Appeal against conviction for murdering wife and son. Court affirmed finding that death was homicidal. Applied Section 106 Evidence Act, holding accused's failure to explain deaths in house murder due to special knowledge justified conviction.
Appeal dismissed; conviction and sentence under Section 302 IPC affirmed.
This page shows the compact analysis of this judgement. The full analysis — procedural history, issue-by-issue holdings with ratio and obiter, advocates, and paragraph-level evidence for every claim — is being added to the record in batches and will appear here when this judgement has been through it.
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NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH, BILASPUR
CRA No. 291 of 2015
---- Appellant
Versus
---- Respondent
For Appellant :- Mr. Dheerendra Pandey, Advocate. For State / Respondent :- Mr. Ashish Tiwari, Government Advocate.
Division Bench
Hon'ble Shri Justice Sanjay K. Agrawal & Hon'ble Shri Justice Radhakishan Agrawal
Judgment On Board (28.07.2023)
Sanjay K. Agrawal, J
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has been convicted for offence under Section 302 (two times) of the IPC and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life, till death, and pay fine of ₹ 2000/- & ₹ 2000/- (total ₹ 4000/-).
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Ramayan Bai (PW-1) on 26.02.2013 at 12:00 pm, went to the house of the appellant and saw the dead bodies of the deceased persons, thereafter, she informed about the incident to village Kotwar and Sarpanch and to other villagers. Dehati Merg intimation was registered vide Exs.P/9 & 10 and Dehati FIR was also registered vide Ex.10A. FIR (Ex.P/13) under Section 154 of the CrPC has been registered against unknown person. On the basis of statements of prosecution witnesses, appellant was arrested as the appellant used to quarrel with deceased Rukhmani Bai and on 24.02.2013 in the evening between 6:007:00 pm dispute arose between the appellant and deceased Rukhmani Bai. Inquest proceedings were conducted vide Exs.P/3 & 4 and the dead bodies were sent for postmortem. As per the postmortem reports (Exs.P/18 & 19), conducted by Dr. Anvita Dhruw (PW-14), cause of death of both the deceased persons was asphyxia due to strangulation and nature of death is homicidal.
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in support of its case has not examined any witness, but exhibited two documents (Exs.D/1 & D/2).
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perverse nor contrary to the record and we hereby affirm the said finding.
“ 106. Burden of proving fact especially within
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knowledge. —When any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him.”
1 AIR 1956 SC 404
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difficulty or inconvenience. The Supreme Court while considering the word “especially” employed in Section 106 of the Evidence Act, speaking through Vivian Bose, J., observed as under: -
“11. … The word "especially" stresses that it means facts that are preeminently or exceptionally within his knowledge. If the section were to be interpreted otherwise, it would lead to the very startling conclusion that in a murder case the burden lies on the accused to prove that he did not commit the murder because who could know better than he whether he did or did not. It is evident that that cannot be the intention and the Privy Council has twice refused to construe this section, as reproduced in certain other Acts outside India, to mean that the burden lies on an accused person to show that he did not commit the crime for which he is tried. These cases are Attygalle v. The King, 1936 PC 169 (AIR V 23) (A) and Seneviratne v. R. 1936-3 ER 36 AT P. 49 (B).”
Their Lordships further held that Section 106 of the Evidence Act cannot be used to undermine the well established rule of law that save in a very exceptional class of case, the burden is on the prosecution and never shifts.
2 (2021) 10 SCC 725
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those cases where the prosecution has succeeded in establishing the facts from which a reasonable inference can be drawn regarding the existence of certain other facts which are within the special knowledge of the accused. When the accused fails to offer proper explanation about the existence of said other facts, the court can always draw an appropriate inference.
v. State of Punjab 3, while considering the provisions contained in Sections 103 & 106 of the Evidence Act, held that the burden of proving a plea specially set up by an accused which may absolve him from criminal liability, certainly lies upon him, but neither the application of Section 103 nor that of 106 could, however, absolve the prosecution from the duty of discharging its general or primary burden of proving the prosecution case beyond reasonable doubt. It was further held by their Lordships
that it is only when the prosecution has led evidence which, if believed, will sustain a conviction, or which makes out a prima
3 AIR 1956 SC 460
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facie case, that the question arises of considering facts of which the burden of proof may lie upon the accused. Their Lordships also held that the burden of proving a plea specifically set up by an accused, which may absolve him from criminal liability, certain lies upon him.
“46.I t is thus settled law even under general criminal jurisprudence that Sections 105 and 106 of the Evidence Act place a part of the burden of proof on the accused to prove facts which are within his knowledge. When the prosecution establishes the ingredients of the offence charged, the burden shifts on to the accused to prove certain facts within his knowledge or exceptions
4 AIR 1974 SC 778
5 1995 Supp (2) SCC 187
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to which he is entitled to. Based upon the language in the statute the burden of proof varies. However, the test of proof of preponderance of probabilities is the extended criminal jurisprudence and the burden of proof is not as heavy as on the prosecution. Once the accused succeeds in showing, by preponderance of probabilities that there is reasonable doubt in his favour, the burden shifts again on to the prosecution to prove the case against the accused beyond reasonable doubt, if the accused has to be convicted. From this conceptual criminal jurisprudence, question emerges whether subsection (5) placing the burden on the accused of the facts stated therein would offend Articles 20(3), 21 and 14 of the Constitution.”
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door was opened then she saw her daughter Rukhmani and her grandson Akash Kumar @ Guddu lying dead on the cot then she informed the Village Kotwar and Village Sarpanch and the appellant / accused was not present in the house. As such, prosecution has proved death to be homicidal in nature and the appellant and deceased persons were last seen together by Ramayan Bai (PW-1) on 23.02.2013 and thereafter the dead body of the deceased persons were noticed on 26.02.2013 and according to the postmortem reports (Exs. P/18 & 19) cause of death is strangulation and duration of time since death is 70 hours. Since it is a house murder, the appellant was required to explain in his statement under Section 313 of the CrPC that under what circumstances his wife Rukhmani Bai and his son Akash Kumar @ Guddu died, which he has failed to explain and has given false explanation that he had gone to village Bhalwahi as he was staying with his first wife Usha Bai (PW-5) which he has not proved by adducing legal evidence and further the deceased Rukhmani Bai was appellant's second wife and he used to quarrel with her and he has stated that he had gone to Bhalwahi for staying with his first wife Usha Bai (PW-5). As such, the appellant used to quarrel with deceased Rukhmani Bai being his second wife that is the motive attributed for the commission of the offence which is duly established, therefore, the appellant was the only person who had the special knowledge of the
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particular fact as to how his wife deceased Rukhmani and his son deceased Akash Kumar @ Guddu died which he has failed
to explain in his statement under Section 313 of the CrPC. As such, the trial Court is absolutely justified in convicting the appellant for offence under Section 302 (two times) of the IPC by holding that the death is homicidal in nature, motive of the offence has been established and Section 106 of the Evidence Act, 1872 is squarely attracted. In that view of the matter, we do
not find any merit in the instant appeal and appeal deserves to
be and accordingly, it is dismissed .
Sd/Sd/- (Sanjay K. Agrawal) (Radhakishan Agrawal) Judge Judge Ankit
3 issues framed by the court
Whether the death of the appellant's second wife and son was homicidal in nature based on post-mortem reports?
Whether Section 106 of the Evidence Act, 1872 applies to shift the burden of proving facts due to special knowledge of the accused?
Whether the appellant successfully discharged the burden under Section 106 by explaining his alibi?
Colour shows how this judgement treated each authority
Shambhu Nath Mehra v. The State of AjmerExplained¶54
Shambhu Nath Mehra v. The State of Ajmer 1 AIR 1956 SC 404 · Who else cites this
Nagendra Sah v. State of BiharFollowed¶57
Nagendra Sah v. State of Bihar 2 (2021) 10 SCC 725 · Who else cites this
Gurcharan Singh v. State of PunjabFollowed¶64
Gurcharan Singh v. State of Punjab 3 AIR 1956 SC 460 · Who else cites this
Sawal Das v. State of BiharFollowed¶70
Sawal Das v. State of Bihar 4 AIR 1974 SC 778 · Who else cites this
P.N. Krishna Lal and Others v. Government of Kerala and OthersReferred¶20
P.N. Krishna Lal and Others v. Government of Kerala and Others 5 1995 Supp (2) SCC 187 · Who else cites this
3 provisions across 3 enactments
Shatruhan S/o Late Manohar Lal Kurre
State of Chhattisgarh
Sanjay K. Agrawal
Radhakishan Agrawal
As recorded by the court registry
Judgements on the same questions, provisions and authorities, from every court
