PW-3 who was accompanying the prosecutrix to school. The evidence of Girija Bai, PW-3 is perfectly natural when she states that out of fear, she ran away from the place while the Respondent dragged the prosecutrix, and on account of fear she did not even go to school that day. So long as the Respondent has not been able to establish or create doubt that he had not accosted the prosecutrix on the fateful day in the morning, the fact that in her Police statement, .tlne^rosecutrix r]iaay,,;nQt have mentioned regarding the presenceofakrfifeandsaidsoforthe'fir'sK^imejnCourtcouldnotalone make her entire evidence suspect as wrongly held by tRe Trial Judge. The prosecutrix has given;rffMy;tl'taniStffl:teient explanation that when she tried to shout, the Respondent'tfacfl30ve][!BicEfter mouth. 3. The Trial Judge has jiQrD.m|(tgd gross error in law and in appreciation of evidence by holding th)ai^tie>i(jMsogecutrix and Girija Bai, PW-3 were child witnesses whose credjl:>j!jtyreoutB'|rro( fte safely relied upon to convict. There is no law that prohibits convictibn 8n basis of the evidence of a child witness absolutely. But that it has to be considered with all surrounding circumstances. Merely because penetration may not have taken place, the Trial Judge was not justified in ordering acquittal without considering that in the facts and circumstances, the Respondent ought to have been convicted of the lesser offence of 376/511 IPC on basis of the same evidence. The Trial Judge has likewise entered into a critical analysis with regard to the place of occurrence as being doubtful on basis of the spot map when no challenge had been laid out to the same by the defence. Merely because evidence with regard to the school where the prosecutrix may have been studying or documentary evidence in respect of the same had not been led, does not create suspicion about the entire occurrence as wrongly held by the Trial Judge. It was lastly submitted that in normal Indian society, Chheduram,
