Allowed

P. K. Gupta v. State Of Chhattisgarh and Ors.

Chhattisgarh HC17 Jan 2020CRMP/366/2015

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

A Tahsildar faced cheating and forgery prosecution over a partition and mutation order. The Court held him protected as a quasi-judicial Revenue Court under the Judges (Protection) Act, 1985 and quashed his prosecution and sanction order. Prosecution against the remaining accused was left to continue.

What did the court decide?

Criminal Case No.743/2011 and the sanction order were quashed insofar as they concerned the petitioner; prosecution against the remaining accused continues.

P. K. Gupta Vs State Of Chhattisgarh and Ors. — Quashing and FIR | Chhattisgarh HC (2020)

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AFR

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HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH, BILASPUR

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Cr.M.P.No.366 of 2015

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P.K. Gupta S/o. A.P. Gupta, aged about 47 years, posted
as Tahsildar, Tahsil Baloda, PS Baloda, District
Janjgir-Champa, R/o 2B-3, Sonal Tower, near Saket
Apartment, Agrasen Chock, Bilaspur, PS Civil Lines,
District Bilaspur (CG)

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---- Petitioner

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Versus

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1. State of Chhattisgarh, through the Secretary, Department of Home, Mantralaya, Naya Raipur, District Raipur (CG)

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2. The Secretary, Department of Law, State of Chhattisgarh, Mantralaya, Naya Raipur, District Raipur (CG)

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3. State of Chattisgarh, through Station House Officer, Police Station Baloda, Tahsil Baloda, District Janjgir-Champa (CG)

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4. Dinesh Kumar Pandey, Aged about 50 years, S/o late Babulal Pandey, R/o Village Banari, P.S. Naila, Tahsil Baloda, District Janjgir-Champa (CG)

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---- Respondents

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`For Petitioner`	`:` `Mr.Ishan`	`Verma, Advocate`
`For Res.No.1 to 3`	`:` `Mr.Akash`	`Pandey, P.L.`
`For Respondent No.4`	`:` `Mr.Amit`	`Kumar, Advocate`

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Hon'ble Shri Justice Sanjay K. Agrawal

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Judgment on Board

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17.01.2020

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1. The short question that emanates for consideration in this petition under Section 482 of the CrPC is whether a Revenue Officer as defined under Section 11 of the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code, 1959 (hereinafter called as 'Code') acting as quasi-

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judicial authority and passing order as Revenue
Court exercising jurisdiction under the Code can be
subjected to criminal proceedings / can be
prosecuted and punished for offences punishable
under Sections 420, 467, 468 and 471/34 of the IPC.
2. The aforesaid question arises on following factual

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backdrop:-

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2.1The petitioner at the relevant point of time was
posted as Tahsildar, a Revenue Officer within the
meaning of Section 11 of the Code. On 30.3.2007,
he passed an order of partition and mutation in
namantaran panji on the basis of report of
patwari with respect to Khasra No.232/1, area
1.56 acres and Khasra No.1239, area 0.43 acre
recorded in the name of complainant/respondent
No.4-Dinesh Kumar Pandey and out of which, 0.86
acre of land was directed to be recorded in the
names of Saheblal, Futan Bai, Kumari Bai & Anil
Kumar and 0.70 acre of land was directed to be
recorded in the names of Pahlad Prasad and Omkar
Prasad, whereas Khasra No.1239 area 0.43 recorded
in the name of Dinesh Pandey was directed to be
partitioned and mutated in the names of Saheblal,
Futan Bai, Kumari Bai & Anil Kumar. Order of
partition and mutation is said to have been

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passed under Section 178 read with Section 110 of
the Code after inviting objections and it was not
challenged further and order dated 30.3.2007 has
become final, but on 7.4.2011, Dinesh Kumar
Pandey-complainant/respondent No.4 herein lodged
First Information Report at Police Station-Baloda
that the present petitioner without inviting
objections and without issuing notice to him,
partitioned the suit land in favour of other
persons in collusion with them and thereby the
complainant/respondent No.4 has deprived of his
right to hold the property in accordance with law
and thereby the present petitioner and others
committed the aforesaid offences. After
registering the offence which was found favour
with the Station House Officer, Police Station
Baloda, it was investigated and thereafter the
petitioner was also charge-sheeted along with
other accused persons and filed the charge-sheet
before the jurisdictional Criminal Court for
offences punishable under Sections 420, 467, 468
and 471/34 of the IPC.

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3. This petition under Section 482 of the CrPC has been
filed seeking quashment of registration of FIR and
charge-sheet filed against him for the above-stated

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offences principally on the ground that he passed

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the order in question while acting as Revenue
Officer under Section 11 of the Code and exercised
his quasi-judicial power under the Code bonafidely,
for which he cannot be criminally prosecuted and he
is protected by Section 3 of the Act of 1950 and as
such, entire criminal prosecution deserves to be
quashed.

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4. Return has been filed opposing the writ petition
stating inter-alia that upon perusal of the
complaint and upon investigation, cognizable offence
is said to have been committed by the petitioner and
other co-accused persons, therefore, offences have
been registered and the petitioner and other
co-accused persons have been rightly charge-sheeted,
in which prosecution for sanction has also been
granted by the Law and Legislative Affairs
Department and as such, no interference is called
for in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of
the CrPC and the petition deserves to be dismissed.

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5. Mr.Ishan Verma, learned counsel for the petitioner, would submit that the petitioner at the relevant point of time was Tahsildar and acted as revenue officer within the meaning of Sections 11 and 31 of the Code and therefore, his order deemed to be an

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order of the revenue Court and order passed in
quasi-judicial capacity was judicially appealable
under Section 44(1) of the Code, as such, he cannot
be subjected to be criminal prosecution as order

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passed in quasi-judicial capacity in view of provisions contained in Section 2 read with Section 3 of the Provisions under the Judges (Protection) Act, 1985 (hereinafter called as “Act of 1985”) and there is no evidence on record of collusion with other accused persons in whose favour the land came to be recorded by his order dated 30.3.2007, as such, the prosecution launched against the petitioner for aforesaid offences is clearly illegal, arbitrary and contrary to the settled principle of law in this regard, as such, initiation of prosecution by registering the FIR and consequent submission of charge-sheet is bad in law. He would further submit that where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima-facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, as such, it deserves to be set aside in the light of judgment of the Supreme Court in the matter of State of Haryana and others v. Bhajan Lal and others 1, as 1 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335

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such, the petition be allowed and entire criminal
proceeding emanated from registering the FIR and
subsequent charge-sheet, which is subject-matter of
Criminal Case No.743/2011 (State of C.G. v. Ramlal
Narmada and others) pending in the Court of Judicial
Magistrate First Class, Akaltara, District-Janjgir-
Champa deserves to be quashed.

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6. Mr.Akash Pandey, learned Panel Lawyer for
respondents No.1 to 3/State, would however support
the registration of FIR, subsequent investigation
and submission of charge-sheet stating inter-alia
that complaint filed by respondent No.4 was
throughly investigated and upon investigation, it
was found prima-facie case against the petitioner

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for submission of charge-sheet against the
petitioner and other co-accused persons and
consequently, charge-sheet has been filed and as
such, the petition under Section 482 of the CrPC
deserves to be dismissed.

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7. On the other hand, Mr.Amit Kumar, learned counsel
for respondent NO.4, would submit that prosecution
launched against the petitioner for the aforesaid
offences is totally in accordance with law and it is
based on a complaint made by him as the land
recorded in his name was directed to be partitioned

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in favour of Saheblal, Futan Bai, Kumari Bai & Anil
Kumar, who are his relatives without inviting
objections and without hearing him and therefore,
registration of FIR, subsequent investigation and
submission of charge-sheet is in accordance with law
and as such, the petition under Section 482 of the
CrPC deserves to be dismissed.

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8. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and
considered their rival submissions made hereinabove
and also went through the records with utmost
circumscription.

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9. In order to perfectly understand the dispute, it
would be appropriate to notice the provisions
contained in the Code and the Act of 1985 relating
to status of Revenue Officer.

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10.Section 11 of the Code defines classes of the
Revenue Officers which states as under:-

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“11. Revenue Officers.-There shall be the
following classes of the Revenue Officers,
namely:-
Commissioners(includingAdditional
Commissioners;
SettlementCommissioner(including
Additional Settlement Commissioners);
Collectors(includingAdditional
Collectors);
Settlement Officers;
Sub-Divisional Officers;
Assistant Collectors;
JointCollectors(includingDeputy
Collectors);
Deputy Settlement Officers;
Assistant Settlement Officers;

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Tahsildars(includingAdditional
Tahsildars);
Superintendents of Land Records;
Naib Tahsildars;
Assistant Superintendents of Land Records.”

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11.By Section 31 of the Code, the revenue Court has

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been conferred with the status of the Court and a
Revenue Officer while exercising the power under
Section 31 shall be a Revenue Court. Section 31 of

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the Code states as under:-

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“31. Conferral of status of Courts on Board
and Revenue Officers.- The Board of a
Revenue Officer, while exercising power
under this Code or any other enactment for
the time being in force to enquire into or
to decide any question arising for
determination between the State Government
and any person or between parties to any
proceedings, shall be a Revenue Court.”

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12.Section 44 (1) of the Code provides appeal and

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appellate authorities which states as under:-

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“44. Appeal and appellate authorities.-(1)
Save where it has been otherwise provided,
an appeal shall lie from every original
order under this Code or the rules made
thereunder-

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(a) if such order is passed by any Revenue
Officer subordinate to the Sub-Divisional
Officer, whether or not the officer passing
the order is invested with the powers of
the Collector to the Sub-Divisional
Officer;

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(b) if such order is passed by the Sub-
Divisional Officer, whether or not invested
with the powers of the Collector to the
Collector;

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(c) if such order is passed by any Revenue
Officer subordinate to the Settlement
Officer to the Settlement Officer;

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(d) if such order is passed by the Revenue

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Officer in respect of whom a direction has
been issued under sub-section (3) of
section 12 or sub-section (2) of section 21
to such Revenue Officer as the State
Government may direct;

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(e) if such is passed by a Collector
whether exercising the powers of Collector
or Settlement Officer, during the currency
of the term of settlement to the
Commissioner;

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(f) if such order is passed by a Settlement
Officer, whether exercising the powers of
Settlement Officer or the powers of a
Collector in connection with any settlement
operation unless otherwise expressly
provided to the Settlement Commissioner;

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(g) if such order is passed by the
Commissioner or the Settlement Commissioner
to the Board.”

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13. Thus, it is quite vivid that Tahsildar is a Revenue Officer within the meaning of Section 11 of the Code and while exercising powers under this Code or any other enactment for the time being in force while deciding the lis between the parties, he will have the status of “Revenue Court” and order passed by the Revenue Officer including that of Tahsildar would be judicially appealable under Section 44(1) of the Code.

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14.The Judicial Officer's Protection Act, 1850
protects Judicial Officers against being sued in any
Civil Court for official acts done or orders passed
by them in good faith under Section 1 of the Act of
1850, not only a Judge, Magistrate or Justice of
Peace, a Collector or other person acting judicially

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are also protected against such civil action.

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15. In the matter of S.P.Goel v. Collector of Stamps, Delhi 2 the Supreme Court while considering the provisions in Section 1 of the Judicial Officers (Protection) Act, 1850 held as under:-

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“35. This section contains the common law rule of immunity of Judges which is based on the principle that a person holding a judicial office should be in a position to discharge his functions with complete independence and, what is more important, without there being in his mind fear of consequences. The scope and purpose of this Act has already been explained by this Court in Anowar Hussain v. Ajay Kumar Mukherjee³ in which the old decision in Teyen v. Ram Lal⁴ was approved. The position of Judges, Judicial Officers and Magistrates has since been made more secure by the enactment of Judges (Protection) Act, 1985.”

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16.Under Section 1 of the Act of 1985, not only a
Judge, Magistrate or Justice of Peace, a Collector
or other person acting judicially are also protected
against such civil action. The Judges (Protection)
Act, 1985 goes a step ahead and provides additional
protection to Judges against any civil or criminal
proceeding against them for any act, thing or word
committed, done or spoken by them when, or in the
course of, acting or purporting to act in discharge
of their official or judicial duty or function.

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2(1996) 1 SCC 573

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3 AIR 1965 SC 1651

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4 ILR (1890) 12 All 115

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17. Section 2(a) of the Act of 1985 defines meaning

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of Judge as under:-

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“2. Definition.- In this Act, “Judge” means
not only every person who is officially
designated as a Judge, but also every
person-

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(a) who is empowered by law to give in any
legal proceeding a definitive judgment, or
a judgment which, if not appealed against,
would be definitive, or a judgment which,
if confirmed by some other authority, would
be definitive, or

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From the above-stated definition of “Judge”, it is
quite vivid that every person who is required to law
to give in any proceeding a judgment is a Judge,
notwithstanding he is officially designated as a
Judge.

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18. In S.P. Goel (supra), Their Lordships have held that provisions of the Act of 1850 will also be available to Collector of Stamps as Collector has been specifically mentioned along with Judges, Magistrates and Justices of Peace in the Act of 1850.

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19. Thus, it is well settled ever since that no action is maintainable against a Judge for anything said or done by him in exercise of a jurisdiction which vest to him. The words he speaks are protected

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by an absolute privileges. It was well

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stated by Lord Tcntcrden C.J. in Gamett Vs.

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Ferrand5:

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“This freedom from action and question at
the suit of an individual is given by the
law to the Judges, not so much for their
own sake as for the sake of the public, and
for the advancement of justice, that being
free from actions, they may be free in
thought and independent in judgment, as all
who are to administer justice ought to be.”
(Excerpts from “The Due Process of Law' by
Lord Denning).”

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As such, this statement of law would apply to the
Judges of all rank (High or Low) as provided under
the Act of 1850 and the Act of 1985.

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20.Section 2(a) of the Act of 1985 defines meaning

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of Judge:-

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“2. Definition.- In this Act, “Judge” means
not only every person who is officially
designated as a Judge, but also every
person-

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(a) who is empowered by law to give in any
legal proceeding a definitive judgment, or
a judgment which, if not appealed against,
would be definitive, or a judgment which,
if confirmed by some other authority, would
be definitive, or

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(b)xxxxxxxxx.”

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Section 3 of the Act of 1985 provides as under:-

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3. Additional protection to Judges.-(1)
Notwithstanding anything contained in any
other law for the time being in force and
subject to the provisions of sub-sec.(2),
no Court shall entertain or continue any
civil or criminal proceeding against any
person who is or was a Judge for any act,
thing or word committed, done or spoken by
him when, or in the course of, acting or

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5 (1827) 6 B & C 611

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purporting to act in the discharge of his
official or judicial duty or function.

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(2) Nothing in sub-sec.(1) shall debar or
affect in any manner the power of the
Central Government or the State Government
or the Supreme Court of India or the High
Court or any other authority under any law
for the time being in force to take such
action (whether by way of civil, criminal,
or departmental proceedings or otherwise)
against any person who is or was a Judge.”

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Section 4 of the Act of 1985 provides as under:-

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“4. Saving.-The provision of this Act shall
be in addition to, and not in derogation
of, the provisions of any other law for the
time being in force providing for
protection of Judges.”

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From perusal of Section 4 of the Act of 1985, it is
quite vivid that the provisions of the Code is in
addition to and not in derogation of the provisions
of any other law for the time being in force
providing for protection of Judges.

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21.Reverting to the facts of the case, it is quite
vivid from definition of Section 2 of the Act of
1985 that the petitioner was empowered to give
definite judgment in revenue proceeding. The
petitioner at the relevant point of time was
empowered to pass order of partition and mutation
under Sections 178 and 110 of the Code respectively
and he would fall within the meaning of person under
Section 2(a) of the Act of 1985 who is empowered by

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law to give definitive judgment in revenue
proceeding

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22.The question for consideration would be,
whether the petitioner is entitled for protection
under Section 3 of the Act of 1985 ?

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23. In Union of India v. Upendra Singh 6 the Supreme Court held that even an officer, while discharging judicial or quasi-judicial duties, is amenable to the disciplinary proceedings into his conduct in discharge of the duty.

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24. The Supreme Court in the matter of Zunjarrao Bhikaji Nagarkar v. Union of India and others 7 has held that if the revenue officer in quasi-judicial adjudication has wrongly exercised his jurisdiction that wrong can be corrected in appeal. That cannot always form a basis for initiating disciplinary proceedings against an officer while he is acting as a quasi-judicial authority. It must be kept in mind that being a quasi-judicial authority, he is always subject to judicial supervision in appeal.

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25. The Division Bench of this Court in the matter

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R.A. Khandelwal v. State of Chhattisgarh & Others

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(M.Cr.C.No.1209 of 2004), decided on 1st August, 2005
quashed criminal proceedings initiated against the

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6 (1994) 3 SCC 257

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7 (1999) 7 SCC 409

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petitioner therein who while acting as competent
authority under the Madhya Pradesh (Ceiling on
Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1960 passed certain
order in that capacity was prosecuted for offences
under Sections 13(1)(d) and 13(2) of the Prevention
of Corruption Act, 1988 and Sections 120-B, 467 and
468 of the Indian Penal Code and held as under:-

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“19. Section 1 of the Judicial Officer's
Protection Act, 1850, Section 3(2) of the
Act, 1985, and Sections 45 and 48 of the
Ceiling Act, 1960 do not provide for
absolutebarfromcivil/criminal
proceedings against a person who has
performed judicial functions, except in
case of good faith, done or intended to be
done. The Central Govt. or the State Govt.
or the Supreme Court of India or the High
Court or any other Authority under any law
which is competent can take action by way
of civil, criminal or departmental or
otherwise against a person who has
performed a function in exercise of his
judicial/quasi judicial proceedings. The
provisions of the Act 1850 and the Act 1985
and the provisions of the Ceiling Act are
to prevent unnecessary harassments and
frivolous prosecution of the officers for
exercising his judicial/quasi judicial
powers at the instance of a private party
or a member of the public.”

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26. Similarly, the Madhya Pradesh High Court in the

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matter of Balram and Ors. v. Aswani Kumar Yadav and

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Ors.8 has held that the petitioner therein-Naib-
Tahsildar/Revenue Officer who has been given status
as revenue Court while exercising the power under
Code/other enactment is entitled for protection

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8 2001 (3) MPLJ 363

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under Section 3 of the Act of 1985 for an order
which he passed in quasi-judicial capacity.

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27. Similarly, in the matter of Om Prakash v. Surjan Singh 9 the High Court of Madhya Pradesh has held that the revenue officer/Tahsildar therein is entitled for protection for passing an order in capacity of revenue Court by provisions of Section 2 and 3 of the Act of 1985. It was also held that even if he has passed the order without jurisdiction he cannot be prosecuted by way of filing criminal complaint.

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28. The High Court of Madhya Pradesh in the matter of State of M.P. v. Rajeev Jain 10 has clearly held that prosecuting agency cannot be allowed to sit in judgments or orders passed in judicial or quasijudicial side by a Judge. May be that he has mistaken or grossly mistaken, yet he acted judicially and for that, no action shall lie against him. The wrong, if any, could be corrected in appeal. That cannot always form a basis for initiation of criminal prosecution.

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29. This Court in the matter of Sushil Kumar Jerom Tigga v. Ganesh Ram Gyanbandhu Patel and others 11 has

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held that Deputy Registrar of Co-operative Society

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9 2004(1) MPJR 244

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10 2001 (4) MPHT 58

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11 ILR 2018 Chhattisgarh 703

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exercising his powers under Section 64 of the
Chhattisgarh Co-operative Societies Act, 1961
functions as 'Court' subordinate to High Court and
therefore, protection under Section 3 of the Act of
1985 is available to him.

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30.Finally, reverting to the facts of the present
case in light of settled legal position noticed
hereinabove, it is quite vivid that the petitioner
while acting as Tahsildar being Revenue Officer
within the meaning of Section 11 of the Code was
entitled to pass an order in an application filed
before him under Section 178 of the Code, which he
entertained and passed an order on 30.3.2007 in
namantaran panji which states as under:

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ch 1 [k- ua- 635	dq-[k-ua- 13 1026 121@1	dq- jdck 4-58 0-34	dq- yxku 5-96 0-35	jft- fnukad 1-3-06 ch 1 ds vuqlkj jkts'k ds ikl czhdzh djus ls deh gqvkA	635 jkeHkjksl o- ykykjke /kksch lk- nsg Hkw&Lokeh	3- jftLVªh fodz; i= ds vk/kkj ij izekf.kr g0lgh 30-03-07
cpr ;ksx	12	4-24	5-62
	62@1	0-03	8-05 iS	vkilh [kkrk foHkktu ls vius HkkbZ o Hkrhth ls cVokjk esa ikus ds dkj.k iwoZ cVokjk vuqlkj dkfct dCtk esa dksbZ fookn ugha vr% iwoZ dCtk vuqlkj [kkrk foHkktu ukek] izLrko gsrq	lkgscyky o- gjizlkn QqVu ckbZ o- xsanjke dqekjh ckbZ o- ckyd`".k vfuy dqekj o- lqUnjyky o- lk- cukjh Hkw&Lokeh vkSjkbZdyk	vkns'k 1- b'rgkj mijkar dksbZ vkifRr is'k ugh 2- lg [kkrsnkjks ds e/; lgefr ds vk/kkj ij cVokjk Lohd`r fd;k tkrk gSA g0lgh 30-03-07
	63@2	0-15
	94	0-08
	232@1 esa ls	0-26
	516	0-26
	565@ es ls	0-02

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¶132

573 0-03
648@15 0-10
645 0-06
667@1 es ls 0-05
815 0-44
1100 0-68
1106
912 0-10
1027@3 0-36
1028@8 0-44
1197 0-45
1198 0-77
23-1-06
uk-dz- 32 dze'k% 1929 0-90
1935 0-21
1936 0-86
;ksx 21 16-99
ch&1 dq- [k-ua- 36 dq- jdck dq- ch&1 ds 644 lkgscyky]
[kk- 644 yxku vuqlkj lqUnjyky ih-
ua- gjizlkn ckyd`".k
22-45 24-05 g0lgh fi- xsanjke cqVu os-
xsanjke izgykn
vksadkj izlkn ih-
xsanjke vk0 ck0
dq- [k-ua-- dq- jdck dq- ukckyhx ls
yxku ckyhx gksus ds lk0 cukjh Hkw&Lok0
dkj.k
3 0-76 0-85 0-124 g0lgh0
vuUnjke fi-
vUrjke rFkk vkns'k
vfuy dqekj 1- bZ'rgkjh
fi- iapwjke vkuUnjke oYn mijkar dksbZ
varjke oks vfuy
nksuks ds vkifRr is'k
ckfyx gks dqekj o iapwjke ughaA
tkus ds dkj.k ejkj lk nsg Hkw
LokA
uk-ck- dks 2- izfof"V
foyksfir djus vuqlkj
gsrqA nkf[kyk
izekf.krA
ch&1 dq- [k-ua-- dq- jdck dq- 13 vkuUnjke uk-ck-
[k-ua yxku cfy firk vUrjke
g0lgh
13 3 0-76 0-85 ch&1 ds oks- vfuy dqekj 22-05-06
vuqlkj firk iapwjke uk-ck-
cfy iapwjke o

¶133

31.A careful perusal of the aforesaid order would
show that the petitioner has invited objections by
issuing public notice and with the consent of co-

¶134

¶135

owners, passed an order of partition, which was
judicially appealable under Section 44(1) of the
Code, but it appears from the record that no appeal
was preferred by respondent No.4 to question the
order passed by the petitioner as Revenue Officer
and allowed that order of partition/mutation to
become final and after lapse of three years from the
date of order of partition, directly lodged the FIR
on 7.4.2011 at Police Station-Balod. Order dated
30.3.2007 passed by the petitioner would show that

¶136

the petitioner has passed an order as Revenue
Officer having conferred with the status of Revenue
Court under Section 31 of the Code while exercising
jurisdiction on an application filed under Section
178 of the Code and order passed by the petitioner
was order of a Revenue Court.

¶137

32. The order passed by the petitioner under

¶138

Section 178 read with Section 110 of the Code has

¶139

becomefinal.Thesaidorderwas
appealable/correctablebeforetheappellate

¶140

authority in terms of Section 44(1) of the Code, but
it was not appealed against. The petitioner may have
mistaken or grossly mistaken in exercise of his
quasi-judicial power and jurisdiction in passing

¶141

orders on the said application and no action

¶142

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will lie against him and he is fully protected by
Section 3 of the Act of 1985 as he acted as quasi-
judicial authority / Revenue Court. It must be kept
in mind that he being a quasi-judicial authority is
always subject to judicial supervision in appeal or
by this Court under Article 226/227 of the
Constitution of India as held by the Supreme Court

¶144

in Zunjarrao Bhikaji Nagarkar(supra), therefore,
prosecuting agency cannot be permitted to sit over a
judgment or order passed on quasi-judicial side by
the petitioner while presiding the Revenue Court
under Section 31 of the Code. Even otherwise, in the
entire charge-sheet there is no allegation that he
in collusion with beneficiaries passed the impugned
order directing partition and mutation of the land
in dispute or he involved in the commission of
alleged offences. Consequently, initiation of
prosecution by lodging the FIR, further
investigation and further submission of charge-sheet
is ex-facie illegal and without authority of law in
view of para-102(6) of the judgment of the Supreme
Court in Bhajan Lal(supra).

¶145

33. The submission raised by learned counsel for respondent NO.4 that order in namantaran panji

¶146

¶147

recorded by the petitioner/revenue officer is bad as
no notice was issued and no consent was given to co-
owners. The order dated 30.3.2017 passed by the
petitioner clearly records that objections were
invited before passing the said order.

¶148

34. In the matter of State of Maharashtra v. Ramdas Shrinivas Nayak and another 12 it has been clearly held by the Supreme Court that statements of fact as to what transpired at the hearing, recorded in the judgment of the court, are conclusive of the facts so stated and no one can contradict such statements by affidavit or other evidence and held as under:-

¶149

“4. When we drew the attention of the learned
Attorney-General to the concession made
before the High Court, Shri A.K. Sen, who
appeared for the State of Maharashtra before
the High Court and led the arguments for the
respondents there and who appeared for Shri
Antulay before us intervened and protested
that he never made any such concession and
invited us to puruse the written submissions
made by him in the High Court. We are afraid
that we cannot launch into an enquiry as to
what transpired in the High Court. It is
simply not done. Public policy bars us.
Judicial decorum restrains us. Matters of
judicial record are unquestionable. They are
not open to doubt. Judges cannot be dragged
into the arena. “Judgments cannot be treated
as mere counters in the game of litigation.”13
We are bond to accept the statement of the
judges recorded in their judgment, as to what
transpired in court. We cannot allow the
statement of the judges to be contradicted by
statements at the Bar or by affidavit and
other evidence. If the judges say in their
judgment that something was done, said or

¶150

12 (1982) 2 SCC 463

¶151

13 Per Lord Atkinson in Samasundaram Chetty v. Subramanian Chetty, AIR 1926 PC 136

¶152

¶153

admitted before them, that has to be the
lastwordonthesubject.The
principle is well-settled that statements
of fact as to what transpired at the
hearing, recorded in the judgment of the
court, are conclusive of the facts so
stated and no one can contradict such
statements by affidavit or other evidence.
If a party thinks that the happenings in
court have been wrongly recorded in a
judgment, it is incumbent upon the party,
while the matter is still fresh in the
minds of the judges, to all the attention
of the very judges who have made the record
to the fact that the statement made with
regard to his conduct was a statement that
had been made in error14. That is the only
way to have the record corrected. If no
such step is taken, the matter must
necessarily end there. Of course, a party
may resile and an appellate court may
permit him in rare and appropriate cases to
resile from a concession on the ground that
the concession was made on a wrong
appreciation of the law and had led to
gross injustice; but, he may not call in
question the very fact of making the
concession as recorded in the judgment.”

¶154

35.In view of the aforesaid analysis, initiation

¶155

of criminal case against the petitioner for passing

¶156

an order of partition in the capacity of Revenue
Officer who has a status of the Revenue Court while
entertaining the application under Section 178 of

¶157

the Code is fully protected by the provisions
contained in Sections 2 and 3 of the Act of 1985 and
as such, prosecution launched against him being
Criminal Case No.743/2011 (State of Chhattisgarh v.
Ramlal Narmada and others) for offences under

¶158

14 Per Lord Buckmaster in Madhu Sudan Chowdhri v. Chandrabati Chowdhrain, AIR 1917 PC 30

¶159

Sections 420, 467, 468 and 471/34 of the IPC and
order granting of sanction dated 3.7.2014
(Annexure P/1) by the Law and Legislative Affairs
Department against him are hereby quashed. However,
prosecution will continue against remaining accused
persons.

¶160

36. The petition under Section 482 CrPC is allowed

¶161

to the extent indicated hereinabove.

¶162

Sd/-

¶163

 (Sanjay K.Agrawal)
 Judge

¶164

B/-

¶165

¶166

HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

¶167

Cr.M.P.No.366 of 2015

¶168

Petitioner

¶169

P.K. Gupta

¶170

Versus

¶171

Respondents

¶172

State of Chhattisgarh and
others

¶173

(Head-note)

¶174

(English)

¶175

Tahsildar being a Revenue Officer under Section 11
of the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code, 1959 conferred
with quasi-judicial power under the said Code and a
Revenue Officer is protected under Section 3 of the
Judicial Officer's Protection Act, 1985 for the orders
passed in discharge of his official duty.

¶176

(fgUnh)

¶177

NRrhlx<+ Hkw&jktLOk lafgrk] 1959 dh /kkjk 11 ds varxZr jktLo vf/kdkjh gksus ds ukrs rglhynkj dks] mDr lafgrk ds v/khu v)Z U;kf;d 'kfDr iznRr dh xbZ gS rFkk jktLo vf/kdkjh] dks vius inh; dRrZO; ds fuoZgu esa ikfjr vkns'k ds fy;s U;kf;d vf/kdkjh laj{k.k vf/kfu;e] 1985 ds varxZr laj{k.k izkIr gSA

P. K. Gupta v. State Of Chhattisgarh and Ors.

Case brief

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What did the court decide?

P. K. Gupta v. State Of Chhattisgarh and Ors.

Case brief

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What the court decided

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