Bank clerk dismissed after inquiry into posting of a fraudulent credit entry and withdrawals from a fictitious account; acquitted later in criminal case but appeal dismissed afresh on remand. Petition challenging dismissal and appellate order failed for want of pleaded grounds; writ dismissed.
This page shows the compact analysis of this judgement. The full analysis — procedural history, issue-by-issue holdings with ratio and obiter, advocates, and paragraph-level evidence for every claim — is being added to the record in batches and will appear here when this judgement has been through it.
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Digitally signed by REKHA SINGH
2024:CGHC:34272
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
WPS No. 444 of 2014
Janak Kumar Dhake S/o Shri Narayan Singh Aged About 53 Years Bank Clerk R/o Amapara, Ps Balod, Distt Balod, Cg, Chhattisgarh
... Petitioner
versus
1 - State Bank Of India Through General Manager (D&PB), Local Head Office, Bhopal, Mp, Madhya Pradesh
2 - Deputy General Manager Appellate Authority, State Bank Of India, Zonal Office, Shanker Nagar, Raipur, Distt Raipur, Cg
3 - Assistant General Manager Disciplinary Authority, State Bank Of India, Region Ii, Zonal Office, Raipur, Distt Raipur, Cg
... Respondents
(Cause-title taken from Case Information System)
For Petitioner : Mr. Aman Pandey, Advocate along with Mr. Aman Memon, Advocate For Respondent/SBI : Mr. P.R. Patankar, Advocate
Hon'ble Shri Justice Rakesh Mohan Pandey
Order
04.09.2024
Heard.
“ 10.1 It is prayed that this Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to call for the entire records pertaining to the case of the petitioner from the possession of the respondents for its kind perusal.
10.2 That this Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to issue an appropriate writ quashing the order of dismissal dated 12.12.1995 (Annexure P/6) and the Appellate order dated 20.09.2010 (Annexure P/1) by
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declaring the same as void, illegal, arbitrary, discriminatory and opposed to principles of natural justice and fair play as also violative of petitioners right guaranteed under the Constitution of India.
10.3 That this Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to direct the respondents to reinstate the petitioner in service immediately with all consequential service benefits like back wages, seniority, promotion, increments etc. along with interest @ 18% on monetary point.
10.4 Any other relief/reliefs, which this Hon’ble Court may think fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case, with cost of the petition, may also please be granted to the petitioner.”
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Crime No.94/1994 was registered on 17.05.1994. Thereafter, a charge sheet was filed before the competent Criminal Court and Criminal Case No.1026/1994 was registered on 08.09.1994. The petitioner and Shri K.R.D. Kamri were held guilty and a punishment of two years R.I. and a fine of Rs.900/- each was imposed. The departmental inquiry was pending during that period against the petitioner as well as against Shri K.R.D. Kamri and after a full-fledged departmental inquiry, the petitioner and Shri K.R.D. Kamri were punished with dismissal from service. The petitioner and Mr. K.R.D. Kamri preferred an appeal before the Appellate Authority raising various grounds and the same was dismissed vide order dated 31.03.1997. At the same time, the petitioner and Shri K.R.D Kamri challenged the judgment of conviction and order of sentence by filing Criminal Appeal Nos.39/1998 and 43/1998 and both appeals were allowed vide judgment dated 17.02.1999. After acquittal, Shri K.R.D. Kamri preferred a representation before the Bank authorities along with a copy of the order dated 17.02.1999 and he was reinstated in service vide order dated 17.08.1999. The petitioner preferred a review appeal before the Appellate Authority on 07.09.1999 but no order was passed, thereafter, he preferred a mercy application before respondent No.2 on 22.10.1999 and vide memo dated 08.02.2000, the petitioner was informed that the mercy appeal dated 22.10.1999 is not tenable in the absence of any provision. Thereafter, by filing Writ Petition No.5140/2000, the petitioner challenged the legality and validity of the suspension order dated 11.05.1994, charge-sheet dated 24.06.1994, order of dismissal dated 12.12.1995, order of Appellate Authority dated 31.03.1997 and the memo dated 08.02.2000. The order passed by the Appellate Authority dated 31.03.1997 was set aside on the ground that
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adequate opportunity was not afforded to the petitioner and the matter was remitted back to the Appellate Authority to decide the appeal afresh within a period of three months vide order dated 01.07.2010. Thereafter, the Appellate authority vide order dated 20.09.2010 dismissed the appeal again. The petitioner filed the present petition on 20.01.2014 challenging therein the orders dated 12.12.1995 and 20.09.2010 and prayed for reinstatement in service with all consequential benefits.
3. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that the Appellate Authority passed an order dated 20.09.2010 contrary to the observation made in the order dated 01.07.2010 passed in Writ Petition No.5140/2000 and failed to consider the grounds raised by the petitioner. He further submitted that the Bank authorities continued with the disciplinary proceedings ignoring the fact that a criminal prosecution was going on simultaneously against the petitioner and the approach of the Bank authorities was in violation of the by-partite agreement dated 19.10.1966. He also submitted there were similar allegations against the petitioner as well as Shri K.R.D.Kamri but punishment of stoppage of increment was imposed against him and punishment of dismissal was inflicted upon the petitioner and thus, the approach of the disciplinary authority was discriminatory. He contended that though the petitioner was convicted by the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Balod, later on, he was acquitted by the learned Sessions Court. He further contended that the departmental inquiry and the criminal case were based on the same set of facts and evidence, therefore, the Appellate Authority ought to have allowed the departmental appeal preferred by the petitioner. He also contended that no decision was taken on the
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mercy appeal preferred by the petitioner without assigning sufficient reason. It is argued that there was no negligence on the part of the petitioner while discharging his duties. He further argued that some miscreants played fraud with the Bank and alone the petitioner was not responsible for such negligence. The petitioner merely posted the vouchers in the register whereas the entries were verified by the higher authorities. He also argued that the petitioner was not supplied relevant documents during the course of the inquiry and it vitiated the whole inquiry. In support of his submissions, he placed reliance on the judgments passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matters of B.C. Chaturvedi Vs. Union of India, 1995 (6) SCC 749, M. Paul Anthony V. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd, 1999 (3) SCC 679, G.M. Tank V. State of Gujarat, 2006 (5) SCC 446, State of U.P. V. Saroj Kumar Sinha, 2010 (2) SCC 772, Shobha Sinha V. State of Bihar, 2013 (16) SCC 456, H.P. SEB V. Mahesh Dahiya, 2017 (1) SCC 768, SBI Vs. Ajai Kumar Srivastava, 2021 (2) SCC 612, United Bank of India V. Biswanath Bhattacharjee, 2022 (13)SCC 329 and State of U.P. V. Rajit Singh, 2022 (15) SCC 254.
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statement of allegations and article of charges were furnished to the petitioner. The petitioner filed his explanation on 13.07.1994. He also submitted that Shri Doneria, Chief Manager, Rajhara Branch was appointed as an Inquiry Officer. A full-fledged departmental inquiry was conducted and the petitioner was afforded sufficient opportunity to defend. The Inquiry Officer submitted his report on 04.08.1995 before the disciplinary authority. The disciplinary authority concurred with the finding of the Inquiry Officer and imposed a penalty of dismissal without notice in terms of para 521(5)(a) of the Sastry Award. A Show cause notice was issued to the petitioner and a reply was filed on 08.11.1995. A personal hearing was also afforded to the petitioner on 01.12.1995 and punishment of dismissal was inflicted on 12.12.1995 and the same was received by the petitioner on 02.01.1996. He further argued that the petitioner had challenged the departmental inquiry in Writ Petition No. 4266 of 1995 before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh and the said petition was dismissed holding that “in the present case after departmental inquiry, report has been submitted. There is no legal bar for continuance of the departmental proceedings during the pendency of the criminal case. This fact has, however, been concealed by the petitioner in the instant petition.” He also argued that the petitioner preferred an appeal before the Appellate Authority and he was provided a personal hearing on 13.01.1997. The appeal of the petitioner was dismissed vide order dated 31.03.1997. He stated that the order passed by the Appellate Authority was set aside by this Court and the matter was remitted back to decide the appeal afresh after considering the points raised by the petitioner in the memo of appeal. He further stated that the appeal was again heard by the Appellate Authority but it was
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dismissed vide order dated 20.09.2010. He also stated that though the appellate order was passed on 20.09.2010, the petitioner filed this petition on 20.01.2014 after a gap of four years without explaining the sufficient reasons for such delay. He contended that the present petition filed by the petitioner is liable to be dismissed on the grounds of delay and laches. He further contended that though the petitioner was acquitted vide order dated 31.03.1997, he was punished in the departmental inquiry on 12.12.1995. He further contended that the grounds raised by the petitioner were considered in earlier Writ Petition No. 5140 of 2000 but the same was not accepted. He referred to para 12 of the order passed in WP No.5140 of 2000 which reads as under:-
“12 .The petitioner, in the case on hand, was dismissed from service not on account of judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 22.01.1998 passed by the Judicial Magistrate, First Class. Thereafter, the question of reinstatement after acquittal by the Court of Additional Sessions Judge by judgment dated 17.02.1999 does not arise. Thus, the orders passed on the basis of acquittal in Sessions Court cannot be quashed, as the petitioner was dismissed from the service on the basis of disciplinary enquiry i.e. before conviction or subsequent acquittal in the Criminal Courts.”
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disproportionate or if the principles of natural justice have not been followed. He also submitted that looking at the misconduct which has been found proved by the Inquiry Officer, concurred by the disciplinary authority and affirmed by the appellate authority, it cannot be said that the quantum of punishment awarded is disproportionate looking to the misconduct. With regard to natural justice, he submitted that sufficient opportunity was afforded to the petitioner to defend the case and at all stages, notices were issued. He lastly submitted that the present petition deserves to be dismissed.
“(I) On 3rd January, 1994, while working as Bank counter clerk at State Bank of India Balod Branch, you posted a fraudulent credit entry of Rs.35024/(Rs. Thirty Five Thousand Twenty Four) in Saving Bank Account No.74/18476 of Shri Ram Charan Sahu son of Shri Ramesh Sahu resident of Balod. The credit entry was in supported by any genuine Banking transaction. A sum of Rs.20,000/- and Rs.14,000/- were withdrawn on 5th of January, 1994 and 3rd February, 1994 respectively fraudulent credit entry by you. Your lapse and negligence has exposed the Bank to serious monetary loss.
II) Your above act is highly prejudicial in the interest of the Bank and tantamount to gross misconduct in terms of para 521 (4)(j) of Shastry Award passed with Deal Award. You are therefore directed to submit your explanation, if any, in writing in your defense through the Branch Manager, Balod Branch within 15 days from the date of receipt of this memo random failing which it will be promoted that you have no explanation to offer and the, you will proceed further against you as deemed fit.”
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was discarded.
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Court held as under:-
“17. These decisions indicate that though it would not be wrong in conducting two parallel proceedings, one by way of disciplinary action and the other in the criminal court, still it would be desirable to stay the domestic inquiry if the incident giving rise to a charge framed against the employee in a domestic inquiry is being tried in a criminal court. The case law was reviewed by this Court in Kusheshwar Dubey vs. M/s Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. & Ors. 1988 (4) SCC 319 = 1988 Supp. (2) SCR 821 = AIR 1988 SC 2118 and it was laid down as under :
7."The view expressed in the three cases of this Court seem to support the position that while there could be no legal bar for simultaneous proceedings being taken, yet, there may be cases where it would be appropriate to defer disciplinary proceedings awaiting disposal of the criminal case. In the latter class of cases, it would be open to the delinquent employee to seek such an order of stay or injunction from the court. Whether in the facts and circumstances of particular case there should or should not be such simultaneity of the proceedings would then receive judicial consideration and the court will decide in the given circumstances of particular case as to whether the disciplinary proceedings should be interdicted, pending criminal trial. As we have already stated that it is neither possible nor advisable to evolve a hard and fast, strait-jacket formula valid for all cases and of general application without regard to the particularities of the individual situation. For the disposal of the present case, we do not think it necessary to say anything more, particularly when we do not intend to lay down any general guideline."
The Court further observed as under :
"8. In the instant case, the criminal action and the disciplinary proceedings are grounded upon the same set of facts. We are of the view that the disciplinary proceedings should have been stayed and the High Court was not right in interfering with the trial court's order of injunction which had been affirmed in appeal.
18. Then came the decision in Nelson Motis vs. Union of India & Ors. (1992) 4 SCC 711 = 1992 Supp.(1) SCR 325 = AIR 1992 SC 1981, which laid down that the disciplinary proceedings can be legally continued even where the employee is acquitted in a criminal case as the nature and proof required in a criminal case are different from those in the departmental proceedings. Besides, the Court found that the acts which led to the initiation of departmental proceedings were not exactly the same which were the subject matter of the criminal case. The question was not considered in detail. The Court observed :
"5. So far the first point is concerned, namely whether the disciplinary proceedings could have been continued in the face of the acquittal of the appellant in the criminal case, the plea has no substance whatsoever and does not merit a detailed consideration. The nature and scope of a criminal
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case are very different from those of a departmental disciplinary proceeding and an order of acquittal, therefore, cannot conclude the departmental proceedings. Besides, the Tribunal has pointed out that the acts which led to the initiation of the departmenal disciplinary proceeding were not exactly the same which were the subject matter of the criminal case.
(Emphasis supplied)
19. The entire case law was reviewed once again by this Court in State of Rajasthan vs. B.K. Meena & Ors. (1996) 6 SCC 417 = AIR 1997 SC 13 = 1997 (1) LLJ 746 (SC), wherein it was laid down as under :
"14. It would be evident from the above decisions that each of them starts with the indisputable proposition that there is no legal bar for both proceedings to go on simultaneously and then say that in certain situation, it may not be 'desirable', 'advisable' or 'appropriate' to proceed with the disciplinary enquiry when a criminal case is pending on identical charge. The staying of disciplinary proceedings, it is emphasised, is a matter to be determined having regard to the facts and circumstances of a given case and that no hard and fast rules can be enunciated in that behalf. The only ground suggested in the above decisions as constituting a valid ground for staying the disciplinary proceedings is that 'the defence of the employee in the criminal case may not be prejudiced.' This ground has, however, been hedged in by providing further that this may be done in cases of grave nature involving questions of fact and law. In our respectful opinion, it means that not only the charges must be grave but that the case must involve complicated questions of law and fact. Moreover, 'advisability', 'desirability' or 'propriety', as the case may be, has to be "determined in each case taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances of the case. The ground indicated in D.C.M. (AIR 1960 SC 806) and Tata Oil Mills (AIR 1965 SC 155) is also not an invariable rule. It is only a factor which will go into the scales while judging the advisability or desirability of staying the disciplinary proceedings. One of the contending considerations is that the disciplinary enquiry cannot be - and should not be - delayed unduly. So far as criminal cases are concerned, it is well known that they drag on endlessly where high officials or persons are involved. They get bogged down on one or the other ground. They hardly ever reach a prompt conclusion. That is the reality in spite of repeated advice and admonitions from this Court and the High Courts. If a criminal case is unduly delayed that may itself be a good ground for going ahead with the disciplinary enquiry even where the disciplinary proceedings are held over at an earlier stage. The interests of administration and good government demand that these proceedings are concluded expeditiously. It must be remembered that interests of administration demand that undesirable elements are thrown out and any charge of misdemeanour is inquired
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into promptly. The disciplinary proceedings are meant not really to punish the guilty but to keep the administrative machinery unsullied by getting rid of bad elements. The interest of the delinquent officer also lies in a prompt conclusion of the disciplinary proceedings. If he is not guilty of the charges, his honour should be vindicated at the earlist possible moment and if he is guilty, he should be dealt with promptly according to law. It is not also in the interest of administration that persons accused of serious misdemeanour should be continued in office indefinitely, i.e., for long periods awaiting the result of criminal proceedings. It is not in the interest of administration. It only serves the interest of the guilty and dishonest. While it is not possible to enumerate the various factors, for and against the stay of disciplinary proceedings, we found it necesasry to emphasise some of the important considerations in view of the fact that very often the disciplinary proceedings are being stayed for long periods pending criminal proceedings. Stay of disciplinary proceedings cannot be, and should not be, a matter of course. All the relevant factors, for and against, should be weighed and a decision taken keeping in view of the various principles laid down in the decisions referred to above." This decision has gone two steps further to the earlier decisions by providing :The 'advisability', 'desirability' or 'propriety' of staying the departmental proceedings "go into the scales while judging the advisability or desirability of staying the disciplinary proceedings" merely as one of the factors which cannot be considered in isolation of other circumstances of the case. But the charges in the criminal case must, in any case, be of a grave and serious nature involving complicated questions of fact and law. (2) One of the contending considerations would be that the disciplinary enquiry cannot -- and should not be -- delayed unduly. If the criminal case is unduly delayed, that may itself be a good ground for going ahead with the disciplinary enquiry even though the disciplinary proceedings were held over at an earlier stage. It would not be in the interests of administration that persons accused of serious misdemeanour should be continued in office indefinitely awaiting the result of criminal proceedings. In another case, namely, Depot Manager, Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation vs. Mohd. Yousuf Miyan (1997) 2 SCC 699 = AIR 1997 SC 2232, again it was held that there is no bar to proceed simultaneously with the departmental inquiry and trial of a criminal case unless the charge in the criminal case is of a grave nature involving complicated questions of fact and law.
22.The conclusions which are deducible from various decisions of this Court referred to above are :
(i) Departmental proceedings and proceedings in a criminal case can proceed simultaneously as there is no bar in their being conducted simultaneously, though separately.
(ii) If the departmental proceedings and the criminal case are based on identical and similar set of facts and the charge in the criminal
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case against the delinquent employee is of a grave nature which involves complicated questions of law and fact, it would be desirable to stay the departmental proceedings till the conclusion of the criminal case.
(iii) Whether the nature of a charge in a criminal case is grave and whether complicated questions of fact and law are involved in that case, will depend upon the nature of offence, the nature of the case launched against the employee on the basis of evidence and material collected against him during investigation or as reflected in the charge sheet.
(iv) The factors mentioned at (ii) and (iii) above cannot be considered in isolation to stay the Departmental proceedings but due regard has to be given to the fact that the departmental proceedings cannot be unduly delayed.
(v) If the criminal case does not proceed or its disposal is being unduly delayed, the departmental proceedings, even if they were stayed on account of the pendency of the criminal case, can be resumed and proceeded with so as to conclude them at an early date, so that if the employee is found not guilty his honour may be vindicated and in case he is found guilty, administration may get rid of him at the earliest.
35. Since the facts and the evidence in both the proceedings, namely, the departmental proceedings and the criminal case were the same without there being any iota of difference, the distinction, which is usually drawn as between the departmental proceedings and the criminal case on the basis of approach and burden of proof, would not be applicable to the instant case.”
15. In the matter of G.M.Tank (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court
held as under:-
“29. The Judgment in the case of State of A.P. & Ors. Vs. S. Sree Rama Rao (supra), was cited for the purpose that the High Court is not constituted in a proceeding under Art. 226 of the Constitution a Court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant, it is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated.
31.In our opinion, such facts and evidence in the department as well as criminal proceedings were the same without there being any iota of difference, the appellant should succeed. The distinction which is usually proved between the departmental and criminal proceedings on the basis of the approach and burden of proof would not be applicable in the instant case. Though finding recorded in the domestic enquiry was found to be valid by the Courts below, when there was an honourable acquittal of the employee during the pendency of the proceedings challenging the dismissal, the same requires to be taken note of and the decision in Paul Anthony's case (supra) will apply. We, therefore, hold that th e appeal filed by the appellant deserves to be allowed.”
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Supreme Court has further held that while exercising the power of judicial review, the Constitutional Courts may evaluate the decisionmaking process and not the merits of the decision itself. The Court may examine as to whether the enquiry was held by the competent authority, whether rules of natural justice are complied with and whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence and authority has the power and jurisdiction to reach a finding of fact or conclusion.
“13.The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts. Where appeal is presented. The appellate authority has coextensive power to reappreciate the evidence or the nature of punishment. In a disciplinary inquiry the strict proof of legal evidence and findings on that evidence are not relevant. Adequacy of evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the Court/Tribunal. In Union of India v. H.C. Goel [(1964) 4 SCR 781], this Court held at page 728 that if the conclusion, upon consideration of the evidence, reached by the disciplinary authority, is perverse or suffers from patent error on the face of the record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued.”
19. In the matter of Ajai Kumar Srivastava (supra), the Hon’ble
Supreme Court held as under:-
“24.It is thus settled that the power of judicial review, of the Constitutional Courts, is an evaluation of the decisionmaking process and not the merits of the decision itself. It is to ensure fairness in treatment and not to ensure fairness of conclusion. The Court/Tribunal may interfere in the proceedings held against the delinquent if it is, in any manner, inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority if based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached or where the conclusions upon consideration of the evidence reached by the disciplinary authority is perverse or suffers from patent error on the face of record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued. To sum up, the scope of judicial review cannot be extended to the examination of correctness or reasonableness of a decision of authority as a matter of fact. 25. When the disciplinary enquiry is conducted for the alleged
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misconduct against the public servant, the Court is to examine and determine:
(i) whether the enquiry was held by the competent authority;
(ii) whether rules of natural justice are complied with;(iii) whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence and authority has power and jurisdiction to reach finding of fact or conclusion.
26. It is well settled that where the enquiry officer is not the disciplinary authority, on receiving the report of enquiry, the disciplinary authority may or may not agree with the findings recorded by the former, in case of disagreement, the disciplinary authority has to record the reasons for disagreement and after affording an opportunity of hearing to the delinquent may record his own findings if the evidence available on record be sufficient for such exercise or else to remit the case to the enquiry officer for further enquiry.”
20. In the matter of Biswanath Bhattacharjee (supra) , the Hon’ble
Supreme Court held as under:-
“19. Other decisions have ruled that being a proceeding before a domestic tribunal, strict rules of evidence, or adherence to the provisions of the Evidence Act, 1872 are inessential. However, the procedure has to be fair and reasonable, and the charged employee has to be given reasonable opportunity to defend himself (ref: Bank of India v. Degala Suryanarayana12 a decision followed later in Punjab & Sind Bank v. Daya Singh13). In Moni Shankar v. Union of India14 this court outlined what judicial review entails in respect of orders made by disciplinary authorities:
“17. The departmental proceeding is a quasi-judicial one. Although the provisions of the Evidence Act are not applicable in the said proceeding, principles of natural justice are required to be complied with. The courts exercising power of judicial review are entitled to consider as to whether while inferring commission of misconduct on the part of a delinquent officer relevant piece of evidence has been taken into consideration and irrelevant facts have been excluded therefrom. Inference on facts must be based on evidence which meet the requirements of legal principles. The Tribunal was, thus, entitled to arrive at its own conclusion on the premise that the evidence adduced by the Department, even if it is taken on its face value to be correct in its entirety, meet the requirements of burden of proof, namely, preponderance of probability. If on such evidence, the test of the doctrine of proportionality has not been satisfied, the Tribunal was within its domain to interfere.”
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held as under:-
“12.In the case of Chairman, Life Insurance Corporation of India and Ors. Vs. A. Masilamani, (2013) 6 SCC 530, which was also pressed into service on behalf of the appellants before the High Court, it is observed in paragraph 16 as under:“16. It is a settled legal proposition, that once the court sets aside an order of punishment, on the ground that the enquiry was not properly conducted, the court cannot reinstate the employee. It must remit the case concerned to the disciplinary authority for it to conduct the enquiry from the point that it stood vitiated, and conclude the same. (Vide ECIL v. B. Karunakar [(1993) 4 SCC 727], Hiran Mayee Bhattacharyya v. S.M. School for Girls [(2002) 10 SCC 293], U.P. State Spg. Co. Ltd. v. R.S. Pandey [(2005) 8 SCC 264] and Union of India v. Y.S. Sadhu [(2008) 12 SCC 30]).”
23. Taking into consideration the facts discussed and the law laid
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down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, no case is made out for interference. Consequently, the present petition fails and is hereby dismissed . No order as to cost(s).
Sd/-
(Rakesh Mohan Pandey) Judge
Rekha
3 issues framed by the court
Whether the appellate authority's order dated 20.09.2010 dismissing the departmental appeal was contrary to the High Court's earlier remand direction.
Whether acquittal in the criminal case required reinstatement despite dismissal based on an independent disciplinary inquiry.
Whether judicial review grounds such as natural-justice violation, non-supply of documents or no-evidence findings were established against the petitioner.
Colour shows how this judgement treated each authority
B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of IndiaRelied on¶18
B.C. Chaturvedi Vs. Union of India, 1995 (6) SCC 749 · Who else cites this
M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd.Relied on¶14
M. Paul Anthony V. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd, 1999 (3) SCC 679 · Who else cites this
G.M. Tank v. State of GujaratExplained¶15
G.M. Tank V. State of Gujarat, 2006 (5) SCC 446 · Who else cites this
State of U.P. v. Saroj Kumar SinhaDistinguished¶12
State of U.P. V. Saroj Kumar Sinha, 2010 (2) SCC 772 · Who else cites this
Shobha Sinha v. State of BiharDistinguished¶12
Shobha Sinha V. State of Bihar, 2013 (16) SCC 456 · Who else cites this
H.P. SEB v. Mahesh DahiyaDistinguished¶12
H.P. SEB V. Mahesh Dahiya, 2017 (1) SCC 768 · Who else cites this
SBI v. Ajai Kumar SrivastavaRelied on¶19
SBI Vs. Ajai Kumar Srivastava, 2021 (2) SCC 612 · Who else cites this
United Bank of India v. Biswanath BhattacharjeeRelied on¶20
United Bank of India V. Biswanath Bhattacharjee, 2022 (13)SCC 329 · Who else cites this
State of U.P. v. Rajit SinghRelied on¶21
State of U.P. V. Rajit Singh, 2022 (15) SCC 254 · Who else cites this
2 provisions across 2 enactments
Janak Kumar Dhake
State Bank of India Through General Manager (D&PB), Local Head Office, Bhopal
Deputy General Manager Appellate Authority, State Bank of India, Zonal Office, Raipur
Assistant General Manager Disciplinary Authority, State Bank of India, Region II, Raipur
Rakesh Mohan Pandey
As recorded by the court registry
Judgements on the same questions, provisions and authorities, from every court
