Allowed

Rajulal Verma v. State of Chhattisgarh

Chhattisgarh HC11 Sept 2024CRA/177/2019

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

Circumstantial-evidence murder appeal. Conviction under Section 302 IPC rested solely on recovery of a blood-stained Gandasa and an FSL blood-group report without proof the blood belonged to the deceased. The High Court held the panchsheel conditions unfulfilled, set aside the conviction and acquitted the appellant.

What did the court decide?

Conviction and sentence for Section 302 IPC set aside; appellant acquitted on benefit of doubt and ordered released from jail forthwith.

Rajulal Verma Vs State of Chhattisgarh — Murder and Culpable Homicide | Chhattisgarh HC (2024)

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Digitally signed by VAISHALI LUCKY NAGARIA Date: 2024.09.20 10:28:07 +0530

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2024:CGHC:35775-DB

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NAFR

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HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

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CRA No. 177 of 2019

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(Arising out of judgment dated 29.11.2018, passed in Session Trial No. 227 of 2017 be the learned Eight Additional Sessions Judge, Raipur, District – Raipur,Chhattisgarh)

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Rajulal Verma S/o Khedram Verma Aged About 31 Years R/o Village Kirna, Police Station Nevra, District Raipur Chhattisgarh.

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... Appellant

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versus

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State of Chhattisgarh Through The Station House Officer, Police Station Nevra, District Raipur Chhattisgarh.

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... Respondent

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For Appellant : Mr. Santosh Bharat, Advocate and Mr. Abdul Wahab Khan, Advocate For Respondent : Mr. Ashish Shukla, Additional A.G.

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Division Bench

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Hon’ble Shri Justice Sanjay K. Agrawal &

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Hon’ble Shri Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad

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Judgment on Board

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12/09/2024

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Sanjay K. Agrawal,J

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Invoking criminal appellate jurisdiction of this Court, the present criminal appeal under Section 374(2) of CrPC has been filed by the appellant namely Rajulal Verma calling in question the legality, validity and correctness of the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 29.11.2018 passed by the learned Eighth Additional Sessions Judge, Raipur, District Raipur, Chhattisgarh in Sessions Trial No.227/2017 whereby the appellant has been convicted for offence punishable under Section 302 of the IPC and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life and pay fine of 500/-, in default of payment of fine, appellant₹ has to undergo additional rigorous imprisonment for one month.

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The case of the prosecution, in a nutshell, is that on 14.08.2017, at about 08:00 PM, in front of the house of Suresh Verma, near a tractor, at Village Kirna, Police Station Nevra, District Raipur, Chhattisgarh, the appellant with the intent to kill Sunil @ Derha Verma (now deceased), assaulted him by means of iron Gandasha (weapon like a knife) on both side of his neck, by which he suffered grievous injuries and died and, thereby, said to have committed the aforesaid offences.

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It is further case of the prosecution that when Pawan Kumar Verma (PW-01) reported the matter to the police,

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merg intimation and FIR were registered vide Exs. P/23 & P/24 respectively. Spot map was prepared vide Ex.P/13. Inquest proceedings (Ex. P/4) were conducted and the dead body of the deceased was sent for postmortem. As per postmortem report (Ex.P/21) proved by Dr. Saroj Gandharw (PW-15) cause of death was shock due to hemorrhage as result of injury to neck vessels and nature was homicidal. Pursuant to memorandum statement of the appellant recorded vide Ex.P/5, one ‘Gandasa’ was seized vide Ex.P/7. Clothes of appellant were also seized vide Ex.P/7. Thereafter, the seized articles were sent for chemical analysis to FSL and as per FSL report (Ex.P/18) on the said Gandasa stains of human blood having O group were found.

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After due investigation, appellant was charge-sheeted for the aforesaid offence and the case was committed to the Court of Sessions for trial in accordance with law. The appellant / accused abjured his guilt and entered into defence.

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During the course of trial, in order to bring home the offence, the prosecution has examined as many as 17 witnesses and exhibited 24 documents, whereas, the appellant has examined 2 defence witnesses. Statements of the appellants were recorded under Section 313 of CrPC in

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which they denied the circumstances appearing against them in the evidence brought on record, pleaded innocence and false implication.

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The learned trial Court after appreciating the oral and documentary evidence available on record, convicted the appellant for the offence as mentioned in the opening paragraph of the judgment, against which this appeal has been preferred by the appellants herein questioning the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence.

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Mr. Santosh Bharat and Mr. Abdul Wahab Khan, learned counsel for the appellant, would submit that the trial Court is absolutely unjustified in convicting the appellants for the offence in question. They further submits that merely on the basis of recovery of blood stained article pursuant to the memorandum statement of the appellant, he has been convicted for the offences in question and same would not complete the chain of circumstance in order to point out the guilt of the appellant. There is no direct evidence available against the appellant and case of the prosecution is based on circumstantial evidence. The circumstances relied upon by the learned trial Court in the impugned judgment are based on surmises and conjunctures and there is no material available on record to connect the appellant herein with the aforesaid offences. Hence, the present appeal deserves to be

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allowed and the appellant is liable to be acquitted of the said charges on basis of benefit of doubt.

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On the other hand, learned State counsel, would support the impugned judgment and submit that prosecution has been able to prove the offence beyond reasonable doubt and the trial Court has rightly convicted the appellant for the aforesaid offence, therefore, the appellant has rightly been convicted for the offence in question. Thus, the instant appeal deserves to be dismissed.

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We have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival submissions made herein-above and perused the records minutely.

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The first question, as to whether the death of the deceased was homicidal in nature, has been answered by the trial Court in affirmative relying upon the postmortem report (Ex.P/21) proved by Dr. Saroj Gandharw (PW-15), wherein it has been opined that the cause of death of the deceased is shock due to hemorrhage, as a result of injury to neck vessel, which, in our considered opinion, is a correct finding of fact based on evidence available on record and which is neither perverse nor contrary to the record. Accordingly, we hereby affirm the finding of the trial Court holding that the death of the deceased was homicidal in nature.

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Now, the question for consideration would be whether the appellant is the author of the crime?

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In the instant case, there is no direct evidence and the case of the prosecution is based on the circumstantial evidence, therefore, it will be relevant to notice the five golden principles which constitute panchsheel of the proof of a case based on circumstantial evidence have been laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the matter of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda (supra) in paragraph 153 which state as under:-

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“153. A close analysis of this decision would show that the following conditions must be fulfilled before a case against an accused can be said to be fully established :

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(1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established.

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It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the circumstances concerned 'must or should' and not 'may be' established. There is not only a grammatical but a legal distinction between 'may be proved' and “must be or should be proved” as was held by this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra¹ where the following observations were made:

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Certainly, it is a primary principle that the accused must be and not merely may be guilty before a court can convict and the mental distance between 'may be' and 'must be' is long and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions.

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(2) the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty,

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1 (1973) 2 SCC 793

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(3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency,

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(4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved, and

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(5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused.”

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In the case at hand, the learned trial Court relied upon the fact that pursuant to the memorandum statement of the appellant recorded vide Ex.P/05, weapon of the offence i.e. Gandasa has been seized vide Ex.P/07, in which, as per FSL report (Ex.P/18) stains of human blood having “O” Group was found alongwith other articles i.e. clothes of the deceased. However, it has vehemently been argued on behalf of the appellant that merely on the basis of recovery of blood stained weapon pursuant to the memorandum statement of the appellant, the chain of circumstances would not be complete and the appellant could not have been convicted for the offence in question. True it is that pursuant to the memorandum statement of the appellant recorded vide Ex.P/05, weapon of the offence i.e. Gandasa has been seized vide Ex.P/07 alongwith clothes of the appellant, which is proved by Ramadhin Verma (PW-08) and Sunil Verma (PW-09) and, as per FSL report (Ex.P/18), stains of human blood of “O” group was found in it.

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The Supreme Court in the matter of Mustkeem alias

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Sirajudeen v State of Rajasthan2 considered the scope

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and ambit of recovery made pursuant to the memorandum statement of the appellant and it has been held that disclosure alone would not automatically lead to the conclusion that the offence was committed by the accused and the burden lies on the prosecution to establish a close link between discovery of the material object and its use in the commission of the offence and observed in Para-25 & 27 as under:

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“25. With regard to Section 27 of the Act, what is important is discovery of the material object at the disclosure of the accused but such disclosure alone would not automatically lead to the conclusion that the offence was also committed by the accused. In fact, thereafter, burden lies on the prosecution to establish a close link between discovery of the material object and its use in the commission of the offence. What is admissible under Section 27 of the Act is the information leading to discovery and not any opinion formed on it by the prosecution.

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The scope and ambit of Section 27 were also illuminatingly stated in Pulukuri Kotayya & Ors. Vs. Emperor, AIR 1947 PC 67 reproduced hereinbelow:-

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"...it is fallacious to treat the 'fact discovered' within the section as equivalent to the object produced; the fact discovered embraces the place from which the object is produced and the knowledge of the accused as to this, and the information given must relate distinctly

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2 (2011) 11 SCC 724

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to this fact. Information as to past user, or the past history, of the object produced is not related to its discovery in the setting in which it is discovered. Information supplied by a person in custody that 'I will produce a knife concealed in the roof of my house' does not lead to the discovery of a knife; knives were discovered many years ago. It leads to the discovery of the fact that a knife is concealed in the house of the informant to his knowledge, and if the knife is proved to have been used in the commission of the offence, the fact discovered is very relevant. But if to the statement the words be added 'with which I stabbed A' these words are inadmissible since they do not relate to the discovery of the knife in the house of the informant."

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The same were thereafter restated in another judgment of this Court reported in Anter Singh Vs. State of Rajasthan, 2004 (10) SCC 657. ”

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The principle of law laid down in Mustkeem alias Sirajudeen (supra) has been followed with approval in Raja

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Naykar v. State of Chhattisgarh3 wherein it has poignantly been held that sole circumstance of recovery of blood-stained article cannot form the basis of conviction unless the same is corroborated with other piece of incriminating circumstances. Consequently, in light of the aforesaid principle, we are of the considered opinion that in the present case solely on the basis of recovery of blood stained weapon i.e. Gandasa, the appellant herein cannot be held guilty of the offence in

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3 2024 SCC Online SC 67

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question and, as such, the recovery of said Gandasa is of no help to the prosecution.

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Furthermore, one more incriminating circumstance that has been relied upon by the learned trial Court is in the Gandasa, which is recovered from the appellant and in the clothes of the deceased i.e. baniyan and undergarment, stains of human blood having “O” group was found according to the FSL report (Ex.P/18). However, there is no evidence in shape of documentary or oral available on record to show that the said human blood having “O” Group, which was found on the said Gandasa and clothes of the deceased i.e. baniyan and undergarment, belongs to the deceased or the blood group of the deceased. As such, the learned trial Court is absolutely unjustified in relying upon the said FSL report in order to hold the appellant guilty of the offence. We hereby hold accordingly.

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In view of aforesaid discussion, we are unable to hold that the prosecution has been able to prove the five golden principles to constitute the ‘panchsheel’ of proof of a case based on circumstantial evidence, as laid down by the Supreme Court in the matter of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda (supra), in absence of which, the learned trial Court is unjustified in convicting the appellant for offence in question, being the author of the crime, in light of the incriminating

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circumstances as culled out in the impugned judgment and same are liable to be set aside.

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Accordingly, the conviction and sentence of the appellant for offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC, as imposed upon him by the learned trial Court, is hereby set aside. He is acquitted of the said charges on the basis of benefit of doubt. Since the appellant is in jail, we direct that he be released from jail forthwith, if not required in any other matter/crime.

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This criminal appeal is allowed .

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Let a certified copy of this order alongwith the original record be transmitted to the trial Court concerned as well as to the Superintendent of Jail where the appellant is languishing for necessary information and action, if any.

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Sd/Sd/-

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(Sanjay K. Agrawal) (Amitendra Kishore Prasad ) Judge Judge

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vaishali

Rajulal Verma v. State of Chhattisgarh

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

Rajulal Verma v. State of Chhattisgarh

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

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