Writ petition seeking promotion for Electrical Fitter was dismissed by the High Court of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur. The bench held that the petitioner approached the court after a delay of four years without explaining the laches or inexcusable delay, invoking Supreme Court precedents.
This page shows the compact analysis of this judgement. The full analysis — procedural history, issue-by-issue holdings with ratio and obiter, advocates, and paragraph-level evidence for every claim — is being added to the record in batches and will appear here when this judgement has been through it.
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2024:CGHC:33512
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
WPS No. 5025 of 2011
... Petitioners
versus
... Respondents
| For Petitioner |
: Mrs. Renu Kochar, Advocate |
|---|---|
| For Respondents No. 1 to 4 | : M r. Atul Kesharwani, Advocate |
Hon'ble Shri Justice Rakesh Mohan Pandey Order on Board
0 2.09.2024
“10.1 That this Hon’ble Court may issue writ in the nature of mandamus directing respondents and personal manager respondent No. 4 to promote the petitioner to the post of Electrical Fitter Category (6)
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prior to the date of promotion of the respondent No. 7(Ayodhya Prasad) and on the date respondent and respondent No. 5 and 6 (petitioner batch mate) were promoted.
10.2 That, the seniority of the petitioner be maintained as per the merit list of initial appointment for further promotion.
10.3 That, the respondents be directed to pay the arrears, increment and back wages of the post of Electrical Fitter Category V from the date in which his batch mate were respondent No. 5 and 6. Petitioner be further entitle for all benefits arising out of promotion on the post of Electrical Fitter Grade V on 02.02.2007.
10.4 The respondent be further directed to produce the entire record relating to the promotion of respondent No. 7 and along with the date of promotion of his batch mates respondent No. 5 and 6 for kind perusal of this Hon’ble Court.
10.5 That the any other relief which this Hon’ble Court being fit and propped may also be granted in favour of the petitioner.
10.6 Cost of the petition may also be granted.”
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post of Category V vide Order dated 31.03.2010. Thus, she would pray for a direction to the respondent No. 4/Deputy Chief Personal Manager, SECL to consider the claim of the petitioner and promote the petitioner on the post of Electrical Fitter Grade V from 02.02.2007, when the private respondents were promoted and arrears and back wages may also be granted.
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filed on 26.08.2011. The petitioner has approached this Court after a lapse of 4 years without explaining the delay, and the petitioner failed to explain the delay and laches in the present petition.
in (2014) 4 SCC 108 held as under:-
‘17. In the case at hand, though there has been four years’ delay in approaching the court, yet the writ court chose not to address the same. It is the duty of the court to scrutinize whether such enormous delay is to be ignored without any justification. That apart, in the present case, such belated approach gains more significance as the respondent employee being absolutely careless to his duty and nurturing a lackadaisical attitude to the responsibility had remain unauthorizedly absent on the pretext of some kind of ill health. We repeat at the cost of repetition that remaining innocuously oblivious to such delay does not foster the cause of justice. On the contrary, it brings in injustice, for it is likely to affect others. Such delay may have impact on others’ ripened rights and may unnecessarily drag others into litigation which in acceptable realm of probability, may have been treated to have attained finality. A court is not expected to give indulgence to such indolent persons -who compete with “Kumbhakarna” or for that matter “Rip Van Winkle” . In our considered opinion, such delay does not deserve any indulgence and on the said ground alone the writ court should have thrown the petition overboard at the very threshold.
Jagdishbhai Pathak Vs. Bhavnagar Municipal Corporation reported in
2022 SCC Online SC 64 held as under:-
‘9. The doctrine of delay and laches, or for that matter statutes of limitation, are considered to be statutes of repose and statutes of peace, though some contrary opinions have been expressed (in Nav Rattanmal Vs. state of Rajasthan, AIR 1961 SC 1704). The courts have expressed the view that the law of limitation rests on the foundations of greater public interest for three reasons, namely, (a) that long dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in them; (b) that a defendant might have lost the evidence to disapprove a stale claim; and (iii) that persons with good causes of action (who are able to enforce them) should pursue them with reasonable diligence (State of Kerala Vs. V.R. Kalliyanikutty, (1999) 3 SCC 657 relying on Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th Edn., Vol. 28, para 605; Halsbury’s Laws of England , Vol. 68 (2021) para 1005. Equally, change in de facto position or character, creation of third party rights over a period of time, waiver, acquiesce, and need to ensure certitude in
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dealings, are equitable public policy considerations why period of limitation is prescribed by law. Law of limitation does not apply to writ petitions, albeit the discretion vested with a constitutional court is exercised with caution as delay and laches principle is applied with the aim to secure the quiet of the community, suppress fraud and perjury, quicken diligence, and prevent oppression.(see Popat and Kotecha Property Vs. State Bank of India Staff Association (2005) 7 SCC 510).Therefore, some decisions and judgments do not look upon pleas of delay and laches with favour, especially and rightly in cases where the persons suffer from adeptness, or incapacity to approach the courts for relief. However, other decisions, while accepting the rules of limitation as well as delay and laches, have observed that such rules are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties but serve a larger public interest and are founded on public policy. There must be a lifespan during which a person must approach the court for their remedy. Otherwise, there would be unending uncertainty as to the rights and obligations of the parties. (See N. Blarkrishnan Vs. M. Krishnamurthy, (1998)7 SCC 123. Referring to the principle of delay and laches, this Court, way back in Moons Mils Ltd Vs. M.R. Mehar, President, Industrial Court, Bombay AIR 1967 SC 1450, had referred to the view expressed by Sir Barnes Peacock in The Lindsay Petroleum Company and Prosper Armstrong Hurd, Abram Farewell, and John Kemp, (L.R.) 5 P.C.221 in the following words:
“ Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine, Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy, either because the party has, by his conduct, done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by this conduct and neglect he has though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every case,if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute of limitations, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances, always important in such cases, are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval, which might affect either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as relates to the remedy.”
State of Orissa and others reported in 2023 Livelaw (SC) 883, under
relevant para 21 held as under:-
“21 . Profitably, we may reproduce relevant passagesfrom certain decisions of this Court:
(A) Union of India v Tarsem Singh, (2008) 8 SCC 648:
“To summarise, normally, a belated service related claim will
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be rejected on the ground of delay and laches (where remedy is sought by filing a writ petition) or limitation (where remedy is sought by an application to the Administrative Tribunal). One of the exceptions to the said rule is cases relating to a continuing wrong. Where a service related claim is based on a continuing wrong, relief can be granted even if there is a long delay in seeking remedy, with reference to the date on which the continuing wrong commenced, if such continuing wrong creates a continuing source of injury. But there is an exception to the exception. If the grievance is in respect of any order or administrative decision which related to or affected several others also, and if the reopening of the issue would affect the settled rights of third parties, then the claim will not be entertained. For example, if the issue relates to payment or refixation of pay or pension, relief may be granted in spite of delay as it does not affect the rights of third parties. But if the claim involved issues relating to seniority or promotion, etc., affecting others, delay would render the claim stale and doctrine of laches/limitation will be applied. Insofar as the consequential relief of recovery of arrears for a past period is concerned, the principles relating to recurring/successive wrongs will apply. As a consequence, the High Courts will restrict the consequential relief relating to arrears normally to a period of three years prior to the date of filing of the writ petition.” (emphasis supplied)
(B) Union of India v N Murugesan, (2022) 2 SCC 25:
"Delay, laches and acquiescence
Laches
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unjustifiable for a Court of Equity to confer a remedy on a party who knocks its doors when his acts would indicate a waiver of such a right. By his conduct, he has put the other party in a particular position, and therefore, it would be unreasonable to facilitate a challenge before the court. Thus, a man responsible for his conduct on equity is not expected to be allowed to avail a remedy.
Acquiescence
(C) Chairman, State Bank of India v M J James, (2022) 2 SCC 301:
"36. What is a reasonable time is not to be put in a straitjacket formula or judicially codified in the form of days, etc. as it depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. A right not exercised for a long time is nonexistent. Doctrine of delay and laches as well as acquiescence are applied to non-suit the litigants who approach the court/appellate authorities belatedly without any justifiable explanation for bringing action after unreasonable delay. In the present case, challenge to the order of dismissal from service by way of appeal was after four years and five months, which is certainly highly belated and beyond justifiable time. Without satisfactory explanation justifying the delay, it is difficult to hold that the appeal was preferred
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within a reasonable time. Pertinently, the challenge was primarily on the ground that the respondent was not allowed to be represented by a representative of his choice. The respondent knew that even if he were to succeed on this ground, as has happened in the writ proceedings, fresh inquiry would not be prohibited as finality is not attached unless there is a legal or statutory bar, an aspect which has been also noticed in the impugned judgment. This is highlighted to show the prejudice caused to the appellants by the delayed challenge. We would, subsequently, examine the question of acquiescence and its judicial effect in the context of the present case.
Xxx
“12. The statement of law has also been summarised in Halsbury's Laws of England, Para 911,p. 395 as follows:
‘In determining whether there has been such delay as to amount to laches, the chief points to be considered are:
(i) acquiescence on the claimant's part;and
(ii) any change of position that has occurred on the defendant's part.
Acquiescence in this sense does not mean standing by while the violation of a right is in progress,but assent after the violation has been completed and the claimant has become aware of it. It is unjust to give the claimant a remedy where,
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by his conduct, he has done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it; or where by his conduct and neglect, though not waiving the remedy, he has put the other party in a position in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted. In such cases lapse of time and delay are most material. Upon these considerations rests the doctrine of laches.’
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10. Considering the facts and circumstances of the present case in light of the judgments passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matters of Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply (supra) , Rushibhai Jagdishbhai Pathak (supra) and Bichitrananda Behera (supra), it is quite vivid that
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the petitioner has approached this Court after a delay of 4 years and in para 7 of the writ petition, it has been stated that there is no delay in filing the instant petition. The petitioner utterly failed to explain the delay caused in filing the instant petition.
11. Taking into consideration the above-stated facts, I do not find any good ground to entertain the instant petition. Accordingly, the instant petition fails and is hereby dismissed . No order as to cost(s).
Sd/-
(Rakesh Mohan Pandey) Judge
$iddhant
2 issues framed by the court
Whether the petition should be entertained given a delay of over four years in approaching the court without justifiable explanation.
Whether the doctrine of laches and delay bars the relief sought for promotion due to unreasonable inaction.
Colour shows how this judgement treated each authority
Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board and Others Vs. T.T. Murali BabuRelied on¶37
Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board and Others Vs. T.T. Murali Babu (2014) 4 SCC 108 · Who else cites this
Rushibhai Jagdishbhai Pathak Vs. Bhavnagar Municipal CorporationRelied on¶40
Rushibhai Jagdishbhai Pathak Vs. Bhavnagar Municipal Corporation 2022 SCC Online SC 64 · Who else cites this
Bichitrananda Behera Vs. State of Orissa and othersRelied on¶47
Bichitrananda Behera Vs. State of Orissa and others 2023 Livelaw (SC) 883
Bhagirathi Nishad
General Manager, SECL
Sub Area Manager, SECL
Project Officer, SECL
Deputy Chief Personal Manager, SECL
Nirmal Das
Rakesh Mohan Pandey
As recorded by the court registry
Judgements on the same questions, provisions and authorities, from every court
