Partly allowed

Jageshwar v. State of Chhattisgarh

Chhattisgarh HC2 Sept 2024CRA/1849/2018

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

Appeal against convictions for murder and cruelty arising from burning death of the accused's wife, resting on a dying declaration. Five co-accused were acquitted of murder because the declaration lacked their full names and corroboration; the husband's conviction was altered to culpable homicide causing death, and cruelty convictions were upheld.

What did the court decide?

Five appellants acquitted under S.302 IPC; Devendra Markande reclassified to S.304 Part-II with ten years RI; S.498A convictions sustained.

Jageshwar Vs State of Chhattisgarh — Dowry and Cruelty | Chhattisgarh HC (2024)

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Page 1 of 18

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(Cr.A.Nos.1856/2018 & 1849/2018)

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Digitally signed by SISTA SISTA SOMAYAJULU SOMAYAJULU Date: 2024.09.06 17:37:26 +0530

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2024:CGHC:33715-DB

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NAFR

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HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

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CRA No. 1856 of 2018

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(Arising out of judgment dated 30-11-2018 passed by the 3^rd Additional Sessions Judge, Durg in Sessions Trial No.170/2016)

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Kamlesh Markande S/o Bhagatram Markande Aged about 35 years

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Sunita Markande W/o Kamlesh Markande Aged about 30 years

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Devendra Markande S/o Bhagatram Markande Aged about 33 years

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All appellants R/o Katulboard Mohan Nagar, District Durg Chhattisgarh ---- Appellants

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Versus

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State of Chhattisgarh Through Arakshi Centre, Mohan Nagar, District Durg Chhattisgarh

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---- Respondent

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AND

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CRA No. 1849 of 2018

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Jageshwar S/o Bhagatram Markande Aged about 28 years

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Sukhvantin wrongly mentioned as Sukhanvatin Markande W/o Bhagatram Markande Aged about 55 years

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Bhagatram Markande S/o Roopsingh Markande Aged about 57 years

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All appellants R/o Katulboard, Mohan Nagar, District Durg, Chhattisgarh

---- Appellants

Versus

Page 2 of 18

(Cr.A.Nos.1856/2018 & 1849/2018)

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State of Chhattisgarh Through Arakshi Centre, Mohan Nagar, District Durg, Chhattisgarh

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---- Respondent

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For Appellants No.1 and 3 in Cr.A.	: Miss Nirupama Bajpai, Advocate/Panel Lawyer
No.1856/2018	appointed by the Chhattisgarh High Court Legal Services Committee.
For Appellant No.2 in Cr.A.No.1856/2018	: Mr. Shrestha Gupta, Advocate.
For Appellants in Cr.A.No.1849/2018	: Mr. Vivek Sharma, Advocate.
For Respondent / State	: Mr.Arvind Dubey, GovernmentAdvocate.

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Division Bench: - Hon’ble Shri Sanjay K. Agrawal and Hon‘ble Shri Amitendra Kishore Prasad, JJ.

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Judgment on Board (03/09/2024 )

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Sanjay K. Agrawal, J.

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Three appellants namely, Kamlesh Markande (A-1), Sunita Markande (A-3) & Devendra Markande (A-5) have preferred Cr.A.No.1856/2018 and three appellants namely, Jageshwar (A-2), Sukhvantin (A-4) & Bhagatram Markande (A-6) have preferred Cr.A.No.1849/2018 under Section 374(2) of the CrPC calling in question legality, validity and correctness of the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 30-11-2018 passed by the 3^rd Additional Sessions Judge, Durg in Sessions Trial No.170/2016, by which they have been convicted and sentenced as under with a direction to run both the sentences

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concurrently: -

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Conviction	Sentence
Section 302 of the IPC	Imprisonment for life and each, in default, add	fine of 100/- ₹ itional simple
	imprisonment for one month
Section 498A of the IPC	Rigorous imprisonment for	threeyears and

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Page 3 of 18

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(Cr.A.Nos.1856/2018 & 1849/2018)

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fine of 100/- each, in default, additional₹ simple imprisonment for one month

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Since both the criminal appeals have arisen out of one and same judgment dated 30-11-2018 passed by the 3^rd Additional Sessions Judge, Durg in Sessions Trial No.170/2016 and since common question of fact and law is involved in both the appeals, they have been clubbed together, heard together and are being disposed of by this common judgment.

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Case of the prosecution, in a nutshell, is that on 17-3-2016 at 07:30 a.m. all the six appellants herein constituted unlawful assembly with a common object of causing death of Premshila – wife of accused/ appellant Devendra Markande (A-5), treated her with cruelty and poured kerosene oil on her body and thereafter, Devendra Markande (A5) alighted matchstick and burnt her by which she suffered burn injuries and died on 24-3-2016 while undergoing treatment at Sector-9 Hospital, Bhilai. During the course of treatment, Premshila was certified to be in fit physical and mental state of mind to record her dying declaration by Dr. Jigyasa (PW-15) vide Ex.P-11 on 17-3-2016 at 12:35 p.m. and accordingly, dying declaration of Premshila was recorded vide Ex.P-11 by Ajit Kumar Choubey (PW-3) – Executive Magistrate-cum-Nayab Tahsildar, Durg in which she has implicated all the appellants and after her death on 24-3-2016, written complaint was lodged by her father Santram Diwakar (PW-1) vide Ex.P-1. FIR was registered vide E.xP-2. Inquest over the dead body of deceased Premshila was conducted vide

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Page 4 of 18

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(Cr.A.Nos.1856/2018 & 1849/2018)

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Ex.P-7 and on the basis of recommendation of panchas, the dead body of the deceased was subjected to postmortem which was conducted by Dr. R.K. Naik (PW-14) vide postmortem report Ex.P-38 in which cause of death was stated to be septicemia due to 75% burns and nature of death was homicidal. MLC report of the deceased was prepared vide Ex.P-9 and bedhead ticket is Ex.P-36. FSL report is Ex.P-27 according to which kerosene was found on bed sheets and match box. Statements of the witnesses were recorded under Section 161 of the CrPC.

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The investigating officer after completion of investigation, chargesheeted the six appellants herein before the jurisdictional criminal court from where the case was committed to the Court of Sessions, Durg and the learned 3^rd Additional Sessions Judge, Durg, received the case on transfer for trial and for hearing and disposal in accordance with law.

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The prosecution, in order to bring home the offence, has examined as many as 15 witnesses PW-1 to PW-15 and exhibited 38 documents Exs.P-1 to P-38. The accused persons abjured the guilt and entered into defence by stating that they have not committed the offence and they have been falsely implicated. They had examined three witnesses DW-1 to DW-3 and exhibited as many as 24 documents Exs.D-1 to D-24 in support of their defence. The accused persons were examined under Section 313 of the CrPC in which they denied the circumstances appearing against them, pleaded innocence and false implication in the crime in question.

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Page 5 of 18

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(Cr.A.Nos.1856/2018 & 1849/2018)

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The trial Court after appreciating ocular, oral and documentary evidence on record, convicted and sentenced the appellants herein in the manner mentioned in the opening paragraph of this judgment against which these appeals have been preferred by the appellants herein.

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Miss Nirupama Bajpai, learned counsel appearing for appellants No.1 & 3 in Cr.A.No.1856/2018 namely, Kamlesh Markande (A-1) & Devendra Markande (A-5) – husband of the deceased, and Mr. Shrestha Gupta, learned counsel appearing for appellant No.2 in Cr.A.No.1856/2018 namely, Sunita Markande (A-3), would submit that the trial Court has clearly erred in convicting the appellants as the dying declaration is not trustworthy and so far as accused Kamlesh (A-1) & Sunita (A-3) are concerned, there is no evidence at all against them in the dying declaration Ex.P-11 to implicate them for the offence in question and so far as accused Devendra (A-5) – husband of the deceased, is concerned, he has taken the deceased (his wife) to hospital which is apparent from Ex.P-9 – MLC report of the deceased, in which the doctor has clearly recorded that Premshila was brought to hospital by Devendra, as such, there is no intention of accused Devendra (A-5) to kill his wife i.e. deceased Premshila, but only knowledge can be attributed to him. Kamlesh Markande (A-1) & Devendra Markande (A-5) are in jail since 25-3-2016 & 4-4-2016, respectively, whereas Sunita Markande (A-3) is on bail. Therefore, the present appellants A-1, A-3 & A-5 are entitled for acquittal.

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Page 6 of 18

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(Cr.A.Nos.1856/2018 & 1849/2018)

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Mr. Vivek Sharma, learned counsel appearing for the appellants in Cr.A. No.1849/2018, would submit that there is no evidence against the present appellants, even the trial Court did not record finding convicting the present appellants under Section 302 of the IPC with the aid of Section 149 of the IPC. It is a case of no evidence against the appellants so far as Section 302 of the IPC is concerned, therefore, they are entitled for acquittal.

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Mr. Arvind Dubey, learned State counsel, would support the impugned judgment and submit that the trial Court is absolutely justified in convicting the appellants for the aforesaid offences as the prosecution has proved the offences against the appellants beyond reasonable doubt. He would further submit that it is in furtherance of common intention all the six appellants herein have committed the offences alleged against them and then in furtherance of their common intention, Devendra Markande (A-5) has poured kerosene oil on the body of the deceased, who was his wife, and set her ablaze due to which the deceased died during the course of treatment. Therefore, both the appeals deserve to be dismissed.

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We have heard learned counsel for the parties and considered their rival submissions made herein-above and also went through the record with utmost circumspection.

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The first question as to whether the death of deceased Premshila was homicidal in nature, has been answered by the trial Court in affirmative

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Page 7 of 18

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(Cr.A.Nos.1856/2018 & 1849/2018)

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relying upon the postmortem report Ex.P-38 proved by Dr. R.K. Naik (PW-14) in which burn injuries sustained by the deceased were said to be up to 75%, which in our considered opinion is a finding of fact based on the evidence available on record, it is neither perverse nor contrary to the record and we hereby affirm the said finding recorded by the trial Court. Even otherwise, that point has not been seriously questioned by learned counsel for the appellants. As such, the finding recorded in that regard by the trial Court is a well merited finding of fact.

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The case of the prosecution is solely based on the dying declaration Ex.P-11 recorded by Ajit Kumar Choubey (PW-3) – Executive Magistrate-cum-Nayab Tahsildar, Durg, in which Dr. Jigyasa (PW-15) has certified the deceased to be in fit physical and mental state of mind to record dying declaration.

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At this stage, it is appropriate to notice Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, which reads thus:

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“ 32. Cases in which statement of relevant fact by person who is dead or cannot be found, etc., is relevant .— Statements, written or verbal, of relevant facts made by a person who is dead, or who cannot be found, or who has become incapable of giving evidence, or whose attendance cannot be procured without an amount of delay or expense which, under the circumstances of the case, appears to the Court unreasonable, are themselves relevant facts in the following cases:—

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(1) when it relates to cause of death .—When the statement is made by a person as to the cause of his death, or as to any of the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death, in cases in which the cause of that person's death comes into question.

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Page 8 of 18

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(Cr.A.Nos.1856/2018 & 1849/2018)

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Such statements are relevant whether the person who made them was or was not, at the time when they were made, under expectation of death, and whatever may be the nature of the proceeding in which the cause of his death comes into question.

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The general ground of admissibility of the evidence mentioned in Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act is that in the matter in question, no better evidence is to be had. The provisions in Section 32(1) constitute further exceptions to the rule which exclude hearsay. As a general rule, oral evidence must be direct (Section 60). The eight clauses of Section 32 may be regarded as exceptions to it, which are mainly based on two conditions: a necessity for the evidence and a circumstantial guarantee of trustworthiness. Hearsay is excluded because it is considered not sufficiently trustworthy. It is rejected because it lacks the sanction of the tests applied to admissible evidence, namely, the oath and crossexamination. But where there are special circumstances which gives a guarantee of trustworthiness to the testimony, it is admitted even though it comes from a second-hand source. The Supreme Court emphasized on the principle enumerated in the famous legal maxim of the Law of Evidence, i.e., nemo moriturus praesumitur mentire which means a man will not meet his Maker with a lie in his mouth. Our Indian Law also recognizes this fact that “a dying man seldom lies” or in other words “truth sits upon the lips of a dying man”. The relevance or this very fact, is an exception to the rule of hearsay evidence.

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Page 9 of 18

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(Cr.A.Nos.1856/2018 & 1849/2018)

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Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act is famously referred to as the “dying declaration” section, although the said phrase itself does not find mention under the Evidence Act. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court have considered the scope and ambit of Section 32 of the Evidence Act, particularly, Section 32(1) on various occasions including in the matter of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra 1 in which their Lordships have summarised the principles enumerated in Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act, including relating to “circumstances of the transaction”, which are as under: -

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“21. Thus, from a review of the authorities mentioned above and the clear language of Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act, the following propositions emerge:-

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(1) Section 32 is an exception to the rule of hearsay and makes admissible the statement of a person who dies, whether the death is a homicide or a suicide, provided the statement relates to the cause of death, or exhibits circumstances leading to the death. In this respect, as indicated above, the Indian Evidence Act, in view of the peculiar conditions of our society and the diverse nature and character of our people, has thought it necessary to widen the sphere of Section 32 to avoid injustice.

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(2) The test of proximity cannot be too literally construed and practically reduced to a cut-and-dried formula of universal application so as to be confined in a straitjacket. Distance of time would depend or vary with the circumstances of each case. For instance, where death is a logical culmination of a continuous drama long in process and is, as it were, a finale of the story, the statement regarding each step directly connected with the end of the drama would be admissible because the entire statement would have to be read as an organic whole and not torn from the context. Sometimes statements relevant to or furnishing

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1 (1984) 4 SCC 116

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Page 10 of 18

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(Cr.A.Nos.1856/2018 & 1849/2018)

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an immediate motive may also be admissible as being a part of the transaction of death. It is manifest that all these statements come to light only after the death of the deceased who speaks from death. For instance, where the death takes place within a very short time of the marriage or the distance of time is not spread over more than 3-4 months the statement may be admissible under Section 32.

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(3) The second part of clause (1) of Section 32 is yet another exception to the rule that in criminal law the evidence of a person who was not being subjected to or given an opportunity of being cross-examined by the accused, would be valueless because the place of cross-examination is taken by the solemnity and sanctity of oath for the simple reason that a person on the verge of death is not likely to make a false statement unless there is strong evidence to show that the statement was secured either by prompting or tutoring.

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(4) It may be important to note that Section 32 does not speak of homicide alone but includes suicide also, hence all the circumstances which may be relevant to prove a case of homicide would be equally relevant to prove a case of suicide.

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(5) Where the main evidence consists of statements and letters written by the deceased which are directly connected with or related to her death and which reveal a tell-tale story, the said statement would clearly fall within the four corners of Section 32 and, therefore, admissible. The distance of time alone in such cases would not make the statement irrelevant.”

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In the matter of Purshottam Chopra and another v. State (Government of NCT of Delhi) 2, principles relating to recording of dying declaration and its admissibility and reliability were summed up in paragraph 21 as under: -

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“21. For what has been noticed hereinabove, some of the principles relating to recording of dying declaration and its

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2 (2020) 11 SCC 489

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Page 11 of 18

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(Cr.A.Nos.1856/2018 & 1849/2018)

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admissibility and reliability could be usefully summed up as under:-

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21.1. A dying declaration could be the sole basis of conviction even without corroboration, if it inspires confidence of the court.

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21.2. The court should be satisfied that the declarant was in a fit state of mind at the time of making the statement; and that it was a voluntary statement, which was not the result of tutoring, prompting or imagination.

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21.3. Where a dying declaration is suspicious or is suffering from any infirmity such as want of fit state of mind of the declarant or of like nature, it should not be acted upon without corroborative evidence.

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21.4. When the eyewitnesses affirm that the deceased was not in a fit and conscious state to make the statement, the medical opinion cannot prevail.

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21.5. The law does not provide as to who could record dying declaration nor there is any prescribed format or procedure for the same but the person recording dying declaration must be satisfied that the maker is in a fit state of mind and is capable of making the statement.

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21.6. Although presence of a Magistrate is not absolutely necessary for recording of a dying declaration but to ensure authenticity and credibility, it is expected that a Magistrate be requested to record such dying declaration and/or attestation be obtained from other persons present at the time of recording the dying declaration.

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21.7. As regards a burns case, the percentage and degree of burns would not, by itself, be decisive of the credibility of dying declaration; and the decisive factor would be the quality of evidence about the fit and conscious state of the declarant to make the statement.

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21.8. If after careful scrutiny, the court finds the statement placed as dying declaration to be voluntary and also finds it coherent and consistent, there is no legal impediment in

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Page 12 of 18

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(Cr.A.Nos.1856/2018 & 1849/2018)

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recording conviction on its basis even without corroboration.”

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A Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the matter of Laxman v.

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State of Maharashtra 3 has clearly held that a certification by the doctor is essentially a rule of caution and therefore the voluntary and truthful nature of the declaration can be established otherwise. Their Lordships held in paragraph 5 of the report as under: -

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“5. The Court also in the aforesaid case relied upon the decision of this Court in Harjit Kaur v. State of Punjab⁴ wherein the Magistrate in his evidence had stated that he had ascertained from the doctor whether she was in a fit condition to make a statement and obtained an endorsement to that effect and merely because an endorsement was made not on the declaration but on the application would not render the dying declaration suspicious in any manner. For the reasons already indicated earlier, we have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the observations of this Court in Paparambaka Rosamma v. State of A.P.⁵ (at SCC p. 701, para 8) to the effect that

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"in the absence of a medical certification that the injured was in a fit state of mind at the time of making the declaration, it would be very much risky to accept the subjective satisfaction of a Magistrate who opined that the injured was in a fit state of mind at the time of making a declaration"

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has been too broadly stated and is not the correct enunciation of law. It is indeed a hypertechnical view that the certification of the doctor was to the effect that the patient is conscious and there was no certification that the patient was in a fit state of mind specially when the Magistrate categorically stated in his evidence indicating the questions he had put to the patient and from the answers elicited was

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3 (2002) 6 SCC 710

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4 (1999) 6 SCC 545

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5 (1999) 7 SCC 695

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Page 13 of 18

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(Cr.A.Nos.1856/2018 & 1849/2018)

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satisfied that the patient was in a fit state of mind whereafter he recorded the dying declaration. Therefore, the judgment of this court in Paparambaka Rosamma v. State of A.P.⁸ must be held to be not correctly decided and we affirm the law laid down by this Court in Koli Chunilal Savji v. State of Gujarat⁶ .

¶107

The Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Laxman (supra) has held that what is essentially required is that the person who records a dying declaration must be satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind. Their Lordships further held that where it is proved by the testimony of the Magistrate that the declarant was fit to make the statement even without examination by the doctor the declaration can be acted upon provided the court ultimately holds the same to be voluntary and truthful.

¶108

Now, coming to the facts of the present case, a careful perusal of the dying declaration Ex.P-11 would show that though all the appellants are said to have treated the deceased with cruelty, but the main allegation of pouring kerosene oil over the body of the deceased is said to be on the part of Devendra Markande (A-5) – husband, who has poured kerosene oil on her body and alighted matchstick, but he has taken her to the hospital for treatment vide Ex.P-9 proved by PW-2. However, so far as other accused persons are concerned, though their presence has been stated by the victim naming sasur, saas, devarani and both nanand , but their specific names along with father’s name or husband’s name have not been clearly stated by the deceased though they were known to her,

¶109

6 (1999) 9 SCC 562

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Page 14 of 18

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(Cr.A.Nos.1856/2018 & 1849/2018)

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however, the fact remains that their names have not been mentioned by the deceased in the dying declaration Ex.P-11. In this regard, the decision of the Supreme Court in the matter of Gopal Singh and another v. The State of Madhya Pradesh and another 7 may be noticed herein profitably in which it has been held by their Lordships that a dying declaration which does not contain complete names and addresses of the persons charged with the offence, even though may help to establish their identity, is not of such a nature on which conviction can be based. It cannot be accepted without corroboration. It has been observed by their Lordships in paragraphs 7 & 8 of the report as under: -

¶113

“ 7. … The High Court, however, in one sentence expressed its opinion that the evidence of these two witnesses, amongst others, corroborated the dying declaration in respect of the identity of the appellants without giving any reasons why it differed on the point from the learned Sessions Judge. It is obvious that the High Court was so well satisfied by the written dying declaration as establishing the identity of the appellants that it ignored to consider the evidence of Umraodas, P.W. 1 and Chhotulal, P.W. 7 independently to see how far they were reliable. In an appeal against acquittal we think the High Court ought to have expressed itself more fully why it considered the learned Sessions Judge's conclusion was unreasonable. In our opinion that conclusion is unexceptionable.

¶114

8. … It is settled law that a court is entitled to convict on the sole basis of a dying declaration if it is such that in the circumstances of the case it can be regarded as truthful. On the other hand if on account of an infirmity, it cannot be held to be entirely reliable, corroboration would be

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7 AIR 1972 SC 1557

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Page 15 of 18

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(Cr.A.Nos.1856/2018 & 1849/2018)

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required. See Khushal Rao v. State of Bombay, 1958 SCR 552 = (AIR 1958 SC 22). In this case, it must be first remembered that though the names of the appellants' fathers were known to Modsingh and others who accompanied him to the police station, their fathers' names and present residence have not been mentioned. It is rather unusual for Police Officers not to enquire and record in the first information the full name and address of the persons complained against. …”

¶119

Reverting to the facts of the present case in light of the aforesaid decisions rendered by their Lordships of the Supreme Court referred herein-above, it is quite vivid that at the time of recording dying declaration Ex.P-11 by Ajit Kumar Choubey (PW-3) – Executive Magistrate-cum-Nayab Tahsildar, Durg, the deceased was certified to be in fit physical and mental state of mind to give statement by Dr. Jigyasa (PW-15) and in the dying declaration, the deceased has specifically named Devendra Markande (A-5). However, so far as other accused persons are concerned, though they were said to be present on the spot at the time of offence, but their presence has been mentioned only as sasur, saas, devarani and both nanand , however, their names and father’s name or husband’s name have not been clearly slept out as required in Gopal Singh (supra) and it lacks corroboration.

¶120

In that view of the matter, except Devendra Markande (A-5), all the other accused persons namely, Kamlesh Markande (A-1), Jageshwar (A-2), Sunita Markande (A-3), Sukhvantin (A-4) & Bhagatram Markande (A-6) deserve to be acquitted of the charge under Section 302 of the IPC by extending the benefit of doubt to them also for the reason

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Page 16 of 18

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(Cr.A.Nos.1856/2018 & 1849/2018)

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that though they were required to be charged for offence under Section 302 read with Section 149 of the IPC, but the trial Court did not convict them with the aid of Section 149 of the IPC, as such, they have suffered serious prejudice in light of the Constitution Bench decision of the Supreme Court in the matter of Willie (William) Slaney v. State of Madhya Pradesh 8. Accordingly, Kamlesh Markande (A-1), Jageshwar (A-2), Sunita Markande (A-3), Sukhvantin (A-4) & Bhagatram Markande (A-6) are acquitted of the charge under Section 302 of the IPC. However, their conviction under Section 498A of the IPC is well merited for which they had already suffered the sentence imposed. Sunita Markande (A-3) & Sukhvantin (A-4) are already on bail, they need not surrender, however, their bail bonds shall remain in force for a period of six months in view of the provision contained in Section 437A of the CrPC; whereas Kamlesh Markande (A-1), Jageshwar (A-2) & Bhagatram Markande (A-6) are in jail, they be released forthwith, if not required in any other case.

¶124

Now, the case of Devendra Markande (A-5) is required to be considered. It is the case of the defence that the deceased has implicated him for the offences in question, but in view of Ex.P-9 – MLC report of the deceased, it is apparent that Devendra Markande (A5) – her husband, has taken her to the hospital and hospitalized her and she died on 24-3-2016 during treatment due to septicemia as a result of burn injuries. As such, there is no intention of Devendra Markande (A-

¶125

8 AIR 1956 SC 116

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Page 17 of 18

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(Cr.A.Nos.1856/2018 & 1849/2018)

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to cause death of the deceased, but, at the most, knowledge can be attributed to him that by his act the deceased may die and accordingly, in light of the decision of the Supreme Court in the matter of Kalu Ram v. State of Rajasthan 9, his conviction under Section 302 of the IPC can be altered to one under Section 304 Part-II of the IPC. Furthermore, considering the homicidal nature of death of the deceased and also considering the injuries sustained by Devendra Markande (A-5) vide injury reports Exs.D-19 & D-20 and record of the Government hospital, which would show that Devendra Markande (A-5) had also suffered burn injuries to the extent of 6.8% and moreover, father of the deceased Santram Diwakar (PW-1) has also stated in paragraph 30 of his evidence that Devendra Markande (A-5) has sustained burn injury on his hand, as it is the case of defence that while covering blanket on the deceased, he suffered burn injury since he has taken her to hospital and got her admitted there for treatment, conviction of Devendra Markande (A-5) under Section 302 of the IPC is hereby converted to Section 304 Part-II of the IPC and he is sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for ten years. However, his conviction under Section 498A of the IPC is sustained as it is well merited.

¶129

The two appeals are allowed to the extent indicated herein-above.

¶130

Let a certified copy of this judgment along with the original record be transmitted to the trial Court concerned for necessary information and action, if any. A certified copy of the judgment may also be sent to the

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9 AIR 2000 SC 3630

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Page 18 of 18

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(Cr.A.Nos.1856/2018 & 1849/2018)

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concerned Jail Superintendent forthwith wherein the appellants Kamlesh Markande (A-1), Jageshwar (A-2), Devendra Markande (A-5) & Bhagatram Markande (A-6) are suffering the jail sentence.

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Sd/Sd/(Sanjay K. Agrawal) (Amitendra Kishore Prasad) Judge Judge

¶136

Soma

Jageshwar v. State of Chhattisgarh

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Jageshwar v. State of Chhattisgarh

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