was of the opinion that 1976
amendment of the Hindu Marriage Act
takes away and eclipses general
rule that the offspring of a
marriage, which is null and void
ipsojureisillegitimate.
According to the Court, this was
common law doctrine, inevitably
resulting in the effect of
bastardising children and has been
superseded by this provision.
Considering the effect of this
amendment, in the context of
Section 8, clause (a) of the Hindu
Succession Act, the Court held that
illegitimate children now given
legitimacy would be included within
the meaning of 'son' and 'daughter'
in the Schedule to the Hindu
SuccessionAct.TheCourt,
therefore, held that though the
lady would not be the widow, her
sons and daughters would be
included within the meaning of the
term in Section 8 read with the
schedule. A close reading of this
decision would indicate that it was
the effect of 1976 amendment of
Section 16 of the Hindu Marriage
Act that made the difference. If
the said amendment had not been
there or any particular case was
not governed by the said amendment,
the learned Judge would not have
decided in the same manner. Since
1976 amendment does not apply to
the facts and circumstances of the
case before this Court, this
judgment cannot be of any help to
the appellant. In fact, Dadu v.
Raghunath, AIR 1976 Bombay 176, is
the case before the amendment and
holds on a detailed consideration
of provisions, that illegitimate
sons even of a Sudra would not be
included within the meaning of the
word 'son' or 'daughter' appearing
in Schedule to Hindu Succession
Act. Learned Judge had noticed that
before 1956, legitimate children of
a Sudra had enjoyed the status of
