Dismissed

Rakesh Pandey v. State of Chhattisgarh

Chhattisgarh HC15 Sept 2023CRMP/154/2022

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

The High Court dismissed a writ petition challenging an FIR registered under IPC Sections 294, 506 and SC/ST Act Section 3(2)(va). The Court held that since the petitioner was aware of the complainant's Scheduled Tribe caste and the threat occurred in the presence of witnesses, the malice requirement for quashing was not met and the ingredients of the offences were satisfied.

What did the court decide?

The writ petition was dismissed; the interim relief previously granted stands vacated.

Rakesh Pandey Vs State of Chhattisgarh — Pension and Retirement Benefits | Chhattisgarh HC (2023)

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NAFR

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HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH, BILASPUR

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Cr.M.P. No. 154 of 2022

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Rakesh Pandey son of Onkar Pandey, aged about 45 years, OccupationTeacher, R/o Mahalpara, Baikunthpur, District Korea (C.G.)

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---- Petitioner

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Versus

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1. State of Chhattisgarh, through the Station House Officer, Police Station, AJAK, Baikunthpur, District Korea (C.G.)

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2. Rajkumar Baghel son Mahuapara, Police Statio	of n-	Kevla Prasad, resident Patna, District Korea (C.G.	of Village Khanda, ) ---- Respondents
For Petitioner	:	Mr. Rahul K. Mishra,	Advocate
For Respondent No. 1/State	:	Mr. R.M. Solapurkar,	Govt. Advocate
For Respondent No. 2	:	Mr. Shivam Agrawal, Mr. Hemant Agrawal,	Advocate on behalf of Advocate

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Hon’ble Shri Justice Rakesh Mohan Pandey Order on Board

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15.09.2023

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Heard.

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Admit.

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In the instant petition, the petitioner has challenged the F.I.R. No. 15/2021 and Final Report No. 23/2021 for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 294 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code (for short 'IPC') and Section 3(2)(va) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act (for short 'Special Act').

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The facts of the present case are that on 20.07.2021, the complainant lodged a written complaint to the effect that on 27.06.2021 at about 05:00 pm while he was in front of the shop of Rajeshwar Sahu, the petitioner came there and abused him using filthy language and also intimidated him for life. It is further alleged that the petitioner told him that he could not be elected as Sarpanch again. Based on such report, the police registered the F.I.R. for

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the commission of offences punishable under Sections 294 and 506 of IPC and Section 3(2)(va) of the Special Act on 21.07.2021 and the statement of the witnesses namely Rajkumar Baghel, Rajeshwar Sahu and Gorelal Cherwa was recorded. After investigation, the police filed the charge sheet against the petitioner and a criminal case is pending before the Special Court.

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Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the petitioner has not abused the complainant about his caste and there is no such allegation in this regard. He would further submit that the offence under Sections 294 of IPC is not a scheduled offence whereas Section 506 of IPC is a scheduled offence according to the schedule appended to the Special Act. As per provisions of Section 3(2)(va) of the Special Act ingredients of Section 506 of IPC are missing, therefore, the F.I.R. and the subsequent charge sheet are an outcome of the malice. He would further submit that a complaint was made before the superior police authorities and an inquiry was also conducted. He would also submit that the complaint was made by the UpSarpanch of the village against the complainant and with intent to counterblast such complaint; a false F.I.R. was lodged by the complainant. He has placed reliance upon the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Vikram Johar v. State of Uttar Pradesh and another, AIR 2019 SC 2109 ; Hitesh Verma v. State of Uttarakhand and Another, (2020) 10 SCC 710 ; Salib Alias Shalu Alias Salim v. State of U.P., AIR Online 2023 SC 617 and N.S. Madhanagopal & Anr. v. K. Lalitha, passed in Criminal Appeal No. 1759 of 2022 arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 6039 . 6. On the other hand, learned counsel for the State and learned counsel for respondent No. 2 would oppose. They would submit that the ingredients of Sections 294 and 506 of IPC are very well available and Section 506 is a scheduled offence according to the provisions of Section 3(2)(v-a) of the Special Act. They would further submit that the petitioner was aware of the

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caste of the complainant even though he abused him and threatened for life. They would submit that the petition preferred by the petitioner deserves to be dismissed.

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I have heard learned counsel for the parties at length and perused the charge sheet.

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From the perusal of the written complaint dated 20.07.2021, it is quite vivid that the complainant belongs to the 'Cherwa’ caste which falls under the scheduled tribe. The petitioner was aware of the fact that the complainant belongs to a particular caste as they are residents of the same village even though the petitioner abused the complainant and threatened him for life. The complainant has specifically stated that he was filthily abused about his mother and sister and threatened for life. He has further stated that the incident was witnessed by Rajkumar Baghel, Rajeshwar Sahu and Gorelal Cherwa. Rajeshwar Sahu and Gorelal Cherwa in their statement recorded under Section 161 of Cr.P.C. have supported the case of the complainant. The police after due investigation filed the charge sheet.

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Section 506 of IPC reads as under:-

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“ 506. Punishment for criminal intimidation. – Whoever commits, the offence of criminal intimidation shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both;

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If threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, etc. – And if the threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, or to cause the destruction of any property by fire, or to cause an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years, or to impute, unchastity to a woman, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, or with fine, or with both.”

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Section 3 (2)(va) of the Special Act says as under:-

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“ 3. Punishment for offences atrocities. –

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(2) Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Castes or a

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Scheduled Tribe,–

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(va) commits any offence specified in the Schedule, against a person or property, knowing that such person is a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe or such property belongs to such member, shall be punishable with such punishment as specified under the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) for such offences and shall also be liable to fine. ”

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From a bare reading of Section 3(2)(v-a) of the Special Act, it is apparent that if a person is aware of the caste of a person who has been abused, the penal provision of Section 3(2)(v-a) of the Special Act would attract. Section 506 of IPC is mentioned in the schedule appended to Section 3(2)(v-a) of the Special Act.

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The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Vikram Johar (supra) in para-

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27 has laid down the ingredients of Section 506 of IPC. Para-27 reads as under:-

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“ 27. Now, reverting back to Section 506, which is offence of criminal intimidation, the principles laid down by Fiona Shrikhande (AIR 2014 SC 957) (supra) has also to be applied when question of finding out as to whether the ingredients of offence are made or not. Here, the only allegation is that the appellant abused the complainant. For proving an offence under Section 506 IPC, what are ingredients which have to be proved by the prosecution? Ratanlal & Dhrajlal on Law of Crimes, 27^th Edition with regard to proof of offence states following:-

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“... The prosecution must prove:

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(i) That the accused threatened some person.

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(ii) That such threat consisted of some injury to his person, reputation or property; or to the person, reputation or property of someone in whom he was interested;

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(iii) That he did so with intent to cause alarm to that person; or to cause that person to do any act which he was not legally bound to do, or omit to do any act which he was legally entitled to do as a means of avoiding the execution of such threat.”

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A plain reading of the allegations in the complaint does not satisfy all the ingredients as noticed above.”

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Now coming to the facts of the present case in the light of the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Vikram Johar (supra), it is apparent that the petitioner threatened the complainant

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though there was no bodily injury, the reputation of the complainant was tarnished in presence of the independent witnesses and thus, the ingredients of Section 506 of IPC in the opinion of this Court are satisfied.

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In the matter of Hitesh Verma (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme in para-17 has dealt with the provisions of Section 3(2)(v) of the Special Act and has held that the person belonged to Scheduled Caste would not be enough to inflict enhanced punishment. Para – 17 & 22 are reproduced herein-below:-

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“ 17. In another judgment reported as Khumar Singh v. State of M.P., (2020)18 SCC 763, this Court held that in a case for applicability of Section 3 (2) (v) of the Act, the fact that the deceased belonged to Scheduled Caste would not be enough to inflict enhanced punishment. This Court held that there was nothing to suggest that the offence was committed by the appellant only because the deceased belonged to Scheduled Caste. The Court held as under:

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“15. As held by the Supreme Court, the offence

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must be such so as to attract the offence under Section 3 (2) (v) of the Act. The offence must have been committed against the person on the ground that such person is a member of Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe. In the present case, the fact that the deceased was belonging to “Khangar” Scheduled Caste is not disputed. There is no evidence to show that the offence was committed only on the ground that the victim was a member of the Scheduled Caste and therefore, the conviction of the appellant-accused under Section 3 (2) (v) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act is not sustainable.”

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22. The appellant had sought quashing of the charge-sheet on the ground that the allegation does not make out an offence under the Act against the appellant merely because Respondent 2 was a Scheduled Caste since the property dispute was not on account of the fact that Respondent 2 was a Scheduled Caste. The property disputes between a vulnerable section of the society and a person of upper caste will not disclose any offence under the Act unless, the allegations are on account of the victim being a Scheduled Caste. Still further, the finding that the appellant was aware of the caste of the informant is wholly inconsequential as the knowledge does not bar any person to protect his rights by way of a procedure established by law.”

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The present is not a case of Section 3(2)(v) of the Special Act as the property of the complainant has not been grabbed. In the present case, there is an allegation with regard to Section 3(2)(va) of the Special Act and

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according to this Section, if a person is aware of the caste of the complainant that would be sufficient to attract the provisions of Section 3(2) (va) of the Special Act, therefore, the facts of the present case are entirely different from the judgment cited by learned counsel for the petitioner.

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In the matter of Salib Alias Shalu Alias Salim (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has dealt with the power of the High Court under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. and Article 226 of Constitution of India with regard to quashing of F.I.R. and complaint case and it is held that where the F.I.R. or complaint is an outcome of malice or the complaint/F.I.R. has been filed with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance, such complaint/F.I.R. can be quashed. Para

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– 26 reads as under:-

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“ 26. At this stage, we would like to observe something important. Whenever an accused comes before the Court invoking either the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) or extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to get the FIR or the criminal proceedings quashed essentially on the ground that such proceedings are manifestly frivolous or vexatious or instituted with the ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance, then in such circumstances the Court owes a duty to look into the FIR with care and a little more closely. We say so because once the complainant decided to proceed against the accused with an ulterior motive for wreaking personal vengeance, etc., then he would ensure that the FIR/complaint is very well drafted with all the necessary pleadings. The complainant would ensure that the averments made in the FIR/complaint are such that they disclose the necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offence. Therefore, it will not be just enough for the Court to look into the averments made in the FIR/complaint alone for the purpose of ascertaining whether the necessary the ingredients to constitute the alleged offence are disclosed or not. In frivolous or vexatious proceedings, the Court owes a duty to look into many other attending circumstances emerging from the record of the case over and above the averments and, if need be, with due care and circumspection try to read in between the lines. The Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC or Article 226 of the Constitution need not restrict itself only to the stage of a case but is empowered to take into account the overall circumstances leading to the initiation/registration of the case as well as the materials collected in the course of investigation. Take for instance the case on hand. Multiple FIRs have been registered over a period of time. It is in the background of such circumstances the registration of multiple FIRs assumes

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importance, thereby attracting the issue of wreaking vengeance out of private or personal grudge as alleged.”

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In the present case, the complaint was made by the petitioner after registration of F.I.R. and therefore, there is no ingredient of malice or ulterior motive, thus the judgment cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner is of no help to the petitioner.

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In the matter of N.S. Madhanagopa l (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that “ to prove the offence under Section 294 of IPC mere utterance of obscene words are not sufficient but there must be a further proof to establish that it was to the annoyance of others, which was lacking in that case. ”

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In the present case, the prosecution is yet to prove the allegations made against the petitioner. The complainant has categorically stated in the F.I.R. regarding utterance of filthy language and the independent witnesses have supported the same, therefore, at this stage, it would not be safe to rely on the judgment cited by learned counsel for the petitioner.

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Taking into consideration the entire material and in light of the above discussion, I do not find any good ground in the instant petition; therefore, it fails and is hereby dismissed.

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The interim relief granted earlier stands vacated.

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Sd/- (Rakesh Mohan Pandey) Judge

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vatti

Rakesh Pandey v. State of Chhattisgarh

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Rakesh Pandey v. State of Chhattisgarh

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