Supreme Court in the above judgment. Hence, the conviction under the POCSO Act is not sustainable.

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Now, the question that remains before this Court is whether the appellant committed the alleged act of rape upon the victim. Determination of this issue requires an assessment of the reliability of the victim’s testimony, the consistency of her version, and the extent of corroboration, if any, from medical or other supporting evidence. The Court must also consider the statements of other prosecution witnesses and the surrounding circumstances to ascertain whether the prosecution has proved the charge of rape beyond reasonable doubt. Only upon such

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evaluation can the allegation be held to be established in law.

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The Victim (PW2) deposed that the incident occurred in March 2014. Her parents used to go for labour work, and she used to remain alone in the house. According to her, the accused used to come to her house daily and would tell her that he would marry her and keep her as his wife, and on this pretext he established physical relations with her. She further stated that both of them were in love.

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The witness stated that due to repeated physical relations by the accused, she became pregnant. Thereafter, she went to Raipur to her maternal aunt and remained there for two days. She disclosed the incident to her aunt, who took her to a doctor. She informed her aunt that she had become pregnant because of the accused. She further stated that she has now delivered a girl child and that the accused is the father of the child. She further deposed that the accused did not accept her and threatened her with a knife, saying that if she informed anyone about the incident, he would kill her. She had gone to the house of the accused to live with him, but she was driven away. Thereafter, she went to the Police Station and lodged the FIR. The witness stated that she also gave consent for DNA sampling of herself and her child.

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Mother (PW1) of the Victim deposed that her daughter was studying up to Class 8 and was about 15 years old at the time of the incident. She used to go for labour work, and during that period the accused used to visit their house, though she cannot say at what time he came or went. She stated that her daughter had gone to her sister Nisha at Raipur,

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where it was revealed that she was pregnant. Her sister informed her over phone, and when she reached Raipur her daughter also told her about the pregnancy. According to her, the pregnancy was caused by the accused. The victim later delivered a girl child. She stated that the accused used to meet the victim at their house in their absence and had physical relations with her on the pretext of marriage. She further stated that the victim had disclosed these facts to her and to her sister Nisha. She did not take the victim for any medical treatment. A consent letter was given by her, and she and her husband were called to the police station for giving statements and submitting the progress report of the victim’s studies.

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In cross-examination, she admitted she is illiterate. She stated that the accused never came to their house in their presence, and neighbours never informed her about any such visits. She did not notice any bodily changes in her daughter during pregnancy and believed the daughter’s explanation that she was becoming fat. She stated that before going to Raipur the daughter behaved normally and did not disclose anything. She clarified that she did not know whose child it was until informed at Raipur.

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In the present case, the DNA Report (Ex. P/31) assumes significant evidentiary value. A perusal of the said report clearly reflects that the genetic profile of the appellant does not match with that of the child delivered by the victim. In categorical terms, the DNA analysis rules out the possibility of the appellant being the biological father of the child.

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This scientific evidence, being conclusive in nature, thus does not support the prosecution’s allegation that the appellant had impregnated the victim.

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Reverting to the facts of the present case, upon a careful and minute evaluation of the entire evidence brought on record, it becomes evident that the prosecution has failed to establish the essential ingredients of the offences alleged against the appellant. There is no reliable evidence to show that the appellant committed sexual assault upon the Victim, nor is there any credible material suggesting the use of criminal force or any act amounting to penetration or sexual intent as required under the POCSO Act. The record further reflects that the prosecution case primarily rests on assumptions rather than concrete proof, and significant inconsistencies in the testimony of material witnesses create substantial doubt regarding the veracity of the allegations. In the absence of medical corroboration, coupled with the DNA report excluding the appellant from paternity, the foundational basis of the prosecution case stands considerably weakened. Therefore, the conviction recorded by the trial Court rests on conjectures and presumptions rather than legal evidence. Consequently, the impugned conviction under the relevant provisions of the POCSO Act cannot be sustained in the eye of law.

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For the foregoing reasons, the appeal is allowed .

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The accused is acquitted of the charges for which he was tried. The appellant is reported to be on bail. His bail bonds are not discharged at this stage and the bonds shall remain operative for a period of six months

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in view of Section 481 of the BNSS. Accordingly, the Criminal appeal is allowed.

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The trial court record along with a copy of this judgment be sent back immediately to the trial court concerned for compliance and necessary action.

¶139

Sd/- (Bibhu Datta Guru) Judge

¶140

Rahul

Harish Kumar Yadav v. State Of Chhattisgarh

Case brief

What is this about?

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Harish Kumar Yadav v. State Of Chhattisgarh

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

Why is it important?

What the court decided

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