Allowed

Manjeet Singh v. State Of Chhattisgarh

Chhattisgarh HC15 Mar 2023CRA/775/2014

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

The High Court of Chhattisgarh allowed two criminal appeals and dismissed an acquittal appeal. Convicting the appellants for murder under Section 302 IPC was unsustainable as the prosecution failed to establish a complete chain of circumstantial evidence. The trial court's reliance on Section 106 of the Evidence Act was disapproved. Both appellants were acquitted of murder and dowry death charges

What did the court decide?

Criminal Appeals No. 775/2014 and No. 651/2014 are allowed; Acquittal Appeal No. 152/2014 is dismissed. Appellants are acquitted and released on bail.

Manjeet Singh Vs State Of Chhattisgarh — Murder and Culpable Homicide | Chhattisgarh HC (2023)

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NAFR

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HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

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Criminal Appeal No. 775 of 2014

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Manjeet Singh S/o Shri Rambhau Singh Thakur, Aged about 30 years, R/o Village Jorva, Patthartul, P.S. Masturi, Civil and Revenue District Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh.

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---Appellant

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Versus

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State of Chhattisgarh through District Magistrate Bilaspur (Police Station Incharge Masturi) District Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh.

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		---Respondent
For Appellant	:-	Mr. Sabhyasachi Bhaduri, Advocate
For State	:-	Mr. Ravi Bhagat, Dy. G.A.

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Criminal Appeal No. 651 of 2014

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Annapurna Singh W/o Shri Rambhau Singh, Aged about 53 years, R/o Village Jorva, Patthartul, P.S. Masturi, Civil and Revenue District Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh.

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---Appellant

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Versus

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State of Chhattisgarh through District Magistrate Bilaspur (Police Station Incharge Masturi) District Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh.

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---Respondent

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For Appellant	:- Mr.	Sabhyasachi Bhaduri , Advocate
For State	:- Mr.	Ravi Bhagat, Dy. G.A.

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Acquittal Appeal No. 152 of 2014

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Ashish Singh Thakur S/o Late Raj Kumar Singh, Aged about 24 years, R/o Kapil Nagar, Sarkanda, Police Station Sarkanda, Bilaspur.

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---Appellant

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Versus

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State of Chhattisgarh through Police Station Masturi, Bilaspur, District Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh.

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Manjeet Singh, S/o Rambhau Singh Thakur, Aged about 30 years.

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Annapurna Singh W/o Rambhau Singh Thakur, Aged about 52 years.

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Respondents no. 2 and 3 are R/o Village Jorwa, Pathartal, Police Station Masturi, District Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh.

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---Respondent

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For Appellant :- Mr. Hemant Gupta, Advocate For Res. 1/State :- Mr. Ravi Bhagat, Dy. G.A.

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Hon'ble Shri Justice Sanjay K. Agrawal Hon'ble Shri Justice Radhakishan Agrawal Judgment on Board

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15/03/2023

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Sanjay K. Agrawal, J.

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Since common question of law and fact is involved in all these three appeals and since they have arisen out of the impugned judgment dated 9/07/2014 passed by learned 3^rd Additional Judge to the Court of 1^st Additional Sessions Judge, Bilaspur in Special Sessions Trial No. 156/13

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therefore, these three appeals have been clubbed together, heard together and are being decided by this common judgment.

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Criminal Appeal No. 775/2014 has been preferred by appellant Manjeet Singh (A-1) challenging his conviction for offence punishable under Sections 302 and 201/34 of IPC, Criminal Appeal No. 651/2014 has been preferred by appellant Annapurna Singh (A-2) challenging her conviction for offence punishable under Section 201/34 of IPC and Acquittal Appeal No. 152/2014 has been filed by brother of the victim namely Ashish Singh Thakur (P.W.-7) challenging acquittal of appellant Manjeet Singh (A-1) for offence punishable under Section 304-B of IPC as well as acquittal of appellant Annapurna Singh (A-2) for offence punishable under Sections 304-B and 302/34 of IPC. Vide impugned judgment dated 09/7/2014, learned Sessions Judge has convicted the appellants/accused for the aforesaid offence and has sentenced them as under :-

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Appellant	Conviction	Sentence
(Accused)
Manjeet Singh (A-1)	U/s 302 of IPC	Life imprisonment with fine of Rs. 1000/-, in default 3 months R.I.
	U/s 201/34 of IPC	R.I. for 2 years with fine of Rs. 1000/-, in default 3 months R.I. (Both sentences to run concurrently)
Annapurna Singh (A-2)	U/s 201/34 of IPC	R.I. for 2 years with fine of Rs. 1000/-, in default 3 months R.I.

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Prosecution Case :-

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Case of the prosecution, in brief, is that on 29/05/2013 in between 5-6 PM at village Jorwa Patthartal within the ambit of Police Station Masturi, the two appellants herein namely Manjeet Singh (A-1) and Annapurna Singh (A-2), in furtherance of their common intention to cause the death of his wife and daughter-in-law Arti Singh, treated her with cruelty and strangulated her and caused her death and in order to screen themselves, they hanged her dead body and thereby, committed the aforesaid offence.

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Further case of the prosecution is that marriage of deceased Arti Singh was solemnized with appellant Manjeet Singh (A-1) in the year 2009 and thereafter, she started residing with her in-laws. Though her parents had given sufficient household articles to her and Manjeet Singh (A-1) at the time of marriage, but after some time, her husband Manjeet Singh (A-1) and her mother-in-law Annapurna Singh (A-2) started harassing her for dowry saying that your parents have not given cash and motorcycle. Thereafter, deceased Arti Singh's parents gave motorcycle to appellant Manjeet Singh (A-1) and also gave him some cash from time to time, however, they did not stop harassing her. On 29/05/2013, under suspicious circumstances, Arti Singh died. The information regarding her death was given at Police Station Masturi by her brother Ashish Singh Thakur (P.W.-7) pursuant to which

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merg intimation was registered vide Ex. P/7A and first information report was lodged vide Ex. P/7 and thereafter, the wheels of investigation started running.

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During investigation, summons were issued to the witnesses under Section 175 of CrPC vide Ex. P/8A and inquest was conducted vide Ex. P/9 and the dead body of Arti Singh was subjected to postmortem, which was conducted by Dr. D.P. Kurre (P.W.-1) and as per the postmortem report (Ex. P/1), cause of death is said to be asphyxia due to strangulation and nature of death is homicidal. Nazri naksha of the spot was prepared vide Ex. P/20 and from the spot, deceased Arti Singh's yellow coloured sari was seized vide Ex. P/6. Memorandum statement of appellant Manjeet Singh was recorded vide Ex. P/12 and recovery of a bamboo stick was made at his instance vide Ex. P/13. Similarly, memorandum statement of appellant Annapurna Singh was recorded vide Ex. P/10 and recovery of a mosquito net and nylon rope was made at her instance vide Ex. P/11. After due investigation, both the appellants were charge-sheeted for offence punishable under Sections 304-B, 302/34, 201/34 of IPC which was committed to the Court of Sessions for trial in accordance with law. The appellants abjured their guilt and entered into defence.

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In order to bring home the offence, prosecution examined as many as 17 witnesses and brought on record 22 documents. Statements of the appellants under Section

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313 of CrPC was taken wherein they denied guilt and examined 3 witnesses and brought on record 4 documents in their defence.

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Learned trial Court, after appreciation of oral and documentary evidence on record, though acquitted appellant Manjeet Singh (A-1) for offences punishable under Section 304-B of IPC but convicted him for offence punishable under Sections 302 and 201/34 of IPC and further though acquitted appellant for offence punishable under Sections 304-B and 302 of IPC but convicted him for offence punishable under Section 201/34 of IPC and sentenced them as aforesaid.

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Submission of the parties :-

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Mr. Sabhyasachi Bhaduri, learned counsel for appellant Manjeet Singh in Criminal Appeal No. 775/2014 as well as for Annapurna Singh in Criminal Appeal No. 651/2014, would submit that the trial Court is absolutely unjustified in convicting appellant Manjeet Singh (A-1) for offence punishable under Sections 302 and 201/34 of IPC as there is no legally admissible evidence available on record, direct or circumstantial, to hold him guilty for the said offence. Except for the fact that death of deceased is homicidal in nature, nothing has been established by the prosecution and Section 106 of the Evidence Act is not at all attracted in view of the fact that prosecution itself has charge-sheeted the two appellants/accused persons for offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC, so it is not a

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case of house murder, therefore, the trial Court could not have convicted appellant Manjeet Singh for offence punishable under Sections 302 and 201/34 of IPC, as such, his conviction is liable to be set aside. Similarly, the trial Court has reached the conclusion that since out of the two appellants, Manjeet Singh (A-1) is healthier and stronger than his mother Annapurna Singh (A-2), therefore, he is the author of the crime and he strangulated his wife Arti Singh and caused his death and thereafter, branding the death of Arti Singh as suicidal in nature, Annapurna Singh (A-2) helped Manjeet Singh (A-1) in concealing him from the offence in question, which is absolutely illegal and bad in law as conviction of an accused must be based on legal evidence and not on surmises and conjectures and without there being any evidence on record, direct or circumstantial, the trial Court has erred in convicting Annapurna Singh (A-2) for offence punishable under Section 201/34 of IPC. As such, conviction of both the appellants is liable to be set aside and they are liable to be acquitted from the charges levelled against them.

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Mr. Ravi Bhagat, learned State counsel, would submit that prosecution has been able to prove the offence beyond reasonable doubt, as such, appellants Manjeet Singh (A-1) and Annapurna Singh (A-2) have rightly been convicted by the trial Court for the aforesaid offences and thus, the

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instant appeals filed on their behalf are liable to be dismissed.

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10. Mr. Hemant Gupta, learned counsel for the appellant in Acquittal Appeal No. 152/2014, would submit that acquittal of accused Manjeet Singh (A-1) for offence punishable under Sections 304-B of IPC as well as acquittal of accused Annapurna Singh (A-2) for offence punishable under Sections 304-B and 302 of IPC is contrary to the evidence available on record, therefore, the impugned judgment acquitting the accused persons for the aforesaid offences is liable to be set aside.

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11. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival submissions made herein-above and went through the records with utmost circumspection.

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12. So far as the nature of death of deceased Arti Singh is concerned, learned trial Court has recorded a clear-cut finding that the death of deceased Arti Singh is homicidal in nature relying upon the expert medical opinion of Dr. D.P. Kurre (P.W.-1) who has proved the postmortem report (Ex. P/1) in which cause of death is said to be asphyxia due to strangulation and nature of death is said to be homicidal. We are of the considered opinion that the said finding recorded by the trial Court is based on evidence available on record and it is neither perverse nor contrary to the record. We hereby affirm the said finding that the death of deceased Arti Singh is homicidal in nature.

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13. Now, we shall consider each of the three appeals one-byone.

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Criminal Appeal No. 775/2014 :-

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14. Since the conviction of the appellant Manjeet Singh (A-1) is based on circumstantial evidence as there is no direct evidence available on record, it would be appropriate to notice the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in the matter of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra 1 wherein their Lordships have laid down five golden principles that constitute the panchsheel of proving a case based on circumstantial evidence, which state as under :-

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“153. A close analysis of this decision would show that the following conditions must be fulfilled before a case against an accused can be said to be fully established :

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(1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. XXX XXX XXX

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(2) the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty,

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(3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency,

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(4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be prove, and

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(5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused.”

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1 (1984) 4 SCC 116

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15. The most crucial circumstance that has been found proved against the appellant Manjeet Singh (A-1) is that he was present in the house at the time of death of deceased Arti Singh, but he did not inform about her death to the Police or to anyone and further he did not give any explanation with regard to her death and that gives rise to suspicious circumstances particularly when appellant Manjeet Singh (A-1) was in the house and he has tried to conceal the offence by stating that deceased Arti Singh died on account of suicide. The trial Court has basically convicted appellant Manjeet Singh (A-1) with the aid of Section 106 of the Evidence Act holding that it is a house murder in which appellant was required to offer explanation in his statement under Section 313 of CrPC with regard to the death of his wife Arti Singh, but he has failed to do so and consequently, finding other circumstances established, the trial Court proceeded to convict him for offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC.

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16. At this stage, it would be appropriate to notice Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, which states as under :-

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“ 106. Burden of proving fact especially within knowledge. - When any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him.”

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17. This provision states that when any fact is specially within the knowledge of any person the burden of proving that fact is upon him. This is an exception to the general rule

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contained in Section 101, namely, that the burden is on the person who asserts a fact. The principle underlying Section 106 which is an exception to general rule governing burden of proof applies only to such matters of defence which are supposed to be especially within the knowledge of the other side. To invoke Section 106 of the Evidence Act, the main point to be established by prosecution is that the accused persons were in such a position that they could have special knowledge of the fact concerned.

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18. In the matter of Shambhu Nath Mehra v. The State of

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Ajmer 2, their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held that the general rule that in a criminal case the burden of proof is on the prosecution and Section 106 of the Evidence Act is certainly not intended to relieve it of that duty. On the contrary, it is designed to meet certain exceptional cases in which it would be impossible, or at any rate disproportionately difficult, for the prosecution, to establish facts which are “especially” within the knowledge of the accused and which he could prove without difficulty or inconvenience. The Supreme Court while considering the word “especially” employed in Section 106 of the Evidence Act, speaking through Vivian Bose, J., observed as under: -

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“11. …. The word "especially" stresses that it means facts that are preeminently or exceptionally within his knowledge. If the section were to be interpreted otherwise, it would lead to the very

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2 AIR 1956 SC 404

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startling conclusion that in a murder case the burden lies on the accused to prove that he did not commit the murder because who could know better than he whether he did or did not. It is evident that that cannot be the intention and the Privy Council has twice refused to construe this section, as reproduced in certain other Acts outside India, to mean that the burden lies on an accused person to show that he did not commit the crime for which he is tried. These cases are Attygalle v. The King, 1936 PC 169 (AIR V 23) (A) and Seneviratne v. R. 1936-3 ER 36 AT P. 49 (B).”

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Their Lordships further held that Section 106 of the

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Evidence Act cannot be used to undermine the well established rule of law that save in a very exceptional class of case, the burden is on the prosecution and never shifts.

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19. The decision of the Supreme Court in Shambhu Nath Mehra (supra) was followed with approval recently in the matter of Nagendra Sah v. State of Bihar 3 in which it has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court as under: -

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“22. Thus, Section 106 of the Evidence Act will apply to those cases where the prosecution has succeeded in establishing the facts from which a reasonable inference can be drawn regarding the existence of certain other facts which are within the special knowledge of the accused. When the accused fails to offer proper explanation about the existence of said other facts, the court can always draw an appropriate inference.

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When a case is resting on circumstantial evidence, if the accused fails to offer a reasonable explanation in discharge of burden placed on him by virtue of Section 106 of the Evidence Act, such a failure may provide an additional link to the chain of circumstances. In a case governed by circumstantial evidence, if the chain of circumstances which is required to be established by the prosecution is not established, the failure of the accused to discharge the burden under Section

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3 (2021) 10 SCC 725

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106 of the Evidence Act is not relevant at all. When the chain is not complete, falsity of the defence is no ground to convict the accused.”

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20. Similarly, the Supreme Court in the matter of Gurcharan

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Singh v. State of Punjab 4, while considering the

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provisions contained in Sections 103 & 106 of the Evidence Act, held that the burden of proving a plea specially set up by an accused which may absolve him from criminal liability, certainly lies upon him, but neither the application of Section 103 nor that of 106 could, however, absolve the prosecution from the duty of discharging its general or primary burden of proving the prosecution case beyond reasonable doubt. It was further held by their Lordships that it is only when the prosecution has led evidence which, if believed, will sustain a conviction, or which makes out a prima facie case, that the question arises of considering facts of which the burden of proof may lie upon the accused. Their Lordships also held that the burden of proving a plea specifically set up by an accused, which may absolve him from criminal liability, certain lies upon him.

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21. The principle of law laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Gurcharan Singh (supra) has been followed with approval by their Lordships in the matter of Sawal Das v. State of Bihar 5 and it has been held that burden of proving the case against the accused was on the

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4 AIR 1956 SC 460

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5 AIR 1974 SC 778

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prosecution irrespective of whether or not the accused has made out a specific defence.

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22. In the matter of Harijan Bhala Teja v. State of Gujarat 6, the Supreme Court has held that where the postmortem report establishes homicidal nature of death and since the accused only was staying with his wife at time of her death, it is for the accused to show has to in what manner she died and relying upon Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act in paragraph 19 of the report it was held as under: -

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“19. Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act provides that when any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him. Since it is proved on the record that it was only the appellant who was staying with his wife at the time of her death, it is for him to show as to in what manner she died, particularly, when the prosecution has successfully proved that she died homicidal death.”

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23. Likewise, in the matter of Gajanan Dashrath Kharate v.

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State of Maharashtra 7, where the accused (Gajanan Dashrath Kharate) alleged to have killed his father and accused has not offered any explanation for homicidal death of his father, conviction was affirmed by the Supreme Court by holding as under in paragraph 14: -

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“14. Upon appreciation of oral evidence and the circumstance of the recovery of blood stained clothes of the accused and the conduct of the accused in not offering any explanation for the homicidal death of his father, by concurrent findings, the trial court and the High Court rightly convicted the appellant-accused under Section

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6 AIR 2016 SC 2065

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7 AIR 2016 SC 1255

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302 IPC and we do not find any reason to interfere with the impugned judgment.”

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24. In the matter of Trimukh Maroti Kirkan v. State of

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Maharashtra 8, Their Lordships of the Supreme Court have relied upon their earlier decision in Nika Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh 9 wherein it was held that the fact that the accused alone was with his wife in the house when she was murdered with the weapon of offence and the fact that the relations of the accused with her were strained would, in the absence of any cogent explanation given by him, point to his guilt. Similarly, Their Lordships have also placed reliance upon their earlier decision in Ganeshlal v. State of Maharashtra 10 wherein the appellant was prosecuted for the murder of his wife which took place inside his house. It was observed that when the death had occurred in his custody, the appellant is under an obligation to give a plausible explanation for the cause of her death in his statement under Section 313 CrPC.

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25. Reverting to the facts of the present case in light of the aforesaid judgments (supra), it is quite vivid that prosecution has established the death of deceased Arti Singh to be homicidal in nature and it is evident from the record that on the date of incident, appellants Manjeet Singh (A-1) as well as Annapurna Singh (A-2) were staying in the house along with deceased Arti Singh as observed

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by the trial Court in paragraph 42 of the impugned

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8 (2006) 10 SCC 681

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9 (1972) 2 SCC 80

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10 (1992) 3 SCC 300

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judgment and furthermore, it is the case of the prosecution that relationship between the appellant and the deceased was not cordial and the appellant Manjeet Singh (A-1) has failed to give an explanation with regard to the death of his wife in his statement under Section 313 of CrPC whereas he has falsely stated the death of his wife Arti Singh to be suicidal in nature and the trial Court has held that as appellants Manjeet Singh (A-1) and his mother Annapurna Singh (A-2) were in the house at the time of death of Arti Singh, the chances of her suicidal death are close to nil in view of nazri naksha (Ex. P/20) and crime details (Ex. P/14), and since out of the two appellants i.e. Manjeet Singh (A-1) and Annapurna Singh (A-2), the present appellant Manjeet Singh (A-1) is much more healthy and powerful than her old mother, it is the appellant Manjeet Singh (A-1) who has strangulated his wife Arti Singh and caused her death which has also been found proved by the trial Court by memorandum and seizure.

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26. As such, in order to convict appellant Manjeet Singh (A-1) for offence punishable under Sections 302 and 201/34 of IPC, the trial Court has recorded the findings in paragraph 50 of the impugned judgment holding inter-alia :-

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(i) the relationship between deceased Arti Singh and her husband Manjeet Singh (A-1) were not cordial and from the date of marriage itself, there was estrangement between them.

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(ii) though deceased Arti Singh and appellant Manjeet Singh (A-1) were wife and husband, but death of Arti Singh was not informed by Manjeet Singh (A-1) to the Police nor he has given any explanation in his statement regarding her death though he was present in the house at that time.

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(iii) appellant Manjeet Singh (A-1) has not offered any explanation with regard to the suspicious circumstances under which her wife Arti Singh died rather he has given false information in order to conceal the offence stating it to be suicidal in nature.

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(iv) though at the time of death of Arti Singh, both the appellants i.e. Manjeet Singh (A-1) and Annapurna Singh (A-2) were present in the house, but considering old age of Annapurna Singh (A-2) and considering the strength of Manjeet Singh (A-1), it is appellant Manjeet Singh (A-1) who strangulated his wife Arti Singh and caused her death.

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(v) the evidence of memorandum and seizure has duly been proved by the prosecution witnesses.

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27. From the aforesaid findings recorded by the trial Court and from the evidence available on record, the death of deceased Arti Singh has been established to be homicidal in nature, however, it is not a case of house murder where the appellant Manjeet Singh (A-1) and deceased Arti Singh were the only two inmates residing at the house. As per

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the own showing of the prosecution, both the appellants Manjeet Singh (A-1) as well as Annapurna Singh (A-2) were present at the house at the time of death of the deceased, as such, prosecution has failed to discharge its primary burden of proving its case beyond reasonable doubt. As held by Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Sawal Das (supra), Section 106 of the Evidence Act can be applied only when the prosecution has led evidence which if believed will sustain conviction, or makes out a prima facie case, that the question arises of considering facts of which the burden of proof may lie upon the accused. Therefore, the conviction of appellant Manjeet Singh (A-1) for offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC applying Section 106 of the Evidence Act is clearly unsustainable and bad in law. Furthermore, the trial Court has committed grave legal error in recording the finding that since appellant Manjeet Singh (A-1) is healthier and stronger as compared to his old mother Annapurna Singh (A-2), then he must have strangulated his wife Arti Singh and caused her death. The finding of commission of offence under Section 302 of IPC has to be recorded on the basis of legal evidence and it cannot be recorded on the basis of surmises and conjectures.

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28. Similarly, even if pursuant to memorandum statement of appellant Manjeet Singh (A-1), bamboo stick has been seized from his possession vide Ex. P/13, but on that basis, it cannot be held that he is the author of the crime

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particularly when it was not stained with blood and there is no FSL report available on record to prove otherwise and in absence of that, recovery of weapon of offence is of no use in view of the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in the matter of Balwan Singh v. State of Chhattisgarh 11.

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29. As such, in our considered opinion, the prosecution has failed to discharge its primary burden of proving its case beyond reasonable doubt and merely on the basis of proving the death to be homicidal in nature, Section 106 of the Evidence Act cannot be invoked and the appellant cannot be held guilty of the offence under Section 302 of IPC. In a case of circumstantial evidence, if the chain of circumstances which is required to be established by the prosecution is not established, the failure of the accused to discharge the burden under Section 106 of the Evidence Act is not relevant at all. When the chain is not complete, falsity of the defence is no ground to convict the accused. In view of the aforesaid legal discussion, we are unable to sustain the conviction imposed upon the appellant Manjeet Singh (A-1) for offence punishable under Section 302 and 201/34 of IPC and he is hereby acquitted on the principle of benefit of doubt.

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Criminal Appeal No. 651/2014 :-

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30. Appellant Annapurna Singh (A-2) had been charge-sheeted and tried for offence punishable under Sections 304-B,

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11 (2019) 7 SCC 781

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302/34 and 201/34, however, the trial Court acquitted her for offence punishable under Section 304-B and 302/34 of IPC and only convicted her for offence punishable under Section 201/34 of IPC stating inter alia that though both the appellants Manjeet Singh (A-1) and Annapurna Singh (A-2) were present at the house at the time of death of the deceased Arti Singh, but considering that Manjeet Singh (A-1) is healthier and stronger than his mother Annapurna Singh (A-2), therefore, he is the author of the crime, however, after causing the death of the deceased, Annapurna Singh (A-2) helped Manjeet Singh (A-1) in branding the death of deceased Arti Singh as suicidal in nature in order to screen him from the offence and as such, she has been convicted for offence punishable under Section 201/34 of IPC.

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31. As we have held in Criminal Appeal No. 775/2014 that apart from proving that the death of deceased Arti Singh is homicidal in nature, no other incriminating circumstance has been proved by the prosecution and on that basis, conviction of appellant Manjeet Singh (A-1) for offence punishable under Sections 302 and 201/34 has been set aside and he has been acquitted on the principle of benefit of doubt. As such, conviction of appellant Annapurna Singh (A-2) for offence punishable under Section 201/34 of IPC is hereby set aside and she is also acquitted on the basis of principle of benefit of doubt.

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Acquittal Appeal No. 152/2014 :-

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32. This acquittal appeal has been preferred by the brother of deceased namely Ashish Singh Thakur (P.W.-7) challenging the impugned judgment by which accused Manjeet Singh (A-1) has been acquitted for offence punishable under Section 304-B of IPC and accused Annapurna Singh (A-2) has been acquitted for offence punishable under Sections 304-B and 302 of IPC.

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33. After hearing learned counsel for the appellant and after going through the evidence available on record, we do not find any good ground to admit this acquittal appeal. It deserves to be and in accordingly dismissed.

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Conclusion :-

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34. Appellants Manjeet Singh (A-1) and Annapurna Singh (A2) are acquitted for the charges levelled against them. Appellant Manjeet Singh (A-1) be released forthwith, if his detention is not required in any other case and since appellant Annapurna Singh (A-2) is already on bail, she need not surrender, however, her bail bonds shall remain in force for a period of six months in view of the provision contained under Section 437A of CrPC.

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35. Accordingly, Criminal Appeal No. 775/2014 and Criminal Appeal No. 651/2014 are hereby allowed whereas Acquittal Appeal No. 152/2014 is hereby dismissed.

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Sd/Sd/- (Sanjay K. Agrawal) (Radhakishan Agrawal) Judge Judge

Manjeet Singh v. State Of Chhattisgarh

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Manjeet Singh v. State Of Chhattisgarh

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