State Of Chhattisgarh Vs Dharam Singh Yadav

This acquittal appeal filed by the appellant/State arises out of the judgment dated 15.12.2014 passed by the Special Judge, Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (for short, 'the Act, 1989), Baikunthpur, District Koriya, C.G. in Special Sessions Case No.25/2014, whereby the learned trial Court acquitted the accused/respondent herein of the charge under Sections 457, 354, 354(d), 323 and 506 of Indian Penal Code and Section 3(1)(c-ii) of the Act, 1989.

¶18

Case of the prosecution, in brief, is that on 26.03.2014, at about 11:45 p.m., the prosecutrix, aged about 28 years and a member of

¶19

2

¶20

Scheduled Caste, had gone to the bathroom situated in the courtyard of her house to relieve herself. During that time, the accused/respondent allegedly entered her courtyard by jumping over the roof of the adjoining house. It is alleged that the accused/respondent caught hold of the prosecutrix, gagged her mouth, threatened to kill her and after pushing her inside the bathroom, started undressing her and tore her blouse with an intention to outrage her modesty. It is further alleged that when the prosecutrix raised an alarm, the accused/respondent tried to flee from the spot and in the course of his escape, his head dashed against the door, receiving an injury. It is also alleged that the accused/respondent committed the aforesaid acts with the knowledge that the prosecutrix belonged to a Scheduled Caste. Thereafter, on the next day, the prosecutrix lodged an FIR against the accused/respondent. During investigation, the prosecutrix was sent for medical examination and PW-3 Dr. Vikas Poddar examined her and gave his MLC report vide Ex.P-4. Vide Ex.P-2, shirt of the accused/respondent was seized. Vide Ex.P-3, blouse, ration card and photo copy of caste certificate were seized and the accused/respondent was taken into custody vide Ex.P-6.

¶21

Statements of the witnesses were recorded and after completing investigation, charge sheet was filed against the accused-respondent before the concerned trial Court under the aforesaid Sections. Accused-respondent abjured the guilt and prayed for trial.

¶22

The prosecution, in order to bring home the offence, examined as many as 7 witnesses in support of its case and exhibited 7 documents.

¶23

3

¶24

The trial Court, after hearing counsel for the parties and appreciating the evidence on record, by the impugned judgment acquitted the accused/respondent herein of said charges leveled against him.

¶25

Learned counsel for the appellant/State submits that the learned trial Court is unjustified in acquitting the accused/respondent of the said charges by recording perverse findings. He further submits that there is cogent and sufficient evidence available on record, particularly the testimony of PW-1 prosecutrix, which clearly establishes that on the date of the incident, the accused/respondent unlawfully entered the courtyard of the prosecutrix and committed the offence in question and despite such clear and reliable evidence, the learned trial Court has committed a grave error in acquitting the accused/respondent without properly appreciating the evidence on record in its correct perspective. Therefore, the impugned judgment of acquittal suffers from perversity and illegality and is liable to be set aside.

¶26

I have heard learned counsel for the appellant and perused the material available on record.

¶27

The Supreme Court in the matter of Jafarudheen and others vs. State of Kerala reported in (2022) 8 SCC 440 has considered the scope of interference in Appeal against acquittal, which reads as under:-

¶28

While dealing with an appeal against acquittal by invoking Section 378 CrPC, the appellate court has to consider whether the trial court's view can be terms as a possible one, particularly when evidence on record has been analysed. The reason is that an order of acquittal adds up to the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused. Thus, the appellate court has to be relatively slow in reversing the order of the trial court rendering acquittal. Therefore, the presumption in favour of the accused does not get weakened but only strengthened. Such a double presumption that enures in favour of the accused has to be disturbed only by thorough scrutiny on the accepted legal parameters.”

¶29

4

¶30

PW-1 Prosecutrix has stated in her deposition that on the date of the incident, at about 11:45 p.m., she had gone to the bathroom situated in the courtyard of her house to relieve herself. At that time, the accused/respondent jumped down from the roof of the house and entered the premises. Thereafter, the accused/respondent threatened to kill her if she made any noise, gagged her mouth, caught hold of her hands and with an intention to outrage her modesty, started untying her saree and tore her blouse. She has further stated that when she started screamings, her husband and brother-in-law, namely Gopal, rushed to the spot. Thereafter, her brother-in-law informed the police about the incident and a constable came to the spot and searched for the accused/respondent, but he could not be apprehended. On the next morning, she went to the police station and lodged an FIR against the accused/respondent. This witness was subjected to cross-examination and in her cross-examination, she admitted that her house is surrounded by a boundary wall and that it is not possible for anyone to enter the house either by climbing the boundary wall or from the roof of the house. She further admitted that her house is situated in the middle of the colony and that the bathroom does not have any door or curtain.

¶31

Contradicting the statement of PW-1- Prosecutrix, PW-2 Gopal, brother-in-law has stated in his deposition that on the date of the incident, the accused/respondent climbed over the house from behind and entered the premises. In his cross-examination, he admitted that the accused/respondent used to frequently visit the house of the prosecutrix and that they used to talk with each other and on account of such familiarity, they had advised the prosecutrix not to allow outsiders to

¶32

5

¶33

enter the house. He further admitted that the prosecutrix had gone to the police station to lodge a report against his father in connection with a monetary transaction.

¶34

PW-3 Dr. Vikas Poddar, who examined the prosecutrix, has stated in his deposition that he found a mild diffuse swelling at the base of her right first toe. However, in his cross-examination, he admitted that such an injury could also be caused if a hard object falls on the toe or if a person strikes a hard object while walking.

¶35

Thus, from perusal of above evidence, it is quite vivid that there are material inconsistencies in the statements of PW-1 prosecutrix and PW-2 Gopal and their statements do not corroborate with each other with respect to the occurrence of the incident. Further, the evidence on record would reveal that the respondent/accused and the prosecutrix were acquainted with each other and used to talk. That apart, the husband of the prosecutrix, who is stated to have immediately reached the spot and the constable who allegedly came thereafter, have not been examined by the prosecution for reasons best known to it. It is also pertinent to note that although the incident is alleged to have occurred on 26.03.2014 at about 11:45 p.m., but the FIR was lodged on 27.03.2014 and no plausible explanation for the said delay has been offered by the prosecution. The delay in lodging the FIR, coupled with the inconsistencies in the testimonies of material witnesses, raises serious doubt regarding the prosecution version and indicates that the report may have been lodged after due deliberation and consideration. Besides, PW-3 Dr. Vikas Poddar, who medically examined the prosecutrix, has admitted that the injury found on her toe could have

¶36

6

¶37

been caused if a hard object fell on it or if she struck it against a hard surface while walking. It is further significant to note that the prosecutrix also failed to identify the seized shirt belonging to the accused/respondent.

¶38

The learned trial Court has elaborately discussed the evidence led by the prosecution and after analyzing the entire evidence, came to the conclusion that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt that on the date of the incident, the accused/respondent had unlawfully entered the house of the prosecutrix, threatened her to life, assaulted her or used criminal force upon her with an intention to outrage her modesty. The learned trial Court, based on the documentary evidence produced, which is a photocopy of a caste certificate purported to have been issued by a competent authority in the State of Madhya Pradesh, further observed that it could not be presumed that a person belonging to that caste in State of Madhya Pradesh would fall within the Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe category in the State of Chhattisgarh. Consequently, the trial Court held that the prosecution failed to establish that the prosecutrix was a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe at the time of the incident and that the accused/respondent had committed the alleged offence on account of her caste status and, accordingly, acquitted him of the said charges.

¶39

After considering the material available on record as well as the elaborate judgment impugned passed by the trial Court, I am of considered opinion that the judgment impugned acquitting the accused /

¶40

7

¶41

respondent herein of the said charges is just and proper and does not

¶42

call for any interference.

¶43

Accordingly, the present acquittal appeal filed by the appellant/State against the acquittal of accused/respondent is hereby dismissed at the admission stage.

¶44

Sd/- (Radhakishan Agrawal) Judge

¶45

Akhilesh

State Of Chhattisgarh v. Dharam Singh Yadav

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

State Of Chhattisgarh v. Dharam Singh Yadav

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

What the court decided

Issues for consideration

Cases cited

Statutes considered

Procedural history

Parties & counsel

Coram

Case details

Similar cases

Smt.vandana Jigyasi Vs Manish Nigam

Prakash Kumar Jigyasi Vs Manish Nigam

Prakash Kumar Jigyasi Vs Manish Nigam

Ramchander and Anr. Vs State of Chhattisgarh

The National Insurance Company Limited Vs Gajropan Yadav

Chhattisgarh State Power Distribution Company Ltd. Vs Chandan Kashyap