Allowed

Raja @ Raj @ Shailesh v. State of Chhattisgarh

Chhattisgarh HC17 Jun 2024CRA/403/2024

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

On appeal against conviction for abduction and sexual offenses, the High Court acquitted the appellant. The court held that school records were insufficient to prove the victim was a minor and found no evidence of abduction or lack of consent based on the victim's conduct and medical reports.

What did the court decide?

Conviction and sentence set aside; Appellant acquitted and released forthwith; Bond directed under Section 437-A CrPC.

Raja @ Raj @ Shailesh Vs State of… — Child Sexual Offences (POCSO) | Chhattisgarh HC (2024)

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NAFR

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HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

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CRA No. 403 of 2024

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Raja @ Raj @ Shailesh S/o Harit Kumar Jangde, Aged About 21 Years R/o Goindra, Police Station-Pathariya, District-Mungeli (C.G.)

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---- Appellant

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Versus

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State of Chhattisgarh Through Police Station -Mahasamund, District-Mahasamund (C.G.)

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---- Respondent

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(Cause title is taken from CIS)

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For Appellant : Mr. Akhtar Hussain, Advocate. For State/respondent : Mr. Sakib Ahmad, Panel Lawyer

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Hon'ble Shri Justice Ramesh Sinha, CJ Hon’ble Shri Justice Sachin Singh Rajput, J Judgment on Board

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Per , Ramesh Sinha, CJ

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18.06.2024

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1 . This appeal arise out of the judgment of conviction and sentence dated 16.02.2024 passed by the Special Judge (POCSO Act), Mahasamund, District Mahasamund in Special Criminal Case No.H-45/2023, whereby the appellant has been convicted and sentence for the offences under Sections as

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below :

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CONVICTION	SENTENCE
Under Section 363 of IPC	: R.I. for 5 years and fine of
	Rs.1,000/- and in default of

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	payment of fine additional R.I. for 1 month.
Under Section 366 of IPC	: R.I. for 7 years and fine of Rs.2,000/- and in default of payment of fine additional R.I. for 2 months.
Under Section 6 of POCSO Act.	: R.I. for 20 years and fine of Rs.10,000/- and in default of payment of fine additional R.I. for 6 years.
	All the sentences will run concurrently.

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2 . Brief case of the prosecution is that, on 02.05.2023 the father of the victim, PW-3, lodged a missing report at Police Station, Mahasamund, District Mahasamund stating that his minor daughter had left the house saying that she was going to the market with her aunt, but did not return home. On the said report of the complainant, a missing report registered as 52/2023 in Police Station, Mahasamund, District Mahasamund. Upon investigation, it was found that the minor daughter of the complainant has been enticed and abducted by some unknown person. On the report of the complainant, the police registered an FIR, Ex.P/8 against the unkonwn person for the offence under Section 363 of IPC. During the course of investigation, the victim was recovered on 05.05.2023. Recovery Panchnama was prepared vide Ex.P-1, and on asking her, the victim told that she became acquainted with the accused through Instagram, both of them fall in love while talking on mobile. On 02.05.2023, the accused/appellant called her on pretext of

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marriage, the victim agreed to marry with him and on the request of accused/appellant she reached at Raipur by bus. Thereafter, the appellant took her to Mungeli and kept her in his house for one day and on the pretext of marriage, forcibly made physical relation several times with her. On the basis of the statement of the victim, the offence under Sections 366, 376(n) of IPC and under Section 6 of POCSO Act was added. After obtaining consent from her mother, the victim was sent for medical examination to District Hospital, Mahasamund for examination on 07.05.2023 where Dr. Ajiti Tiwari, PW-10, examined her and gave her report vide Ex.P-11, in which it is stated that secondary sexual character developed over body and no injury present over body. The Doctor has opined that according to external and internal examination sexual assault cannot be ruled out. Vide memo dated 20.07.2023 Ex- P-27, the 2 vaginal slides, pubic hairs and underwear obtained after examination of the privates parts were sent for FSL examination to Director, FSL, Raipur. The accused/appellant was arrested on 23.07.2023 was sent for medical examination to District Hospital, Mahasamund where he was examined by Dr. Arvind, PW-5, who gave his report vide Ex. P-12, and opined that there is noting to say that he is incapable of performing intercourse. Vide memo dated 21.08.2023, Ex. P-14, two slides of semen in a sealed envelop alongwith underwear of the accused/appellant were sent for FSL examination to Director, FSL, Raipur. Spot

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map Ex. P-5, of the site was prepared by the Patwari. On 09.09.2023, vide Ex.P/17 the school admission and discharge register has been asked from the Principal of the Swami Atmanand Govt. English School (Hindi Medium) Nayapara and seized by the police, in which the date of birth of the victim is recorded as 28.07.2006. The school admission and discharge register is Ex.P/21. Thereafter, after recording the statements of the witnesses and completing the investigation proceedings, the charge sheet was presented before the Court for trial.

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3 . Charges were framed against the accused and the accused abjured his guilt and plead innocence.

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4 . In order to establish the charge against the appellant, the prosecution examined 10 witnesses. The statement of appellant was also recorded under section 313 of CrPC in which he denied the allegation against him and stated that he is innocent and he has been falsely implicated in the case.

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5 . After appreciation of the evidence available on record, the learned trial Court has convicted the accused/appellant and sentenced him as mentioned in para 1 of this judgment. Hence this appeal.

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6 . Learned counsel for the appellant has argued that the prosecution has failed to prove the case against the appellant beyond reasonable doubts. There is no legally admissible evidence with regard to the age of the victim that on the date of incident she was minor and less than 18 years of age. It is

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stated by the Principal of said school that she had taken admission on 08.07.2019 by producing transfer certificate of her previous education centre in which date of birth is mentioned as 28.07.2006 and same was recorded in their school records but on what basis her age was recorded on her previous education centre is not known to him. In absence of said fact, the same can not be taken into consideration for determination of the actual age of the victim, as no any Kotwari register or ossification report was produced by the prosecution to determine the actual age of the victim that on the date of incident, she was below 18 years of age. It is further argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that the victim and the appellant were having love affair and she herself accompanied with the appellant. Thus, the victim was grown up girl and was a consenting party. No complaint has been made by her to any one regarding sexual intercourse or any false promise of marriage. Hence, the alleged offence of IPC and POCSO Act are not made out against the appellant and he is entitled for acquittal.

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7 . On the other hand, the learned counsel for the State opposes and contended that the victim was minor and below 18 years of age at the time of incident which is proved by the school admission and discharge register, Ex.P-21 wherein the date of birth of the victim is mentioned as 28.07.2006. The School register is the admissible evidence to determine the age of

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victim which has been proved by the Principal,(PW-7) Swami Atmanand Govt. English School (Hindi Medium), Nayapara, Mahasamund. Therefore, there is no illegality or infirmity in the findings of the learned trial Court. The minor victim was abducted by the appellant and kept away from the lawful guardianship and performed marriage with her. Therefore, the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence needs no interference.

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8 . We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the records with utmost circumspection.

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9 . In order to consider the age of the victim, we have examined the evidence available on record produced by the prosecution. The prosecution relied upon the school admission and discharge register, Ex.P/21, which is sought to be proved by PW-7, K.R. Sagar, who is the Principal, Swami Atmanand Govt. English School (Hindi Medium), Nayapara, Mahasamund. The said register is the only piece of evidence to establish the age of the victim. Neither any Kotwari register or birth certificate of the victim is filed nor her ossification test was conducted. Although, in the school admission and discharge register Ex.P/21, the date of birth of the victim is mentioned as 28.07.2006. In his examination in chief, he has stated that the entry of her date of birth is made considering the transfer certificate issued from her previous education centre and on

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what basis it is mentioned in her transfer certificate is not known to him.

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10. PW-3, the father of the victim, has stated that the date of birth of her daughter is 28.07.2006, however, in para 11 of his cross examination, he admits that he could not get registered her date of birth with the prescribed authority for the purpose of getting birth certificate. He also admits that with respect to date of birth of the victim he has not produced any certificate in the School at the time of her admission to primary school. It is nowhere stated by this witness that any declaration was given by him to the Headmaster/Principal at the time of admission of the victim in the school for making entry in the admission register.

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11. The mother of the victim, PW-2, has stated that the victim is aged about 16 years and she could not remember the date of birth of the victim.

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12. In case of Ravinder Singh Gorkhi Vs. State of UP, 2006 (5) SCC 584, relying upon its earlier judgment in case of Birad Mal Singhvi Vs. Anand Purohit, 1988 supp. SCC 604 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under :

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“26. To render a document admissible under Section 35, three conditions must be satisfied, firstly, entry that is relied on must be one in a public or other official book, register or record; secondly, it must be an entry stating a fact in issue or relevant fact; and thirdly, it must be made by a public servant in discharge of his official duty, or any other person in performance of a duty specially enjoined by law. An entry relating to date of birth made in the school register is relevant and admissible under Section 35 of the Act but the entry regarding the age of a person in a school register is of not much evidentiary value to

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prove the age of the person in the absence of the material on which the age was recorded."

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13. In case of Alamelu and Another Vs. State, represented by Inspector of Police, 2011(2)SCC-385 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the transfer certificate which is issued by government school and is duly signed by the Headmaster would be admissible in evidence under Section 35 of the Evidence Act 1872. However, the admissibility of such a document would be of not much evidentiary value to prove the age of the victim in the absence of any material on the basis of which the age was recorded. The Hon'ble Supreme court held that the date of birth mentioned in the transfer certificate would have no evidentiary value unless the person who made the entry or who gave the date of birth is examined.

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14. In paragraphs 40,42,43,44 and 48 of its judgment in Alamelu (Supra), the Supreme Court has observed as under :

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“40.Undoubtedly, the transfer certificate, Ex.P16 indicates that the girl's date of birth was 15th June, 1977. Therefore, even according to the aforesaid certificate, she would be above 16 years of age (16 years 1 month and 16 days) on the date of the alleged incident, i.e., 31st July, 1993. The transfer certificate has been issued by a Government School and has been duly signed by the Headmaster. Therefore, it would be admissible in evidence under Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act. However, the admissibility of such a document would be of not much evidentiary value to prove the age of the girl in the absence of the material on the basis of which the age was recorded. The date of birth mentioned in the transfer certificate would have no evidentiary value unless the person, who made the entry or who gave the date of birth is examined.

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Considering the manner in which the facts recorded in a document may be proved, this Court in the case of Birad Mal Singhvi Vs. Anand Purohit1, observed as follows:-

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"The date of birth mentioned in the scholars' register has no evidentiary value unless the person who made the entry or who gave the date of birth is examined….Merely because the documents Exs. 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12 were proved, it does not mean that the contents of documents were also proved. Mere proof of the documents Exs. 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 would not tantamount to proof of all the contents or the correctness of date of birth stated in the documents. Since the truth of the fact, namely, the date of birth of Hukmi Chand and Suraj Prakash Joshi was in issue, mere proof of the documents as produced by the aforesaid two witnesses does not furnish evidence of the truth of the facts or contents of the documents. The truth or otherwise of the facts in issue, namely, the date of birth of the two candidates as mentioned in the documents could be proved by admissible evidence i.e. by the evidence of those persons who could vouchsafe for the truth of the facts in issue. No evidence of any such kind was produced by the respondent to prove the truth of the facts, namely, the date of birth of Hukmi Chand and of Suraj Prakash Joshi. In the circumstances the dates of birth as mentioned in the aforesaid documents 1988 (Supp) SCC 604 have no probative value and the dates of birth as mentioned therein could not be accepted."

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The same proposition of law is reiterated by this Court in the case of Narbada Devi Gupta Vs. Birendra Kumar Jaiswal, where this Court observed as follows:-

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"The legal position is not in dispute that mere production and marking of a document as exhibit by the court cannot be held to be a due proof of its contents. Its execution has to be proved by admissible evidence, that is, by the "evidence of those persons who can vouchsafe for the truth of the facts in issue"."

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In our opinion, the aforesaid burden of proof has not been discharged by the prosecution. The father says nothing about the transfer certificate in his evidence. The Headmaster has not been examined at all. Therefore, the entry in the transfer certificate can not be relied upon to definitely fix the age of the girl.

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We may further notice that even with reference to Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, a public document has to be tested by applying the same standard in civil as well as criminal proceedings. In this context, it would be appropriate to notice the observations made by this Court in the case of Ravinder Singh Gorkhi Vs. State of U.P. held as follows:-

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"The age of a person as recorded in the school register or otherwise may be used for various purposes, namely, for obtaining admission; for obtaining an appointment; for contesting election; registration of marriage; obtaining a separate unit under the ceiling laws; and even for the purpose of litigating before a civil forum e.g. necessity of being represented in a court of law by a guardian or where a suit is filed on the ground that the plaintiff being a minor he was not appropriately represented therein or any transaction made on his behalf was void as he was a minor. A court of law for the purpose of determining the age of a (2006) 5 SCC 584 party to the lis, having regard to the provisions of Section 35 of the Evidence Act will have to apply the same standard. No different standard can be applied in case of an accused as in a case of abduction or rape, or similar offence where the victim or the victim although might have consented with the accused, if on the basis of the entries made in the register maintained by the school, a judgment of conviction is recorded, the accused would be deprived of his constitutional right under Article 21 of the Constitution, as in that case the accused may unjustly be convicted."

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15. In case of Rishipal Singh Solanki Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh

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& Others, 2022 (8) SCC 602, while considering various judgments, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed in para 33 as under :

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“33. What emerges on a cumulative consideration of the aforesaid catena of judgments is as follows:

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33.2.2. If an application is filed before the Court claiming juvenility, the provision of sub-section (2) of section 94 of the JJ Act, 2015 would have to be applied or read along with subsection (2) of section 9 so as to seek evidence for the purpose of recording a finding stating the age of the person as nearly as may be.

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XXXX XXXX XXX

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33.3. That when a claim for juvenility is raised, the burden is on the person raising the claim to satisfy the Court to discharge the initial burden. However, the documents mentioned in Rule 12(3)(a)(i), (ii), and (iii) of the JJ Rules 2007 made under the JJ Act, 2000 or sub-section (2) of section 94 of JJ Act, 2015, shall be sufficient for prima facie satisfaction of

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the Court. On the basis of the aforesaid documents a presumption of juvenility may be raised.

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33.4. The said presumption is however not conclusive proof of the age of juvenility and the same may be rebutted by contra evidence let in by the opposite side.

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33.5. That the procedure of an inquiry by a Court is not the same thing as declaring the age of the person as a juvenile sought before the JJ Board when the case is pending for trial before the concerned criminal court. In case of an inquiry, the Court records a prima facie conclusion but when there is a determination of age as per sub-section (2) of section 94 of 2015 Act, a declaration is made on the basis of evidence. Also the age recorded by the JJ Board shall be deemed to be the true age of the person brought before it. Thus, the standard of proof in an inquiry is different from that required in a proceeding where the determination and declaration of the age of a person has to be made on the basis of evidence scrutinised and accepted only if worthy of such acceptance.

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33.6. That it is neither feasible nor desirable to lay down an abstract formula to determine the age of a person. It has to be on the basis of the material on record and on appreciation of evidence adduced by the parties in each case.

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33.7 This Court has observed that a hypertechnical approach should not be adopted when evidence is adduced on behalf of the accused in support of the plea that he was a juvenile.

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33.8. If two views are possible on the same evidence, the court should lean in favour of holding the accused to be a juvenile in borderline cases. This is in order to ensure that the benefit of the JJ Act, 2015 is made applicable to the juvenile in conflict with law. At the same time, the Court should ensure that the JJ Act, 2015 is not misused by persons to escape punishment after having committed serious offences.

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33.9. That when the determination of age is on the basis of evidence such as school records, it is necessary that the same would have to be considered as per Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, inasmuch as any public or official document maintained in the discharge of official duty would have greater credibility than private documents.

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33.10. Any document which is in consonance with public documents, such as matriculation certificate, could be accepted by the Court or the JJ Board provided such public document is credible and authentic as per the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act viz., section 35 and other provisions.

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33.11. Ossification Test cannot be the sole criterion for age determination and a mechanical view regarding the age of a person cannot be adopted solely on the basis of medical opinion by radiological examination. Such evidence is not conclusive evidence but only a very useful guiding factor to be

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considered in the absence of documents mentioned in Section 94(2) of the JJ Act, 2015.”

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16. Recently, in case of P. Yuvaprakash Vs. State represented by

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Inspector of Police, 2023 (SCC Online) SC 846, Hon’ble

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Supreme Court has held in para 14 to 17 as under :

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“14. Section 94 (2)(iii) of the JJ Act clearly indicates that the date of birth certificate from the school or matriculation or equivalent certificate by the concerned examination board has to be firstly preferred in the absence of which the birth certificate issued by the Corporation or Municipal Authority or Panchayat and it is only thereafter in the absence of these such documents the age is to be determined through “an ossification test” or “any other latest medical age determination test” conducted on the orders of the concerned authority, i.e. Committee or Board or Court. In the present case, concededly, only a transfer certificate and not the date of birth certificate or matriculation or equivalent certificate was considered. Ex. C1, i.e., the school transfer certificate showed the date of birth of the victim as 11.07.1997. Significantly, the transfer certificate was produced not by the prosecution but instead by the court summoned witness, i.e., CW-1. The burden is always upon the prosecution to establish what it alleges; therefore, the prosecution could not have been fallen back upon a document which it had never relied upon. Furthermore, DW-3, the concerned Revenue Official (Deputy Tahsildar) had stated on oath that the records for the year 1997 in respect to the births and deaths were missing. Since it did not answer to the description of any class of documents mentioned in Section 94(2)(i) as it was a mere transfer certificate, Ex C-1 could not have been relied upon to hold that M was below 18 years at the time of commission of the offence.

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In a recent decision, in Rishipal Singh Solanki vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. this court outlined the procedure to be followed in cases where age determination is required. The court was dealing with Rule 12 of the erstwhile Juvenile Justice Rules (which is in pari materia) with Section 94 of the JJ Act, and held as follows:

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“20. Rule 12 of the JJ Rules, 2007 deals with the procedure to be followed in determination of age. The juvenility of a person in conflict with law had to be decided prima facie on the basis of physical appearance, or documents, if available. But an inquiry into the determination of age by the Court or the JJ Board was by seeking evidence by obtaining: (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificates, if available and in

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the absence whereof; (ii) the date of birth certificate from the school (other than a play school) first attended; and in the absence whereof; (iii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat. Only in the absence of either (i), (ii) and (iii) above, the medical opinion could be sought from a duly constituted Medical Board to declare the age of the juvenile or child. It was also provided that while determination was being made, benefit could be given to the child or juvenile by considering the age on lower side within the margin of one year.”

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Speaking about provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act, especially the various options in Section 94 (2) of the JJ Act, this court held in Sanjeev Kumar Gupta vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors that:

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“Clause (i) of Section 94 (2) places the date of birth certificate from the school and the matriculation or equivalent certificate from the 2021 (12) SCR 502 [2019] 9 SCR 735 concerned examination board in the same category (namely (i) above). In the absence thereof category (ii) provides for obtaining the birth certificate of the corporation, municipal authority or panchayat. It is only in the absence of (i) and (ii) that age determination by means of medical analysis is provided. Section 94(2) (a)(i) indicates a significant change over the provisions which were contained in Rule 12(3)(a) of the Rules of 2007 made under the Act of 2000. Under Rule 12(3)(a) (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificate was given precedence and it was only in the event of the certificate not being available that the date of birth certificate from the school first attended, could be obtained. In Section 94(2)(i) both the date of birth certificate from the school as well as the matriculation or equivalent certificate are placed in the same category.

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In Abuzar Hossain @ Gulam Hossain Vs. State of West Bengal, this court, through a three-judge bench, held that the burden of proving that someone is a juvenile (or below the prescribed age) is upon the person claiming it. Further, in that decision, the court indicated the hierarchy of documents that would be accepted in order of preference.”

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17. In the instant case, except school admission and discharge register wherein the date of birth is recorded on the basis of transfer certificate issued to her, no other documentary

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evidence is available to prove the age of the victim at the time of her primary education that she was less than 18 of age on the date of incident. PW-7, K.R. Sagar, Principal of the said school states that the date of birth of the victim in the school admission and discharge register is recorded on the basis of transfer certificate issued from her previous education centre, however, the father of the victim, PW-3 has denied execution of any such declaration before the Principal. The mother of the victim, PW-3, has also not stated the date of birth of the victim. She only states that the victim was aged about 16 years.

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18. Thus, after considering the evidence available on record with respect to the age of the victim, we are of the view that there is no legally admissible evidence on record to establish the fact that victim was less than 18 years of age on the date of incident and therefore, the trial court has committed an error in holding that the victim was less than 18 years of age at the time of incident.

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19. Now the second issue involved in the case is as to whether the victim was subjected to forceful intercourse by the appellant or not?

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20. We have carefully perused the statement of the victim recorded under Section 164 Cr.PC. In her 164 CrPC statement she has stated that she got acquainted with the accused on Instagram and she came in contact with the appellant; started talking with the appellant over mobile and thereafter the appellant called her

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to Raipur and she ran away from her house without informing anyone and went to Raipur. After meeting him, he has taken her to his aunt's house at Bilaspur where she stayed with the appellant for three days and touched her private parts for making physical relation. Thereafter, the appellant taken her to village Pathariya where they stayed for one day and the appellant made physical relation. Although she stated in her statement that her age is 16 years and birth year is 2006, but it is only on the basis of information given by her parents.

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21. While giving statement to police, she stated that in Bilaspur, she alongwith her aunt and accused with his brother stayed in the house of aunt of the accused for 3 days but she did not know the area or locality where it is situated. There are many other houses in which people lived around the place where aunt of the accused lived. She admitted that she alongwith her aunt had gone with the accused voluntarily and the accused never threatened her. Further it is stated that on the pretext of marriage the accused kissed her and molest her body. She admits that the appellant has performed marriage with her by filling her head specified as maang with vermilion in front of idol of God installed in his house. She also admits that while staying at the house of the appellant, she has not made any complaint with regard to alleged forcible sexual intercourse or assault being made by the appellant. She admits that while staying with the appellant she never made any effort to escape from the

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custody of the appellant and no complaint were made to the persons nearby her aunt house.

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22. PW-4, Jasinta Ekka, who is posted as Lady Head Constable in City Kotwali, Mahasamund, has stated that at the time of recording her statement the victim has not mentioned her date of birth and not even told anything in context with marriage or any act of molest to her body.

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23. Dr. Ajiti Tiwari, PW-10, have stated that during her medical examination she has not found any injury on the body of the victim. Further, there was no external or internal injury over the private part of the victim. Further, vaginal slides of the victim were also sent for chemical examination.

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24. Close scrutiny of the evidence makes it clear that the victim was not abducted by the appellant and she was not taken by the appellant forcefully. She herself went to Raipur by Bus on being called by the appellant to meet him there on her own will. Further, it is not a case that the appellant has committed sexual intercourse with the victim without her will or consent. Had it been a case of forceful abduction, she would have definitely raised an alarm while staying in the house of aunt or at village Pathariya, or made a complaint to the person of nearby residents. Perusal of FSL report Ex. P/30, would reveal that no semen stains and spermatozoa were found on the vaginal swab and underwear of the victim.

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25. The evidence available on record would take us to hold that the victim was the consenting party in the act of sexual intercourse with the appellant while staying in his aunt's house for 3 days and at Village Pathariya for one day.

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26. Considering the entire evidence available on record, the evidence with regard to age and the conduct of the victim, we are of the opinion that the victim was more than 18 years of age at the time of incident. Further, she was a consenting party with the appellant. Therefore, in the above facts and circumstances of the case, the offence under Sections 363, 366, 376 (2)(n) and Section 6 of the POCSO Act would not be made out against the appellant.

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27. For the forgoing reasons, the appeal is allowed . The judgment of conviction and sentence dated 16.02.2024 is set aside. The appellant is acquitted from the charges under Sections 363, 366, 376 (2)(n) and Section 6 of the POCSO Act. The appellant is in jail since 23.07.2023. He be released forthwith, if not required in any other case. If fine amount is deposited, the same shall be refunded to the appellant.

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28. Keeping in view the provisions of Section 437-A CrPC, the appellant is directed to forthwith furnish a personal bond in terms of Form No.45 prescribed in the Code of Criminal Procedure of sum of Rs.25,000/- with two reliable sureties in the like amount before the Court concerned which shall be effective for a period of six months along with an undertaking

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that in the event of filing of Special Leave Petition against the instant judgment or for grant of leave, the aforesaid appellant on receipt of notice thereof shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

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29. The lower court record along with a copy of this judgment be sent back immediately to the trial court concerned for compliance and necessary action.

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Sd/-

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Sd/-

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(Sachin Singh Rajput) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice

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Ravi Mandavi

Raja @ Raj @ Shailesh v. State of Chhattisgarh

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Raja @ Raj @ Shailesh v. State of Chhattisgarh

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