Rajendra Prasad Yadav Vs State of Chhattisgarh

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NAFR

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HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH, BILASPUR

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Criminal Appeal No. 1740 of 2018

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(Arising out of judgment dated 15.10.2018 passed in Sessions Trial No. 49/2017 by the learned Sessions Judge, Surajpur, CG)

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Rajendra Prasad Yadav S/o Shambhu Ram Yadav Aged About 50 Years R/o Village Brijlal, Police Station Jaynagar District Surajpur Chhattisgarh., District : Surajpur, Chhattisgarh

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---- Appellant

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Versus

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State Of Chhattisgarh Through Station House Officer Police Station Jaynagar District Surajpur Chhattisgarh.

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---Respondent

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For Appellant : Mr. Shashi Kumar Kushwaha, Advocate For Respondent : Mr. H. A. P. S. Bhatia, Panel Lawyer

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(Division Bench)

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Hon'ble Shri Justice Sanjay K. Agrawal Hon'ble Shri Justice Sanjay Kumar Jaiswal

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Judgment On Board (23.07.202 4)

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Sanjay K. Agrawal, J.

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1. This criminal appeal preferred by the appellant under Section 374(2) of Cr.P.C. is directed against the impugned judgment dated 15.10.2018, passed by the Sessions Judge, Surajpur, district Surajpur (CG) in Sessions Trial

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No. 49/2017, by which, the appellant herein has been convicted for the offence under Section 302 of Indian Penal Code and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life and pay fine of Rs.100/-, in default of payment of fine, to undergo 7 days additional rigorous imprisonment.

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2. The case of prosecution, in brief, is that on 23.04.2017 at about 7 a.m. in village – Brijnagar, Police Station - Jainagar, District Surajpur, the appellant herein, assaulted his wife Prasadi Yadav (now deceased) by spade, as a result of which, she suffered grievous injuries and died, thereby committed the said offence. On the information of Arati Yadav (PW-1), Merg Intimation (Ex.-P1) was recorded and FIR was registered vide Ex. P-2. Inquest proceeding was conducted vide Ex. P-11 and the dead body of deceased Prasadi Yadav was subjected to postmortem, which was conducted by Dr. Amit Bhagat (PW-14), who has proved the post-mortem report Ex. P- 14, in which, cause of death has been opined to be shock due to head injury and multiple fractures and death was homicidal in nature. Pursuant to memorandum statement of the appellant (Ex.P/6), weapon of offence i.e. spade was seized vide Ex.P-7 which was sent for chemical examination to FSL along with other articles and in FSL report Ex.P-20, human blood was found on the spade.

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3. After due investigation, appellant herein was chargesheeted for the aforesaid offence and the case was committed to the Court of Sessions for trial in accordance with law. The appellant / accused abjured his guilt and entered into defence stating that he has not committed any offence and he has falsely been implicated in crime in question.

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4. In order to bring home the offence, prosecution examined as many as 15 witnesses and exhibited 32 documents and the appellant-accused in support of his defence has examined 1 witness and exhibited 4 documents.

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5. Learned trial Court after appreciating the oral and documentary evidence available on record, convicted the appellant / accused for the offence as mentioned in the opening paragraph of the judgment, against which this appeal has been preferred by the appellant questioning the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence.

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6. Mr. Shashi Kumar Kushwaha , learned counsel for the appellant, would submit that the eye witnesses Arati Yadav (PW-1), Maheshwari Yadav (PW-4), Dharmendra Yadav (PW-6) & Doodhnath Yadav (PW-13) who are the daughters and sons of appellant and deceased are not reliable witnesses and therefore, their statement could not be relied upon for convicting the appellant under Section 302 of IPC. Hence, the appellant is entitled for acquittal on the basis of benefit of doubt.

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7. Mr. Arvind Dubey, learned State counsel, would support the impugned judgment and submit that the eye witnesses PW-1, PW-4, PW-6 & PW-13 who are the sons and daughters of appellant and deceased have clearly stated that on the date and time of offence, the appellant assaulted deceased Prasadi Yadav by spade due to which she suffered grievous injuries and died. He would submit that the prosecution has been able to bring home the offence beyond reasonable doubt and the trial Court has rightly convicted the appellant for offence under Section

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302 of I.P.C. and therefore, the appeal deserves to be dismissed.

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8. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival submissions made herein-above and went through the records with utmost circumspection.

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9. The first and foremost question for consideration is as to whether the death of deceased Prasadi Yadav was homicidal in nature, which has been answered by the trial Court in affirmative relying upon post-mortem report Ex. P-14 proved by Dr. Amit Bhagat (PW-14), according to which, cause of death has been opined to be shock due to head injury and multiple fractures and death was homicidal in nature, which in our considered opinion is a correct finding of fact based on evidence available on record and it is neither perverse nor contrary to the record. Accordingly, we hereby affirm the said finding.

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10. Now, the next question is as to whether the appellant has committed the murder of his wife Prasadi Yadav?

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11. The case of the prosecution is based on the testimony of four eye witnesses namely Arati Yadav (PW-1), Maheshwari Yadav (PW-4), Dharmendra Yadav (PW-6) & Doodhnath Yadav (PW-13), who are the daughters and sons of appellant and deceased. Arti Yadav (PW-1) has clearly stated that on the date of offence, at about 6:30 a.m. her mother and father both went towards Kothar for carrying chaff (Hkwlk) and at that time she was taking tea. On hearing cry when she went towards Kothar side, she saw her father assaulting her mother by spade, due to which, she suffered grievous injuries and died within five minutes. This witness was subjected to cross-examination but she remained consistent in her statement that her

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father had assaulted her mother in her presence, due to which, she suffered grievous injuries and died. Similar statements have been made by other eye witness Maheshwari Yadav (PW-4), Dharmendra Yadav (PW-6) & Doodhnath Yadav (PW-13) and they have also clearly supported the case of prosecution. Except minor omissions and contradictions nothing has been extracted from their cross-examination to hold that the appellant has not assaulted the deceased and he has been falsely implicated. Furthermore, the statements of these eye witnesses are also supported by medical evidence of Dr. Amit Bhagat (PW-14) who in his query report has clearly stated that the injuries could be caused by spade which was seized pursuant to the memorandum statement of the appellant (Ex.P-6) and as per FSL report Ex.P-20 human blood was found on it. As such, we are of the considered opinion that the finding recorded by the trial Court that it is the appellant who assaulted his wife Prasadi (deceased) by spade due to which she suffered grievous injuries and died, which is the finding of fact based on evidence available on record and, as such, we hereby affirm the said finding recorded by the trial Court.

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12. At this stage, learned counsel for the appellant contented that the eye witnesses Arati Yadav (PW-1), Maheshwari Yadav (PW-4), Dharmendra Yadav (PW-6) & Doodhnath Yadav (PW-13) have clearly stated that the appellant had taken loan from the bank and he could not repay the loan amount, on account of which, there used to quarrel between appellant and deceased. On the date of incident also, on account of the said issue there arose a dispute between them and the appellant assaulted the deceased by spade resulting in her death. This fact is clear from

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paragraphs 2, 2, 4 & 2 of the statements of PW-1, PW-4, PW-6 and PW-13 respectively. Therefore, it is a clear case of sustained provocation and therefore, the conviction of the appellant is liable to be set aside as his case is covered by Exception 1 to Section 300 of IPC and the appellant be sentenced to the period already undergone as he is in jail since 25.04.2017 and the appeal be allowed accordingly.

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13. Now, the question is as to whether the case of the appellant would fall under Exception 1 to Section 300 of IPC, as contended by learned Counsel for the appellant?

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14. In this regard, learned counsel appearing for the appellant has relied upon the following decisions rendered in the matters of K.M. Nanavati v. State of Maharashtra¹ , In Re, Chervirala Narayan² , Balku v. Emperor³ , Suyambukkani v. State of Tamil Nadu⁴ , stating that in these judgments ‘sustained provocation’ has been held to be covered by Exception 1 to Section 300 of IPC.

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15. Section 299 of IPC defines ‘culpable homicide’. Section 300 of IPC defines ‘murder’ stating that except in the cases hereinafter excepted, culpable homicide is murder, if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death. Section 300 of IPC has three classes, namely – 2ndly, 3rdly & 4thly. Culpable homicide falling under any one of these three classes amounts to murder which is punishable under Section 302 of IPC. However, Section 300 of IPC itself contains five Exceptions with certain restrictions/conditions and if

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AIR 1962 SC 605

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AIR 1958 Andhra Pradesh 235

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AIR 1938 Allahabad 532

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1989 Law Weekly (Cri.) 86

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culpable homicide falls under any one of these Exceptions then it will be culpable homicide not amounting to murder and it is punishable under Section 304 of IPC. Section 304 of IPC has two parts. If the act is done with intention, it will fall under Part-I and if the act is done with the knowledge but without any intention then it will fall under Part-II of Section 304 of IPC. Both these parts differ in severity of punishment.

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16. The marked distinction between the offences under Section 302 and Section 299 of IPC brought out by Justice Melvill in R. v. Govinda⁵ . Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in State of A.P. v. Rayavarappu⁶ has pointed out the said distinction brought out in Govinda (supra) in the following words:-

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“ In the scheme of the Penal Code, 'culpable homicide' is genus and 'murder' its specie. All 'murder' is 'culpable homicide' but not vice versa. Speaking generally, 'culpable homicide' sans 'special characteristics of murder', is 'culpable homicide not amounting to. murder'. For the purpose of fixing punishment, proportionate to the gravity of this generic offence, the Code practically recognises three degress of culpable homicide. The first is, what may be called, culpable homicide of the first degree. This is the gravest form of culpable homicide which is defined in Section 300 , as 'murder'. The second may be termed as 'culpable homicide of the second degree'. This is punishable under the l st part of Section 304. Then, there is 'culpable homicide of the third degree.' This is the lowest type of culpable homicide and the punishment provided for it is, also, the lowest among the punishments provided for the three grades. Culpable homicide of this degree is punishable under the second Part ” of Section 304 .

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AIR 1977 SC 45

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1986 (1) Bom. 342

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17. Exception 1 to Section 300 of IPC states as under:-

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“ — Exception 1 . When culpable homicide is - not murder .—Culpable homicide is not mur der if the offender, whilst deprived of the power - of self-control by grave and sudden provoca tion, causes the death of the person who gave the provocation or causes the death of any other person by mistake or accident.

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The above exception is subject to the following provisos:—

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First .—That the provocation is not sought or - voluntarily provoked by the offender as an ex cuse for killing or doing harm to any person.

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Secondly .—That the provocation is not given by anything done in obedience to the law, or by a public servant in the lawful exercise of the powers of such public servant.

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Thirdly .—That the provocation is not given by anything done in the lawful exercise of the right of private defence.

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Explanation .—Whether the provocation was - grave and sudden enough to prevent the of fence from amounting to murder is a question of fact. ”

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18. The word ‘provocation’, which is essential condition for invoking Exception 1 to Section 300 of IPC, must be grave and must be sudden has not been defined in the Indian Penal Code. However, in Halsbury’s Laws of England7 , provocation has been defined as under:-

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" Provocation may reduce a charge of murder to one of manslaughter. It consists of something done which would cause in any reasonable person, and actually causes in the defendant, a

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4^th Edition, Volume 11, Paragraph 1163, Page 619

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sudden and temporary loss of self-control, making him so subject to passing that he is not the master of his mind. Where on a charge of murder there is evidence on which the jury can find that the person charged was provoked, whether by things done or said, to lose his selfcontrol, the question whether the provocation was enough to make a reasonable man do as he did must be left to be determined by the jury. In determining that question the jury must take into account everything both done and said according to the effect which, in the jury's opinion, it would have on a reasonable man. "

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19. Similarly, Lord Goddard, C.J., in R. Duffy8 has defined provocation thus :-

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" Provocation is some act, or series of acts, done by the dead man to the accused which would cause in any reasonable person, and actually causes in the accused, a sudden and temporary loss of self-control, rendering the accused so subject to passion as to make him or her for the moment not master of his mind. "

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20. In In Re, Chervirala Narayan (supra ), it was held that the mental state created by an earlier act may be taken into consideration in ascertaining whether a subsequent act was sufficient to make the assailant to lose his selfcontrol.

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21. Prof. Stanley Yeo of School of Law and Justice, Southern Cross University, Australia made a comparative study of law relating to provocation and self-defence in India, England and Australia and in his admirable book 'Unrestrained Killings and the Law' (Oxford University Press, 2002) at page 27 concluded thus :-

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“ This comparative survey shows that, while cumulative provocation is now recognized in all three jurisdictions, the Indian Courts were the earliest to adopt it, followed by the Australian

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1949 (1) All ER 932

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courts with a few exceptions, and only lately by the English Courts. Accordingly, an appraisal of Indian law on the matter by English and Australian lawmakers might well have persuaded them to sooner embrace the concept of cumulative provocation. ”

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22. In K. M. Nanavati (supra), their Lordships have considered several English and Indian cases with reference to grave and sudden provocation and have held that in India, words and gestures may also, under certain circumstances, cause grave and sudden provocation to an accused so as to bring his act within the first Exception to Section 300 IP C, and have laid down the following conditions which have to be satisfied for invoking Exception 1 to Section 300 of IPC :-

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“ (1) The deceased must have given provocation to the accused.

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(2) The provocation must be grave.

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(3) The provocation must be sudden.

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(4) The offender, by reason of the said provocation,shall have been deprived of his power of self-control.

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(5) He should have killed the deceased during the continuance of the deprivation of the power of self-control. (6) The offender must have caused the death of the person who gave the provocation or that of any other person by mistake or accident. ”

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23. Further, their Lordships have held that for determining whether or not the provocation had temporarily deprived the offender from the power of self-control, the test to be applied is that of a reasonable man and not that of an usually excitable and pugnacious individual. Further, it

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must be considered whether there was sufficient interval and time to allow the passion to cool. Their Lordships in paragraphs 84 & 85 of the report observed as under: -

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“ (84) Is there any standard of a reasonable man for the application of the doctrine of "grave and sudden" provocation? No abstract standard of reasonableness can be laid down. What a reasonable man will do in certain circumstances depends upon the customs, manners, way of life, traditional values etc.; in short, the cultural, social and emotional background of the society to which an accused belongs. In our vast country there are social groups ranging from the lowest to the highest state of civilization. It is neither possible nor desirable to lay down any standard with precision : it is for the court to decide in each case, having regard to the relevant circumstances. It is not necessary in this case to ascertain whether a reasonable man placed in the position of the accused would have lost his self-control momentarily or even temporarily when his wife confessed to him of her illicit intimacy with another, for we are satisfied on the evidence that the accused regained his self-control and killed Ahuja deliberately.

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(85) The Indian law, relevant to the present enquiry, may be stated thus : (1) The test of "grave and sudden" provocation is whether a reasonable man, belonging to the same class of society as the accused, placed in the situation in which the accused was placed would be so provoked as to lose his self-control. (2) In India, words and gestures may also, under certain circumstances, cause grave and sudden provocation to an accused so as to bring his act within the first Exception to S. 300 of the Indian Penal Code. (3) The mental background created by the previous act of the victim may be taken into consideration in ascertaining whether the subsequent act caused grave and sudden provocation for committing the offence. (4) The fatal blow should be clearly traced to the influence of passion arising from that

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provocation and not after the passion had cooled down by lapse of time, or otherwise giving room and scope for premeditation and calculation. ”

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24. However, the Supreme Court in the matter of Radharani

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v. State of Madhya Pradesh 9 has held as follows:-

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“ The circumstances of the case are very sad and touching. A desolate woman jumped into a well with her two children. She was charged under Ss. 307 and 309 of the I.P.C. She has been released on admonition for the offence u/s 309, I.P.C. and has been sentenced to imprisonment for three months for the offence u/s 307. We see no valid reason for making this distinction and therefore direct that she shall be released on admonition for the offence u/s 307 also. ”

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25. In Vashram Narshibhai Rajpara v . State of Gujarat¹⁰ , the Supreme Court has also recognized the sustained provocation, as the house purchased by the accused was not to the liking of his wife and daughter and they continuously rebuked him, unable to bear this at one point of time he killed them. The Supreme Court has held that though they were all living together, the continuous harassment and constant nagging could have very well affected his mental balance and as such sustained provocation could have reached a boiling point resulting in the dastardly act and ultimately set aside the death sentence and awarded him life sentence. (also see Santosh Satish Bhusan v . State of Maharashtra¹¹ )

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26. In Sankarlal @ Sankarayee v. State¹² , the Division Bench of the Madras High Court has recognized that grave and sudden provocation under Exception 1 to

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(1981) Supp. SCC 84

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2002 (9) SCC 168

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2009 (6) SCC 498

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(1989) Law Weekly (Cri.) 468

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Section 300 of IPC would include sustained provocation also and held as under:-

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" When there is positive evidence to show that there was grave and sudden provocation at or about the time of occurrence, there would be no difficulty in applying the said principles. There are other type of cases, where there has been sustained provocation for a considerable length of time and there would not have been a real sudden provocation immediately preceding the murder. In such cases, the Courts have given the benefit of Exception 1 to Section 300 of IPC on the ground that the provocation which is the route cause for the commission of the offence need not arise at the spur of the moment. "

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27. The Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the matter of Suyambukkani (supra), considering the earlier English decisions and the decision in K.M. Nanavati (supra), has held that s ustained provocation is undoubtedly an addition by the Courts as anticipated by the architects of the Indian Penal Code, and held in para20 as under:-

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“20. It is clear from the opinion of the important architects of the Indian codification that AngloIndian Codes, which were the first experiments in English language in the art of codification, in spite of their immense value, are far from being perfect and were intended to be overhauled from time to time. Therefore, though technically the exceptions to Section 300 IPC. appear to be limitative they can no longer be considered so, after the efflux of time. In fact, Courts have added one more exception known as ''sustained provocation''. The leading decision in that field is the well known Nanavati's case, A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 605. That decision is not the first one to take into consideration the situation of sustained provocation. There are previous decisions, which are reviewed in that case are: The Empress v. Khagayi , ILR 2 Mad. 122; Boya Munigadu v. The Queen , ILR 3 Mad. 33;

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Murugien , In Re , (1957) 2 MLJ 9; Chervirala Narayan , In Re , 1958 (1) An.W.R. 149, Balku v. Emperor , AIR 1938 All. 532 and Babu Lal v. State , AIR 1960 All. 223. Thereafter several decisions have been pronounced and recently this Court dealt with the same subject in the following unreported cases; C.A. No. 70 of 1981, dated 15th December, 1982, Laxmi v. State ; C.A. No. 417 of 1983, dated 10th February, 1986, Dharman v. State ; C.A. No. 184 of 1983, dated 6th February 1983, Devanathan @ Mara v. State and C.A. No. 301 of 1984, dated 4th August, 1988, Gopal v. State . Though there has been here and there attempts in those decisions to bring the sustained provocation under Exception 1 to Section 300 IPC, there is a cardinal difference between provocation as defined under Exception 1 and sustained provocation. The only word which is common is ''provocation''. What Exception 1 contemplates is a grave and sudden provocation, whereas the ingredient of sustained provocation is a series of acts more or less grave spread over a certain period of time, the last of which acting as the last straw breaking the camel's back may even be a very trifling one. We are therefore far from grave and sudden provocation contemplated under Exception 1 to Section 300 IPC. Sustained provocation is undoubtedly an addition by Courts, as anticipated by the architects of IPC.”

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28. The sustained provocation as included in Exception 1 to Section 300 of IPC was also considered by the Supreme Court recently in the matter of Dauvaram Nirmalkar v. State of Chhattisgarh¹³ and relying upon the decision in K.M. Nanavati (supra) held that cumulative or sustained provocation test would be satisfied when the accused’s retaliation was immediately preceded and precipitated by some sort of provocative conduct which would satisfy the requirement of sudden or immediate provocation, and observed in para- 12, 13 & 16 as under:-

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2022 SCC Online SC 955

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"12. The question of loss of self-control by grave and sudden provocation is a question of fact. Act of provocation and loss of self-control, must be actual and reasonable. The law attaches great importance to two things when defence of provocation is taken under Exception 1 to Section 300 of the IPC. First, whether there was an intervening period for the passion to cool and for the accused to regain dominance and control over his mind. Secondly, the mode of resentment should bear some relationship to the sort of provocation that has been given. The retaliation should be proportionate to the provocation [See the opinion expressed by Goddard, CJ. in R v. Duffy (supra)]. The first part lays emphasis on whether the accused acting as a reasonable man had time to reflect and cool down. The offender is presumed to possess the general power of self-control of an ordinary or reasonable man, belonging to the same class of society as the accused, placed in the same situation in which the accused is placed, to temporarily lose the power of selfcontrol. The second part emphasises that the offender’s reaction to the provocation is to be judged on the basis of whether the provocation was sufficient to bring about a loss of selfcontrol in the fact situation. Here again, the Court would have to apply the test of a reasonable person in the circumstances. While examining these questions, we should not be short-sighted, and must take into account the whole of the events, including the events on the day of the fatality, as these are relevant for deciding whether the accused was acting under the cumulative and continuing stress of provocation. Gravity of provocation turns upon the whole of the victim’s abusive behaviour towards the accused. Gravity does not hinge upon a single or last act of provocation deemed sufficient by itself to trigger the punitive action. Last provocation has to be considered in light of the previous provocative acts or words, serious enough to cause the accused to lose his self-control. The cumulative or sustained provocation test would be satisfied when the accused’s retaliation was immediately preceded and precipitated by some sort of provocative

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conduct, which would satisfy the requirement of sudden or immediate provocation.

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Thus, the gravity of the provocation can be assessed by taking into account the history of the abuse and need not be confined to the gravity of the final provocative act in the form of acts, words or gestures. The final wrongdoing, triggering off the accused’s reaction, should be identified to show that there was temporary loss of self-control and the accused had acted without planning and premeditation. This has been aptly summarised by Ashworth13 in the following words:

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“ [T]he significance of the deceased’s final act should be considered by reference to the previous relations between the parties, taking into account any previous incidents which add colour to the final act. This is not to argue that the basic distinction between sudden provoked killings and revenge killings should be blurred, for the lapse of time between the deceased’s final act and the accused’s retaliation should continue to tell against him. The point is that the significance of the deceased’s final act and its effect upon the accused – and indeed the relation of the retaliation to that act – can be neither understood nor evaluated without reference to previous dealings between the parties. "

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For clarity, it must be stated that the prosecution must prove the guilt of the accused, that is, it must establish all ingredients of the offence with which the accused is charged, but this burden should not be mixed with the burden on the accused of proving that the case falls within an exception. However, to discharge this burden the accused may rely upon the case of the prosecution and the evidence adduced by the prosecution in the court. It is in this context we would refer to the case of the prosecution, which is that the deceased was addicted to alcohol and used to constantly torment, abuse and threaten the

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appellant. On the night of the occurrence, the deceased had consumed alcohol and had told the appellant to leave the house and if not, he would kill the appellant. There was sudden loss of self-control on account of a ‘slow burn’ reaction followed by the final and immediate provocation. There was temporary loss of selfcontrol as the appellant had tried to kill himself by holding live electrical wires. Therefore, we hold that the acts of provocation on the basis of which the appellant caused the death of his brother, Dashrath Nirmalkar, were both sudden and grave and that there was loss of self-control. "

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29. In the backdrop of the law relating to provocation particularly, sustained provocation, reverting to the facts of the present case, it is quite vivid from the statements of Arati Yadav (PW-1), Maheshwari Yadav (PW-4), Dharmendra Yadav (PW-6) & Doodhnath Yadav (PW-13 that the appellant had taken loan from the bank which he could not repay. The deceased advised the appellant that they would repay the loan amount after selling the wheat. There used to quarrel between appellant and deceased on this issue. In these circumstances, the appellant appears to have assaulted his wife Prasadi by spade, as a result of which, she suffered grievous injuries and died. All these facts constitutes it a case of sustained provocation, making the appellant to be entitled for the benefit of Exception 1 to Section 300 of IPC by converting his conviction under Section 302 of IPC to that of Part-I of Section 304 of IPC.

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30. Accordingly, we set aside the conviction of the appellant for the offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC and the sentence of Rigorous Imprisonment for Life awarded thereunder as well. Instead, we convict the appellant for the offence punishable under Part-I of Section 304 of IPC

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and sentence him to undergo R.I. for 10 years. However, the fine amount of Rs.100/- with its default clause is hereby maintained.

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31. This criminal appeal is partly allowed to the extent indicated herein-above.

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32. Let a certified copy of this judgment along with the original record be transmitted forthwith to the concerned Trial Court and also the concerned Superintendent of Jail, for information and necessary action.

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Sd/Sd/(Sanjay K. Agrawal) (Sanjay Kumar Jaiswal) Judge Judge

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Khatai

Rajendra Prasad Yadav v. State of Chhattisgarh

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Rajendra Prasad Yadav v. State of Chhattisgarh

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