Allowed

Budhan Ram Prajapati v. The State Of Chhattisgarh

Chhattisgarh HC20 Dec 2023CRA/19/2016

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

Appeal against conviction under Sections 302/34 and 201 IPC for murder by axe and concealment of the body. The court found the death homicidal but held that the circumstance of last seen together, recovery of bloodstained articles without proof of human blood, and motive did not complete the chain of circumstantial evidence, and acquitted the appellants.

What did the court decide?

Conviction and sentences under Sections 302/34 and 201 of IPC set aside; appellants acquitted of the charges and directed to be released from jail forthwith, if not required in any other case.

Budhan Ram Prajapati Vs The State Of… — Murder and Culpable Homicide | Chhattisgarh HC (2023)

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Page 1 of 19

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(Criminal Appeal No.19 of 2016)

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NAFR

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HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH, BILASPUR

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Criminal Appeal No. 19 of 20 16

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Budhan Ram Prajapati, Son of Dharamjeet Prajapati, aged about 23 years, Resident of Village Sakalpur, Police Station Bhatgaon, District Surajpur (Chhattisgarh)

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Anand Bargah, Son of Moharlal Bargah, aged about 23 years, Resident of Village Shyamnagar, Police Station Bhatgaon, District Surajpur (Chhattisgarh)

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---- Appellants

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Versus

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State of Chhattisgarh, through Station House Officer, Police Station Bhatgaon, District Surajpur (Chhattisgarh)

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---- Respondent

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------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- For Appellants : Mr. Anil Tripathi, Advocate For Respondent : Mr. Sudeep Verma, Dy. Govt. Adv.

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Division Bench

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Hon'ble Shri Justice Sanjay K. Agrawal and Hon'ble Shri Justice Sanjay S. Agrawal

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Judgment on Board (20.12.2023)

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Sanjay K. Agrawal, J

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(1) In this criminal appeal filed under Section 374(2) of Cr.P.C., the two accused-appellants herein, namely, Budhan Ram Prajapati (A-1) and Anand Bargah (A-2) are calling in question the legality, validity and correctness of the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 14.10.2015, passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Pratapur, District Surajpur (Chhattisgarh) in Sessions Trial No.16 of 2015, whereby they have been convicted for offences under Section 302 read with Section 34 of IPC and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life with fine of Rs.500/-

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Page 2 of 19

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(Criminal Appeal No.19 of 2016)

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each and, in default of payment of fine, additional rigorous imprisonment for 06 months each and also under Section 201 of IPC and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 05 years with fine of Rs.100/- each and, in default of payment of fine amount, additional rigorous imprisonment for 06 months each. [Both the sentences are directed to run concurrently] .

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(2) The case of the prosecution, in short, is that between 22.05.2015, at about 11:00 PM, to 23.05.2015, at about 12:00 AM, at Village Sakalpur, the two accused-appellants herein firstly shared common intention and, in furtherance thereof, assaulted Sukhan Prajapti (for short the “deceased”) by means of axe, due to which, he suffered grievous injuries and died and, thereafter, in order to screen themselves from the legal punishment of committing murder of the deceased, tried to hide the dead-body of the deceased and, thereby, the appellants are said to have committed offences under Sections 302/34 & 201 of IPC.

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(3) The further case of the prosecution is that the appellant No.01- Budhan Ram Prajapati was real brother of the deceased and the appellant No.02- Anand Bargah is friend of the appellant No.01. The marriage of the deceased was solemnized with Vinita (PW-05) on 25.04.2013 and, after 02-03 months of their marriage, the deceased used to suspect relationship of his wife- Vinita with his brother (appellant No.01) outside the marriage and, on account of which, enmity existed between the deceased and the appellant

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Page 3 of 19

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(Criminal Appeal No.19 of 2016)

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No.01 and deceased used to quarrel with his wife- Vinita (PW-05). On the date of offence, the appellant No.02 came to the house of the deceased and took him towards the courtyard of the house for some conversation and went back and, thereafter, the deceased went outside of his house on his cycle and did not return back. Thereafter, on the next day, at about 12:00 AM, villagers informed Vinita (PW-05) that the dead-body of the her husband (deceased) is lying near the pond, upon which, dehati merg intimation (Ex.P/12) was registered by the police.

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(4) Thereafter, on the report lodged by Vinita (PW-05), dehati nalsi (Ex.P/11) was also registered by the police and wheels of investigation started running, in which, inquest proceedings were conducted vide Ex.P/17 and summons under Section 175 of CrPC were sent vide Ex.P/16. Spot map and panchnama were also prepared vide Ex.P/23 & Ex.P/24 respectively. The dead-body of deceased was sent for postmortem examination and in the postmortem report (Ex.P/31), conducted by Dr. Maheshwar Singh (PW-15), it was opined that the cause of death of the deceased is hemorrhage and shock resulting to asphyxia due to head injury and throttling and nature of death is homicidal. FIR (Ex.P/21) was registered against the appellants and, thereafter, the appellantsaccused were arrested vide Ex.P/14 & Ex.P/15 and their memorandum statements were recorded vide Ex.P/01 & Ex.P/03 respectively. Pursuant to the memorandum statement of the

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Page 4 of 19

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(Criminal Appeal No.19 of 2016)

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appellant No.01, axe has been seized vide Ex.P/02 and similarly, on the basis of the memorandum statement of the appellant No.02, wooden parts of the axe were seized vide Ex.P/04. Further, from the possession of the appellants, their clothes (shirts and paints) were also seized vide Ex.P/05 & Ex.P/06 respectively. The aforesaid seized articles were sent for chemical examination and in the FSL report (though not exhibited, but annexed at Page Nos.5961 of the paper-book), it has been opined that blood has been found on the axe and on the wooden parts of the axe, seized pursuant to the memorandum statements of the appellants respectively and also on the clothes of the appellants. Thereafter, statements of witnesses were recorded and, after due investigation, the police filed charge-sheet against the appellants in the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Pratapur and, thereafter, the case was committed to the Court of Sessions for hearing and trial in accordance with law, in which the appellants/accused abjured their guilt and entered into defence by stating that they are innocent and have been falsely implicated.

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(5) The prosecution in order to prove its case examined as many as 18 witnesses and exhibited 32 documents apart from FSL report, whereas the appellants-accused, in support of their defence, though not examined any witness, but exhibited 01 document i.e. statement of Ramfal Prajapati (Ex.D/01).

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(6) The learned trial Court after appreciating the oral and

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Page 5 of 19

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(Criminal Appeal No.19 of 2016)

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documentary evidence available on record, proceeded to convict the appellants for offences under Sections 302/34 & 201 of IPC and sentenced them as mentioned herein-above, against which this appeal has been preferred by the appellants-accused questioning the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence.

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(7) Mr. Anil Tripathi, learned counsel appearing for the appellants submits that the learned trial Court is absolutely unjustified in convicting the appellants for offences under Sections 302/34 & 201 of IPC, as the prosecution has failed to prove the offences beyond reasonable doubt. He further submits that in the present case there is no direct evidence available on record against the appellants and the case of the prosecution is based on circumstantial evidence. He also submits that the theory of last seen together with regard to the appellant No.02 with the deceased is not established beyond reasonable doubt. Merely on the basis of surmises and conjunctures, the appellants herein have been convicted. Though, certain incriminating articles were seized from the appellants, however as per FSL report, only blood has been found on the said articles and not human blood and, therefore, in light of the principles of law laid down by the Supreme Court in the matter of Balwan Singh v. State of Chhattisgarh and another1 , the recovery of aforesaid articles is of no help to the prosecution. Further, there are major contradictions and 1 (2019) 7 SCC 781

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Page 6 of 19

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(Criminal Appeal No.19 of 2016)

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omissions in the statements of various prosecution witnesses. As such, the appellants could not have been convicted on the basis of aforesaid incriminating circumstances. Hence, the present appeal deserves to be allowed and the appellants are liable to be acquitted of the said charges.

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(8) Per-contra , learned State counsel supported the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence and submits that the prosecution has proved the offence beyond reasonable doubt by leading evidence of clinching nature. In view of the statements of various prosecution witnesses, specially, Vinita (PW-05) and Dharmjeet (PW-06) coupled with other material available on record, the learned trial Court has rightly convicted the appellants for offences under Sections 302/34 & 201 of IPC. Thus, the present appeal deserves to be dismissed.

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(9) We have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival submissions made herein-above and went through the records with utmost circumspection.

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(10) The first and foremost question is as to whether the death of the deceased was homicidal in nature, which the learned trial Court has recorded in affirmative by taking into consideration the postmortem report (Ex.P/31), wherein it has been opined that hemorrhage and shock resulting to asphyxia due to head injury and throttling and nature of death is homicidal, which is duly proved by the statement of Dr. Maheshwar Singh (PW-15).

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Page 7 of 19

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(Criminal Appeal No.19 of 2016)

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Accordingly, taking into consideration the postmortem report (Ex.P/31) and the statement of Dr. Maheshwar Singh (PW-15), who has conducted the postmortem of the dead-body of the deceased, we are of the considered opinion that the death of the deceased is homicidal in nature, as the same is correct finding of fact based on evidence and same is neither perverse nor contrary to the record. We hereby affirm the said finding.

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(11) Now, the next question would be whether the accusedappellants herein are the author of the crime in question or not, which the learned trial Court has answered in affirmative by relying upon the following incriminating/circumstantial evidence, which reads thus:

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“(i) theory of last seen together with regard to the appellant No.02 with the deceased by Vinita (PW-05);

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(ii) recovery of incriminating articles pursuant to the memorandum statement of the appellants, in which as per FSL report, blood stains were found;

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(iii) motive on the part of the appellant No.01 to commit the offence/murder of the deceased, as the deceased used to suspect relationship of his wife (Vinita) with his brother (appellant No.01) outside the marriage, owing to which, enmity existed between the appellant No.01 and the deceased.”

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(12) Before proceeding further, it is profitable here to note following five golden principles laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the matter of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda vs.

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Page 8 of 19

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(Criminal Appeal No.19 of 2016)

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State of Maharashtra2 which constitute the ‘panchsheel’ of proof of a case based on circumstantial evidence and same read as under:

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“153. …. (1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established.

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It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the circumstances concerned 'must or should' and not 'may be' established. There is not only a grammatical but a legal distinction between 'may be proved' and 'must be or should be proved' as was held by this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra, (1973) 2 SCC 793 where the following observations were made:

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"Certainly, it is a primary principle that the accused must be and not merely may be guilty before a court can convict and the mental distance between 'may be' and 'must be' is long and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions."

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(2) The facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say. they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty,

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(3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency.

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(4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved, and

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(5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused.”

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(13) We shall now consider and test the correctness of each of the aforesaid incriminating circumstances one by one.

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2 (1984) 4 SCC 116

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Page 9 of 19

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(Criminal Appeal No.19 of 2016)

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Theory of last seen together:-

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(14) The first incriminating circumstance that has been putforth by the prosecution and found proved by the learned trial Court is that the appellant No.02 and the deceased both were last seen together by the wife of the deceased, namely, Vinita (PW-05).

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(15) In the matter of Jaharlal Das v. State of Orissa 3, the Supreme Court has noted the fact that at the stage of inquest, the important incriminating circumstance namely, the deceased was last seen in the company of the accused, was not noted and that is not there in the inquest report. Thereafter, in that view of the above fact and other evidence on record, their Lordships have held that the deceased was last seen in the company of the accused is not established beyond reasonable doubt.

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(16) In the matter of Arjun Marik v. State of Bihar 4, it has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that conviction cannot be made solely on the basis of theory of 'last seen together' and observed in paragraph 31 as under :-

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“31. Thus the evidence that the appellant had gone to Sitaram in the evening of 19-7-1985 and had stayed in the night at the house of deceased Sitaram is very shaky and inconclusive. Even if it is accepted that they were there it would at best amount tothough a number of witnesses have been examined be the evidence of the appellants having been seen last together with the deceased. But it is settled law that the only circumstance of last seen will not complete the chain of

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3 (1991) 3 SCC 27

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4 1994 Supp (2) SCC 372

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Page 10 of 19

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(Criminal Appeal No.19 of 2016)

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circumstances to record the finding that it is consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and, therefore, no conviction on that basis alone can be founded.”

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(17) Likewise, in the matter of State of Goa v. Sanjay Thakran 5, the Supreme Court has held that the circumstance of last seen together would be a relevant circumstance in a case where there was no possibility of any other person meeting or approaching the deceased at the place of incident or before the commission of crime in the intervening period. It was observed in paragraph 34 as under :-

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“34. From the principle laid down by this Court, the circumstance of last-seen together would normally be taken into consideration for finding the accused guilty of the offence charged with when it is established by the prosecution that the time gap between the point of time when the accused and the deceased were found together alive and when the deceased was found dead is so small that possibility of any other person being with the deceased could completely be ruled out. The time gap between the accused persons seen in the company of the deceased and the detection of the crime would be a material consideration for appreciation of the evidence and placing reliance on it as a circumstance against the accused. But, in all cases, it cannot be said that the evidence of last seen together is to be rejected merely because the time gap between the accused persons and the deceased last seen together and the crime coming to light is after a considerable long duration. There can be no fixed or straight jacket formula for the duration of time gap in this regard and it would depend upon the evidence led by the prosecution to remove the possibility of any other person meeting the deceased in the intervening period, that is to say, if the prosecution is

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5 (2007) 3 SCC 755

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Page 11 of 19

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(Criminal Appeal No.19 of 2016)

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able to lead such an evidence that likelihood of any person other than the accused, being the author the crime, becomes impossible, then the evidence of circumstance of last seen together, although there is long duration of time, can be considered as one of the circumstances in the chain of circumstances to prove the guilt against such accused persons. Hence, if the prosecution proves that in the light of the facts and circumstances of the case, there was no possibility of any other person meeting or approaching the deceased at the place of incident or before the commission of the crime, in the intervening period, the proof of last seen together would be relevant evidence. For instance, if it can be demonstrated by showing that the accused persons were in exclusive possession of the place where the incident occurred or where they were last seen together with the deceased, and there was no possibility of any intrusion to that place by any third party, then a relatively wider time gap would not affect the prosecution case. ”

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(18) Similarly, in the matter of Kanhaiya Lal v. State of Rajasthan 6, their Lordships of the Supreme Court have clearly held that the circumstance of last seen together does not by itself and necessarily lead to the inference that it was the accused who committed the crime and there must be something more establishing connectivity between the accused and the crime. Mere non-explanation on the part of the appellant in our considered opinion, by itself cannot lead to proof of guilt against the appellant. It has been held in paragraphs 15 & 16 as under :-

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“15. The theory of last seen – the appellant having gone with the deceased in the manner noticed hereinbefore, is the singular piece of circumstantial evidence available against him. The conviction of the appellant cannot be maintained merely on suspicion, however strong it may

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6 (2014) 4 SCC 715

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Page 12 of 19

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(Criminal Appeal No.19 of 2016)

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be, or on his conduct. These facts assume further importance on account of absence of proof of motive particularly when it is proved that there was cordial relationship between the accused and the deceased for a long time. The fact situation bears great similarity to that in Madho Singh v. State of Rajasthan¹ .

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In view of the aforesaid circumstances, it is not possible to sustain the impugned judgment and sentence. This appeal is allowed and the conviction and sentence imposed on the appellant-accused Kanhaiya Lal are set aside and he is acquitted of the charge by giving benefit of doubt. He is directed to be released from the custody forthwith unless required otherwise.”

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(19) In the matter of Anjan Kumar Sarma v. State of Assam 7, their Lordships of the Supreme Court have clearly held that in a case where other links have been satisfactorily made out and circumstances point to guilt of accused, circumstance of last seen together and absence of explanation would provide an additional link which completes the chain. In absence of proof of other circumstances the only circumstance of last seen together and absence of satisfactory explanation, cannot be made basis of conviction.

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(20) In the matter of Navaneethakrishnan v. State by Inspector of Police 8, the Supreme Court has held that though the evidence of last seen together could point to the guilt of the accused, but this evidence alone cannot discharge the burden of establishing the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt and requires corroboration, and observed in paragraph 22 as under: -

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7 (2017) 14 SCC 359

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8 (2018) 16 SCC 161

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Page 13 of 19

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(Criminal Appeal No.19 of 2016)

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“22. PW 11 was able to identify all the three accused in the court itself by recapitulating his memory as those persons who came at the time when he was washing his car along with John Bosco and further that he had last seen all of them sitting in the Omni van on that day and his testimony to that effect remains intact even during the cross-examination in the light of the fact that the said witness has no enmity whatsoever against the appellants herein and he is an independent witness. Once the testimony of PW 11 is established and inspires full confidence, it is well established that it is the accused who were last seen with the deceased specially in the circumstances when there is nothing on record to show that they parted from the accused and since then no activity of the deceased can be traced and their dead bodies were recovered later on. It is a settled legal position that the law presumes that it is the person, who was last seen with the deceased, would have killed the deceased and the burden to rebut the same lies on the accused to prove that they had departed. Undoubtedly, the last seen theory is an important event in the chain of circumstances that would completely establish and/or could point to the guilt of the accused with some certainty. However, this evidence alone cannot discharge the burden of establishing the guilt of accused beyond reasonable doubt and requires corroboration.”

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(21) In the matter of State of Goa v. Sanjay Thakran and another 9, their Lordships of the Supreme Court found that there was considerable time gap of approximately 8½ hours when the deceased was last seen alive with the accused persons and their Lordships held that there being a considerable time gap between the persons seen together and the proximate time of crime, the circumstance of last seen together, even if proved, cannot clinchingly fasten the guilt on the accused.

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9 (2007) 3 SCC 755

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Page 14 of 19

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(Criminal Appeal No.19 of 2016)

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(22) Reverting to the facts of the case in light of the principles of law laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in abovementioned judgments, it is quite vivid that in the instant case the prosecution has cited Vinita (PW-05) [wife of the deceased] as witness to the theory of last seen together with regard to the appellant No.02 with the deceased on the date and time of the offence. However, a careful perusal of the statement of Vinita (PW05) would show that she has clearly stated that on the date of occurrence, at about 10:00 PM, the appellant No.02 came to her house and took her husband (deceased) towards the courtyard of the house, where they both had some conversation and, thereafter, her husband (deceased) returned back, but the appellant No.02 did not return back, thereafter, Vinita (PW-05) had gone to sleep, but meanwhile, the deceased asked her for a torch, which she gave and went to sleep. Thereafter, the deceased took her dinner and went outside the house, but where and at what time the deceased had gone, she did not know. Further, Vinita (PW-05) has also stated that prior to the date of occurrence, her husband (deceased) used to suspect her relationship with the appellant No.01 outside the marriage, on account of which, the deceased used to quarrel with her and enmity also existed between the appellant No.01 and the deceased. As such, taking the statement of Vinita (PW-05) as it is, it has only been established that on the date of offence, the appellant No.02 had visited her house and spent some time with

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Page 15 of 19

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(Criminal Appeal No.19 of 2016)

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her husband (deceased) and, thereafter, the deceased returned back to his house, but the appellant No.02 did not return back and, therefore, it has clearly been established beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant No.02 had not taken the deceased alongwith him on the date and time of the offence. Thus, the theory of last seen together does not establish beyond reasonable doubt. Apart from it, the dead-body of the deceased has also not been recovered within considerable time, as the same has been recovered after a time gape of more than 12 hours. Therefore, in our considered opinion, the finding recorded by the learned trial Court that the appellant No.02 and the deceased were lastly seen together on the date and time of the offence is contrary to the material available on record and same is perverse finding. We hereby hold accordingly.

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Recovery of incriminating articles from the appellants:

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(23) In shape of corroboration, the learned trial Court has relied upon the recovery of axe and wooden parts of the axe pursuant to the memorandum statements of the appellants herein. True it is that pursuant to the memorandum statements of the appellants recorded vide Ex.P/01 & Ex.P/03 respectively, axe and wooden parts of the axe were seized vide Ex.P/02 & Ex.P/04 respectively and further the clothes of the appellants (i.e. shirts and paints) were also seized vide Ex.P/05 & Ex.P/06, however, as per FSL report (not exhibited) it has been clearly opined that only blood

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Page 16 of 19

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(Criminal Appeal No.19 of 2016)

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stains were found on the aforesaid seized articles and no human blood has been found on it.

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(24) The Supreme Court in the matter of Balwan Singh (supra) held that if the recovery of bloodstained articles is proved beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution, and if the investigation was not found to be tainted, then it may be sufficient if the prosecution shows that the blood found on the articles is of human origin though, even though the blood group is not proved because of disintegration of blood and held in Para-24 as under:

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“ 24. In the instant case, then, we could have placed some reliance on the recovery, had the prosecution at least proved that the blood was of human origin. As observed supra, while discussing the evidence of PWs 9 and 16, the prosecution has tried to concoct the case from stage to stage. Hence, in the absence of positive material indicating that the stained blood was of human origin and of the same blood group as that of the accused, it would be difficult for the Court to rely upon the aspect of recovery of the weapons and tabbal, and such recovery does not help the case of the prosecution.”

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(25) Further, the Supreme Court in the matter of Mani v. State of Tamil Nadu10 , considering the nature, scope and applicability of Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, has held that discovery is a weak kind of evidence and cannot be wholly relied upon and has observed the following in paragraph 26 of the judgment :-

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“26. The discovery is a weak kind of evidence and cannot 10 (2009) 17 SCC 273

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Page 17 of 19

¶112

(Criminal Appeal No.19 of 2016)

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be wholly relied upon and conviction in such a serious matter cannot be based upon the discovery. Once the discovery fails, there would be literally nothing which would support the prosecution case. We have already held that the prosecution has failed to prove that the house where alleged bloodstains were found belonged exclusively or was possessed exclusively by the appellant, we have further pointed out that the discovery was absolutely farcical. There is one other very relevant factor ignored by both the courts that the prosecution never made any attempts to prove that the clothes belonged to the appellants. There is literally no evidence to suggest anything to that effect. Therefore, even if we accept the discovery, it does not take us anywhere near the crime. Both the courts below have ignored this very important aspect. Once these two important circumstances are disbelieved, there is nothing which would remain to support the prosecution theory.”

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(26) Bearing in mind the aforesaid principle of law laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the matters of Balwan Singh (supra) and Mani (supra), it is quite vivid that though as per FSL report (not exhibited) only blood has been found on the articles seized from the appellants, but there is no evidence available on record to show that stains of human blood were found on the said articles (i.e. axe, wooden parts of the axe and clothes of the appellants), in absence of which, recovery of aforesaid articles is of no help to the prosecution. We hereby hold accordingly.

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Motive of the offence:-

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(27) The final and last circumstance that has been found proved by the learned trial Court is that the appellant No.01 has motive to commit the offence of murder of the deceased, as the deceased

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Page 18 of 19

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(Criminal Appeal No.19 of 2016)

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used to suspect relationship of his wife (Vinita) with his brother (appellant No.01) outside the marriage and, on account of which, enmity existed between the deceased and the appellant No.01. The aforesaid incriminating circumstance is based on the statement of Dharmjeet (PW-06), who is father of the deceased, wherein he has stated that the appellant No.01 had relationship with the wife of the deceased, namely, Vinita (PW-05) outside the marriage and, on account of which, the deceased used to quarrel with his wife (Vinita). As such, from the statement of Dharmjeet (PW-06), motive to commit the offence by the appellant No.01 is clearly established. However, it is well settled law that motive may be an important circumstance in a case based on circumstantial evidence, but it cannot take place of conclusive proof. (See: Sampath Kumar vs.

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Inspector of Police, Krishnagiri11 ). Further, in a recent decision rendered in the matter of Mahendra Singh vs. State of M.P.12 their Lordships of the Supreme Court reiterated the law on the point stating that merely because motive is established, solely on that basis accused cannot be convicted that too for an offence under Section 302 of IPC. We hereby hold accordingly.

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(28) In view of the aforesaid discussion, we are unable to hold that the prosecution has been able to prove the five golden principles to constitute the ‘panchsheel’ of proof of a case based on circumstantial evidence, as laid down by their Lordships of the

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11 (2012) 4 SCC 124

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12 (2022) 7 SCC 157

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Page 19 of 19

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(Criminal Appeal No.19 of 2016)

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Supreme Court in the matter of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda (supra), in absence of which, the appellants are entitled to get benefit of doubt. The learned trial Court is unjustified in convicting the appellants for offences under Sections 302/34 & 201 of IPC in light of incriminating circumstances as culled out in Para-11 of this judgment. Accordingly, the conviction and sentences of the appellants for offences punishable under Sections 302/34 & 201 of IPC imposed upon them by the learned trial Court are hereby set aside. They are acquitted of the said charges. Since the appellants are in jail, we direct that they be released from jail forthwith, if not required in any other matter/case.

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(29) This criminal appeal is allowed .

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(30) Let a certified copy of this order alongwith the original record be transmitted to the trial Court concerned as well as to the Superintendent of Jail where the appellants are languishing for necessary information and action, if any.

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Sd/Sd/- (Sanjay K. Agrawal) (Sanjay S. Agrawal) Judge Judge

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s@if

Budhan Ram Prajapati v. The State Of Chhattisgarh

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Budhan Ram Prajapati v. The State Of Chhattisgarh

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