M/S Coolage Vs M/S Anil Refrigeration Work

¶1

1

¶2

2025:CGHC:3659

¶3

AFR

¶4

HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

¶5

ACQA No. 554 of 2024

¶6

1 - M/s Coolage Through Proprietor James K. Wargis S/o Late C.J. Wargis, Aged About 54 Years, Through Power Of Attorney Holder Shri Sajal James Wargis S/o James K. Wargis Aged About 27 Years, R/o House No.30/442, Tatyapara, Kankali Hospital, Near Brahmanpara, Sadar Bazar Road, Raipur, District Raipur, Chhattisgarh

¶7

... Appellant

¶8

versus

¶9

1 - M/s Anil Refrigeration Work Through Proprietor Suresh Kumar S/o A. Appu Kuttan, Aged About 60 Years, R/o Plot No. B/175, Smriti Nagar, Street No.7, New Nehru Nagar, Bhilai, District Durg, Chhattisgarh

¶10

... Respondent

¶11

For Appellant : Mr. Pravin Kumar Tulsyan, Advocate For Respondent : Ms. Seema Verma, Advocate appears on behalf of Mr. Jitendra Gupta, Advocate

¶12

Hon'ble Shri Justice Narendra Kumar Vyas

¶13

Order on Board

¶14

21.01.2025

¶15

The appellant has filed present acquittal appeal under Section 378(4) of the Criminal Procedure Code by which learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Raipur in Criminal Case No. 5175 of 2019 has acquitted the accused for commission of offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act, 1881 ( in short “the N.I. Act, 1881”).

¶16

The brief facts reflected from the record are that the appellant is running business of Air Conditioners and spare parts. It is also the case of the complainant that accused had purchased spare parts through different invoices for Rs. 10,61,196/- and has given cheques of Rs.

¶17

Digitally signed by BHUMIKA BHUMIKA ANGARE ANGARE Date: 2025.02.12 11:07:13 +0530

¶18

2

¶19

8,20,000/- out of which one cheque bearing No. 490039 of Rs. 3,00,000/- drawn at State Bank of India Branch, Smriti Nagar, Bhilai was dishonored and returned to the appellant with endorsement that the said cheque was dishonored due to “insufficient fund” in the account on 26.06.2019. The complainant has sent legal notice (Exhibit P/3) on 04.07.2019 to accused demanding amount of cheque to the tune of Rs. 3,00,000/- which was neither replied nor the amount was given though notice was served upon him, therefore, he has filed an application under Section 138 of the the N.I. Act, 1881.

¶20

The appellant/complainant to substantiate his claim has exhibited documents namely dishonored cheque (Ex. P/1), cheque return memo (Ex. P/2), Legal Notice (Ex. P/3), postal receipt (Ex. P/4), consignment (Ex. P/5), invoice (Ex. P/6 to Ex. P/17), delivery memo (Ex. P/18 to Ex. P/28). The appellant/complainant examined himself by way of an affidavit under Section 145 of the the N.I. Act, 1881 reiterating the stand taken in the complaint. The witness was extensively crossexamined by the accused wherein the complainant has categorically stated that he has sent the material to the accused to tune of Rs. 10,61,196/- out of which the accused has given a cheque amounting to Rs. 8,20,000/- on various dates, but he has denied the fact that the entire amount of Rs. 8,20,000/- has been received by him out of which one cheque of Rs. 3,00,000/- was dishonored due to insufficient fund. He has also denied that he has claimed excess amount after receiving the amount of Rs. 10,61,196/-.

¶21

The accused examined himself as DW-1 and also examined under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. before the trial Court who has denied the allegations and also stated that he has given one cheque as security

¶22

3

¶23

as he used to purchase the material from the complainant and no liability exists against him. He has stated that he has put signature in the cheque, but all the entries have been recorded by other person. The witness was cross-examined by the complainant wherein he has admitted that whatever material he has purchased from the complainant he takes a cash memo and voluntarily stated that he used to give receipt in his letter pad which is exhibited as Exhibit D-1 to D- 30. He has voluntarily stated that it is a delivery memo. The witness has also admitted that he has received legal notice (Exhibit P/3) and admitted that since he has not given the reply, therefore, he has not produced the same. He has also admitted that in exhibit D-1 to D-30 it is not mentioned that the complainant has received the payment of material mentioned in these documents. He has also admitted that in exhibit D-1 to D-30 he has not put his signature and voluntarily stated that the complainant’s person used to give delivery memo and collect the cash money. He has also admitted that he has submitted a complaint before Police (Exhibit D-32) wherein he has mentioned about 5 cheques, but he has not mentioned the cheque numbers. He has voluntarily stated that for every financial year one cheque was given to the accused as security, but has not returned the same.

¶24

Learned trial Court after appreciating the evidence the material has dismissed the complaint by recording its finding that the complainant is unable to prove that the accused has given a cheque towards any liability, therefore, it has decided the issue No. 1 against the complainant and also decided the issue No. 2 against the complainant on the count that the bank slips do not bear official seal of the bank and the signature of any officer of the bank, as such no presumption can be

¶25

4

¶26

raised about the presentation and dishonor of the cheque for maintaining the complaint under Section 138 of the the N.I. Act, 1881 accordingly it has dismissed the complaint. Being aggrieved with this order, present acquittal appeal has been filed by the complainant.

¶27

Learned counsel for the appellant would submit that learned trial Court without appreciating the evidence and material on record and cogent material was placed by the complainant to prove that the cheque was given not as a surety but in lieu of some liability which is paramount consideration for attracting Section 138 of N.I. Act, 1881 has dismissed the complaint. He would further submit that so far the return memo does not bear the signature of the bank stamp, therefore, the finding recorded by the learned trial Court that it cannot be a banking record as per Section 146 of the the N.I. Act, 1881 is also illegal, erroneous and would pray for allowing the appeal.

¶28

Per contra learned counsel for the respondent would submit that learned trial Court after appreciating the evidence and material on record has recorded its finding that the complainant has not proved the case beyond reasonable doubt that cheque was given in lieu of any liability has rightly dismissed the complaint. She would further submit that as per Section 146 of the N.I. Act, 1881 until and unless the bank returning memo bears seal and signature of the bank it cannot be termed as record. Thus, she would submit that the returning memo is very well generated and fabricated document by the complainant. As such the trial Court has not committed any illegality in not believing upon the said documents and would pray for dismissal of the acquittal appeal.

¶29

I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the records.

¶30

5

¶31

From above submission the points required for determination of this Court are

¶32

I. whether the complainant is able to prove that the cheque was given towards any liability or not?

¶33

II. Whether the trial Court was justified in dismissing the complaint by not relying upon the cheque returning memo as it does not bear seal and signature of the bank official to attract Section 146 of the N.I. Act, 1881?

¶34

To appreciate the point No. 1 framed by this Court, it is expedient for this Court to go through the evidence brought on record. The complainant in his examination in chief as provided under Section 145 of N.I. Act, 1881 has categorically stated in paragraph 2 that he has supplied the spare parts to the accused through various invoices which is valued at Rs. 10,61,196/- and the accused has given cheque of Rs. 8,20,000/- on various dates, out of which one cheque of Rs. 3 lakhs dated 26.06.2019 bearing No. 490039 when presented in the Union Bank where the complainant is maintaining his account was dishonored and returned to the complainant on 27.06.2019 dishonored due to “insufficient fund” in the account. The witness was cross- examined by the accused and in paragraph 31 he has denied that the cheque was given as security and in paragraph 30 he has also denied that he has received entire money of Rs. 8,20,000/-. The witness has also exhibited the Delivery Challans before the trial Court (Exhibit P/18 to P/28) and Invoices (Exhibit P/6 to P/17), but there is no crossexamination on the aspect for which material he has made payment to the complainant to establish that cheque was given as security not to discharge liability.

¶35

6

¶36

The Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 has been enacted to define and amend the law relating to Promissory Notes, Bills of Exchange and Cheques. Various provisions have been incorporated under the Negotiable Instruments Act regarding Presumptions as to Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and Section 139 makes it ample clear that a person to sign a cheque and makes it over the payee remains liable unless he adduced evidence to rebut the presumption that cheque has been issued for a debt or in discharge of liability. It is also well settled position of law that even a blank cheque leaf, voluntarily signed and handed over by the accused which is towards payment, would attract presumption under Section 139 of N.I. Act, 1881, in absence of any cogent evidence to show that the cheque was not issued in discharge of a debt. Thus, it is incumbent upon the accused to rebut the presumption by leaving cogent evidence by demonstrating that he has already paid towards entire liability of Rs. 10,61,196/- or the material valued at Rs. 10,61,196/- was not supplied by the complainant. The accused should have demonstrated that in view of any understanding between the complainant and the accused, the cheques were given as security, no such material has been placed on record. Thus, it is quite vivid that the complainant is able to prove that cheque was given toward liability. Thus, the finding of the learned trial Court that the cheque was not given for any liability, is contrary to the evidence, material placed on record and also against the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Kalamani Tex v. P. Balasubramanian reported in (2021) 5 SCC 283

¶37

“14. Adverting to the case in hand, we find on a plain reading of its judgment that the trial Court completely overlooked the provisions and failed to appreciate the statutory presumption

¶38

7

¶39

drawn under Section 118 and Section 139 of NIA. The Statute mandates that once the signature(s) of an accused on the cheque/negotiable instrument are established, then these ‘reverse onus’ clauses become operative. In such a situation, the obligation shifts upon the accused to discharge the presumption imposed upon him. This point of law has been crystalized by this Court in Rohitbhai Jivanlal Patel v. State of Gujarat in the following words: (SCC pp. 120-21, para 18)

¶40

“18. In the case at hand, even after purportedly drawing the presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act, the trial court proceeded to question the want of evidence on the part of the complainant as regards the source of funds for advancing loan to the accused and want of examination of relevant witnesses who allegedly extended him money for advancing it to the accused. This approach of the trial court had been at variance with the principles of presumption in law. After such presumption, the onus shifted to the accused and unless the accused had discharged the onus by bringing on record such facts and circumstances as to show the preponderance of probabilities tilting in his favour, any doubt on the complainant's case could not have been raised for want of evidence regarding the source of funds for advancing loan to the appellant-accused.”

¶41

The Hon’ble Supreme Court again in case Rajesh Jain vs Ajay Singh

¶42

reported in 2023 (10) SCC 148 has held in paragraphs 33 to 44 which reads as under:

¶43

“33. The NI Act provides for two presumptions: Section 118 and Section 139. Section 118 of the Act inter alia directs that it shall be presumed, until the contrary is proved, that every negotiable instrument was made or drawn for consideration. Section 139 of the Act stipulates that 'unless the contrary is proved, it shall be presumed, that the holder of the cheque received the cheque, for the discharge of, whole or part of any debt or liability'. It will be seen that the 'presumed fact' directly relates to one of the crucial ingredients necessary to sustain a conviction under Section 138.

¶44

Section 139 of the NI Act, which takes the form of a ‘shall presume’ clause is illustrative of a presumption of law. Because Section 139 requires that the Court ‘shall presume’ the fact stated therein, it is obligatory on the Court to raise this presumption in every case where the factual basis for the raising of the presumption had been established. The rules discussed hereinbelow is common to both the presumptions under Section 139 and Section 118 and is hence, not repeatedReference to one can be taken as reference to another But this does not preclude the person against whom the presumption is drawn from rebutting it and proving the contrary as is clear from

¶45

8

¶46

the use of the phrase ‘unless the contrary is proved’.

¶47

The Court will necessarily presume that the cheque had been issued towards discharge of a legally enforceable debt/liability in two circumstances. Firstly, when the drawer of the cheque admits issuance/execution of the cheque and secondly, in the event where the complainant proves that cheque was issued/executed in his favour by the drawer. The circumstances set out above form the fact(s) which bring about the activation of the presumptive clause. [Bharat Barrel Vs. Amin Chand] [(1999) 3 SCC 35]

¶48

Recently, this Court has gone to the extent of holding that presumption takes effect even in a situation where the accused contends that 'a blank cheque leaf was voluntarily signed and handed over by him to the complainant. [Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar11]. Therefore, mere admission of the drawer's signature, without admitting the execution of (2019) 4 SCC 197 the entire contents in the cheque, is now sufficient to trigger the presumption.

¶49

As soon as the complainant discharges the burden to prove that the instrument, say a cheque, was issued by the accused for discharge of debt, the presumptive device under Section 139 of the Act helps shifting the burden on the accused. The effect of the presumption, in that sense, is to transfer the evidential burden on the accused of proving that the cheque was not received by the Bank towards the discharge of any liability. Until this evidential burden is discharged by the accused, the presumed fact will have to be taken to be true, without expecting the complainant to do anything further.

¶50

John Henry Wigmore12 on Evidence states as follows:

¶51

“The peculiar effect of the presumption of law is merely to invoke a rule of law compelling the Jury to reach the conclusion in the absence of evidence to the contrary from the opponent but if the opponent does offer evidence to the contrary (sufficient to satisfy the Judge's requirement of some evidence), the presumption 'disappears as a rule of law and the case is in the Jury's hands free from any rule.” 12 Rules of Evidence- The Hidden Origin of Modern Law

¶52

The standard of proof to discharge this evidential burden is not as heavy as that usually seen in situations where the prosecution is required to prove the guilt of an accused. The accused is not expected to prove the non-existence of the presumed fact beyond reasonable doubt. The accused must meet the standard of ‘preponderance of probabilities’, similar to a defendant in a civil proceeding. [Rangappa vs. Mohan (AIR 2010 SC 1898)]

¶53

In order to rebut the presumption and prove to the contrary, it is open to the accused to raise a probable defence wherein the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability can be contested. The words ‘until the contrary is proved’ occurring in Section 139 do not mean that accused must necessarily prove the negative that the instrument is not issued in discharge of any debt/liability but the accused has the option to ask the

¶54

9

¶55

Court to consider the non-existence of debt/liability so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the case, to act upon the supposition that debt/liability did not exist. [Basalingappa Vs. Mudibasappa (AIR 2019 SC 1983) See also Kumar Exports Vs. Sharma Carpets (2009) 2 SCC 513]

¶56

In other words, the accused is left with two options. The first option-of proving that the debt/liability does not exist-is to lead defence evidence and conclusively establish with certainty that the cheque was not issued in discharge of a debt/liability. The second option is to prove the non-existence of debt/liability by a preponderance of probabilities by referring to the particular circumstances of the case. The preponderance of probability in favour of the accused's case may be even fifty one to forty nine and arising out of the entire circumstances of the case, which includes: the complainant's version in the original complaint, the case in the legal/demand notice, complainant's case at the trial, as also the plea of the accused in the reply notice, his 313 statement or at the trial as to the circumstances under which the promissory note/cheque was executed. All of them can raise a preponderance of probabilities justifying a finding that there was ‘no debt/liability’. [Kumar Exports and Sharma Carpets, (2009) 2 SCC 513]

¶57

The nature of evidence required to shift the evidential burden need not necessarily be direct evidence i.e., oral or documentary evidence or admissions made by the opposite party; it may comprise circumstantial evidence or presumption of law or fact.

¶58

The accused may adduce direct evidence to prove that the instrument was not issued in discharge of a debt/liability and, if he adduces acceptable evidence, the burden again shifts to the complainant. At the same time, the accused may also rely upon circumstantial evidence and, if the circumstances so relied upon are compelling the burden may likewise shift to the complainant. It is open for him to also rely upon presumptions of fact, for instance those mentioned in Section 114 and other sections of the Evidence Act. The burden of proof may shift by presumptions of law or fact. In Kundanlal's case- (supra) when the creditor had failed to produce his account books, this Court raised a presumption of fact under Section 114, that the evidence, if produced would have shown the non-existence of consideration. Though, in that case, this Court was dealing with the presumptive clause in Section 118 NI Act, since the nature of the presumptive clauses in Section 118 and 139 is the same, the analogy can be extended and applied in the context of Section 139 as well.

¶59

Therefore, in fine, it can be said that once the accused adduces evidence to the satisfaction of the Court that on a preponderance of probabilities there exists no debt/liability in the manner pleaded in the complaint or the demand notice or the affidavit-evidence, the burden shifts to the complainant and the presumption 'disappears' and does not haunt the accused any longer. The onus having now shifted to the complainant, he

¶60

10

¶61

will be obliged to prove the existence of a debt/liability as a matter of fact and his failure to prove would result in dismissal of his complaint case. Thereafter, the presumption under Section 139 does not again come to the complainant's rescue. Once both parties have adduced evidence, the Court has to consider the same and the burden of proof loses all its importance. [Basalingappa vs. Mudibasappa, AIR 2019 SC 1983; See also, Rangappa vs. Sri Mohan (2010) 11 SCC 441] Our Analysis.”

¶62

From the abovestated legal position and evidence brought on record by the complainant as well as the accused, it is quite vivid that accused is unable to rebut the presumption by adducing some evidence on the principle of probabilities also as the accused has nowhere clarified that for which material mentioned in the exhibit P/1 to P/30 he has made payment. The learned trial Court ignoring the evidence of the complainant that he has admitted in his examination-in-chief that the accused has given cheques of Rs. 8,20,000/- out of them one cheque for Rs. 3 Lakhs was dishonored which remained unshaken in the cross-examination of the complainant. The record of the case demonstrates that the accused is unable to rebut that the amount of Rs. 8,20,000/- has been paid to the complainant and the trial Court unnecessarily examined the fact that out of Rs. 10,61,196/-, Rs. 8,20,000/- has been paid, as such only Rs. 2,41,196/- is payable therefore, the cheque of Rs. 3 lakhs is a security amount. Even the trial Court has failed to consider that the accused has nowhere taken a defense that he has to pay only Rs. 2,41,196/- and the cheque of Rs. 3 lakhs has been given towards security and unnecessarily struggle to record a finding that the complainant has not given any explanation how the liability of Rs. 3 lakhs is accrued against the accused. Thus, the finding of the learned trial Court that complainant is unable to prove that the cheque of Rs. 3 lakhs was given towards any liability is

¶63

11

¶64

erroneous finding of the facts deserves to be set aside by this Court, and accordingly it is set aside.

¶65

To appreciate the point No. 2 framed by this Court, it is expedient for this Court to go through the provisions of Sections 118, 139 and 146 of the N.I. Act, 1881, which are reproduced below:

¶66

Section 118 of the N.I. Act, 1881:

¶67

“118. Presumptions as to negotiable instruments.—Until the contrary is proved, the following presumptions shall be made:— (a) of consideration:—that every negotiable instrument was made or drawn for consideration, and that every such instrument, when it has been accepted, indorsed, negotiated or transferred, was accepted, indorsed, negotiated or transferred for consideration;

¶68

(b) as to date:—that every negotiable instrument bearing a date was made or drawn on such date;

¶69

(c) as to time of acceptance:—that every accepted bill of exchange was accepted within a reasonable time after its date and before its maturity;

¶70

(d) as to time of transfer:—that every transfer of a negotiable instrument was made before its maturity;

¶71

(e) as to order of indorsements:—that the indorsements appearing upon a negotiable instrument were made in the order in which they appear then on;

¶72

(f) as to stamp:— that a lost promissory note, bill of exchange or cheque was duly stamped;

¶73

(g) that holder is a holder in due course:—that the holder of a negotiable instrument is a holder in due course: provided that, where the instrument has been obtained from its lawful owner, or from any person in lawful custody thereof, by means of an offence or fraud, or has been obtained from the maker or acceptor thereof by means of an offence or fraud, or for unlawful consideration, the burden of proving that the holder is a holder in due course lies upon him.”

¶74

Section 139 of the N.I. Act, 1881:

¶75

“139. Presumption in favour of holder.—It shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that the holder of a cheque received the cheque of the nature referred to in section 138 for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability.”

¶76

12

¶77

Section 146 of the N.I. Act, 1881:

¶78

“146. Bank’s slip prima facie evidence of certain facts.—The Court shall, in respect of every proceeding under this Chapter, on production of Bank's slip or memo having thereon the official mark denoting that the cheque has been dishonoured, presume the fact of dishonour of such cheque, unless and until such fact is disproved.”

¶79

This Court while deciding the point No. 1 has already held that the cheque was given towards liability not as security as the accused is unable to rebut the same and even to substantiate his stand that the description made in the cheques has been written by another person, no permissible evidence has been adduced. Thus, the presumption under Section 139 of N.I. Act, 1881 is held to be in favour of complainant, therefore, merely due to no seal and signature of cheque return forwarding memo by the bank, the finding of the trial Court that no presumption regarding dishonor of cheque can be drawn, is misconceived. Even otherwise, the purpose of cheque return memo is to give the information of holder of the cheque that his cheque on presentation could not be encashed due to various reasons as mentioned in the cheque return memo. Even as per Section 146 of N.I. Act, 1881, the cheque return on presentation presumed the fact of dishonor of cheque unless and until such fact is disapproved. It is pertinent to mention here that neither Section 138 nor 146 of the N.I. Act, 1881 prescribed any particular form of cheque return memo, it is a nothing but a mere information given by the due holder of a cheque that cheque has been returned as unpaid. If the cheque return memo is not bearing any official stamp of the bank, it does not render the cheque return memo as invalid or illegal. The cheque return memo is not document which required to be covered under Bankers Book

¶80

13

¶81

(Evidence Act), 1891 if there is any infirmity in the cheque return memo, it does not render entire trial under Section 138 of N.I. Act, 1881 as nullity. The Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in case of Guneet Bhasin Vs. State of NCT of Delhi & Anr. & Ors. In CRL.M.C. 4100/2022 & CRL.M.A. 16919/2022(Stay) has taken same view.

¶82

High Court of Allahabad in case of Mohd. Yunus Malik Vs. State of U.P. and Another in application under Section 482 No. 41434 of 2022 in Neutral Citation no. 2023:AHC:140834 relying upon the judgment of Delhi High Court in case of Guneet Bhasin Vs. State of NCT of Delhi and Others in paragraph 13 has held as under:

¶83

“From perusal of the same, it is apparently clear that if the cheque return memo is not bearing any official stamp of the bank, it does not render the cheque as invalid or illegal. Further, if there is any infirmity in the cheque or letter,it does not render entire trial under Section 138 of Act, 1881 as nullity.”

¶84

The High Court of Madras in case of India Cements Investments Services Limited Vs. T. P. Nallusamy in Crl. A. No. 13 of 2014 Neutral Citation No. 2017(1) MLJ(Crl)689 in paragraph 56 reads as under:

¶85

“56. A perusal of the Judgment of the First Appellate Court in C. A. No. 1 of 2013 dated 08.11.2013 shows that the First Appellate Court had observed at paragraph 10 that in Ex. P7 -Cheque, it was written as ‘21.1.2000’ and the last ‘0’ was corrected as ‘8’ mention of on what date they were presented for collection. Moreover, the First Appellate Court went on to add that to prove the written memos filed, the HDFC Bank Manager was not examined to show how much amount was available in Respondent/Accused Account. In this connection, though a stand is taken on behalf of the Appellant/Complainant that as per Section 146 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, the Manager of the Bank need not be examined to speak about the written of three cheques etc., this Court is of the considered opinion that the Appellant/Complainant ought to examine the concerned Bank Manager to substantiate his version of the case, In fact, the evidence of the Bank Manager in favour of the

¶86

14

¶87

Appellant/Complainant will strengthen its case.”

¶88

Considering the fact and law on the subject, it is quite vivid that the Learned trial Court has failed to consider the fact that the appellant is able to prove that the cheque in question was given towards discharge, as such this finding is quashed. So far as other finding that cheque forwarding memo does not bear the seal and signature of bank official, as such presumption under Section 138 of N.I. Act, 1881 cannot be raised, is misconceived and deserves to be set aside, and accordingly it is quashed.

¶89

Consequentially, the matter is remitted back to the trial Court only to prove that cheque was presented before the bank and it has been dishonored due to “insufficient funds” in the account by examining the officer of the bank alongwith records maintained in the bank including physical, computer generated record duly authenticated by the officer of the bank who is well aware with the affairs of dishonor of the cheques of the bank.

¶90

Consequentially, the appeal is partly allowed and the matter is remitted back to the trial Court for deciding the case as per the direction given by this Court in forgoing paragraphs. Since the parties have already appeared before this Court, no fresh notice is required to be issued to the parties, the complainant and accused shall appear before the concerning trial Court on 18.03.2025.

¶91

Sd/-

¶92

(Narendra Kumar Vyas) Judge

¶93

Bhumika

M/S Coolage v. M/S Anil Refrigeration Work

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

M/S Coolage v. M/S Anil Refrigeration Work

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

Why is it important?

What the court decided

Issues for consideration

Cases cited

Statutes considered

Procedural history

Parties & counsel

Coram

Case details

Similar cases

Sukumar Mandal Vs State of Chhattisgarh

Neelpad Rai Vs State of Chhattisgarh

Mrs. Monika Singh Vs Directorate of Enforcement

Suresh Brothers Vs Mohan Bhutada

Annu Tarak Vs State of Chhattisgarh

Smt. Shilpa Kaushik Vs Santram Sahu