Mansingh Rajpurohit Vs Ghanshyam Singh

¶1

Page 1 of 10

¶2

2024:CGHC:48173

¶3

NAFR

¶4

HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

¶5

ACQA No. 720 of 2024

¶6

1 - Mansingh Rajpurohit S/o Salam Singh Rajpurohit Aged About 46 Years R/o Village -Jata, Police Station- Saja, District Bemetara, Chhattisgarh. .....Complainant.

¶7

... Appellant

¶8

versus

¶9

1 - Ghanshyam Singh S/o Kishan Singh Rajpurohit Aged About 49 Years R/o 96/ B, Hiran Magri, Sector No. 06, Police Station- Hiran Magri, DistrictUdaypur (Rajasthan).

¶10

2 - Accused Bhanumati @ Yogita Rajput D/o Ghanshyam Singh Rajpurohit Aged About 32 Years R/o 96/ B, Hiran Magri, Sector No. 06, Police Station- Hiran Magri, District- Udaypur (Rajasthan).

¶11

3 - Smt. Kanya Kanwar W/o Ghanshyam Singh Rajpurohit Aged About 45 Years R/o 96/ B, Hiran Magri, Sector No. 06, Police Station- Hiran Magri, DistrictUdaypur (Rajasthan). 4 - Mahipal Singh S/o Ghanshyam Singh Rajpurohit Aged About 35 Years R/o 96/ B, Hiran Magri, Sector No. 06, Police Station- Hiran Magri, DistrictUdaypur (Rajasthan).

¶12

5 - Kishan Singh S/o Shivnath Singh Rajpurohit Aged About 75 Years R/o Village- Sandiya, Police Station- Sojar, District Pali Rajasthan.

¶13

KISHORE KUMAR DESHMUKH

¶14

Digitally signed by KISHORE KUMAR DESHMUKH Date: 2024.12.17 11:32:38 +0530

¶15

6 - Mahendra Singh S/o Kishan Singh Rajpurohit Aged About 33 Years R/o Village- Sandiya, Police Station- Sojar, District Pali Rajasthan.

¶16

7 - Chain Singh S/o Kishan Singh Rajpurohit Aged About 38 Years R/o Village- Sandiya, Police Station- Sojar, District Pali Rajasthan.

¶17

8 - Karan Singh S/o Kishan Singh Rajpurohit Aged About 31 Years R/o Village- Sandiya, Police Station- Sojar, District Pali Rajasthan.

¶18

9 - Arjun Singh S/o Roop Singh Rajpurohit Aged About 36 Years R/o

¶19

Page 2 of 10

¶20

Khivada, Police Station- Khivada, District- Pali Rajsthan.

¶21

---- Respondents

¶22

For Appellant : Shri Vaibhav A. Goverdhan, Advocate For Respondents : Shri Gaurav Singhal, Advocate

¶23

Hon'ble Shri Justice Narendra Kumar Vyas

¶24

Judgment on Board

¶25

06.12.2024

¶26

This acquittal appeal has been filed by the appellant against the judgment and order passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Saja, District Bemetara dated 12.09.2023, in Complaint Case No. 03/2018, whereby the respondents/accused have been acquitted of the charges under Sections 417, 500/34 of the IPC.

¶27

The complainant has filed complaint before the Magistrate under Section 417, 500/34 of the IPC alleging that the appellant is Rajasthani Brahmin and governned by Hindu Law. In their society second marriage is forbidden during the lifetime of husband and wife, if someone violates it then the society does not accept it. Younger brother of appellant Om Prakash Singh Rajpurohit died suddenly on 08.05.2006 in village Janta, Police Station Saja due to electric shock and his father Salam Rajpurohit died on 05.11.2008. Marriage of his brother Om Prakash with respondent No. 02 was solemnized in village Janta on 22.04.2004. As per the rules of said marriage, the girl's maternal side brought the girl to the residence of groom's side in village Janta and got the rituals performed by both the parties. Later, after the death of Om Prakash, respondent No. 1 Ghanshyam Singh Rajpurohit and his brother respodnent No. 7 Chainsingh Hiran Magri came from Udaipur to village Janta to join the last rituals of the deceased. Thereafter they went back to Rajasthan. On 07.08.2006 respondent No. 1 Ghanshyam Singh Rajpurohit came to his house in village Janta and took respodnent No. 2 Bhanumati alias Yogita Rajpurohit and her son

¶28

Page 3 of 10

¶29

Himanshu Rajpurohit with him and went back to Rajasthan. Respondent No. 2 took with her Rs. 7000 cash and all the jewellery of marriage offerings. Later, on 03.04.2007 she sent a registered notice to appellant’s brother Tikam Singh through her advocate alleging the withdrawal of money from the bank account of deceased late Omprakash by forcibly taking her signature and also alleging mishandling of her dowry and belongings. The said notice was replied by his brother Tikam Singh.

¶30

In May 2007, a sealed envelope came from Udaipur in the name of Bhupendra Singh which was sent from Rajasthan by a person named S. Meneria in which there was an affidavit dated 05.09.2003 signed by respondent No.2 with her photo on the affidavit. The said affidavit was related to the marriage of respondent No. 2 with one Bhavarlal Paneri. In this relation respondent No. 1 had also filed FIR against Bhavarlal Paneri under sections 366, 368, 376 IPC, whose session case number 14/2004 wherein he was discharged on 25.07.2005 on the count that respondent No. 2 had solemnised marriage with him and was staying with him on her free will. Respondnet No. 1 Ghanshyam Singh Rajpurohit concealing the fact of earlier marriage of his daughter, got the marriage solemnised with his deceased brother which has caused defamation to his family therefore, he would pray for registration of the complainant against the respondents.

¶31

Learned trial Court on the basis of the preliminary evidence registered the offence under Sections 417, 500/34 of the IPC. The appellant examined Mansingh Rajpurohit (P.W.1) and the accused have not examined any witness. She was examined under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. and denied the allegations levelled against her. The witness Mansingh has admitted in his examination that they have not made any attempt to ascertain the identification of the person who has sent the envelope. He has also admitted that the entire property is the self acquired property of his father. Learned trial Court after considering the

¶32

Page 4 of 10

¶33

materials placed before it and evidence on record, recorded its finding that no such material has been placed by the prosecution which suggest defamation of the family of the appellant and acquitted the respondents No. 1 to 9 from the charges.

¶34

Learned counsel for the appellant would submit that there was sufficient materials in the record the affidavit of respondent No. 2 with regard to her earlier marriage, documents related with the session case Number 14/2004 filed before the District and Sessions Court, Udaipur which suggests that respondent No. 2 was a legally wedded wife of another person before marriage with the appellant’s deceased brother. Learned trial Court has failed to appreciate this fact, therefore, it has committed illegality and irregularity which warrant interference by this Court and would pray for allowing the appeal.

¶35

Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents would submit that no evidence has been brought on record how defamation has been caused to the family of the appellant by respondents No. 1 to 9. The appellant has not stated anything about the manner in which defamation has taken place. Learned trial Court has rightly recorded its finding that in the worst view of the matter even if cheating has been done then, it has been with the deceased not with the appellant, therefore, would pray for

¶36

dismissal of the appeal.

¶37

I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.

¶38

Considering the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the parties and perusal of the record, the point which emerges for determination of this Court is whether the finding recorded by learned trial Court in acquitting the respondents from commission of offence under Section 417, 500/34 of the IPC is legal, justified ?

¶39

To appreciate the point, it is expedient for this Court to extract Section 417 and 500 of the IPC which are extracted below:- —

¶40

417. Punishment for cheating.

¶41

Whoever cheats shall be punished with imprisonment of either

¶42

Page 5 of 10

¶43

description for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine, or with both.

¶44

500. Punishment for defamation.—

¶45

Whoever defames another shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.

¶46

The term cheating has been defined in Section 415 of the IPC as under :-

¶47

415. Cheating.—

¶48

Whoever, by deceiving any person, fraudulently or dishonestly induces the person so deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to consent that any person shall retain any property, or intentionally induces the person so deceived to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived, and which act or omission causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property, is said to “cheat”.

¶49

A perusal of the aforesaid provision shows that the offence of cheating is in two parts. The first is where a person fraudulently or dishonestly deceives another in inducing that person to deliver any property to any person etc. The second part of the offence would be made out if somebody is deceived to do an act which causes damage or harm to that person “in body, mind, or reputation or property is said to have cheated”.

¶50

12. It is well settled position of law that in order to make out an offence under cheating the intention to cheat or deceive should be right from the beginning. By no stretch of imagination, this is even reflected from the complaint made by the informant.

¶51

The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Hridaya Ranjan Prasad Verma vs. Stateof Bihar (2000) 4 SCC 168, has held as under:-

¶52

“15. In determining the question it has to be kept in mind that the distinction between mere breach of contract and the offence of cheating is a fine one. It depends upon the intention of the accused at the time of inducement which may be judged by his subsequent conduct but for this subsequent conduct is not the sole test. Mere breach of contract cannot give rise to criminal prosecution for cheating unless fraudulent or dishonest intention is shown right at the

¶53

Page 6 of 10

¶54

beginning of the transaction, that is the time when the offence is said to have been committed. Therefore it is the intention which is the gist of the offence. To hold a person guilty of cheating it is necessary to show that he had fraudulent or dishonest7intention at the time of making the promise. From his mere failure to keep up promise subsequently such a culpable intention right at the beginning, that is, when he made the promise cannot be presumed.”

¶55

(Emphasis

¶56

supplied)

¶57

Further, in the case of Indian Oil Corporation v. NEPC India Ltd. and Others (2006) 6 SCC 736 this position was reiterated in the following manner:

¶58

33. The High Court has held that mere breach of contractual terms would not amount to cheating unless fraudulent or dishonest intention is shown right at the beginning of the transaction and in the absence of an allegation that the accused had a fraudulent or dishonest intention while making a promise, there is no “cheating”. The High Court has relied on several decisions of this Court wherein this Court has held that dishonest intent at the time of making the promise/inducement is necessary, in addition to the subsequent failure to fulfil the promise. Illustrations (f) and (g) to Section 415 make this position clear:“

¶59

(f) A intentionally deceives Z into a belief that A means to repay any money that Z may lend to him and there by dishonestly induces Z to lend him money, A not intending to repay it. A cheats.(g) A intentionally deceives Z into a belief that A means to deliver to Z a certain quantity of indigo plant which he does not intend to deliver, and thereby dishonestly induces Z to advance money upon the faith of such delivery, A cheats; but if A, at the time of obtaining the money, intends to8deliver the indigo plant, and afterwards breaks his contract and does not deliver it,he does not cheat, but is liable only to a civil action for breach of contract.”(emphasis supplied)

¶60

14. Again the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Raju Krishna Shedbalkar vs. State of Karnataka and Another {Cr.A. NO. 577/2024 dated 02.02.2024} has taken same view.

¶61

15. In the light of the above stated legal position and coming to the fact of the case it is quite vivid that learned trial Court while acquitting the accused has recorded its finding in paragraph 30

¶62

Page 7 of 10

¶63

that the accused Bhanumait has lived with deceased Om Prakash Rajpurohit for 2-3 years and with their wedlock one child has born and after death of appellants father and brother, he has filed this complaint and during their life time no such complaint was filed and even they have not produced any material to suggest how the reputation of their family is being damaged before the peoples who are surrounding to them, As such there is not material to suggest that the complainant has been defamed by act of cheating committed by respondents No. 1 to 9, therefore, the finding recorded by the learned trial Court that no cheating has been done by them is legal and justified.

¶64

16. So far as defamation is concerned, no material has been placed on record to prove ingredients of definition by their evidence. Only bald allegation has been levelled in the evidence without any cogent evidence that defamation has been done due to marriage of the deceased brother with respondent No. 2. The defamation has been defined under Section 499 of the IPC which reads as under :-

¶65

499. Defamation.—

¶66

Whoever, by words either spoken or intended to be read, or by signs or by visible representations, makes or publishes any imputation concerning any person intending to harm, or knowing or having reason to believe that such imputation will harm, the reputation of such person, is said, except in the cases hereinafter expected, to defame that person.

¶67

First Exception.— Imputation of truth which public good requires to be made or published.— It is not defamation to impute anything which is true concerning any person, if it be for the public good that the imputation should be made or published. Whether or not it is for the public good is a question of fact.

¶68

Second Exception.— Public conduct of public servants.— It is not defamation to express in a good faith any opinion whatever respecting the conduct of a public servant in the discharge of his public functions, or respecting his character, so far as his character appears in that conduct, and no further.

¶69

Third Exception.— Conduct of any person touching any public question.— It is not defamation to express in good faith any opinion whatever respecting the conduct of any

¶70

Page 8 of 10

¶71

person touching any public question, and respecting his character, so far as his character appears in that conduct, and no further.

¶72

Fourth Exception.— Publication of reports of proceedings of Courts.— It is not defamation to publish substantially true report of the proceedings of a Court of Justice, or of the result of any such proceedings.

¶73

Fifth Exception.— Merits of case decided in Court or conduct of witnesses and others concerned.— It is not defamation to express in good faith any opinion whatever respecting the merits of any case, civil or criminal, which has been decided by a Court of Justice, or respecting the conduct of any person as a party, witness or agent, in any such case, or respecting the character of such person, as far as his character appears in that conduct, and no further.

¶74

Sixth Exception.— Merits of public performance.— It is not defamation to express in good faith any opinion respecting the merits of any performance which its author has submitted to the judgment of the public, or respecting the character of the author so far as his character appears in such performance, and no further.

¶75

Seventh Exception.— Censure passed in good faith by person having lawful authority over another.— It is not defamation in a person having over another any authority, either conferred by law or arising out of a lawful contract made with that other, to pass in good faith any censure on the conduct of that other in matters to which such lawful authority relates.

¶76

Eighth Exception.— Accusation preferred in good faith to authorised person.— It is not defamation to prefer in good faith an accusation against any person to any of those who have lawful authority over that person with respect to the subject-matter of accusation.

¶77

Ninth Exception.— Imputation made in good faith by person for protection of his or other’s interests.— It is not defamation to make an imputation on the character of another provided that the imputation be made in good faith for the protection of the interests of the person making it, or of any other person, or for the public good.

¶78

Tenth Exception.— Caution intended for good of person to whom conveyed or for public good.— It is not defamation to convey a caution, in good faith, to one person against another, provided that such caution be intended for the good of the person to whom it is conveyed, or of some person in whom that person is interested, or for the public good.

¶79

The issue of defamation under Section 499 and 500 of the IPC

¶80

Page 9 of 10

¶81

has come up for consideration before the Hon’ble Supreme

¶82

Court in case of S. Khushboo vs Kanniammal & Anr {2010 (5)

¶83

SCC 600} wherein Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under :-

¶84

It is our considered view that there is no prima facie case of defamation in the present case. This will become self- evident if we draw attention to the key ingredients of the offence contemplated by Section 499 IPC……………..

¶85

The definition makes it amply clear that the accused must either intend to harm the reputation of a particular person or reasonably know that his/her conduct could cause such harm. Explanation 2 to Section 499 further states that `It may amount to defamation to make an imputation concerning a company or an association or collection of persons as such.'

¶86

With regard to the complaints in question, there is neither any intent on part of the appellant to cause harm to the reputation of the complainants nor can we discern any actual harm done to their reputation. In short, both the elements i.e. mens rea and actus reus are missing. As mentioned earlier, the appellant's statement published in India Today' (in September 2005) is a rather general endorsement of premarital sex and her remarks are not directed at any individual or even at a company or an association or collection of persons'. It is difficult to fathom how the appellant's views can be construed as an attack on the reputation of anyone in particular. Even if we refer to the remarks published in `Dhina Thanthi' (dated 24.9.2005) which have been categorically denied by the appellant, there is no direct attack on the reputation of anyone in particular. Instead, the purported remarks are in the nature of rhetorical questions wherein it was asked if people in Tamil Nadu were not aware of the incidence of sex. Even if we consider these remarks in their entirety, nowhere has it been suggested that all women in Tamil Nadu have engaged in premarital sex. That imputation can only be found in the complaints that were filed by the various respondents. It is a clear case of the complainants reading in too much into the appellant's remarks.

¶87

This takes us to the question of whether the impugned complaints were made in a bona fide manner. As we have already noted, most of the complainants are associated with the PMK, a political party which is active in the State of Tamil Nadu. This fact does add weight to the suggestion that the impugned complaints have been filed with the intention of gaining undue political mileage.

¶88

38.In M.S. Jayaraj Vs. Commissioner of Excise, Kerala & Ors.(2000) 7 SCC 552, this Court observed as under:

¶89

"The person aggrieved' means a person who is wrongfully deprived of his entitlement which he is legally entitled to receive and it does not include any kind of disappointment or personal inconvenience. Person aggrieved' means a person who is injured or one who is adversely affected in a legal sense."

¶90

The appellant cannot be said to be aggrieved person whose

¶91

Page 10 of 10

¶92

reputation has been damaged or cheated. The trial Court has already taken a view which is based upon appreciation of evidence and materials placed before it. It is well settled position of law that once trial Court has taken one probable view, the same can not be unsettled by appellate Court while hearing acquittal appeal and rush for a different view disturbing the well reasoned finding. It is also well settled position of law that where two views are possible, the view which is much favouable to the accused should be taken, therefore, I refrain from taking another view and interfere in the impugned order.

¶93

Considering this aspect of the matter, I do not find any illegality or irregularity committed by the learned trial Court which warrants interference by this Court. Accordingly, the present Acquittal Appeal is dismissed.

¶94

Sd-

¶95

(Narendra Kumar Vyas)

¶96

Judge

¶97

Deshmukh

Mansingh Rajpurohit v. Ghanshyam Singh

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

Mansingh Rajpurohit v. Ghanshyam Singh

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

Why is it important?

What the court decided

Issues for consideration

Cases cited

Statutes considered

Procedural history

Parties & counsel

Coram

Case details

Similar cases

Sushant Yadav @ Ghadi Yadav Vs State of Chhattisgarh

Dharmendra Yadav Vs State of Chhattisgarh

Santosh Agrawal Vs Dhaniram Sarang

Dhiraj Sahu Vs State of Chhattisgarh

Uttam Kumar Dewangan Vs State of Chhattisgarh

Smt. Reeta Verma Vs Krishna Bai Kashyap