Appeals against conviction for wrongful restraint and gang rape of a minor girl. The High Court set aside the finding that the prosecutrix was a minor for want of admissible proof of age, but upheld the gang rape conviction on her testimony, corroborating injuries, FSL report and defence suggestions, and dismissed both appeals.
This page shows the compact analysis of this judgement. The full analysis — procedural history, issue-by-issue holdings with ratio and obiter, advocates, and paragraph-level evidence for every claim — is being added to the record in batches and will appear here when this judgement has been through it.
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NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH, BILASPUR
CRA No. 1225 of 2022
and
Digitally signed by VAISHALI VAISHALI LUCKY LUCKY NAGARIA NAGARIA Date: 2025.02.21 12:06:47 +0530
CRA No. 1358 of 2022 Judgment reserved on : 12/03/2024 Judgment delivered on :24/04/2024
CRA No. 1225 of 2022
---- Appellant
Versus
---- Respondent
CRA No. 1358 of 2022
---- Appellant
Versus
For Appellant in CRA No. 1225 of 2022 : Mr. Hariom Rai, Advocate For Appellant in CRA No. 1358 of 2022 :Mr. Rajeev Kumar Shrivastava, Advocate
For Respondent/State : Mr. R.S. Marhas, Additional A.G.
Division Bench
Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge CAV Judgment
Per Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, J
(1) These two appeals arising out of the same sessions trial
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and common judgment and therefore, both these appeals are being decided together.
(2) These appeals are arise out of the judgment of conviction and sentenced dated 24.06.2022 passed by learned Special Judge (POCSO Act) Balod, District - Balod in Special Session Case (POCSO) No. 06/2019 whereby the appellants have been convicted and sentenced in the following manner:-
| Conviction | Sentences | Punishment in default of payment of fine |
|---|---|---|
| Under Section 341 of IPC |
One month R.I. with fine of Rs. 500/- |
One month S.I. |
| Under Section 376(D) of IPC |
Twenty years R.I with fine of Rs. 2,000/- |
Tow months R.I. |
| Under Section 4 of Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 |
No separate sentence has been awarded. |
- |
All the sentences are directed to run concurrently.
father of the prosecutrix has lodged report to the police station Rajhara, District – Balod, against the appellants with the allegation that on 08.12.2018 at about 7:00 p.m when his minor daughter had gone to the house of the his
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neighbor and has not returned back after a long time he started searching her. At about 8:00 p.m. she came to back to his house in very unusual condition and she was scared and after having her dinner she went for sleep. On the next day she shared her difficulty to her friend who asked from the prosecutrix about her well being then she disclosed the incident that yesterday evening when she returning from her neighbor’s house after charging of her mobile, both the appellants have kidnapped her, gagged her mouth and taken her towards Sheetla Mandir by lifting her. She gave a teeth bite to the appellant Nandu Patel and when she tried to come out from the clutches of the appellants, they again chased her and again caught hold her and again dragged her towards the field of Seeta Bai where they committed rape upon her one after one. She raised her alarm and shouted and protested by giving nail stretch marks and teeth bite on the body of the accused persons. After committing rape upon her, both of them fled away from the place after giving her threatening. Village meeting was convened and thereafter report has been lodged. The police has registered the offence against the appellant for the offence under Section 376, 294, 323, 506, 384/34 of IPC and Section 3,4, 5(g) and 6 of POCSO Act. The
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prosecutrix was sent for her medical examination to Government Hospital Balod where PW-6 Dr. R. Prasanno has examined her who gave her report Ex.P-17. While examining the prosecutrix the doctor has not found any injury on her body. Two slider of her vaginal swab were prepared. The slides, pubic hair were sealed and handed over to police constable for FSL examination. The prosecutrix was advised for x-ray examination for confirmation of her age. The spot map Ex.P-2 was prepared by the police and Ex.P-3 was prepared by the Patwari. The underwear of the prosecutrix was seized vide seizure memo Ex.P-1 with respect to the age and date of birth of the prosecutrix the progress report card of class five of the prosecutrix was seized vide seizure memo Ex. P-8 and the progress report card is Ex.P-9. The school admission and discharge register from Primary School, Jheekatola has also been seized vide seizure memo Ex.P14 and after retaining the attested true copy of the same the original register was returned back and attested true copy of school admission and discharge register is article ‘A’ in which the date of birth of the prosecutrix is recorded as 04.03.2003. The appellants are arrested on 11.12.2018 and they have also been sent for their medical examination
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to Community Health Centre, Chiklakasa, where they have been examined by PW-8 Dr. P.Dhanendra. After their examination the doctor gave his report Ex.P-20 with respect to the appellant Bhagwan Singh and Ex.P-21 with respect to the appellant Nandkishore @ Nandu Patel. While examining the appellant Bhagwan Singh the doctor has noticed abrasion above and medially of his right side of chest size-
(a) 1/4x1/2 c.m.
(b) 3/4 inch above the first first injury size 1/6 x 1/3 with red in color.
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Cr.P.C. of the prosecutrix has also been recorded and after completion of usual investigation charge-sheet was filed before the learned trial Court for the offences under Sections 376, 294, 323, 506, 384/34 of IPC and Section 3(a), 4, 5(g) and 6 of POCSO Act.
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prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. There are material, omissions and contradictions in the evidence of the prosecution witnesses. There is no legally admissible evidence produced by the prosecution to hold that on the date of incident the prosecutrix was minor and below eighteen years of age, no any kotwari register, birth certificate or ossification test report has been produced by the prosecution to prove the age of the prosecutrix. The author of the school admission and discharge register has not been examined and therefore the same can not be taken into consideration. He would further submit that there is a dispute between the father of the prosecutrix and the appellants with respect to money transaction and the father of the prosecutrix threaten them to rope in a false case. The conduct of the prosecutrix is suspicious and her evidence can not be made basis to convict the appellants particularly in absence of any corroborative evidence. She has not immediately disclosed the incident to her parents and when her friend have asked in the next day she disclosed the incident to him which itself raised suspicion over her credibility. A totally improbable story has been
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developed by the prosecutrix for which no sufficient evidence has been produced by the prosecution, therefore appellants are entitle for their acquittal.
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justified and there is no need to interfere with the impugned judgment.
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witness it appears that he is not the author of the school register and he has not made any statement to that effect that he himself has made entry in the school register. Although the progress report card of class five of the prosecutrix was seized by the police in which also her date of birth recorded as 04.02.2003, but in absence of any evidence regarding entries made in the said report card, the same also can not be taken into consideration to determine the age of the prosecutrix.
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before Hon’ble Supreme Court in Alamelu and Another Vs.
State, represented by Inspector of Police, 2011(2) SCC
385 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the transfer certificate which is issued by government school and is duly signed by the Headmaster would be admissible in evidence under Section 35 of the Evidence Act 1872. However, the admissibility of such a document would be of not much evidentiary value to prove the age of the prosecutrix in the absence of any material on the basis of which the age was recorded. The Hon'ble Supreme court held that the date of birth mentioned in the transfer certificate would have no evidentiary value unless the person who made the entry or who gave the date of birth is examined.
In paragraphs 40,42,43,44 and 48 of its judgment in Alamelu (Supra), the Supreme Court has observed as under:-
"40.Undoubtedly, the transfer certificate, Ex.P16 indicates that the girl's date of birth was 15th June, 1977. Therefore, even according to the aforesaid certificate, she would be above 16 years of age (16 years 1 month and 16 days) on the date of the alleged incident, i.e., 31st July, 1993. The transfer certificate has been issued by a Government School and has been duly signed by the Headmaster. Therefore, it would be admissible in evidence under Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act. However, the admissibility of such a document would be of not much evidentiary value to prove the age of the girl in the absence of the material on the basis of which the age was recorded. The date of birth mentioned in the transfer certificate would have no evidentiary value unless the person, who made the entry or who gave the date of birth is examined.
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"The date of birth mentioned in the scholars' register has no evidentiary value unless the person who made the entry or who gave the date of birth is examined....Merely because the documents Exs. 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12 were proved, it does not mean that the contents of documents were also proved. Mere proof of the documents Exs. 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 would not tantamount to proof of all the contents or the correctness of date of birth stated in the documents. Since the truth of the fact, namely, the date of birth of Hukmi Chand and Suraj Prakash Joshi was in issue, mere proof of the documents as produced by the aforesaid two witnesses does not furnish evidence of the truth of the facts or contents of the documents. The truth or otherwise of the facts in issue, namely, the date of birth of the two candidates as mentioned in the documents could be proved by admissible evidence i.e. by the evidence of those persons who could vouchsafe for the truth of the facts in issue. No evidence of any such kind was produced by the respondent to prove the truth of the facts, namely, the date of birth of Hukmi Chand and of Suraj Prakash Joshi. In the circumstances the dates of birth as mentioned in the aforesaid documents 1988 (Supp) SCC 604 have no probative value and the dates of birth as mentioned therein could not be accepted."
"The legal position is not in dispute that mere production and marking of a document as exhibit by the court cannot be held to be a due proof of its contents. Its execution has to be proved by admissible evidence, that is, by the "evidence of those persons who can vouchsafe for the truth of the facts in issue"."
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where a suit is filed on the ground that the plaintiff being a minor he was not appropriately represented therein or any transaction made on his behalf was void as he was a minor. A court of law for the purpose of determining the age of a (2006) 5 SCC 584 party to the lis, having regard to the provisions of Section 35 of the Evidence Act will have to apply the same standard. No different standard can be applied in case of an accused as in a case of abduction or rape, or similar offence where the victim or the prosecutrix although might have consented with the accused, if on the basis of the entries made in the register maintained by the school, a judgment of conviction is recorded, the accused would be deprived of his constitutional right under Article 21 of the Constitution, as in that case the accused may unjustly be convicted."
"33. What emerges on a cumulative consideration of the aforesaid catena of judgments is as follows:
33.2.2. If an application is filed before the Court claiming juvenility, the provision of sub-section (2) of section 94 of the JJ Act, 2015 would have to be applied or read along with sub-section (2) of section 9 so as to seek evidence for the purpose of recording a finding stating the age of the person as nearly as may be.
33.3. That when a claim for juvenility is raised, the burden is on the person raising the claim to satisfy the Court to discharge the initial burden. However, the documents mentioned in Rule 12(3)(a)(i), (ii), and (iii) of the JJ Rules 2007 made under the JJ Act, 2000 or sub- section (2) of section 94 of JJ Act, 2015, shall be sufficient for prima facie satisfaction of the Court. On the basis of the aforesaid documents a presumption of juvenility may be raised.
33.4. The said presumption is however not conclusive proof of the age of juvenility and the same may be rebutted by contra evidence let in by the opposite side.
33.5. That the procedure of an inquiry by a Court is not the same thing as declaring the age of the person as a juvenile sought before the JJ Board when the case is pending for trial before the concerned criminal court. In case of an inquiry, the Court records a prima facie conclusion but when there is a determination of age as per subsection (2) of section 94 of 2015 Act, a declaration is made on the basis of evidence. Also the age recorded by the JJ Board shall be deemed to be the true age of the person brought before it. Thus, the standard of proof in an inquiry is different from that required in a proceeding where the determination and declaration of the age of a person has to be made on the basis of evidence scrutinised and accepted only if worthy of such acceptance.
33.6. That it is neither feasible nor desirable to lay down an abstract formula to determine the age of a person. It has to be on the basis of the material on record and on appreciation of evidence adduced by the parties in each case.
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33.7 This Court has observed that a hypertechnical approach should not be adopted when evidence is adduced on behalf of the accused in support of the plea that he was a juvenile.
33.8. If two views are possible on the same evidence, the court should lean in favour of holding the accused to be a juvenile in borderline cases. This is in order to ensure that the benefit of the JJ Act, 2015 is made applicable to the juvenile in conflict with law. At the same time, the Court should ensure that the JJ Act, 2015 is not misused by persons to escape punishment after having committed serious offences.
33.9. That when the determination of age is on the basis of evidence such as school records, it is necessary that the same would have to be considered as per Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, inasmuch as any public or official document maintained in the discharge of official duty would have greater credibility than private documents.
33.10. Any document which is in consonance with public documents, such as matriculation certificate, could be accepted by the Court or the JJ Board provided such public document is credible and authentic as per the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act viz., section 35 and other provisions.
33.11. Ossification Test cannot be the sole criterion for age determination and a mechanical view regarding the age of a person cannot be adopted solely on the basis of medical opinion by radiological examination. Such evidence is not conclusive evidence but only a very useful guiding factor to be considered in the absence of documents mentioned in Section 94(2) of the JJ Act, 2015."
16. Recently, in case of P. Yuvaprakash Vs. State represented by Inspector of Police, 2023 (SCC Online) SC 846 , Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in para 14 to 17 as under :
“14. Section 94 (2)(iii) of the JJ Act clearly indicates that the date of birth certificate from the school or matriculation or equivalent certificate by the concerned examination board has to be firstly preferred in the absence of which the birth certificate issued by the Corporation or Municipal Authority or Panchayat and it is only thereafter in the absence of these such documents the age is to be determined through “an ossification test” or “any other latest medical age determination test” conducted on the orders of the concerned authority, i.e. Committee or Board or Court. In the present case, concededly, only a transfer certificate and not the date of birth certificate or matriculation or equivalent certificate was considered. Ex. C1, i.e., the school transfer certificate showed the date of birth of the victim as 11.07.1997. Significantly, the transfer certificate was produced not by the prosecution but instead by the court summoned witness, i.e., CW-1. The burden is always upon the prosecution to establish what it alleges; therefore,the prosecution could not have been fallen back upon a document which it had never relied upon. Furthermore, DW-3,the concerned Revenue Official (Deputy Tahsildar) had stated on oath that the records for the year 1997 in respect to the births and deaths were missing. Since it did not
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answer to the description of any class of documents mentioned in Section 94(2)(i) as it was a mere transfer certificate, Ex C-1 could not have been relied upon to hold that M was below 18 years at the time of commission of the offence.
15. In a recent decision, in Rishipal Singh Solanki vs. Stateof Uttar Pradesh & Ors. this court outlined the procedure to be followed in cases where age determination is required. The court was dealing with Rule 12 of the erstwhile Juvenile Justice Rules (which is in pari materia) with Section 94 of the JJ Act, and held as follows:
“20. Rule 12 of the JJ Rules, 2007 deals with the procedure to be followed in determination of age. The juvenility of a person in conflict with law had to be decided prima facie on the basis of physical appearance, or documents, if available. But an inquiry into the determination of age by the Court or the JJ Board was by seeking evidence by obtaining: (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificates, if available and in the absence whereof; (ii) the date of birth certificate from the school (other than a play school) first attended; and in the absence whereof; (iii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat. Only in the absence of either (i), (ii) and (iii) above, the medical opinion could be sought from a duly constituted Medical Board to declare the age of the juvenile or child. It was also provided that while determination was being made, benefit could be given to the child or juvenile by considering the age on lower side within the margin of one year.
16. Speaking about provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act, especially the various options in Section 94 (2) of the JJ Act, this court held in Sanjeev Kumar Gupta vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors that: “Clause (i) of Section 94 (2) places the date of birth certificate from the school and the matriculation or equivalent certificate from the 2021 (12) SCR 502 [2019] 9 SCR 735 concerned examination board in the same category (namely (i) above). In the absence thereof category (ii) provides for obtaining the birth certificate of the corporation, municipal authority or panchayat. It is only in the absence of (i) and (ii) that age determination by means of medical analysis is provided. Section 94(2) (a)(i) indicates a significant change over the provisions which were contained in Rule 12(3)(a) of the Rules of 2007 made under the Act of 2000. Under Rule 12(3)(a) (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificate was given precedence and it was only in the event of the certificate not being available that the date of birth certificate from the school first attended, could be obtained. In Section 94(2)(i) both the date of birth certificate from the school as well as the matriculation or equivalent certificate are placed in the same category.
17. In Abuzar Hossain @ Gulam Hossain Vs. State of West Bengal, this court, through a three-judge bench, held that the burden of proving that someone is a juvenile (or below the prescribed age) is upon the person claiming it. Further, in that decision, the court indicated the hierarchy of documents that would be accepted in order of preference.”
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Reverting to the facts of present case from the above evidence, it is quite vivid that there is no legally admissible evidence available on record to hold that on the date of incident the prosecutrix was minor and less than 18 years of age. Yet the learned trial Court has held as minor and therefore the set aside the findings recorded by the learned trail Court that on the date of incident the prosecutrix was below 18 years of age.
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on the body of appellant Bhagwan Singh. In the field of Seeta Bai the appellant Nand Kishore committed rape upon her first and thereafter the appellant Bhagwan Singh committed rape upon her. When she raised her alarm, the appellants gave threatening to her with dire consequences. The appellants left her in jungle and then she returned back to her house by crying. She was very much scared due to the threatening given by the appellants and for that reason she could not inform the incident to her parents. On the next day she disclosed the incident to her uncle in presence of her father. Her parents have called a village meeting in which the appellants and her family members were also present. They denied from their guilt and then they have lodged the report. In her cross-examination she has stated that due to fear she has not disclosed the incident to her parents. In cross examinations she denied the suggestion given by the defence that she refused the proposal of the appellants to visit places. She admitted that the appellants were in intoxicate condition of liquor. She admitted the suggestion given by the appellants that she gave nail stretch marks and teeth bite on the body of the appellants. She was unaware about any dispute with Dinesh and her father. She further denied that Dinesh has demanded Rs. 20,000/- from the appellants or else they
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would be roped in a false case. She again denied the suggestion given by the defence that she had gone to visit places with the appellants. She has also denied the suggestion that no incident of rape has occurred with her.
PW-2, is the father of the prosecutrix, have stated in his deposition that on the date of incident his daughter return at about 8:00 p.m from the house of his neighbor and she was not in good condition and scared. On the next day when his friend Dinesh have asked her about her well being she disclosed the entire incident to his friend and then he came to know about the incident that the appellants have kidnapped her and committed rape upon her. The prosecutrix disclosed him that she scared and thereby she could not informed about the incident and then village meeting was called and in the village meeting appellants have denied their guilt and then he lodged the report. In cross examination he denied the dispute
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with the appellants at the time of marriage function in the house of Panchu. He also denied that Dinesh has threaten the appellants to rope in a false case.
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presence of the appellants at the relevant part of time and consumed liquor have not been cross examined and challenged in his cross-examination thereby the presence of the appellants on the place of incident and its nearby place is proved by the prosecution. The house of the prosecutrix was also situated in the same locality. The evidence of PW-4 is corroborated with the evidence of PW-1 prosecutrix that on the date of incident the appellants were in intoxicated condition of liquor. In cross examination of PW-1, the defence themselves have given suggestion that the appellants were consumed liquor which has been duly corroborated by the evidence of PW-4 that on the date of incident he and the appellants have consumed liquor.
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of the prosecutrix were sent for FSL examination and as per
FSL report Ex. P-40. The semen and sperm were found on the underwear of the prosecutrix as well as underwear of the appellant Nand Kishore. The presence of human sperms from the underwear of the prosecutrix was also corroborated, the evidence of the prosecutrix that she was subjected to rape by the appellants.
24. The offence of Section 376 (D) is provided punishment
for gang rape which reads as under:-
376-D Gang rape- Where a woman is raped by one or more persons constituting a group or acting in furtherance of a common intention, each of those persons shall be deemed to have committed the offence of rape and shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than twenty years, but which may extend to life which shall mean imprisonment for the remainder of that person’s natural life, and with fine:
Provided that such fine shall be just and reasonable to meet the medical expenses and rehabilitation of the victim:
Provided further that any fine imposed under this section shall be paid to the victim.
presumption as to absence of consent in certain prosecution of rape which reads under :-
114A. Presumption as to absence of consent in certain prosecution for rape - In a prosecution for rape under clause (a), clause(b), clause(c), clause (d), clause (e), clause (f), clause (g), clause (h), clause (I), clause (j), clause (k), clause (l), clause (m), or clause (n) of sub-section (2) of section 376 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), where sexual intercourse by the accused is proved and the question is whether it was without the consent of the woman alleged to have been raped and such woman states in her evidence
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before the court that she did not consent, the court shall presume that she did not consent.
150 The High Court has referred to some decisions of this Court and tried to apply the ratio of those cases to the present case which, as we shall show, are clearly distinguishable. The High Court was greatly impressed by the view taken by some courts, including this Court,n that a false defence or a false plea taken by an accused would be an additional link in the various chain of circumstantial evidence and seems to suggest that since the
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appellant had taken a false plea that would be conclusive, taken along with other circumstances, to prove the case. We might, however, mention at the outset that this is not what this Court has said. We shall elaborate this aspect of the mater a little later.
151 It is well settled that the prosecution must stand or fall on its legs and it cannot derive an strength from the weakness of the defence. This is trite law and no decision has taken a contrary view. What some cases have held is only this : where various links in a chain are in themselves complete, then a false plea or a false defence may be called into aid only lend assurance to the court. In other words, before using the additional link it must be proved that all the links in the chain are complete and do not suffer from any infirmity. It is not the law that where there is any infirmity or lacuna in the prosecution case, the same could be cured or supplied by a false defence or a plea which is not accepted by a court.
From the above pronouncement it, it is settled that where various links of the chain are completed then false plea or a false defence may be called into aid only to lend assurance to the Court. It is not the law that where there is any infirmity or lacuna in the prosecution case, the same could be cured by a false defence or plea which is not accepted by the Court. In the light of the observations made by the Apex Court in the case of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda, (supra), we are of the view, that though the suggestion made in the crossexamination is not evidence but certainly they may be called into aid only to lend assurance to the prosecution case, particularly when other evidence establishes the guilt of the accused. We have already observed that the evidence of P.W. 1 stands corroborated by F.I.R. as also the evidence of P.W. 2 and 4 on material points. In view thereof the suggestion made by the defence could be used to lend
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assurance to the prosecution case. In the case of Rakesh
Kumar alias Babli v. State of Haryana reported in 1987 (2) SCC 34 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 9 of the report held thus:
"In his cross-examination, P.W. 4, Sube Singh, stated that the accused Dharam Vir, was wearing a shirt of white colour. It was suggested to him on behalf of the accused that Dharam Vir was wearing a shirt of cream colour. In answer to that suggestion, P.W. 4 said "It is not correct that Dharam Vir accused was wearing a shirt of cream colour and not a white colour at that time." The learned Sessions Judge has rightly observed that the above suggestion at least proves the presence of accused Dharam Vir, on the spot at the time of occurrence."
8- "It is not correct that before the incident she had gone with the accused persons to visit towards Shitla Mandir. It is also not correct that she refused to go with the accused persons to visit places. It is true that the accused persons were in drunken condition. It is not correct that she refused to go with them because of the reason that they were in drunken condition. She voluntarily stated that she had not gone with them. It is true that she gave her teeth bite and nail scratched the accused persons. She voluntarily stated that she gave nail scratch to accused Bhagwan and teeth bite to accused Nandu.
14it is not correct that she had gone with the accused persons to visit places."
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prosecution case.
State of Haryana:-
17.It has to be borne in mind that an offence of rape is basically an assault on the human rights of a victim. It is an attack on her individuality. It creates an incurable dent in her right and free will and personal sovereignty over the physical frame. Everyone in any civilised society has to show respect for the other individual and no individual has any right to invade on physical frame of another in any manner. It is not only an offence but such an act creates a scar in the marrows of the mind of the victim. Anyone who indulges in a crime of such nature not only does he violate the penal provision of the Indian Penal Code but also right of equality, right of individual identity and in the ultimate eventuality an important aspect of rule of law which is a constitutional commitment. The Constitution of India, an organic document, confers rights. It does not condescend or confer any allowance or grant. It recognises rights and the rights are strongly entrenched in the constitutional framework, its ethos and philosophy, subject to certain limitation. Dignity of every citizen flows from the fundamental precepts of the equality clause engrafted Under Articles 14 and right to life Under Article 21 of the Constitution, for they are the "fon juris" of our Constitution. The said rights are constitutionally secured.
appellants are guilty for commission of offence of gang rape
upon the prosecutrix and they have rightly been convicted by the
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learned trial Court for the alleged offences of wrongful restrain and gang rape by the appellants, the judgment of conviction and sentenced passed by the learned trial Court is well reasoned and justified.
Sd/-
Sd/-
(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice
Vaishali
2 issues framed by the court
Whether the prosecutrix was proved to be a minor (below 18 years) on the date of the incident on legally admissible evidence.
Whether the prosecution proved gang rape by the appellants beyond reasonable doubt despite omissions, contradictions and delayed disclosure.
Colour shows how this judgement treated each authority
Alamelu and Another Vs. State, represented by Inspector of PoliceRelied on¶14
Alamelu and Another Vs. State, represented by Inspector of Police, 2011(2) SCC 385 · Who else cites this
Rishipal Singh Solanki Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & OthersRelied on¶15
Rishipal Singh Solanki Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Others, 2022 (8) SCC 602 · Who else cites this
P. Yuvaprakash Vs. State represented by Inspector of PoliceRelied on¶16
P. Yuvaprakash Vs. State represented by Inspector of Police, 2023 (SCC Online) SC 846 · Who else cites this
Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of MaharashtraApplied¶27
Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra reported in 1984(4) SCC 116 · Who else cites this
Rakesh Kumar alias Babli v. State of HaryanaApplied¶27
Rakesh Kumar alias Babli v. State of Haryana reported in 1987 (2) SCC 34 · Who else cites this
Prahlad Versus State of HaryanaRelied on¶31
2015 (8) SCC 688 Prahlad Versus State of Haryana · Who else cites this
4 provisions across 3 enactments
Bhagwan Singh Gond
Nandkishore @ Nandu Patel
State of Chhattisgarh Through Station House Officer, P.S. Rajhara, District Balod
Ramesh Sinha
Ravindra Kumar Agrawal
As recorded by the court registry
Judgements on the same questions, provisions and authorities, from every court
