Allowed

Daulal and Anr. v. Malti Bai and Anr.

Chhattisgarh HC6 Feb 2020SA/36/2008

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

In this second appeal, the High Court of Chhattisgarh set aside the First Appellate Court's dismissal of an appeal due to a 15-day delay. The court held that sufficient cause was shown for the delay in part and restored the first appeal to be decided on merits.

What did the court decide?

Impugned judgment and decree set aside; delay in filing appeal condoned subject to payment of cost 2,000/- by appellants; first appeal restored for hearing on merits.

Daulal and Anr. Vs Malti Bai and Anr. — Civil Procedure and Limitation | Chhattisgarh HC (2020)

¶1

¶2

NAFR

¶3

HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

¶4

Second Appeal No. 36 of 2008

¶5

1. Daulal S/o Gour Singh, Aged 35 years.

¶6

2. Devanand S/o Gour Singh, Aged 16 years, Through Guardian Mother Sukhwantinbai Kewat W/o Gaur Singh, Aged 23 years, Both R/o Ward No. 10, Beldarpara, Mahasamund, Tahsil and Distt. Mahasamund, Chhattisgarh.

¶7

---Appellants/Plaintiffs

¶8

 Versus

¶9

1. Maltibai W/o Sakharam Kewat, Aged 60 years, R/o Beldarpara, Ward No. 10, Mahasamund, Tahsil and Distt. Mahasamund, Chhattisgarh.

¶10

2. Parasram S/o Saligram Gond, Aged 40 years, R/o Ward No. 10, Beldarpara, Mahasamund, Tahsil and Distt. Mahasamund, Chhattisgarh.

¶11

 --- Respondents/Defendants

¶12

For Appellants:-Mr. Anand Kumar Gupta, Advocates
For Respondents:-Mr. J.A. Lohani, Advocate

¶13

Hon'ble Shri Justice Sanjay K. Agrawal Judgment on Board

¶14

06/02/2020

¶15

1. This second appeal preferred by the

¶16

appellants/plaintiffs was admitted for hearing on
the following substantial question of law :-

¶17

“Whether the First Appellate Court is
justified in dismissing the appeal by

¶18

¶19

rejectingtheapplicationfor
condonation of delay holding that no
sufficient cause has been shown for the
delay of 15 days in filing first appeal
under Section 96 of the CPC by recording
a finding which is perverse to the
record ?”

¶20

(For the sake of convenience, the parties will be
referred hereinafter as per their status in the
trial Court.)

¶21

2.The two plaintiffs filed a suit for declaration
of title and recovery of possession against the
defendants which was dismissed by the trial Court
on merits vide judgment and decree dated
21/07/2004 against which the plaintiffs preferred
first appeal under Section 96 of the CPC along
with an application for condonation of delay for
condoning the delay of 15 days in filing the
appeal. The first appellate Court did not found
favour with the application for condonation of
delay and rejected it and consequently, dismissed
the appeal as well vide judgment and decree dated
28/11/2007 holding that sufficient cause has not
been shown by the plaintiffs for delay of 15 days
in filing the appeal against which this second
appeal under Section 100 of the CPC has been

¶22

¶23

preferred by the appellants/plaintiffs in which
substantial question of law has been framed and
set out in the opening paragraph of this
judgment.

¶24

3.Mr. Anand Kumar Gupta, learned counsel appearing
for the appellants/plaintiffs would submit that
sufficient cause has been shown by the plaintiffs
in the application for condonation of delay for
delay of 15 days in filing the appeal, yet the
first appellate Court dismissed the appeal on the
ground that no sufficient cause has been shown by
the plaintiff for delay in filing the appeal, as
such, the second appeal deserves to be allowed by
setting aside the judgment and decree of the
first appellate Court.

¶25

4.Mr. J.A. Lohani, learned counsel appearing for
the respondents/defendants would support the
judgment and decree passed by the first appellate
Court and wold submit that the second appeal
deserves to be dismissed.

¶26

5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival submissions made hereinabove and went through the records with utmost circumspection.

¶27

¶28

6.The Supreme Court in the matter of Collector.

¶29

Land Acquisition, Anantnag and another v. Mst.
Katiji and others1 while construing the meaning
of “sufficient cause” under Section 5 of the
Limitation Act, 1963 held that the Courts should
adopt a liberal and justice-oriented approach and
condoned the delay of four days in filing appeal,
under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
Their Lordships of the Supreme Court further held
that the High Court erred in dismissing the
appeal on hyper technical ground of bar of
limitation and observed as under: -

¶30

“The courts therefore have to be informed
with the spirit and philosophy of the
provision in the course of the
interpretationoftheexpression
"sufficient cause". So also the same
approach has to be evidenced in its
application to matters at hand with the
end in view to do even-handed justice on
merits in preference to the approach
which scuttles a decision on merits.”

¶31

7. Similarly, the Supreme Court in N. Balakrishnan

¶32

v. M. Krishnamurthy² observed that sufficient cause has to be construed liberally especially when the delay is not deliberate and mala fide .

¶33

Paragraphs 11 and 12 of the report state as
under:-

¶34

1(1987) 2 SCC 107

¶35

2 (1998) 7 SCC 123

¶36

¶37

“11. Rule of limitation are not meant to destroy the right of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. the object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. Law of limitation fixes a life-span for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time is precious and the wasted time would never revisit. During efflux of time newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the courts. So a life span must be fixed for each remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. Law of limitation is thus founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim interest reipublicae up sit finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be putt to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the right of the parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time.

¶38

12. A court knows that refusal to condone delay would result foreclosing a suitor from putting forth his cause. There is no presumption that delay in approaching the court is always deliberate. This Court has held that the words "sufficient cause" under Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice vide Shakuntala Devi Jain Vs. Kuntal Kumari [AIR 1969 SC 575] and State of West Bengal Vs. The Administrator, Howrah Municipality [AIR 1972 SC 749]. ”

¶39

8.Thus, applying the principle of law laid down by
the Supreme Court in N. Balakrishnan(supra)

¶40

¶41

which has been followed by their Lordships in
Bhivchandra Shankar More v. Balu Gangaram More
and Ors.3 to the facts of the case at hand, it is
quite vivid that plaintiffs' suit for declaration
of title and recovery of possession was dismissed
by the trial Court on merits against which they
filed an appeal along with an application for
condonation of delay for condoning the delay of
15 days in filing the appeal. The application for
condonation of delay was rejected by the first
appellate Court along with the first appeal only
on the ground that each day delay has not been
explained by the plaintiffs and medical
certificate has also not been filed. The reason
projected by the plaintiffs in the application
for condonation of delay for the delay of 15 days

¶42

is that he was suffering from dysentery but the
medical certificate has not been filed. In the
considered opinion of this Court, sufficient
cause has been shown by the plaintiffs for the
delay of 10 days in filing the appeal and if
medical certificate was not filed by them, then
learned additional District Judge could have
given an opportunity to the plaintiffs to file

¶43

3 (2019) 6 SCC 387

¶44

¶45

medical certificate. The first appellate Court
has gravelly legally erred in taking a hyper
technical view and rejecting the application for
condonation of delay and subsequently, dismissing
the appeal as well. The appeal, particularly for
declaration of title, ought to have been decided
on merits.

¶46

9. Consequently, the instant second appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment and decree passed by the first appellate Court is set aside; delay in filing the appeal is condoned subject to payment of cost of ₹ 2,000/- to the

¶47

respondents/defendants which will be paid by the
plaintiffs to the defendants before the first
appellate Court and the first appeal is restored

¶48

to its original file for hearing and disposal on
merits in accordance with law preferably within a
period of three months from the date of receipt
of record and certified copy of this order.

¶49

10.Registry is directed to return the records to the

¶50

first appellate Court forthwith.

¶51

Sd/-
(Sanjay K. Agrawal)
Judge

¶52

Harneet

Daulal and Anr. v. Malti Bai and Anr.

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

Daulal and Anr. v. Malti Bai and Anr.

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

What the court decided

A compact analysis

Issues for consideration

Cases cited

Statutes considered

Parties & counsel

Coram

Case details

Similar cases

Khiru (Dead) Through Lrs. Vs (a ) Mini Bewa

Nanda Kumar Pathak Vs Shri Ram Bishal and Others

Sukutri Bai Vs Surji Bai and Others

Smt. Rukkhmani Bai and Others Vs Neel Kunwar and Ors.

Motilal Agrawal Vs Shiv Kumar Agrawal and Ors.

Smt. Raeesa Ansari Vs State of Chhattisgarh