State Of Chhattisgarh Vs C. H. Narsingh Rao

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Page No.1 of 20 IN ACQA-256-2015 & ACQA-48-2016

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2025:CGHC:48756-DB

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Digitally SAIFAN signed by KHAN SAIFAN KHAN

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NAFR

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HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

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[Arising out of common impugned judgment dt. 31.07.2015, passed in Sessions Case No.17 of 2015 (State of Chhattisgarh v. CH Narsingh Rao and others) by the Sessions Judge, Bastar at Jagdalpur (CG)]

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Acquittal Appeal No. 256 of 2015

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M. Vengal Rao S/o Late Shri M. Iyanna Aged About 52 Years R/o Anarkali Basti, Ward No. 5, Police Station Hydro, Port Blair.

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--- Appellant

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Versus

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1 - C. H. Narsingh Rao S/o C.H. Kondayya Aged About 27 Years R/o Dalpat Sagar Ward, Jagdalpur, Distt. Bastar Chhattisgarh, Chhattisgarh

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2 - C.H. Kondayya S/o C.H. Acheyya Aged About 65 Years R/o Dalpat Sagar Ward, Jagdalpur, Distt. Bastar Chhattisgarh, District : Bastar(Jagdalpur), Chhattisgarh

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3 - C.H. Narayanamma W/o C.H. Kondayya Aged About 60 Years R/o Dalpat Sagar Ward, Jagdalpur, Distt. Bastar Chhattisgarh, District : Bastar(Jagdalpur), Chhattisgarh

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4 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Station House Officer, Police Station Kotwali, Jagdalpur, Distt. Bastar Chhattisgarh, District : Bastar(Jagdalpur), Chhattisgarh

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--- Respondents [Cause-titles taken from Case Information System (CIS)] ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------For Appellant : Mr. Sourabh Sahu, Advocate For Respondents No.1-3 : Mr. PK Tulsyan, Advocate For Respondent No.4 : Mr. RS Marhas, Addl. Adv. General ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

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WITH

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Page No.2 of 20 IN ACQA-256-2015 & ACQA-48-2016

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Acquittal Appeal No. 48 of 2016

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State of Chhattisgarh Through District Magistrate Jagdalpur, Distt. Bastar Chhattisgarh. , Chhattisgarh

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--- Appellant

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Versus

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1 - C. H. Narsingh Rao S/o C.H. Kondaiyya Aged About 27 Years R/o Dalpat Sagar Ward, Jagdalpur, Distt. Bastar Chhattisgarh, Chhattisgarh

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2 - C.H. Kondaiyya S/o C.H. Achaiyya Aged About 65 Years R/o Dalpat Sagar Ward, Jagdalpur, Distt. Bastar Chhattisgarh, District : Bastar(Jagdalpur), Chhattisgarh

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3 - C.H. Narayanamma W/o C.H. Kondaiyya Aged About 60 Years R/o Dalpat Sagar Ward, Jagdalpur, Distt. Bastar Chhattisgarh, District : Bastar(Jagdalpur), Chhattisgarh

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--- Respondents

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[Cause-titles taken from Case Information System (CIS)]

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For Appellant/State : Mr. R.S. Marhas, Addl. Advocate General For Respondents No.1 to 3 : Mr. PK Tulsyan, Advocate

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Division Bench

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Hon'ble Mr. Justice Sanjay K. Agrawal and Hon'ble Mr. Justice Radhakishan Agrawal

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Judgment on Board (23.09.2025)

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Sanjay K. Agrawal, J

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(1) Regard being had to the similitude of the questions of fact and law involved and being arising out of a common impugned judgment of acquittal dated 31.07.2015, on the joint request of learned counsel for the parties, both the matters are clubbed together, heard together and are being decided by this common judgment.

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(2) Both the acquittal appeals, i.e. ACQA-256-2015 filed by the father of the deceased- CH Rama, namely, M Vengal Rao (PW-04) and ACQA-48-2016 filed by the State under Section 378(1) of the

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Code of Criminal Procedure (for short the “CrPC”) are calling in question the legality, validity and correctness of a common impugned judgment of acquittal dated 31.07.2015, passed in Sessions Case No.17 of 2015 (State of Chhattisgarh v. CH Narsingh Rao and others) by the Sessions Judge, Bastar at Jagdalpur (CG), whereby the learned trial Court has acquitted all the accused/respondents No.01 to 03 herein for offence under Section 304-B/34 of IPC.

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Facts of the case, in brief:

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(3) According to the case of the prosecution, the marriage of CH Rama (herein after referred to as the “deceased”) was solemnized with accused- CH Narsingh Rao (A-1) on 22.07.2012. However, the deceased committed suicide by hanging on 22.09.2014 at her matrimonial house under abnormal circumstances within 07 years of her marriage. Accused- CH Kondaiyya (A-2) is father-in-law of the deceased, whereas CH narayanamma (A-3) is mother-in-law of the deceased. It is also the case of the prosecution that after the marriage of the deceased and prior to the date she committed suicide, acquitted accused persons (respondents No.01 to 03 herein) all have subjected deceased with cruelty for or in connection with demand of dowry and, due to which, deceased suffered harassment mentally and physically and, therefore, committed suicide by hanging. As such, the accused persons are said to have committed the offence under Section 304-B/34 of IPC.

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(4) It is also the case of the prosecution that immediately after the incident, on the basis of information so given to the police, merg intimation (Ex.P/25) was registered by the police on 22.09.2014 and, thereafter, when father of the deceased- M Vengal Rao (PW-04), reported the matter to the police by submitting written complaint (Ex.P/20) on 27.09.2014, FIR (Ex.P/09) was registered against all the acquitted accused persons for offence under Section 304-B/34 of IPC and wheels of investigation started running, in which, site map was prepared vide Ex.P/13. Summons under Section 175 of CrPC were sent vide Ex.P/01 and inquest proceedings were conducted vide Ex.P/02. The dead-body of the deceased was sent for postmortem examination, which was conducted by Dr. Sanjay Basak (PW-02) and, according to PM Report (Ex.P/05), the cause of death has been opined to be asphyxia due to compression of neck. Certain articles were seized vide Ex.P/14 to P/18. The accused persons were arrested vide Ex.P/26 to Ex.P/28. The seized articles were sent for chemical examination and FSL report is Ex.P/33 & P/34. Thereafter, statements of witnesses were recorded and, after due investigation, the police filed charge-sheet against the accused persons in the competent court of criminal jurisdiction and, ultimately, the case was committed to the Court of Sessions for hearing and trial in accordance with law, in which the accused persons abjured their guilt and entered into defence by stating that they are innocent and have been falsely implicated.

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(5) The prosecution in order to prove its case examined as many as 14 witnesses and exhibited 34 documents, whereas the accused persons in support of their defence, have neither examined any witness nor exhibited any document.

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(6) The learned trial Court after appreciating the oral and documentary evidence available on record proceeded to acquit all the accused persons for offences under Sections 304-B/34 of IPC vide impugned judgment dated 31.05.2015, against which, both these acquittal appeals are preferred before this Court.

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Submissions of parties:

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(7) Mr. R.S. Marhas, learned Additional Advocate General appearing on behalf of the appellant-State in ACQA-48-2016 submits that the learned trial Court is absolutely unjustified in acquitting the accused persons, as there is ample evidence available on record to connect them with the offences in question. He further submitted that the evidence of family members of the deceased i.e. M Vengal Rao (PW-04) [father of the deceased], Smt. CH Nirmala (PW-05) [sister of the deceased], Smt. M Nageshwari (PW-06 [mother of the deceased], CH Ratnaiyya (PW-07) [maternal uncle of the deceased) and CH Venkteshwar Rao (PW-08) [brother-in-law of the deceased] clearly establish all the ingredients to constitute offence under Section 304-B of IPC. The death of the deceased was within seven years o her marriage and the death has occurred

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otherwise than the normal circumstances and soon before her death the deceased was subjected to cruelty for or in connection with demand of dowry. Though the learned trial Court has placed reliance on the alleged suicide note (Ex.P/11), written by the deceased, but no question was ever put to the parents and blood relatives of the deceased with regard to the authenticity of the same and, therefore, the same cannot be said to have been written by the deceased. Therefore, it is not a case where the accused persons were entitled for acquittal and the learned trial Court has committed grave legal error in acquitting the accused persons. Hence, in exercise of appellate power, the acquittal appeal preferred by the appellant-State deserves to be allowed and, further, the accused persons (respondents No.01 to 03) are liable to be punished for offences under Sections 304-B/34 of IPC.

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(8) Mr. Sourabh Sahu, learned counsel appearing for the appellant (father of the deceased) in ACQA-256-2015 would borrow the arguments putforth by Mr. RS Marha, learned Addl. AG and further submits that the learned trial Court is absolutely unjustified in acquitting the accused persons, as there are sufficient evidence available on record to connect them with the offences in question and, therefore, his appeal be allowed by punishing the the acquitted accused persons for the offences under Section 304-B/34 of IPC.

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(9) Per-contra, Mr. PK Tulsyan, learned counsel appearing for the acquitted accused persons (A-1 to A-3) by rely upon the decision of

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the Supreme Court in the matter of Constable 907 Surendra Singh and another v. State of Uttarakhand1 submits that the scope of interference in an appeal against the judgment of acquittal is extremely limited. He further submits that though in the present case the deceased has committed suicide by hanging within seven years of her marriage, but other necessary ingredients to constitute offence under Section 304-B of IPC are completely missing and not established. Accordingly, the findings recorded by the learned trial Court in acquitting all the accused persons are well merited and, no interference by this Court is called for in it. Hence, both the acquittal appeals are liable to be dismissed.

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(10) We have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival submissions made herein-above and went through the records with utmost circumspection.

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Discussion and analysis:

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(11) At the very outset, we would firstly consider the scope of interference in an appeal against the judgment of acquittal, for which, it would be profitable to notice the relevant principle of law laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the matter of Constable 907 Surendra Singh and another (supra), whereby in Para-11 & 12 it has been held that the High Court should interfere in the order of acquittal, if the same suffers from perversity and is based on misreading of material evidence etc. and observed as

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1 2025 INSC 114

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under:

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“ 11. Recently, in the case of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar and others v. State of Karnataka , (2024) 8 SCC 149, a Bench of this Court to which one of us was a Member (B.R. Gavai, J.) had an occasion to consider the legal position with regard to the scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal. It was observed thus:

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“38. First of all, we would like to reiterate the principles laid down by this Court governing the scope of interference by the High Court in an appeal filed by the State for challenging acquittal of the accused recorded by the trial court.

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This Court in Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar [Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar, (2022) 3 SCC 471 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 31] encapsulated the legal position covering the field after considering various earlier judgments and held as below : (SCC pp. 48283, para 29) 6 (2024) 8 SCC 149

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“29. After referring to a catena of judgments, this Court culled out the following general principles regarding the powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal in the following words : (Chandrappa case [Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka (2007) 4 SCC 415 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 325] , SCC p. 432, para 42)

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‘42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge:

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(1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded.

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(2) The Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence

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before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law.

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(3) Various expressions, such as, “substantial and compelling reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very strong circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”, etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion.

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(4) An appellate court, however,must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court.

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(5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.’ ”

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Further, in H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka [H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 581: (2023) 3 SCC (Cri) 748] this Court summarised the principles governing the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal against

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acquittal under Section 378CrPC as follows : (SCC p. 584, para 8)

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“8. … 8.1. The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the presumption of innocence;

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8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the oral and documentary evidence;

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8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record;

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8.4. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and

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8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible.”

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Thus, it is beyond the pale of doubt that the scope of interference by an appellate court for reversing the judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial court in favour of the accused has to be exercised within the four corners of the following principles:

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41.1. That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity;

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41.2. That the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and

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41.3. That no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the

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accused is possible from the evidence available on record.”

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It could thus be seen that it is a settled legal position that the interference with the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned trial judge would be warranted by the High Court only if the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; that the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and that no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.”

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(12) Thus, in light of the above quote guidelines, we have to examine whether the findings recorded by the learned trial Court suffers from patent perversity or the same is based on misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record and whether two reasonable views are possible or only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.

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(13) In order to consider the plea raised at the Bar, it would be now appropriate to notice relevant provisions of Section 304-B of the IPC which relates to dowry death:-

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“ 304-B. Dowry death .-(1) Where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, such death shall be called "dowry death", and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death.

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Explanation.-For the purposes of this sub-section,

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"dowry" shall have the same meaning as in section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961).

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(2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for life.”

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The above provision was inserted by Act 43 of 1986 and came into force w.e.f. 19.11.1986.

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(14) In order to convict an accused for the offence punishable under Section 304-B IPC, the following essentials must be satisfied-

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The death of a women should be caused by burn or bodily injury or otherwise than under normal circumstances.

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Such death should have occurred within seven years of the marriage.

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Soon before the death of deceased, she must have been subjected to cruelty or harassment by her Husband or any relative of her Husband.

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Such cruelty or harassment should be for or in connection with demand for dowry.

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(15) Thus, if the aforesaid ingredients are established by the prosecution by leading appropriate reliable evidence, such death shall be called dowry death and the court shall presume and it shall record such fact as proved unless and until it is disproved by the accused.

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(16) Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 speaks about presumption as to dowry death which reads as under:-

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" 113B. Presumption as to dowry death- When the question is whether a person has committed the dowry death of a woman and it is shown that soon before her

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death such woman has been subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, the Court shall presume that such person had caused the dowry death.

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Explanation. For the purposes of this section, "dowry death" shall have the same meaning as in section 304B of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860)."

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(17) The aforesaid provision shows that if the women has been subjected to cruelty as defined in Section 498-A IPC, the court may presume that such person has caused dowry death. Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 provides as under:-

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Definition of "dowry". In this Act," dowry" means any property or valuable security given or agreed to be given either directly or indirectly-

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a. by one party to a marriage to the other party to the marriage; or

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b. by the parents of either party to a marriage or by a other person, to either party to the marriage or to any other person; at or before or after the marriage us consideration for the marriage of the said parties, but does not include dower or mahr in the case of persons to whom the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) applies."

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(18) To attract the provisions of Section 304B, one of the main ingredients of the offence which is required to be established is that "soon before her death" she was subjected to cruelty or harassment "for, or in connection with the demand for dowry". The expression "soon before her death" used in Section 304B IPC and Section 113B of the Evidence Act is present with the idea of proximity test.

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(19) Keeping the above-stated principles of law in mind, we shall

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now proceed to consider the evidence led by the prosecution in the instant case qua whether ingredients for offence under Section 304B of IPC is made out or not ?

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As regards ingredients No.1 i.e. the death of the women should be caused by burn or bodily injury or otherwise than under normal circumstances:

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(20) In this regard, it would be feasible to take note of the PM report (Ex.P/05), which was conducted by Dr. Sanjay Basak (PW-02) and, according to which, the cause of death of the deceased has been opined to be asphyxia due to compression of neck. Furthermore, Dr. Sanjay Basak (PW-02) has also given Query Report (Ex.P/06), whereby he has clearly opined that the compression of neck of the deceased is her cause of death. Both, PM Report (Ex.P/05) and Query Report (Ex.P/06) have duly been proved by the statement of Dr. Sanjay Basak (PW-02) and, which, the learned trial Court has also relied upon to hold that the death of the deceased was otherwise than under normal circumstance. As such, we hereby affirm the finding of the learned trial Court that the death of the deceased was otherwise than under normal circumstance, as the same is neither perverse nor contrary to the record. We hereby hold accordingly.

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As regards ingredients No.2 i.e. Such death should have occurred within seven years of the marriage:

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(21) In the present case, admittedly, the marriage of the deceased

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was solemnized on 22.07.2012 and, she committed suicide by

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hanging on 22.09.2014, therefore, it can safely be held that the death of the deceased occurred within seven years of her marriage. We herby hold accordingly.

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As regards ingredients No.3 i.e. Soon before the death of deceased, she must have been subjected to cruelty or harassment by her Husband or any relative of her Husband:

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(22) In this regard, the father of the deceased, namely, M Vengal Rao (PW-04) has clearly stated in Para-03 before the learned trial Court that deceased has informed him on 21.09.2014 that the accused/respondents used to harass her as she has not brought any dowry in her marriage and she is not conceiving baby. He further stated that he has informed about the said aspect to his wife- Smt. M Nageshwari (PW-06). However, in the present case the FIR (Ex.P/09) has been registered on the basis of written complaint (Ex.P/20) lodged by M Vengal Rao (PW-04) and, in Para-14, he has clearly admitted that the aforesaid aspect of demand of dowry by the accused/respondents one day prior to the incident has not been mentioned by him in his written report (Ex.P/20). Similarly, mother of the deceased, namely, M Nageshwari (PW-06) has stated that on 21.09.2014, the deceased has called her and stated that since she is not conceiving baby, the respondents/accused are harassing her. However, in Para-16 she has clearly admitted that if the aforesaid facts are not mentioned in her statement recorded under Section 161 of CrPC (Ex.P/22), she cannot state the reason. Even, a perusal of statement (Ex.P/22) of M Nageshwari (PW-06) recorded under

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Section 161 of CrPC would show that she has stated that on 21.09.2014 the deceased has called her elder daughter, namely, CH Nirmala (PW-05) and only informed that she is very much disturbed. As such, the aforesaid aspect of harassment on the deceased by the accused/respondent is also missing in M Nageshwari’s (PW-06) statement recorded under Section 161 of CrPC (Ex.P/22). So far as the aspect of deposition of Rs.30,000/- by the father of the deceased is in the bank account of the accusedrespondent No.01 is concerned, the learned trial Court has not accepted the said evidence in Para-51 of the impugned judgment in order to hold the accused-respondent No.01 guilty for the offences in question, as there is no independent witnesses or any other material available on record to show that the said amount has been deposited by the father of the deceased on the demand of dowry by the accused-respondents. As such, ingredient No.03 i.e. soon before the death of deceased, she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her Husband or any relative of her Husband, is not at all established in the present case. We hereby hold accordingly.

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As regards ingredients No.4 i.e. such cruelty or harassment should be for or in connection with demand of dowry:

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(23) In this regard, the prosecution as well as the defence both

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have relied upon the suicidal note (Ex.P/24), which is said to have been written by the deceased. Since the said suicidal note (Ex.P/24) has been written in Telugu Language, the same was translated in

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Hindi Language vide Ex.P/11 at the instance of Narsingh Rao (PW09), which reads as under:

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“thtk th] eq>s ekQ dhft, lkl] llqj ,slk djus ds fy, eq>s ekQ dj nhft,A esjs dkj.k vki lc yksx nqf[kr gksukA eq>s fcydqy ilUn ugha gS] eq>s thtk ds lkFk thus esa cgqr vkuUn gS vkSj muds lkFk thuk Hkh pkgrh Fkh ysfdu thtk nq[kh jgus ls eq>s rdyhQ gks jgk gSA eka dks Hkh cPpksa ls cgqr I;kj gS eq>s cPps ugha gks jgk gS eq>s cgqr bPNqd ls lklq eka viuh cgq cuk yh gS ysfdu budk QtZ fudky ugha ik jgk gwaA eSa jkst Hkxoku ls ,d gh izkFkZuk djrh gwa ,d cPps gksus ls bl ?kj esa lHkh [kq’k jgsaxsA

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lkl] llqj thtk gekjs vPNs yksx gSaA thtk cgqr Hkksyk gS] dbZ ckj lkspk gwa fd eq>s cPps ugha gksus ls D;k gqvk thtk dks gh esjs cPpk ekudj pyrh Fkh ysfdu ftUnxh Hkj ,slk ugha pysxk uk thtk dks rdyhQ gksuk cnkZ’r ugha dj ikmaxh vxj eSa ugha jgus ls dy nwljk ’kknh dj ysxk rc vki lc yksxksa dk reUuk iwjk gks tk;sxkA eSa thrs&th thtk dks NksM+dj ugha jg ikmaxh vkSj mudk rdyhQ ns[k ugh a ikmaxh vkSj thtk&lkl]llqjksa dk ckr ekurs gq, vki nwljk ’kknh djds [kq’kh ls jguk ;s irk pyus ls esjh eka firkth cnkZ’r ugha dj ik;saxsA mu yksx eq>s cgqr I;kj ls ikys gSa mrus gh eq>s eka firkth ls I;kj gSA esjh dkj.k vki yksx fdlh ls xM+cM+ ugha djuk gS vxyk tUe esa thtk eSa rsjh iRuh gksds vPNs ls ns[k ywaxhA eka&firk th eq>s ekQ dj nhft, thtk ,d lky ds vUnj vki t#j nwljh ’kknh dj ysuk tkus vutkus bu nks lkyksa esa dksbZ xyrh fd;k gks rks ;k fdlh dks rdyhQ nh gwa rks eq>s ekQ dj nhft,A”

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(24) A perusal of the above translated suicide note would show that the deceased has used word “Jija” in it. However, Narsingh Rao (PW-09), who has translated the above suicide note, has specifically admitted in his cross-examination that in Telugu the “Husband” is called as “Jija” and, he has also admitted that the family members of the deceased has accepted that fact that the said suicide note

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(Ex.P/24) has been written by the deceased herself. Smt. Saroj Toppo (PW-03), the Assistant Sub-Inspector, who has also made part of initial investigation in the matter, has stated in para-11 that she has shown the suicide note (Ex.P/24) to the father and mother of the deceased, namely, M Vengal Rao (PW-04) and Smt. M Nageshwari (PW-06) and they have not made any objection to it. Furthermore, a careful perusal of the suicide note as translated vide Ex.P/11 would show that only on account of not conceiving baby/child, it appears that the deceased has ended her life by committing suicide. Even if, the said suicide note is taken as it is, we do not find any allegation of harassment or cruelty on the part of the accused/respondents upon the deceased. Though, M Vengal Rao (PW-04) and Smt. M Nageshwari (PW-06) have stated that the accused-respondent No.01 (i.e. husband of the deceased) demanded Rs.4 lac. for starting new business, but the same has not been accepted by the learned trial Court for the simple reason that there is no evidence on record to substantiate the said fact. As such, apart in the suicide note, there is no evidence available on record to show that the deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassment for or in connection with demand of dowry. Hence, ingredient No.04 is also not established in the presnet case. We hereby hold accordingly.

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(25) In view of the above analysis, we are of the considered opinion that two primary ingredients, i.e. the death of the deceased was under abnormal circumstance and within seven years from the date

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of her marriage are duly established, but other two ingredients i.e. soon before the death of the deceased, she was subjected to cruelty and harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband (accused persons herein) and said cruelty and harassment should be for or in connection with demand of dowry, are completely lacking/missing. There is no evidence available on record to show that at any point of time, the acquitted accused had demanded dowry or had committed cruelty and harassment upon the deceased for or in connection with the same soon before her death. Thus, the learned trial Court is absolutely justified in acquitting all the accused persons (respondents No.01 to 03 herein) for offence under Section 304-B/34 of IPC.

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Conclusion:

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(26) Concludingly, we are unable to hold that the accused persons (private respondents No.01 to 03 herein) are the authors of the crime and, therefore, they are liable to be convicted for the offences in question. The learned trial Court has rightly held all the accused persons (private respondents No.01 to 03 herein) entitled for acquittal for offences under Section 304-B/34 of IPC on the basis of finding recorded in the impugned judgment dated 31.07.2015 and we do not find that the said findings recorded by the learned trial Court suffers from patent perversity or the same is based on misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record and two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with

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Page No.20 of 20 IN ACQA-256-2015 & ACQA-48-2016

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the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.

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(27) Accordingly, both the ACQA-256-2015 , filed by the father of the deceased, namely, M Vengal Rao (PW-04), and ACQA-48-2016 filed by the State, are liable to be and are hereby dismissed . No cost.

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Sd/Sd/(Sanjay K. Agrawal) (Radhakishan Agrawal) Judge Judge

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s@if

State Of Chhattisgarh v. C. H. Narsingh Rao

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State Of Chhattisgarh v. C. H. Narsingh Rao

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