Petitioner sought quashing of royalty demand. Court dismissed petition holding earlier final judgments barring litigation via res judicata despite subsequent change in law.
Petition dismissed; parties to bear their own costs.
This page shows the compact analysis of this judgement. The full analysis — procedural history, issue-by-issue holdings with ratio and obiter, advocates, and paragraph-level evidence for every claim — is being added to the record in batches and will appear here when this judgement has been through it.
1
AFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH, BILASPUR
Order reserved on: 04.09.2017 Order passed on: 03.11.2017 Writ Petition No.2203 of 2000
Steel Authority of India Ltd. A Government Company duly incorporated under the Indian Companies Act, 1956, having its Regd. Office at Ispat Bhawan Lodhi Road, New Delhi 110 003, Through its Managing Director, Bhilai Steel Plant, Bhilai (M.P.) (Now C.G.)
---- Petitioner
Versus
---- Respondents
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------For Petitioner : Mr.Prashant Jayaswal, Senior Advocate with Mr.Shailendra Sharma, Advocate For Respondents : Mr.Dhiraj Wankhede, Govt. Advocate
Hon'ble Shri Justice Sanjay K. Agrawal
C.A.V. Order
2
24% per annum on payment of royalty recovered by the State in excess from the petitioner.
3
commencement of this Act shall pay royalty in respect of any mineral removed or consumed by him or by his agent, manager, employee, contractor or sub-lessee from the leased area at the rate of the time being specified in the Second Schedule in respect of that mineral. Section 9(3) further lays down that the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, amend the Second Schedule so as to enhance or reduce the rate at which royalty shall be payable in respect of any mineral with effect from such date as may be specified in the notification. In exercise of power conferred under Section 9(3) of the MMRD Act, the Central Government has notified the rate of royalty payable in respect of mineral as per Second Schedule by gazette notification dated 11th April, 1997.
4
dated 17.2.1997 demanding additional royalty of ₹ 1,57,10,921/- in respect of the years 1990-91 till December, 1996. Both the writ petitions came to be dismissed by a decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court on 15.2.2000. This judgment was not challenged either in writ appeal or by way of Special Leave Petition and same has attained finality. Thereafter, on 24.3.2000 this writ petition has been filed principally on the ground that respondent No.2 is making demand for payment of royalty payable by the petitioner under Section 9 of the MMRD Act contrary to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the matter of State of Orissa and others Vs. M/s. Steel Authority of India Ltd 1 and decision of Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in the matter of N.M.D.C. Vs. State of M.P. 2 and decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Misc. Petition No.2595/92 dated 15.2.2000, whereas the decisions referred to above lay down that royalty is payable by the petitioner on extraction of the minerals from the mines and finally, relief of quashing the order dated 3.3.2000 (Annexure P/15) demanding ₹ 10,00,88,874/towards royalty on iron ore for the period 1971-72 till December 1999, was sought.
1
AIR 1998 SC 3052
2 2000 (1) J.L.J. 12
5
Misc.Petition No.4813/1997 questioning the demand of additional royalty have already been dismissed and that judgment has attained finality as the petitioner did not challenge the order dated 15.2.2000 before the higher Court and that judgment would remain binding between the parties and therefore, the present writ petition deserves to be dismissed.
3 AIR 2004 SC 2456
4 AIR 1999 Madhya Pradesh 112
6
therefore, the impugned order dated 3.3.2000 (Annexure P/15) passed by respondent No.2 deserves to be quashed.
7
(b) to issue an appropriate writ, direction or order quashing the notice of demand dated 1.7.1992 (Annexure 'J') issued by the Additional Collector, Durg demanding additional royalty of Rs.41.97 Lacs in respect of the years 1971-72 to 1989-90;
(c) to issue a writ of mandamus commanding the respondents hereto to refund to the Petitioner the additional royalty amount of Rs.10,95,837.61 recovered from the Petitioner as aforesaid which, in the circumstances hereinabove set out, is without due authority of law and the Respondents are not entitled to retain the said amount;
(d) to issue a writ of mandamus against the second and the third Respondent hereto restraining them from acting upon the said notice of demand dated 1.7.1992 (Annexure 'J') and enforcing payment of the amount thereunder or otherwise acting thereon;
(e) to award to the petitioner the costs of the petition.”
6.2 In the aforesaid petition, the petitioner has challenged the order dated 9.4.1992 passed by the Mines Tribunal, order dated 25.5.1989 and also challenged notice demanding
8
additional royalty of ₹ 41.97 lacs in respect of the years 1971-72 to 1989-90 and claimed refund of additional royalty of ₹ 10,95,837.61.
“(i) To issue an appropriate writ, direction or order quashing demand notice dated 17.2.1997, Annexure P-5 demanding additional royalty of Rs.1,57,10,921/- in respect of the years 1990-91 till December, 1996 (ii) To issue an appropriate direction or order, not to demand notice of additional royalty for the period, subsequent to 1989-90, till disposal of the instant writ petition.”
9
dated 15.2.2000 passed in MP No.2595/1992 states as under:-
“5. The submission canvassed by Shri Chaphekar pointedly came up for consideration before a Division Bench of this Court in the case of N.M.D.C. v. State M.P. 2000 (1) J.L.J. 12 and in the said case the Division Bench has held as follows:-
“But that does not mean that it ceases to have contents of iron ore. Therefore, the submission of the learned counsel that slime is not iron ore and it is not liable to be subjected to royalty is not correct. The basic of the charging of the royalty on the mineral is that the moment mineral is removed from the leased area, then the same is exigible to royalty. It is different matter that it cannot be put to use for commercial purposes. The moment mineral is removed from the earth, then the royalty is liable to be charged. It is different that the Parliament has given varying rates depending upon the quality of iron contents in the mineral, that does not mean that slime which also contains ferreous cannot be exigible to royalty. Slime is also a part of mineral though ferreous contents may be minimal but it does not cease to be the iron ore. Merely because slime has not been identified in all the three categories of iron ore, that does not mean that it ceases to have character of iron ore. It is nothing but part of second category i.e. 'fines'. As per the description given in the petition, it is more than apparent that at the time of crushing of the big boulders of the iron ore, certain powder in the form of iron is also produced which the present petitioner is not utilising and it is thrown as waste and dumped. Nonetheless, it contains fine ore. Simply because it is commercial commodity, it does not cease to be ore. It is a part of fines only and it is exigible to royalty.”
10
The order dated 15.2.2000 passed in WP No.4813/1997 states as under:-
“5. The submission canvassed by Shri Chaphekar pointedly came up for consideration before a Division Bench of this Court in the case of N.M.D.C. v. State M.P. 2000 (1) J.L.J. 12 and in the said case the Division Bench has held as follows:-
“But that does not mean that it ceases to have contents of iron ore. Therefore, the submission of the learned counsel that slime is not iron ore and it is not liable to be subjected to royalty is not correct. The basic of the charging of the royalty on the mineral is that the moment mineral is removed from the leased area, then the same is exigible to royalty. It is different matter that it cannot be put to use for commercial purposes. The moment mineral is removed from the earth, then the royalty is liable to be charged. It is different that the Parliament has given varying rates depending upon the quality of iron contents in the mineral, that does not mean that slime which also contains ferreous cannot be exigible to royalty. Slime is also a part of mineral though ferreous contents may be minimal but it does not cease to be the iron ore. Merely because slime has not been identified in all the three categories of iron ore, that does not mean that it ceases to have character of iron ore. It is nothing but part of second category i.e. 'fines'. As per the description given in the petition, it is more than apparent that at the time of crushing of the big boulders of the iron ore, certain powder in the form of iron is also produced which the present petitioner is not utilising and it is thrown as waste and dumped. Nonetheless, it contains fine ore. Simply because it is commercial commodity, it does not cease to be ore. It is a part of fines only and it is exigible to royalty.”
11
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12
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|---|---|---|---|
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13
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14
or 'slimes' cannot be included in 'fines' or 'concentrates' for the purpose of charging royalty under Section 9(1) read with Entry 23 of the Second Scheduled of the Act, but question would be whether subsequent change in law after judgment rendered inter parties and attained finality would effect the judgment already rendered.
Vs. R.S. Bhonde and others 5, the Supreme Court has held that effect of change in law subsequent thereto (repeal of statutory provision on which said judgment/order based) does not take away the effect of the said judgment/order as between the parties thereto.
“26. It is well settled that even if the decision on a question of law has been reversed or modified by subsequent decision of a superior court in any other case it shall not a ground for review of such judgment merely because a subsequent judgment of the Single Judge has taken contrary view. That does not confer jurisdiction upon the Tribunal to ignore the judgment and direction of the High Court given in the case of the appellants.”
the Supreme Court in Pradeep Kumar Maskara and R.S.
5 (2005) 6 SCC 751
6 (2015) 2 SCC 653
15
Bhonde (supra), decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Steel Authority of India Ltd. Vs. State of M.P. and Ors. dated 15.2.2000 would be binding upon the petitioner and amount of royalty, if any, is required to be paid by the petitioner herein on the ground of finality of the judgment inter parties.
the Constitution Bench held that the decision rendered in the writ petition on merits would be binding upon the parties unless it is set aside. The Constitution Bench held as under:-
“If a writ petition filed by a party under Art. 226 is considered on the merits as a contested matter and is dismissed the decision thus pronounced would continue to bind the parties unless it is otherwise modified or reversed by appeal or other appropriate proceedings permissible under the Constitution.......”
Gulabchand Chhotalal Parikh Vs. State of Gujarat 8 held
that the decision in earlier writ petition on merits would operate as res judicata in subsequent suit involving the same question and the same reliefs. The Constitution Bench held as under:-
“.........Art. 226 or 32 of the Constitution from operating as res judicata in subsequent regular suits on the same matters in controversy between the same parties and thus to give limited effect to the principle of the finality of decisions after full contest. Consequently on the general principle of res judicata the decision of the High Court on a writ petition under Art. 226 on the merits on a matter after contest will operate as res judicata in a subsequent regular suit between the same parties with respect to the same matter.........”
7 AIR 1961 SC 1457
8 AIR 1965 SC 1153
16
“35. It is well established that the principles of res judicata are applicable to writ petitions. The relief prayed for on behalf of the petitioner in the present case is the same as he would have, in the event of his success, obtained in the earlier writ petition before the High Court. The petitioner in reply contended that since the special 'leave petition before this Court was dismissed in limine without giving any reason, the order cannot be relied upon for a plea of res judicata. The answer is that it is not the order of this Court dismissing the special leave petition which is being relied upon; the plea of res judicata has been pressed on the basis of the High Court's judgment which became final after the dismissal of the special leave petition. In similar situation a Constitution Bench of this Court in Daryao v. State of U.P. [(1962) 1 SCR 574: AIR 1961 SC 1457] held that where the High Court dismisses a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution after hearing the matter on the merits, a subsequent petition in the Supreme Court under Article 32 on the same facts and for the same reliefs filed by the same parties will be barred by the general principle of res judicata. The binding character of judgments of courts of competent jurisdiction is in essence a part of the rule of law on which the administration of justice, so much emphasised by the Constitution, is rounded and a judgment of the High Court under Article 226 passed after a hearing on the merits must bind the parties till set aside in appeal as provided by the Constitution and cannot be permitted to be circumvented by a petition under Article 32. An attempted change in the form of the petition or the grounds cannot be allowed to defeat the plea as was observed at SCR p. 595 of the reported judgment, thus: (SCR p. 595)
"We are satisfied that a change in the form of attack against the impugned statute would make no difference to the true legal position that the writ petition in the High Court and the present writ petition are directed against the same
9 (1990) 2 SCC 715
17
statute and the grounds raised by the petitioner in that behalf are substantially the same." The decision in Forward Construction Co. and others v. Prabhat Mandal (Regd.), Andheri [(1986) 1 SCC 100: 1985 Supp 3 SCR 766], further clarified the position by holding that an adjudication is conclusive and final not only as to the actual matter determined but as to every other matter which the parties might and ought to have litigated and have had decided as incidental to or essentially connected with subject matter of the litigation and every matter coming into the legitimate purview of the original action both in respect of the matters of claim and defence. Thus, the principle of constructive res judicata underlying Explanation IV of Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure was applied to writ case. We, accordingly hold that the writ case is fit to be dismissed on the ground of res judicata.”
Subramanian Swamy Vs. State of Tamilnadu 10 has held
that even the erroneous decision on question of law attracts the doctrine of res judicata. It was observed as under:-
“40. Even an erroneous decision on a question of aw attracts the doctrine of res judicata between the parties to it. The correctness or otherwise of a judicial decision has no bearing upon the question whether or not it operates as res judicata (See Sha Shivraj Gopalji Vs. Edappakath Ayissa Bi11 and Mohanlal Goenka Vs. Benoy Krishna Mukherjee12 .”)
10 (2014) 5 SCC 75
11 (1949) 62 LW 770 : AIR 1949 PC 302
12 AIR 1953 SC 65
13 (2011) 3 SCC 408
18
“22. In view of such authoritative pronouncement of the Constitution Bench of this Court, there can be no doubt that the principles of constructive res judicata, as explained in Explanation IV to Section 11 CPC, are also applicable to the writ petitions.”
“44. One of the example cited as an abuse of the process of the court is relitigation. It is an abuse of the process of the court and contrary to justice and public policy for a party to relitigate the same issue which has already been tried and decided earlier against him. The reagitation may or may not be barred as res judicata.”
21. In the matter of Union of India and others Vs. Major
S.P. Sharma and others 15 the Supreme Court has observed
as under:-
“80. In M. Nagabhushana Vs. State of Karnataka (supra), this Court held that doctrine of res-judicata was not a technical doctrine but a fundamental principle which sustains the rule of law in ensuring finality in litigation. The main object of the doctrine is to promote a fair administration of justice and to prevent abuse of process of the court on the issues which have become final between the parties. The doctrine was based on two age-old-principles, namely, interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium which means that it is in the interest of the State that there should be an end to litigation and the other principle is nemo debet bis vexari, si constat curiae quod sit pro una et eadem causa meaning thereby that no one ought to be vexed twice in a litigation if it appears to the Court that it is for one and the same cause.
14 (1998) 3 SCC 573
15 (2014) 6 SCC 351
19
res judicata has been evolved to prevent such an anarchy.
20
in the year 2004 in N.M.D.C. (Supreme Court) (supra). Since, the order of Madhya Pradesh High Court inter parties has attained finality, subsequent change in law would not render the earlier decision bad and it would not be ground for review and the petitioner will be required to pay the amount of additional royalty on the ground of principle of finality of judgment and principle of res-judicata discussed hereinabove. Merely on the basis of change in law, present petition is not maintainable as the Supreme Court has held in Major S.P. Sharma (supra) that doctrine of finality has to be complied in strict legal sense and emphasized great need for following the principle of res-judicata as it has to be made applicable to prevent anarchy. The principle of constructive res judicata is also applicable with full force to the facts of the present case.
21
administration of justice and upholding the flag of justice. Maintaining appropriate attire in the Court room is the minimum fundamental requirement of law to be maintained by all concerned.
“Justice can best be administered when legal proceedings are conducted with decorum and certain decree of formality. “The place of justice” as Francis Bacon remarked, is a hallowed place.” and those seeking its aid either for themselves or those whom they represent should so conduct themselves as to uphold its dignity. The trappings of a Court room and the costume specially meant for the Court and its officers invest the Court with a sort of dignity which is not without its effect. The traditional prescribed dress of an Advocate gives him certain aloofness wherefrom his submission come with added force. As A.G. Gardner has so eloquently expressed, “Dress”, has its spiritual and moral reactions. It may seem absurd, but it is true that we are in a teal sense the creatures of our clothes.”
16 AIR 1974 Allahabad 133
17 2017 SCC OnLine HP 1055
22
“3. Dispensation of justice is inevitable feature in any civilized society. Judiciary is the backbone of democracy. In a democratic polity, the role of the judiciary is to maintain and stabilize the rule of law, which is essential in successful functioning of the democracy. The Judges and Magistrates play a pivotal role in the administration of justice and that is why they wear specific dress prescribed by the Rules framed by the High Court. This dress is worn compulsorily in order to maintain the dignity and decorum of the Court and, therefore, we see no reason why any litigant, more particularly, Government officers and officials should be improperly or inappropriately dressed while appearing before the Court. After all being appropriately dressed only induces a seriousness of purpose and a sense of decorum which is highly conducive for the dispensation of justice.”
B/-
23
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
WP No.2203 of 2000
Petitioner Steel Authority of India
Versus
Respondents State of Madhya Pradesh and another
HEAD NOTE
(English)
Principles of res-judicata and constructive res-judicata are applicable in writ proceedings.
(fgUnh)
izkM-U;k; vkSj vkUof;d izkM-U;k; ds fl)kar fjV dk;Zokfg;ksa ij ykxw gksrs
gSA
3 issues framed by the court
Whether the petitioner is barred by the principle of res judicata and constructive res judicata from challenging the royalty demand already adjudicated in final order.
Whether a subsequent change in law after the impugned judgment attained finality renders the earlier decision bad or reviewable.
Whether the petition to reargue the same issue is an abuse of the process of the court.
Colour shows how this judgement treated each authority
State of OrissaReferred¶21
(1998) 6 SCC 295 · Who else cites this
N.M.D.C. Vs. State of M.P.Distinguished¶6
N.M.D.C. Vs. State of M.P. 2000 (1) J.L.J. 12
National Mineral Development Corporation Ltd Vs. State of M.P. and anotherFollowed¶64
National Mineral Development Corporation Ltd Vs. State of M.P. and another (3 AIR 2004 SC 2456) · Who else cites this
State of Maharashtra and another Vs. R.S. Bhonde and othersFollowed¶94
State of Maharashtra and another Vs. R.S. Bhonde and others (2005) 6 SCC 751 · Who else cites this
Pradeep Kumar Maskara and others Vs. State of West Bengal and othersFollowed¶94
Pradeep Kumar Maskara and others Vs. State of West Bengal and others (2015) 2 SCC 653 · Who else cites this
Daryao and others Vs. State of U.P. and othersFollowed¶103
Daryao and others Vs. State of U.P. and others, AIR 1961 SC 1457 · Who else cites this
Gulabchand Chhotalal Parikh Vs. State of GujaratFollowed¶107
Gulabchand Chhotalal Parikh Vs. State of Gujarat, AIR 1965 SC 1153 · Who else cites this
Direct Recruit Class II Engineering Officers' Association Vs. State of MaharashtraFollowed¶113
Direct Recruit Class II Engineering Officers' Association Vs. State of Maharashtra (1990) 2 SCC 715 · Who else cites this
Sha Shivraj Gopalji Vs. Edappakath Ayissa BiFollowed¶121
(1949) 62 LW 770 : AIR 1949 PC 302 · Who else cites this
Mohanlal Goenka Vs. Benoy Krishna MukherjeeFollowed¶121
AIR 1953 SC 65 · Who else cites this
M. Nagabhushana Vs. State of Karnataka and othersFollowed¶122
(2011) 3 SCC 408 · Who else cites this
K.K. Modi v. K.N. ModiFollowed¶129
(1998) 3 SCC 573 · Who else cites this
Union of India and others Vs. Major S.P. Sharma and othersFollowed¶132
(2014) 6 SCC 351 · Who else cites this
Prayag Das Vs. Civil Judge, BulandshahrFollowed¶16
Prayag Das Vs. Civil Judge, Bulandshahr, AIR 1974 Allahabad 133 · Who else cites this
Om Prakash Vs. State of H.P. and othersFollowed¶154
2017 SCC OnLine HP 1055 · Who else cites this
3 provisions across 2 enactments
Steel Authority of India Ltd.
State of Madhya Pradesh
Collector, Dist. Durg
Sanjay K. Agrawal
As recorded by the court registry
Judgements on the same questions, provisions and authorities, from every court
