Liberty Court dismissed an appeal against conviction and sentence for murder under Section 302 IPC. Upholding trial court's finding, it affirmed the homicide nature, applied Section 106 Evidence Act, and found circumstantial evidence complete.
Criminal appeal dismissed confirming conviction and sentence of life imprisonment and fine.
This page shows the compact analysis of this judgement. The full analysis — procedural history, issue-by-issue holdings with ratio and obiter, advocates, and paragraph-level evidence for every claim — is being added to the record in batches and will appear here when this judgement has been through it.
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NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH, BILASPUR
CRA No. 730 of 2015
Ram Kanhai Mandal son of Rajeshwar Mandal, aged about 55 years, R/o P.V.77, Police Station Pakhanjur, District Kanker (C.G.) ---- Appellant
Versus
For Appellant : Mr. Mirza Kaiser Baeg, Advocate For Respondent/State : Mr. Soumya Rai, P.L.
Hon'ble Shri Sanjay K. Agrawal and Hon'ble Shri Radhakishan Agrawal, JJ. Judgment On Board (20.07.2023)
Radhakishan Agrawal, J.
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murder of his wife by axe by causing fatal injuries on her. Thereafter he fled away from the spot. On the morning of fateful day, i.e., 26.02.2014, when son of appellant, namely, Ravi Mandal (P.W.5) got up, he saw his mother's dead body lying in front of door. Upon knowing the same, P.W.2 Mohan Mandal, brother of the appellant and one Subal Badhai (P.W.3) rushed to the spot along with others, they were informed by P.W.5 Ravi Mandal that the appellant used to doubt the character of his mother. The matter was reported to the Police Station Pakhanjur by P.W.5 Ravi Mandal, who lodged the F.I.R. vide Ex.P.9, which was reduced in writing by P.W.10 Ajay Singh Bais. On reaching to the spot, Investigating Officer prepared inquest proceedings vide Ex.P.4. Spot map along with crime details was prepared vide Ex.P.13). Thereafter, dead body was sent examination to Primary Health Center, Pakhanjur, where Dr. Sukhdev Shende (P.W.1) conducted post-mortem vide Ex.P.1 and opined that cause of death was due to severe haemorrhagic shock with neurogenic shock and nature of death was homicidal in nature. During investigation, the appellant was taken into custody. Memorandum statement of the appellant was taken vide Ex.P.7 and at his behest bloodstained axe was seized from him vide Ex.P.8. Vide Ex.P.12 cloths of the deceased Menka were seized. Seized articles were sent for chemical examination to F.S.L. and vide Ex.P.17, F.S.L. report was brought on record and blood was
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found on the seized weapon of offence. Vide Ex.P.14, the appellant was arrested.
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and P.W.6 Sushant Mali have turned hostile as they did not support the prosecution story. The evidence of other prosecution witnesses does not inspire confidence and untrustworthy and the prosecution has not been able to build up the chain of circumstantial evidence so complete which excludes all other hypothesis of guilt of any other person and points out to the guilt of the appellant alone. On these premises, he urged that the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence deserves to be set aside and the appellant be set at liberty.
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in nature, which, in our considered opinion, is correct finding of fact based on evidence available on record and it is neither perverse nor contrary to the record and we hereby affirm the said finding.
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saw the injuries with blood coming out of her body. He has further testified that his father (appellant) was present in the house in the night prior to the incident and in the morning he was not there. He has further deposed that he has informed about the incident to P.W.2 Ram Mohan Mandal and P.W.3 Subal Badhai and others. Evidence of P.W.3 Subal Badhai and P.W.5 Ravi Mandal shows that the accused/appellant and deceased wife together were living in one room and in another room, Ravi Mandal with his wife was residing.
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1 AIR 1956 SC 404
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the Evidence Act, speaking through Vivian Bose, J., observed as under :-
“11. …... The word “especially” stresses that it means facts that are preeminently or exceptionally within his knowledge. If the section were to be interpreted otherwise, it would lead to the very startling conclusion that in a murder case the burden lies on the accused to prove that he did not commit the murder because who could know better than he whether he did or did not. It is evident that that cannot be the intention and the Privy Council has twice refused to construe this section, as reproduced in certain other Acts outside India, to mean that the burden lies on an accused person to show that he did not commit the crime for which he is tried. These cases are Attygalle v. The King, 1936 PC 169 (AIR V 23) (A) and Seneviratne v. R. 1936-3 ER 36 At P. 49 (B).”
Act cannot be used to undermine the well established rule of law that save in a very exceptional class of case, the burden is on the prosecution and never shifts.
(supra) was followed with approval recently in the matter of Nagendra Sah v. State of Bihar2 in which it has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court as under :-
“22. Thus, Section 106 of the Evidence Act will apply to those cases where the prosecution has succeeded in establishing the facts from which a reasonable inference can be drawn regarding the existence of certain other facts which are within the special knowledge of the accused. When the accused fails to offer proper explanation about the existence of said other facts, the court can always drawn an appropriate inference.
2 (2021) 10 SCC 725
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3 AIR 1956 SC 460
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followed with approval by their Lordships in the matter of Sawal Das v. State of Bihar4 and it has been held that burden of proving the case against the accused was on the prosecution irrespective of whether or nor the accused has made out a specific defence.
which it was observed in paragraph 153 as under :
“ 153. A close analysis of this decision would show that the following conditions must be fulfilled before a case against an accused can be said to be fully established:
(1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established.
It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the circumstances concerned 'must or should' and not 'may be' established. There is not only a grammatical but a legal distinction between 'may be proved' and “must be or should be proved” as was held by this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra6 where the following observations were made : [SCC para 19, p. 807 : SCC (Cri) p. 1047]
Certainly, it is a primary principle that the accused must be and not merely may be guilty before a court can convict and the mental distance between 'may be' and 'must be' is long and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions.
(2) the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty,
(3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency,
5 (1984) 4 SCC 116
6 (1973) 2 SCC 793
4 AIR 1974 SC 778
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(4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved, and
(5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused.”
23. The Supreme Court in the matter of Trimukh Maroti Kirkan vs. State of Maharashtra7 held in para 22 as under :-
“ 22. Where an accused is alleged to have committed the murder of his wife and the prosecution succeeds in leading evidence to show that shortly before the commission of crime they were seen together or the offence takes placed in the dwelling home where the husband also normally resided, it has been consistently held that if the accused does not offer any explanation how the wife received injuries or offers an explanation which is found to be false, it is a strong circumstance which indicates that he is responsible for commission of the crime. In Nika Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh [(1972) 2 SCC 80] it was observed that the fact that the accused alone was with his wife in the house when she was murdered there with 'khokhri' and the fact that the relations of the accused with her were strained would, in the absence of any cogent explanation by him, point to his guilt. In Ganeshlal v. State of Maharashtra [(1992) 3 SCC 106] the appellant was prosecuted for the murder of his wife which took place inside his house. It was observed that when the death had occurred in his custody, the appellant is under an obligation to give a plausible explanation for the cause of her death in his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. The mere denial of the prosecution case coupled with absence of any explanation were held to be inconsistent with the innocence of the accused, but consistent with the hypothesis that the appellant is a prime accused in the commission of murder of his wife. In State of U.P. v. Dr. Ravindra Prakash Mittal AIR 1992 SC 2045 the medical evidence disclosed that the wife died of strangulation during late night hours or early morning and her body was set on fire after sprinkling kerosene. The defence of the husband was that wife had committed suicide by burning herself and that he was not at home at that time.”
7 (2006) 10 SCC 681
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fact that he was present along with his wife in the same room in the house, it can safely inferred that it was the appellant who has committed murder of his wife on the fateful day of incident.
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Sd/Sd/- (Sanjay K. Agrawal) (Radhakishan Agrawal) Judge Judge
Anjani
3 issues framed by the court
Whether the death of deceased Menka was homicidal in nature.
Whether the appellant was the author of the crime based on circumstantial evidence and Section 106 of the Evidence Act.
Whether the chain of circumstances excludes every hypothesis except guilt of the appellant.
Colour shows how this judgement treated each authority
Shambhu Nath Mehra v. The State of AjmerFollowed¶39
AIR 1956 SC 404 · Who else cites this
Nagendra Sah v. State of BiharFollowed¶49
(2021) 10 SCC 725 · Who else cites this
Gurcharan Singh v. State of PunjabFollowed¶52
3 AIR 1956 SC 460 · Who else cites this
Sawal Das v. State of BiharFollowed¶56
4 AIR 1974 SC 778 · Who else cites this
Sharad Birdhichand Sarda vs. State of MaharashtraFollowed¶57
(1984) 4 SCC 116 · Who else cites this
Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of MaharashtraReferred¶61
(1973) 2 SCC 793 · Who else cites this
State of U.P. v. Dr. Ravindra Prakash MittalReferred¶72
4 AIR 1992 SC 2045 · Who else cites this
Nika Ram v. State of Himachal PradeshReferred¶72
(1972) 2 SCC 80 · Who else cites this
Ganeshlal v. State of MaharashtraReferred¶72
(1992) 3 SCC 106 · Who else cites this
3 provisions across 3 enactments
Ram Kanhai Mandal
State Of Chhattisgarh
Sanjay K. Agrawal
Radhakishan Agrawal
As recorded by the court registry
Judgements on the same questions, provisions and authorities, from every court
