Dadan Ram Yadav Vs State of Chhattisgarh

Dadan Ram Yadav S/o Shri Dukh Haran Yadav, Aged About 32 Years, Occupation Agriculturist, R/o Karra (Ghorbandha), Police Station Rajpur District Surguja Chhattisgarh

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Deleted (Smt. Jamunibai) (Died) Nill

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---- Appellants

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Versus

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State of Chhattisgarh Through Police Station Rajpur, District Surguja Chhattisgarh

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---- Respondent

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(Cause-title taken from Case Information System)

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For Appellants : Mr. Sushil Dubey and Mr. Aman Upadhyay, Advocates

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For State/Respondent : Mr. Kanwaljeet Singh Saini, Panel Lawyer

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Hon'ble Shri Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, J. Judgment on Board

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05-04-2024

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Both these appeals are arising out of the common incident and common judgment, therefore, they are being decided together.

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CRA No. 353/2003 has been filed by appellants Dadan Yadav and Smt. Jamunibai and CRA No.352/2003 has been filed by appellant Smt.

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Sonamati against the common judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 11-03-2003 which has been passed by the First Additional Sessions Judge Ambikapur Surguja in Sessions Case No.338/2002 (State of C.G. Vs. Dadan Ram and Smt. Jamuni Bai) and Sessions Case No.339/2002 (State of C.G. Vs. Smt. Sonamati) whereby each of these appellants have been convicted and sentenced as mentioned below with a direction to run all the jail sentences councurrenlty-

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Conviction	Sentence
U/s 498-A of the IPC	R.I. for 3 years and fine of Rs.1000/-, in default of payment of fine further R.I. for 6 months
U/s 306 read with Section 34 of the IPC	R.I. for 10 years and fine of Rs.1000/-, in default of payment of fine further R.I. for 6 months

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Brief facts of the case are that deceased Ratnari Bai was married with accused/appellant Dadan Ram Yadav since 10 years back from the date of incident. She committed suicide on 17-08-2001 by hanging herself on a tree of her court yard. The dead body was seen by one Umashankar Yadav who has lodged merg intimation on 17-8-2001 to the police at about 10 a.m. vide Ex.-P/13. The police came on the spot, got down the body of the deceased and prepared inquest Ex.-P/3 in presence of the witnesses. The dead body of the deceased was sent for postmortem to Community Health Center, Rajpur where Doctor Rajesh Bhajgavali (PW8) along with another doctor Pritam Ram had conducted postmortem of the deceased and gave his report Ex.-P/8. While conducting the postmortem of the dead body of the deceased the doctor has found the following injury on body :-

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“Straight laying, body with legs extended (foot) neck elongated eyes' protuded. toungue slightly protuded between teeth. No marks

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of external injury except ligature mark. ligature of rope around neck. Circumsphere of ligature 3.5 cm. Single knot. cyanosis of lips, face and ears. bloated face. Saliva mark on right side of chest. Hands clenched, post mortem staing above legature mark.”

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He found ligature mark on her neck which was 0.5 cm. in depth and dark brown in colour. The mark of the knot of rope was in her neck which was triangular in shape, the ligature mark was obliquely placed. and opined that cause of death asphyxia due to hanging and nature is suicidal.

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The spot map Ex.-P/12 was prepared by police and Ex.-P/6 was prepared by the Patwari. The FIR Ex.-P/14 has been registered against appellant Dadan Ram Yadav and mother of appellant Dadan Ram Yadav namely Smt. Jamunibai (since dead) for the offence under Section 498A, 306, 34 of the IPC. The statement of the witnesses under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. have been recorded and after completion of the usual intestigation charge sheet was filed in the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate First Class Ambikapur against appellant Dadan Ram Yadav and his mother Jamunibai on 10-12-2001. On 01-08-2002 the police has filed a supplimentary charge sheet against appellant Smt. Sonamati (appellant in CRA No.352/2003) for offence under Section 498A, 306/34 of the IPC and her case was also committed to the Court of learned Sessions Judge, from where to the learned trial Court for trial. The learned trial Court has framed charges against the appellants for the offences under Section 498A, 306, 34 of the IPC. The accused persons/appellants denied the charge and claimed for trial.

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In order to establish the charge against the appellants the prosecution has examined 16 witnesses. Statement under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. of the appellants have also been recorded in which they denied the

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circumstances appearing against them, pleaded innocence and have submitted that they have been falsely implicated in the offence.

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After considering the oral as well as documentary evidence produced by the prosecution, the learned trial Court has convicted the appellants and sentenced them as mentioned in earlier part of this judgment. Hence, these appeals.

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Learned counsel for the appellants would submit that the appellants are innocent and have been falsely implicated in the offence. The prosecution has failed to prove their case beyond reasonable doubt. There is no harassment to the deceased either for demand of dowry or for any other reason, but she herself has committed suicide because of the reason that she was suffering from ailment and despite having treatment she was not getting cured by which she went in depression and has committed suicide. The father of the deceasd have admitted about her ailment and when appellant Dadan Ram Yadav went to her parents house for bringing her back, her parents have refused to sent her back because of her ailment. There is no instigation to commit suicide or even there is no any act or omission which compelled her to commit suicide. The marriage was taken place 10 years back and both of them have already settled in their marital life. There is no any earlier complaint made by the deceased or by her parents to anywhere that the deceased was subjected to cruelty by the appellants. The alleged letter which is said to have been received by the father of the deceased allegedly written by the deceased side has also not been proved because as per the evidence of the father of the deceased it has been received by him in an open envelop and there is every possibility of tampering of the letter. Suman Tirki (PW-7) who has scribed the letter has stated in her deposition that she has written the letter on instruction of the deceased on 15^th of August, whereas, the letter

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(Article B) bears with the date as 16-08-2001 and she herself has posted the same. It is not in the handwriting of the deceased and not posted by herself, therefore, it cannot be considered to be a clinching evidence to pove the fact of any instigation to commit suicide. From the evidence of father of the deceased, maternal uncle of the deceased as well as maternal aunt (cqvk) of the deceased no evidence of curelty is made out against the appellants and therefore, they are entitled for acquittal.

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On the other hand, learned counsel for the State vehementaly opposes the argument advanced by learned counsel for the appellants and has submitted that the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubts. From the evidence of Suman Tirki (PW-7) it has been proved that just 2 days before the date of incident she disclosed her pain and asked her to write a letter to her parents which she wrote and posted to the father of the deceased. The evidence came on record which clearly established the conduct of the appellants and the compelling circumstances under which the deceased has committed suicide. He would further submit that the father of the deceased has stated in his deposition that the deceased informed him about the harassment given by the appellants by which she lost her mental equilibrium for which she was being treated which is sufficient to hold that the deceased was under extreme pressure of the appellants and ultimately committed suicide. Therefore, the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence passed by the trial Court is strictly in accordance with law and needs no interference. 8. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record of the trial Court.

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To resolve the controversy it appears necessary first of all to have a look on the provisions of Section 306 and 107 of IPC which reads as under-

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“ 306. Abetment of suicide. ─ If any person commits suicide, whoever abets the commission of such suicide, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.

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Abatement has been defined in Section 107 of IPC which reads as under-

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“ 107. Abetment of a thing. ─ A person abets the doing of a thing, who ─

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First ─ Instigates any person to do that thing; or

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Secondly ─ Engages with one or more other person or persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that thing; or

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Thirdly ─ Intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing.”

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As per definition given in Section 107 of IPC abetment is constituted by-

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I. Instigating a person to commit an offence; or

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II. Engaging in a conspiracy to commit it; or

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III. Intentionally aiding a person to commit it.

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A person is said to 'instigate' another to an act, when he actively suggests or stimulates him to the act by any means of language, direct or indirect, whether it takes the form of express solicitation, or of hints, insinuation or encouragement. The word 'instigate' means to goad or urge forward or to provoke, incite, urge or encourage to do an act.

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As Section 306 of IPC makes abatement of commission of suicide punishable, therefore, making liable for an offence punishable under Section 306 IPC, it is a duty of the prosecution to establish that such person has abetted the commission of suicide and for the purpose of determining the act of the accused it is necessary to see that his act must fall in any of the three categories as enumerated under Section 107 IPC, and therefore, it is necessary to prove that the said accused has

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instigated the person to commit suicide or must have engaged with one or more other person in any conspiracy for seeking that the deceased commits suicide or he must intentionally aid by any act or illegal omission, of the commission of suicide by the deceased.

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Doctor Rajesh Bhajgavali (PW-8) who conducted postmortem of the dead body of the deceased has stated in his deposition that on 17-01-2001 he conducted the postmortem of dead body of deceased Ratnari. He found ligature mark on her neck which was 0.5 cm. in depth and dark brown in colour. The mark of knot of the rope was in her neck which was triangular in shape, the ligature mark was obliquely placed. He opined that cause of death is asphyxia due to hanging, its nature is suicidal, postmortem report of the deceased given by him is Ex.-P/8, therefore, the unnatural death of deceased Ratnari is proved by medical evidence in the present case.

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Tuswa (PW-4) and Smt. Lakshmaniya (PW-5) who are community members have stated that deceased Ratnari was married with appellant Dadan Yadav since 10 years back. These witnesses have been declared hostile as they have not supported the case of prosecution.

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Suman Tirki (PW-7) has stated in her deposition that presently she is married and prior to that she was residing along with her parents at Village Karra and studying at Rajpur. She used to go to her school at Rajpur by cycle and bus. Last year, when she was going to her school the deceased who is presently died, met her on the way when she was returning from the school. It was the day of 15 August when she called her. She asked her to write a letter to her parents so that her parents may come to take her back. She informed her that her in-laws are misbehaving with her. Three other persons were also there. Thereafter, on the instruction of the deceased she wrote a letter on the same day and

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on the next day the said letter was posted. The address was also mentioned on the instruction of the deceased. The said envelop of the letter is Article A and the letter is Article B. In cross-examination she has stated that when she met with the deceased she was alone. The deceased informed about the harassment given to her by her in-laws and on her request she wrote the letter. In her cross-examination nothing specific has been disclosed by her and she has stated in her crossexamination that prior to the incident she was not known to the deceased and she wrote the letter on instruction of the deceased.

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Shanti @ Nanaki (PW-12) and Shiv Prasad (PW-13) have also turned hostile and not supported the prosecution case.

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Sukadu Yadav @ Ravinarayan (PW-14) who is father of the deceased has stated in his deposition that his daughter Navratni was got married with accused Dadan Yadav since 10-11 years back. After 4 to 5 years of her marriage his daughter got ill and the accused persons have provided treatment to her. During her treatment the doctor has informed him that his daughter was being harassed by her in-laws and therefore, she lost her mental equilibrium and he may take back his daughter to the village. His daughter has suffered from ulcer in her abdomen and after exorcism, she recovered from her ailment. He further stated that after a prolonged treatment his daughter has cured and thereafter she was again sent to her in-laws house. Her daughter has informed him that her in-laws have harassed her for demand of dowry. He convinced her in-laws not to harass her and thereafter he returned back to his house. He further stated that appellant Dadan Yadav has kept another lady with him and thereafter he convinced his daughter to consider the same. Subsequent to that he occasionally received information from other persons that his daughter

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was being harassed by her in-laws and ultimately he received information that his daughter has died. His friend has informed him that his daughter is hanging on a tree. Umashankar has already lodged report to the police station and he suspected that after committing murder of his daughter the accused persons have hanged her dead body. The police has seized an envelop and letter vide seizure memo Ex.-P/1 and the letter Article B. In cross-examination he admitted that after 3-4 years of her marriage his daughter has got ill and he has taken his daughter with him from the hospital. He left his daughter to her in-laws house two months back from her death. He admitted that when the deceased was residing with him, the appellant Dadan came to bring his daughter back. Father of appellant Dadan had also came to bring her back, but he has not sent her because of her ailment. He admitted that when Dadan has kept another lady with him he has not made any complaint and no action has been taken against him. He received the letter in Lundra which was in open condition. He admitted that he was informed by villagers that his daughter was harassed by the accused persons. He voluntarily stated that his daughter has also informed him about the harassment. He further stated that after the marriage when his daughter was in her matrimonial house she was living happily. He further stated in his cross-examination that the doctor has informed him about the harassment given by her in-laws, but if it is not there in his police statement he could not tell the reason. He further stated that he has taken his daughter with him with consent of her husband and her own will. His daughter was treated for about 2 ½ - 3 years, in between that period appellant Dadan has came to his house to bring her back. He admitted that when he informed his daughter about another lady kept by the appellant Dadan his daughter replied that she too will live with appellant Dadan and has not left him. He further stated

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that his daughter has informed about the harassment in his presence and in presence of Lalman and if the said statement is not in his police statement he could not tell the reason. He further stated that he received the letter in open condition which was informed by him to the police. From the evidence of this witness it reflects that the deceased was got married with appellant Dadan Yadav since 10-11 years back. After 3-4 years of marriage she got ill and her treatment was continued for a long time which continue for about 3 - 4 years. Despite having knowledge of the fact that appellant Dadan Yadav has kept another lady she inclined to go with her husband and to reside with him which itself shows that she was living at her matrimonial house without any complaint, otherwise she would not have ready to go with her husband and to live with him.

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As per evidence of Suman Tirki (PW-7), she wrote the letter on 15 August and posted it on the next day. The father of the deceased Sukadu Yadav @ Ravinarayan has stated in his deposition that he received the letter in open condition which was received by him at village Lundra. From perusal of the envelop Article A, it appears that it contains address of village Durana, Post Durana, P.S. Lundra, District Surguja. If it has been addressed for village Durana then receiving by the father of the deceased in an open condition at village Lundra itself is suspicious as to who received the letter from post and from whom Sukadu Yadav @ Ravinarayan (PW-14) has received the letter particularly when the letter received by Sukadu Yadav @ Ravinarayan in open condition. Further, Suman Tirki (PW-7) has written the letter on 15 August whereas in the letter Article B the date of 16 August 2001 is mentioned which also creates doubt particularly when the letter received by the father of the deceased was in open condition. Therefore, the envelop and letter Article

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A and B do not have any special quality to conclude that the accused persons are guilty for commission of abetment of suicide.

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Having gone through the evidence available on record I am satisfied that the prosecution sought to improve its case at the trial by introducing facts of instigation to commit suicide.

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In the matter of Hansraj Vs. State of Haryana, (2004 ) 12 SCC 257 Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that in para 12 to 15 that-

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The question then arises as to whether in the facts and circumstances of the case the appellant can be convicted of the offence under Section 306 I.P.C. with the aid of the presumption under Section 113 A of the Indian Evidence Act. Any person who abets the commission of suicide is liable to be punished under Section 306 I.P.C. Section 107 I.P.C. lays down the ingredients of abetment which includes instigating any person to do a thing or engaging with one or more person in any conspiracy for the doing of a thing, if an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy and in order to the doing of that thing, or intentional aid by any act or illegal omission to the doing of that thing. In the instant case there is no direct evidence to establish that the appellant either aided or instigated the deceased to commit suicide or entered into any conspiracy to aid her in committing suicide. In the absence of direct evidence the prosecution has relied upon Section 113-A of the Indian Evidence Act under which the Court may presume on proof of circumstances enumerated therein, and having regard to all the other circumstances of the case, that the suicide had been abetted by the accused. The explanation to Section 113-A further clarifies that cruelty shall have the same meaning as in Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code which means:-

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"(a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman; or

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(b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand".

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Unlike Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act, a statutory presumption does not arise by operation of law merely on proof of the circumstances enumerated in Section 113-A of the Indian Evidence Act. Under Section 113-A of the Indian Evidence Act the prosecution has first to establish

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that the woman concerned committed suicide within a period of seven years from the date of her marriage and that her husband (in this case) had subjected her to cruelty. Even if these facts are established the Court is not bound to presume that the suicide had been abetted by her husband. Section 113-A gives a discretion to the Court to raise such a presumption, having regard to all the other circumstances of the case, which means that where the allegation is of cruelty it must consider the nature of cruelty to which the woman was subjected, having regard to the meaning of word cruelty in Section 498-A I.P.C. The mere fact that a woman committed suicide within seven years of her marriage and that she had been subjected to cruelty by her husband, does not automatically give rise to the presumption that the suicide had been abetted by her husband. The Court is required to look into all the other circumstances of the case. One of the circumstances which has to be considered by the Court is whether the alleged cruelty was of such nature as was likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health of the woman. The law has been succinctly stated in RameshKumar Vs. State of Chhattisgarh (2001) 9 SCC 618 wherein this Court observed :

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“12 This provision was introduced by the Criminal Law (Second) Amendment Act, 1983 with effect from 26-12-1983 to meet a social demand to resolve difficulty of proof where helpless married women were eliminated by being forced to commit suicide by the husband or in-laws and incriminating evidence was usually available within the four corners of the matrimonial home and hence was not available to anyone outside the occupants of the house. However, still it cannot be lost sight of that the presumption is intended to operate against the accused in the field of criminal law. Before the presumption may be raised, the foundation thereof must exist. A bare reading of Section 113-A shows that to attract applicability of Section 113-A, it must be shown that (i) the woman has committed suicide, (ii) such suicide has been committed within a period of seven years from the date of her marriage, (iii) the husband or his relatives, who are charged had subjected her to cruelty. On existence and availability of the abovesaid circumstances, the court may presume that such suicide had been abetted by her husband or by such relatives of her husband. Parliament has chosen to sound a note of caution. Firstly, the presumption is not mandatory; it is only permissive as the employment of expression "may presume" suggests. Secondly, the existence and availability of the abovesaid three circumstances shall not, like a formula, enable the presumption being drawn; before the presumption may be drawn the court shall have to have regard to "all the other circumstances of the case". A consideration of all the other circumstances of the case may strengthen the presumption or may dictate the conscience of the court to abstain from drawing the presumption. The expression "the other circumstances of the case" used in

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Section 113- A suggests the need to reach a cause-andeffect relationship between the cruelty and the suicide for the purpose of raising a presumption. Last but not the least, the presumption is not an irrebuttable one. In spite of a presumption having been raised the evidence adduced in defence or the facts and circumstances otherwise available on record may destroy the presumption. The phrase "may presume" used in Section 113-A is defined in Section 4 of the Evidence Act, which says "Whenever it is provided by this Act that the court may presume a fact, it may either regard such fact as proved, unless and until it is disproved, or may call for proof of it".

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The same principle has been reiterated in Sanju Alias Sanjay Singh Sengar Vs. State of M.P. (2002) 5 SCC 371.

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In the State of West Bengal Vs. Orilal Jaiswal and Anr. (1994) 1 SCC 73 this Court observed :

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"We are not oblivious that in a criminal trial the degree of proof is stricter than what is required in a civil proceedings. In a criminal trial however intriguing may be facts and circumstances of the case, the charges made against the accused must be proved beyond all reasonable doubts and the requirement of proof cannot lie in the realm of surmises and conjectures. The requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt does not stand altered even after the introduction of Section 498-A IPC and Section 113-A of Indian Evidence Act. Although, the court's conscience must be satisfied that the accused is not held guilty when there are reasonable doubts about the complicity of the accused in respect of the offences alleged, it should be borne in mind that there is no absolute standard for proof in a criminal trial and the question whether the charges made against the accused have been proved beyond all reasonable doubts must depend upon the facts and circumstances of the case and the quality of the evidences adduced in the case and the materials placed on record. Lord Denning in Bater v. Bater [(1950) 2 All ER 458,459] has observed that the doubt must be of a reasonable man and the standard adopted must be a standard adopted by a reasonable and just man for coming to a conclusion considering the particular subjectmatter".

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In the matter of Gurucharan Singh Vs. State of Punjab, 2017 (1) SCC

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433 , Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed in para 20 to 30 that--

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“20. . Section 306 of the Code prescribes the punishment for abetment of suicide and is designed thus:

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“Abetment of suicide. – If any person commits suicide, whoever abets the commission of such suicide, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.”

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It is thus manifest that the offence punishable is one of abetment of the commission of suicide by any person,

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predicating existence of a live link or nexus between the two, abetment being the propelling causative factor. The basic ingredients of this provision are suicidal death and the abetment thereof. To constitute abetment, the intention and involvement of the accused to aid or instigate the commission of suicide is imperative. Any severance or absence of any of this constituents would militate against this indictment. Remoteness of the culpable acts or omissions rooted in the intention of the accused to actualize the suicide would fall short as well of the offence of abetment essential to attract the punitive mandate of Section 306 IPC. Contiguity, continuity, culpability and complicity of the indictable acts or omission are the concomitant indices of abetment. Section 306 IPC, thus criminalises the sustained incitement for suicide.

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Section 107 IPC defines abetment and is extracted hereunder:

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“107. Abetment of a thing. – A person abets the doing of a thing, who – First – Instigates any person to do that thing; or Secondly – Engages with one or more other person or persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that thing; or Thirdly – Intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing.

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Explanation 1 – A person, who by wilful misrepresentation, or by wilful concealment of a material fact which he is bound to disclose, voluntarily causes or procures or attempts to cause or procure, a thing to be done, is said to instigate the doing of that doing.

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Explanation 2 – Whoever, either prior to or at the time of the commission of an act, does anything in order to facilitate the commission of that act, and thereby facilitate the commission thereof, is said to aid the doing of that act.”

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Not only the acts and omissions defining the offence of abetment singularly or in combination are enumerated therein, the explanations adequately encompass all conceivable facets of the culpable conduct of the offender relatable thereto.

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Section 113A of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 permits a presumption as to the abetment of suicide by a married woman by her husband or any relative of his, if it is proved that she had committed the act within a period of seven years from the date of her marriage and that her husband or such relative of his had subjected her to cruelty. The explanation to this Section exposits “cruelty” to have the same meaning as attributed to this expression in Section 498A IPC. For ready

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reference, Section 113A of the Indian Evidence Act, 1882 is quoted hereunder as well.

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“113A. Presumption as to abetment of suicide by a married woman—When the question is whether the commission of suicide by a woman had been abetted by her husband or any relative of her husband and it is shown that she had committed suicide within a period of seven years from the date of her marriage and that her husband or such relative of her husband had subjected her to cruelty, the Court may presume, having regard to all the other circumstances of the case, that such suicide had been abetted by her husband or by such relative of her husband.

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Explanation—For the purposes of this section, “cruelty” shall have the same meaning as in section 498A of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860).”

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In the legislative backdrop outlined hereinabove, Section 498A of the Code also demand extraction.

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“498A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty

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Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine.

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Explanation- For the purpose of this section, “cruelty” means-

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(a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman; or

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(b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand.”

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This provision, as the quote hereinabove reveals, renders the husband of a woman or the relative of his, punishable thereby with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and also fine, if they or any one of them subject her to cruelty. The explanation thereto defining “cruelty” enfolds:

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any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or

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danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman; or harassment of the woman, where it is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her, to meet such demand.

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Though for the purposes of the case in hand, the first limb of the explanation is otherwise germane, proof of the willful conduct actuating the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health, whether mental of physical, is the sine qua non for entering a finding of cruelty against the person charged.

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The pith and purport of Section 306 IPC has since been enunciated by this Court in Randhir Singh vs. State of Punjab (2004)13 SCC 129, and the relevant excerpts therefrom are set out hereunder.

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“12. Abetment involves a mental process of instigating a person or intentionally aiding that person in doing of a thing. In cases of conspiracy also it would involve that mental process of entering into conspiracy for the doing of that thing. More active role which can be described as instigating or aiding the doing of a thing is required before a person can be said to be abetting the commission of offence under Section 306 IPC.

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13.In State of W.B. Vs. Orilal Jaiswal (1994) 1 SCC 73, this Court has observed that the courts should be extremely careful in assessing the facts and circumstances of each case and the evidence adduced in the trial for the purpose of finding whether the cruelty meted out to the victim had in fact induced her to end the life by committing suicide. If it transpires to the court that a victim committing suicide was hypersensitive to ordinary petulance, discord and differences in domestic life quite common to the society to which the victim belonged and such petulance, discord and differences were not expected to induce a similarly circumstanced individual in a given society to commit suicide, the conscience of the court should not be satisfied for basing a finding that the accused charged of abetting the offence of suicide should be found guilty.”

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Significantly, this Court underlined by referring to its earlier pronouncement in Orilal Jaiswal (supra) that courts have to be extremely careful in assessing the facts and circumstances of each case to ascertain as to whether cruelty

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had been meted out to the victim and that the same had induced the person to end his/her life by committing suicide, with the caveat that if the victim committing suicide appears to be hypersensitive to ordinary petulance, discord and differences in domestic life, quite common to the society to which he or she belonged and such factors were not expected to induce a similarly circumstanced individual to resort to such step, the accused charged with abetment could not be held guilty. The above view was reiterated in Amalendu Pal @ Jhantu vs. State of West Bengal (2010) 1 SCC 707.

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That the intention of the legislature is that in order to convict a person under Section 306 IPC, there has to be a clear mens rea to commit an offence and that there ought to be an active or direct act leading the deceased to commit suicide, being left with no option, had been propounded by this Court in S.S. Chheena vs. Vijay Kumar Mahajan (2010) 12 SCC 190.

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In Pinakin Mahipatray Rawal vs. State of Gujarat (2013) 10 SCC 48, this Court, with reference to Section 113A of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, while observing that the criminal law amendment bringing forth this provision was necessitated to meet the social challenge of saving the married woman from being illtreated or forcing to commit suicide by the husband or his relatives demanding dowry, it was underlined that the burden of proving the preconditions permitting the presumption as ingrained therein, squarely and singularly lay on the prosecution. That the prosecution as well has to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the deceased had committed suicide on being abetted by the person charged under Section 306 IPC, was emphasised.

¶121

After considering the evidence available on record and also the law laid down

¶122

by Hon’ble Supreme Court in above mentioning Judgments, this Court is of the considered opinion that the evidence on record does not demonstrate the unqualified clarity and conviction and role of the appellants as contemplated by the above provision so as to hold an unassailable findings of culpability of the accused persons under Section 306 of IPC. The material on record do not suggest any act of cruelty, oppression, harassment or inducement so as to provoke or compel the deceased to commit suicide with no alternative. No such continuous and proximate conduct of the accused persons/appellants with the required provocative culpability is proved by the prosecution to infer that the

¶123

-18-

¶124

deceased has been put in such a condition either physically or mentally that she had chosen to commit suicide.

¶125

For the foregoing reasons both the appeals are allowed . The judgment and conviction and order of sentence dated 11-03-2003 is set aside. The appellants stand acquitted from the charges of Section 498-A and 306/34 of IPC. The appellants are on bail. Their bail bonds shall continue for the further period of six months as provided under Section 437-A of Cr.P.C.

¶126

The trial court record along with a copy of this judgment be sent back to the trial court concerned for compliance and necessary action.

¶127

Sd/(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) Judge

¶128

Aadil

Dadan Ram Yadav v. State of Chhattisgarh

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Dadan Ram Yadav v. State of Chhattisgarh

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