Hemant @ Hemlal Chakradhari Vs State of Chhattisgarh

The present is a Criminal Appeal under Section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, against the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence dated 19.12.2023, passed by Learned

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VEDPRAKASHDEWANGAN Digitallysigned byVEDPRAKASHDEWANGANDate:2024.11.2918:28:45+0530

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Additional Sessions Judge, F.T.S.C., (POCSO) Dhamtari, in Special Criminal Case (POCSO) No. 26 of 2023, whereby the appellant has been convicted for the offence under Section 376(2)(j) and (n) of IPC and Section 6 of Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (in short “POCSO Act”) and has been sentenced for the offence of Section 6 of POCSO Act for R.I. for 20 years with fine of Rs. 5,000/-, in default of payment of fine further R.I. for 6 months. Since the appellant was sentenced for the offence under Section 6 of POCSO Act, no separate sentence was awarded to the appellant for the offence under Section 376(2)(j) and (n) of IPC, as provided under Section 42 of the POCSO Act.

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The brief facts of the case are that on 10.03.2023, the prosecutrix had made a written complaint (exhibit P-1) to the police with the allegation that while working at Brickkiln at village Kamraud, she introduced with the appellant and they entangled with each other and engaged in making physical relation in her house. From the physical relation with the appellant, she conceived pregnancy and when she disclosed about her pregnancy to the appellant, two days prior to the date of lodging of the report, he gave some medicine along with the groundnut and jaggery for causing miscarriage and assured her that when he attains the age of majority, he will perform marriage with her. By the medicine given by the appellant, she suffered miscarriage on 10.03.2023. Then she was being taken to hospital by her family members.

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From the hospital, a merg intimation was sent to police station with

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respect to death of foetus, who was delivered by the prosecutrix and the merg intimation is Exhibit P-22. On the basis of merg intimation sent by the doctor, the police has registered the offence under Sections 376(2)(n) and 315 of IPC and Section 4 of POCSO Act against the appellant and started investigation. The dead body of foetus delivered by the prosecutrix was sent for its post-mortem to Civil Hospital, Kurud, where doctor has conducted the post-mortem and gave its report (exhibit P-24) and opined that according to the finding and post-mortem and history, the age of foetus is approximately 5 months and sex of foetus is male. The inquest of the foetus was also prepared vide Exhibit P-6. The prosecutrix was also sent for her medical examination to Civil Hospital Kurud, where PW4/Dr. Sheelarani Dewangan has medically examined her and gave report (exhibit P-17). While examining the prosecutrix, she opined that the prosecutrix was about to deliver a foetus and the foetus was coming out from her private part. After her examination she opined that on the basis of examination she had an abortion of around 5 months ’ foetus on 10.03.2023. During the investigation, the DNA samples were taken from the body of the prosecutrix, the appellant as well as the foetus, which was sent for its DNA examination report to State FSL Raipur, from where DNA report (exhibit P-32) came and according to the DNA report, the appellant was found the biological father of the foetus came out from the prosecutrix .

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With respect to the age and date of birth of the prosecutrix, the progress report card of class-1 of the prosecutrix has been seized vide seizure memo (exhibit P-3) and the school register from Naveen

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Prathmikshala, Mandraud (Bhatapara), District Dhamtari has also been seized vide seizure memo (exhibit P-13). After retaining the attested true copy of the school register (exhibit P-14C), the original register was returned back to the school. An admission certificate (exhibit P-16) has also been seized by the police, which was issued by the Headmaster of the school, in which the date of birth of the prosecutrix is shown as 10.07.2006. The appellant was arrested on 11.03.2023 and he too was sent for his medical examination to Civil Hospital, Kurud, where he was medically examined by PW-5/Dr. Gaurav Vaidya and after his medical examination, he opined that there is no sign suggestive of the person incapable to perform sexual intercourse and his report is Exhibit P-18. Statement of the witnesses under section 161 of CrPC and the statement of the prosecutrix have been recorded and after completion of usual investigation, charge sheet was filed before the Learned Trial Court for the offence under Sections 376(2)(n) and 315 of IPC and Sections 4 and 6 of POCSO Act against the appellant.

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The Learned Trial Court has framed charge against the appellant for the offence under Section 376(2)(j) and (n) and 315 of IPC and Section 6 of POCSO Act. The appellant abjured his guilt and claimed trial.

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In order to establish the charge against the appellant, the prosecution has examined as many as 12 witnesses. Statement of the appellant under Section 313 of CrPC has also been recorded, in which he denied the circumstances appears against him, pleaded innocence

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and has submitted that he did not know, as to why the witnesses have deposing against him.

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After appreciation of oral as well as documentary evidence led by the prosecution, the Learned Trial Court has convicted and sentenced the appellant as mentioned in the earlier part of the judgment. Hence this appeal.

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Learned counsel for the appellant would submit that the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. There are material omissions and contradictions in the evidence of prosecution witness, which makes their case doubtful and on the uncorroborated evidence of the prosecution witnesses, the appellant cannot be convicted. There is no legally admissible evidence with respect to age of the prosecutrix that she was minor and less than 18 years of age on the date of incident. Except from the school register, there is no birth certificate, Kotwari register or even any ossification test report to determine the actual age of the prosecutrix. The basis on which the date of birth of the prosecutrix is recorded in the school register has also not been produced by the prosecution. He would also submit that author of the said school register has not been examined, therefore in absence of any cogent and clinching evidence, it cannot be held that the prosecutrix was minor on the date of incident and less than 18 years of age. He would further submit that from the written complaint of the prosecutrix, itself reflects that she was having love affair with the appellant and she herself engaged in making consensual physical relation with him on her own will and it is only when she conceived

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pregnancy, she tried to abort her pregnancy and when some complication arose during the abortion, she made complaint to the police. There is no evidence on the record that the appellant gave any medicine to her or he in any manner responsible for miscarriage/ abortion of the pregnancy of the prosecutrix. Therefore, no offence as alleged, are made out against the appellant and he is entitled for acquittal.

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On the other hand, learned counsel for the State opposes and has submitted that the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt against the appellant, but for minor omissions of contradictions in the evidence of prosecution witnesses, their evidence are reliable, upon which the Learned Trial Court has convicted the appellant for the alleged offence. He would further submit that from the school record, the age of the prosecutrix is proved, which is supported by the evidence of PW-3, who is the Headmaster of the school and proved the school record (exhibit P-14C). The minor prosecutrix was subjected to sexual intercourse by the appellant, by which she conceived pregnancy and in the DNA report, it is established that the appellant is the biological father of the foetus came out from the prosecutrix and therefore, there is sufficient evidence available on record to hold the appellant guilty for the alleged offence. Therefore, the Learned Trial Court has absolutely justified in holding conviction of the appellant for the alleged offence and sentenced him, which is not required to be interfere in the present appeal.

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We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.

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The first and foremost question arises for consideration would be the age of the prosecutrix, as to whether she was minor and less than 18 years of age on the date of alleged incident of rape or not. The prosecution has mainly relied upon the school register (exhibit P-14C) to prove her age that she was less than 18 years on the date of incident. The said school register is sought to be proved by PW-3 (Headmaster of the school), who stated in his evidence that the police has seized the school register vide seizure memo (exhibit P-13) and after retaining its attested true copy (exhibit P-14C), the original register was returned back to the school. In the said school register, the date of birth of the prosecutrix is mentioned as 10.07.2006. She was being admitted in the school by her mother. He also proved the affidavit register (exhibit P-15C) and certificate issued by him (exhibit P-16). In cross-examination, he admitted that it is not mentioned in the register (exhibit P-14 and P-15) as to on what basis her date of birth is recorded in it. He also admitted that her date of birth is not annexed with the said register (exhibit P-14 and P-15) and the entries made in Exhibit P-14 and P-15 are not in his handwriting. From the evidence of PW-3, it clearly reveals that he is not the author of the school register and he stated only on the basis of entries made in it. Who made the entry or on what basis the entries have been made, it does not reflect from his evidence.

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In paragraphs 40, 42, 43, 44 and 48 of its judgment in Alamelu and Another Vs. State, represented by Inspector of Police, 2011(2) SCC 385 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as under:

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"40. Undoubtedly, the transfer certificate, Ex.P16 indicates that the girl's date of birth was 15th June, 1977. Therefore, even according to the aforesaid certificate, she would be above 16 years of age (16 years 1 month and 16 days) on the date of the alleged incident, i.e., 31st July, 1993. The transfer certificate has been issued by a Government School and has been duly signed by the Headmaster. Therefore, it would be admissible in evidence under Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act. However, the admissibility of such a document would be of not much evidentiary value to prove the age of the girl in the absence of the material on the basis of which the age was recorded. The date of birth mentioned in the transfer certificate would have no evidentiary value unless the person, who made the entry or who gave the date of birth is examined.

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42. Considering the manner in which the facts recorded in a document may be proved, this Court in the case of Birad Mal Singhvi Vs. Anand Purohit, observed as follows:-

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"The date of birth mentioned in the scholars' register has no evidentiary value unless the person who made the entry or who gave the date of birth is examined....Merely because the documents Exs. 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12 were proved, it does not mean that the contents of documents were also proved. Mere proof of the documents Exs. 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 would not tantamount to proof of all the contents or the correctness of date of birth stated in the documents. Since the truth of the fact, namely, the date of birth of Hukmi Chand and Suraj Prakash Joshi was in Issue, mere proof of the documents as produced by the aforesaid two witnesses does not furnish evidence of the truth of the facts or contents of the documents. The truth or otherwise of the facts in issue, namely, the date of birth of

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the two candidates as mentioned in the documents could be proved by admissible evidence i.e. by the evidence of those persons who could vouchsafe for the truth of the facts in issue. No evidence of any such kind was produced by the respondent to prove the truth of the facts, namely, the date of birth of Hukmi Chand and of Suraj Prakash Joshi. In the circumstances the dates of birth as mentioned in the aforesaid documents 1988 (Supp) SCC 604 have no probative value and the dates of birth as mentioned therein could not be accepted."

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43. The same proposition of law is reiterated by this Court in the case of Narbada Devi Gupta Vs. Birendra Kumar Jaiswal, where this Court observed as follows:-

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"The legal position is not in dispute that mere production and marking of a document as exhibit by the court cannot be held to be a due proof of its contents. Its execution has to be proved by admissible evidence, that is, by the "evidence of those persons who can vouchsafe for the truth of the facts in issue".

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44. In our opinion, the aforesaid burden of proof has not been discharged by the prosecution. The father says nothing about the transfer certificate in his evidence. The Headmaster has not been examined at all. Therefore, the entry in the transfer certificate can not be relied upon to definitely fix the age of the girl.

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48. We may further notice that even with reference to Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, a public document has to be tested by applying the same standard in civil as well as criminal proceedings. In this context, it would be appropriate to notice the observations made by this Court in the case of Ravinder Singh Gorkhi Vs. State of U.P.4 held as follows:-

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"The age of a person as recorded in the school register or otherwise may be used for various purposes, namely, for obtaining admission; for obtaining an appointment; for contesting election; registration of marriage; obtaining a separate unit under the ceiling laws; and even for the purpose of litigating before a civil forum e.g. necessity of being represented in a court of law by a guardian or where a suit is filed on the ground that the plaintiff being a minor he was not appropriately represented therein or any transaction made on his behalf was void as he was a minor. A court of law for the purpose of determining the age of a (2006) 5 SCC 584 party to the lis, having regard to the provisions of Section 35 of the Evidence Act will have to apply the same standard. No different standard can be applied in case of an accused as in a case of abduction or rape, or similar offence where the victim or the prosecutrix although might have consented with the accused, if on the basis of the entries made in the register maintained by the school, a judgment of conviction is recorded, the accused would be deprived of his constitutional right under Article 21 of the Constitution, as in that case the accused may unjustly be convicted."

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In case of Rishipal Singh Solanki Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Others, 2022 (8) SCC 602 , while considering various judgments, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed in para 33 as under:

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"33. What emerges on a cumulative consideration of the aforesaid catena of judgments is as follows:

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33.2.2. If an application is filed before the Court claiming juvenility, the provision of sub-section (2) of section 94 of the JJ Act, 2015 would have to

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be applied or read along with sub-section (2) of section 9 so as to seek evidence for the purpose of recording a finding stating the age of the person as nearly as may be.

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33.3. That when a claim for juvenility is raised, the burden is on the person raising the claim to satisfy the Court to discharge the initial burden. However, the documents mentioned in Rule 12(3) (a)(i), (ii), and (iii) of the JJ Rules 2007 made under the 33 Act, 2000 or sub-section (2) of section 94 of JJ Act, 2015, shall be sufficient for prima facie satisfaction of the Court. On the basis of the aforesaid documents a presumption of juvenility may be raised.

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33.4. The said presumption is however not conclusive proof of the age of juvenility and the same may be rebutted by contra evidence let in by the opposite side.

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33.5. That the procedure of an inquiry by a Court is not the same thing as declaring the age of the person as a juvenile sought before the JJ Board when the case is pending for trial before the concerned criminal court. In case of an inquiry, the Court records a prima facie conclusion but when there is a determination of age as per subsection (2) of section 94 of 2015 Act, a declaration is made on the basis of evidence. Also the age recorded by the JJ Board shall be deemed to be the true age of the person brought before it. Thus, the standard of proof in an inquiry is different from that required in a proceeding where the determination and declaration of the age of a person has to be made on the basis of evidence scrutinised and accepted only if worthy of such

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acceptance.

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33.6. That it is neither feasible nor desirable to lay down an abstract formula to determine the age of a person. It has to be on the basis of the material on record and on appreciation of evidence adduced by the parties in each case.

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33.7 This Court has observed that a hyper. technical approach should not be adopted when evidence is adduced on behalf of the accused in support of the plea that he was a juvenile.

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33.8. If two views are possible on the same evidence, the court should lean in favour of holding the accused to be a juvenile in borderline cases. This is in order to ensure that the benefit of the JJ Act, 2015 is made applicable to the juvenile in conflict with law. At the same time, the Court should ensure that the JJ Act, 2015 is not misused by persons to escape punishment after having committed serious offences.

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33.9. That when the determination of age is on the basis of evidence such as school records, it is necessary that the same would have to be considered as per Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, Inasmuch as any public or official document maintained in the discharge of official duty would have greater credibility than private documents.

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33.10. Any document which is in consonance with public documents, such as matriculation certificate, could be accepted by the Court or the 33 Board provided such public document is credible and authentic as per the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act viz., section 35 and other provisions.

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33.11. Ossification Test cannot be the sole criterion for age determination and a mechanical view regarding the age of a person cannot be

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adopted solely on the basis of medical opinion by radiological examination. Such evidence is not conclusive evidence but only a very useful guiding factor to be considered in the absence of documents mentioned in Section 94(2) of the JJ Act, 2015."

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Recently, in case of P. Yuvaprakash Vs. State represented by Inspector of Police, 2023 (SCC Online) SC 846 , Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in para 14 to 17 as under:

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"14, Section 94 (2)(iii) of the 33 Act clearly Indicates that the date of birth certificate from the school or matriculation or equivalent certificate by the concerned examination board has to be firstly preferred in the absence of which the birth certificate issued by the Corporation or Municipal Authority or Panchayat and it is only thereafter in the absence of these such documents the age is to be determined through "an ossification test" or "any other latest medical age determination test" conducted on the orders of the concerned authority, l.e. Committee or Board or Court. In the present case, concededly, only a transfer certificate and not the date of birth certificate or matriculation or equivalent certificate was considered. Ex. C1, i.e., the school transfer certificate showed the date of birth of the victim as 11.07.1997. Significantly, the transfer certificate was produced not by the prosecution but instead by the court summoned witness, i.e., CW-1. The burden is always upon the prosecution to establish what it alleges; therefore, the prosecution could not have been. fallen back upon a document which it had never relied upon. Furthermore, DW-3, the concerned Revenue Official (Deputy Tahsildar) had stated on oath that the records for the year 1997 in respect to the births and deaths were missing. Since it did not answer to the description of any class of

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documents mentioned in Section 94(2) (i) as it was a mere transfer certificate, Ex C-1 could not have been relied upon to hold that M was below 18 years at the time of commission of the offence.

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15. In a recent decision, in Rishipal Singh Solanki vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. this court outlined the procedure to be followed in cases where age determination is required. The court was dealing with Rule 12 of the erstwhile Juvenile Justice Rules (which is in pari materia) with Section 94 of the JJ Act, and held as follows:

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"20. Rule 12 of the JJ Rules, 2007 deals with the procedure to be followed in determination of age. The juvenility of a person in conflict with law had to be decided prima facie on the basis of physical appearance, or documents, if available. But an inquiry into the determination of age by the Court or the JJ Board was by seeking evidence by obtaining: (1) the matriculation or equivalent certificates, if available and in the absence whereof; (ii) the date of birth certificate from the school (other than a play school) first attended; and in the absence whereof; (iii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat. Only in the absence of either (i), (ii) and (iii) above, the medical opinion could be sought from a duly constituted Medical Board to declare the age of the juvenile or child. It was also provided that while determination was being made, benefit could be given to the child or juvenile by considering the age on lower side within the margin of one year."

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16. Speaking about provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act, especially the various options in Section 94 (2) of the JJ Act, this court held in Sanjeev Kumar Gupta vs. The State of Uttar

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Pradesh & Ors that:

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"Clause (i) of Section 94 (2) places the date of birth certificate from the school and the matriculation or equivalent certificate from the 2021 (12) SCR 502 [2019] 9 SCR 735 concerned examination board in the same category (namely (i) above). In the absence thereof category (ii) provides for obtaining the birth certificate of the corporation, municipal authority or panchayat. It is only in the absence of (i) and (ii) that age determination by means of medical analysis is provided. Section 94(2) (a)(i) indicates a significant change over the provisions which were contained in Rule 12(3)(a) of the Rules of 2007 made under the Act of 2000. Under Rule 12(3)(a) (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificate was given precedence and it was only in the event of the certificate not being available that the date of birth certificate from the school first attended, could be obtained. In Section 94(2)(1) both the date of birth certificate from the school as well as the matriculation or equivalent certificate are placed in the same category.

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17. In Abuzar Hossain Gulam Hossain Vs. State of West Bengal, this court, through a three-judge bench, held that the burden of proving that someone is a juvenile (or below the prescribed age) is upon the person claiming it. Further, in that decision, the court indicated the hierarchy of documents that would be accepted In order of preference."

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Reverting to the facts of the present case, although the prosecutrix (PW-1) has stated in her evidence that her date of birth is 10.07.2006, but she has not stated that on what basis, she deposed about her date of birth or even her date of birth was supported by any documentary

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evidence. The PW-2 (mother of the prosecutrix), though has stated that the date of birth of her daughter is 10.07.2006, but in crossexamination, she stated that after birth of the prosecutrix, she has got recorded her birth with Gram Panchayat and Kotwar. She admitted that at the time of her admission in the school, she has not taken any document of Kotwari Panji with her. She admitted that the Kotwar has not given her any written document with respect to the date of birth of the prosecutrix. She further admitted that she has given the mark sheet of class-2 of the prosecutrix to the police, but has not given any Kotwari Panji to the police.

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From the aforesaid evidence with respect to the date of birth of the prosecutrix, as also in the light of the aforementioned judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, it is very difficult for this Court to hold that the prosecutrix was minor and less than 18 years of age on the date of incident on the basis of said school register and progress report card of the prosecutrix. As has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the school register cannot be found proved in absence of the examination of its author or the basis on which the entries have been made in the school register and the same is the situation here in the present case that the author of the school register has not been examined and the basis on which the date of birth has been recorded, has also not been proved. Except these documents, no other document, either her birth certificate, Kotwari register or Ossification test report have been produced by the prosecution to determine her age. Yet, the Learned Trial Court has found her minor, which in the opinion of this Court is erroneous.

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The next question for consideration would be the offence of rape committed by the appellant upon the prosecutrix.

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The prosecutrix (PW-1) has stated in her evidence that when she was going to work in the Brickkiln, she introduced with the appellant and he made physical relation with her by which she conceived pregnancy. She informed about her pregnancy to the appellant, but he did nothing and four months back, when she was feeling pain on her abdomen and went to washroom, her foetus came out from her abdomen and then her mother took her to Civil Hospital, Kurud and then she was being treated by the doctor. She informed the police about the incident and gave her written complaint (exhibit P-1). She denied that the appellant has given any medicine for miscarriage of the foetus. In cross-examination, she admitted that she and the appellant were in love affair with each other and their relationship was not in the knowledge of her mother. She further admitted that even after her pregnancy, she has not disclosed about the same up to five months to her mother or any other person. She also admitted that due to their love affair, she made physical relation with the appellant. She further admitted that since she was also consented in making physical relation with the appellant, she has not disclosed about her physical relation with the appellant to her mother. She further admitted that due to their love affair, she was willing to marry with the appellant.

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PW-2/the mother of the prosecutrix has stated in her evidence that 3-4 months back when she was taking her lunch, the prosecutrix started shouting from bathroom. When she came there, she saw that her

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foetus is coming out from her abdomen. Then she immediately taken her to hospital. She was giving her statement to the police. She heard that the prosecutrix had made physical relation with the appellant 2-4 times and he kept her in assurance that he will marry with her. She did not heard about the fact that the appellant has given any medicine to her. In her evidence, she did not state about any act of the appellant or that the prosecutrix has informed her that the appellant has committed rape upon her.

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PW-4/Dr. Sheelarani Dewangan, who medically examined the prosecutrix has stated in her evidence that on 13.03.2023, the prosecutrix was brought before her for her medical examination. Her foetus was coming out from her uterus. She was being treated and her foetus was died. After her examination, she gave her report (exhibit P- 17).

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PW-10/Dr. Lokesh Sahu, who has taken the blood sample of the prosecutrix as well as the appellant for DNA test and their identification form is Exhibit P-10 and P-11, which was filled up by him. Although the blood sample were sent to FSL Raipur for DNA test and DNA report (exhibit P-32) reflects that the appellant is the biological father of the foetus, which came out from the body of the prosecutrix. But the same is not relevant to be discussed here further, because the appellant has not challenged that the foetus came out from the body of the prosecutrix, as the same is not from his side, whereas the prosecutrix herself has admitted that due to their love affair with the appellant, they made physical relation by which she conceived pregnancy.

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Therefore, the paternity of the said foetus is not the subject matter of the present appeal, as no one has challenged the same.

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From the aforesaid evidence available on record, it is quite vivid that the prosecution has failed to prove the fact that the prosecutrix was minor and less than 18 years of age on the date of incident. She was in love affair with the appellant and engaged in making consensual physical relation with him. Both of them were willing to marry with each other. In the meantime, she got miscarriage of her foetus, which was of about 5 months and when she was being taken to hospital, the merg intimation of death of foetus was given to police by the doctor, upon which the police started investigation and then on being disclosed by the prosecutrix that she made physical relation with the appellant, the offence has been registered. When the prosecutrix herself has stated that she made physical relation with the appellant consensually and she is not found to be minor, no offence of rape is made out against the appellant.

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The version of the prosecutrix commands great respect and acceptability, but if there are some circumstances which cast some doubt in the mind of the court on the veracity of the prosecutrix's evidence, then it will not be safe to rely on the said version of the prosecutrix. There is contradiction and omissions in the statement of the prosecutrix and her parents. The law is well settled that in case of rape, conviction can be maintained even on the basis of sole testimony of the prosecutrix. However, there is an important caveat which is that the testimony of the prosecutrix must inspire confidence.

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Even though the testimony of the prosecutrix is not required to be corroborated, if her statement is not believable, then the accused cannot be convicted. The prosecution has to bring home the charges levelled against the appellant beyond any reasonable doubt, which the prosecution has failed to do in the instant case.

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From the foregoing reasons, the appeal filed by the appellant is allowed. The impugned judgment of conviction and sentence dated 19.12.2023 is set aside. The appellant is acquitted from the alleged offences. The appellant is reported to be in jail since 11.03.2023. He be released forthwith, if not required in any other case.

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Keeping in view the provisions of Section 481 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, the appellant- Hemant @ Hemlal Chakradhari is directed to furnish a personal bond for a sum of Rs. 25,000/- with one surety in the like amount before the Court concerned which shall be effective for a period of six months along with an undertaking that in the event of filing of Special Leave Petition against the instant judgment or for grant of leave, the aforesaid appellant, on receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

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Registry is directed to transmit the trial Court record along with a copy of this order to the Court concerned forthwith for necessary information and compliance.

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Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice

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ved

Hemant @ Hemlal Chakradhari v. State of Chhattisgarh

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Hemant @ Hemlal Chakradhari v. State of Chhattisgarh

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