Partly allowed

Smt. Kishori Devi and Ors. v. State and Others

Chhattisgarh HC8 Sept 2014WPS/1825/2005

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

The High Court granted relief to petitioners who were dismissed from police service following a departmental inquiry. It set aside an impugned appellate order for lack of application of mind and reasons, remanding the matter. Independently, the petition filed by two employees after a 15-year delay was dismissed on grounds of laches.

What did the court decide?

Writ Petition (S) No.1825/05 and 1830/05 partly allowed; order set aside and remanded to Appellate Authority for fresh decision within 4 months. W.P. (S) No.584/14 dismissed on grounds of delay and la

Smt. Kishori Devi and Ors. Vs State and… — Pension and Retirement Benefits | Chhattisgarh HC (2014)

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V e r s u s .

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R e s p o n d e n t s :

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1 . S t a t e o f M . P . T h r o u g h t h e S e c r e t a r y H B m e D e p a r u ' n e n t ( P o l i c e h B h o p a l .

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2 . I n s p e c t o r G e n e r a l o f P o l i c e B a l a g h a t Z o n e . B a l a g h a t , M . P . 3 . S u p d t . o f P o l i c e R a j n a n d g a o n ,

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D E T A I L S O F A P P L I C A T I O N

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HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH: BILASPUR

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S.B^: HON'BLESHRI WIANINDRA MOHAN SHRIVASTAVA. J,

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Writ Petition (S) No. 1825 of 2005

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(O.A. No.2208/99)

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Petitioners

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Smt. Kishori Devi and Ors.

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Versus

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Respondents

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State of M.P. and Ors.

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(' A

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Writ Petition (S)No. 1830 of 2005

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(O.A. No.2269/99)

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Petitioners Ramlal and Ors.

Versus

Respondents

StateofM.R. and Ors.

And

Petitioners • Writ Petition Ram Kumar (S) No.584 Dhruw of & 2014 another

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Versus

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Respondents

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State of Chhattisgarh and Ors.

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Appearance:

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Shri B.D. Guru and Shri Utsav Mahiswar, counsel for the respective petitioners.

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Shri Satish Gupta, Govt. Advocate for the State.

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ORDER

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(Passed on 8"' September, 2014)

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These petitions arise outofcommon orderdated 30.3.1999 passed bythe Appellate Authority/DIG Balaghat, Range-Balaghat by which the appeals of the petitioners jn the three writ petitions have been dismissed. The petitioners in the aforesaid petitions were subjected to common departmental inquiry initiated by issuance of common charge sheet dated 27 October, 1996 issued by the Superintendent of Police, Rajnandgaon.

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-Common order was passed in respect of all these petitioners by the

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Disciplinary Authority agreeing with the common inquiry report submitted by the Inquiry Officer. Vide order dated 24.10.1997, the Disciplinary Authority held all the petitioners guilty of misconduct and imposed penalty of dismissal from service. The appeals having been dismissed, the petitioners have approached this Court.

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The petitioners in W.P, (S) No. 1825 and W.P. (S) No. 1830 of 2005 had initially filed an Original Application before the Madhya Pradesh State Administrative Tribunal (for short "the Thbunal") in the year 1999. During the pendency of thqse Original Applications, the State of Madhya Pradesh was re-organized and successor States of Madhya Pradesh and Chhatti^arh were created under Madhya Pradesh Re-organization Act, 2000. The Tribunal was also abolished. Therefore, two Original Applicgtions i.e. O.A. No.2208/99 and O.A. No.2269/99 were transferred to this Court and j-egistered as W.P. (S) No.1825 and W.P. (S) No.1830 of 2005.

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The petitioners in W.P. (S) No.584/14 were also subjected to disciplinary action in common proceedings culminating in common order of penalty and dismissal of appeal by a common order. However, two petitioners in this case, did not choose to file any Original Application before the Tribunal and they have now filed a petition before this court in the year 2014, after about 15 years of the order passed by the Appellate Authority.

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Before adverting to the grounds of challenge raised in these petitions, Writ Petition (S) No.584/14 filed by Ram Kumar Dhruw and Ramakant Upadhyay is dealt with separately because.in this case, serious objection with regard to very maintainability of the petition on the ground of delay and laches has been raised.

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Learned counsel for the State submits that these two petitioners have filed petition after 15 years of inordinate and unexplained delay. It is contended that though these petitioners were also affected by impugned orders passed by the Disciplrnary Authority and the Appellate Authority along with

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the petitioners W.P. (S) No. 1825 ad 1830 of 2005, they slept over their right for one and half decades. They have now filed petition after 15 years for which there is no reasonable explanation. Therefore, the petition of these two petitioners be dismissed only on the ground ofdelay and laches.

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Learned counsel for the petitioner contrveri:ed by contending that these two petitioners had been subjected to common proceedings under a common charge sheet and also dismissed from service by common order passed by the Disciplinary Authority. These two petitioners had also filed appeal before the Disciplinary Authority which was also dismissed by common order. Thereafter, these petitioners came to know that other delinquent employees who were dismissed along with them and whose appeals were also dismissed, filed petition before this Court. They also came to know that another set of employees alleged to be involved in the same incident of looting police station by naxallites were dismissed from service and-tbey had also filed petition before the Tribunal. These two petitioners^{cametoknowthattheTribunalhadallowed} petitions^{of number} of employees vide order dated 7.3.1998 against which petition was filed before this Court, which was dismissed on 1.3.2006 and SLP filed by the State in the Supreme Court was also dismissed on 24.9.2013 . All these petitioners approached this Court and filed this petition. These events and circumstances provided sufficient explanation why these two petitioners could not file petition. He submits that the case of all the employees being identical on every aspects, as petitioners of other employees, are still pending before this Court, therefore, this case may also be decided on merits.

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True it is that common departmental proceedings were initiated against these two petitioners and petitioners in W.P (S)No.1825 and 1830 of 2005, culminating in common order of penalty passed by the Disciplinary Authority, the petitioners herein filed appeal against a common order of penalty^{alongwithotherdelinquentemployeesandtheappealswerealso} dismissed by common order dated 30.3.1999. While other employees

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whose appeals were dismissed, promptly approached the Tribunal by filing their respective Original Applications in the year 1999 itself, no reason has been assigned as to what prevented these two petitioners from challenging the order passed in appeal against them. It is not the case of these two petitioners that for some reason, peculiar to them, they could not file petition before the Tribunal. Even after abolition of the Tribunal, the petitioners^{didnottakeanyremedybeforethisCourtand} preferred^tosit on the fence for many years.

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Learned counsel for the petitioners urged before this Court that another set of employees who had already filed petition before the Tribunal were directed to be reinstated in service, but in their case,»the dispute attained finality upon dismissal of SLP of the State by order passed by the Supreme Court on 24.9.2013, therefore, this provide sufficient explanation.

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In the considered opinion of this Court, the pendency of the petition of another se't'of employees before the Tribunal or the order passed in their cases had nothing to do with the case of petitioners. In fact, these petitioners were sailing in the same boat as the petitioners in W.P (S) No. 1825 and 1830 of 2005 and not those who had filed petition before the Tribunal in Original Application No.1790/97 (R.P. Katiyar and batch of petitions.). Those were the cases of employees who were terminated without any inquiry and the Tribunal had allowed their petition in year 1998 itself. The State had filed petition against the order which were dismissed by the High Court in the year 2006 and the SLP was finally dismissed in the year 2013. However, these cases had nothing to do with the cases of these two petitioners. Therefore, the explanation offered for such along delay of 15 years is not based on any proper explanation.

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Where the petitioner has remained indolent and has not taken proper steps for redressal of grievance by filing petition within a reasonable time and has. failed tooffer proper explanation for sucha long time, petition is liable to be dismissed only on the ground of delay and laches. Learned

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• coynsel for the petitioners has placed heavy reliance on the judgment of

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the Supreme court in the case of Basanti Prasad Vs. Chairman, Bihar School Examination Board and ors. . That was a case where criminal proceedings^were instituted and the employees was simultaneously removed from service. The Employee had challenged the order of conviction and when he was finally acquitted by higher court, he filed petition^{challengingtheorderofterminationafter15} years.^Itwasinthose circumstances that delay in filing the petition was held properly explained. The principle applied in the aforesaid case was that the writ Court in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution may condone the delay in filing the petition, if the delay is satisfactorily explained. Reiterating principtes applicable in tl^e matter of condonation of delay in filing petition, laid down in plethora of decisions, it was held by the Supreme Court that if the delay is properly explained and if the third pari:y rights are not going to be affected, the High Court may entertain the petition and consider the entire proceedings on merit. In the present^{case,eventhoughnothird} party^interestare going^{tobeaffected,} nevertheless, the petitioners' burden to satisfactorily explain the delay is not absolved. Present is a case where the petitioners have approached this Court after a long delay of 15 years and the explanation , as has been given^{hereinabove,isfarfrombeingsatisfactory.Therefore,lookingtothe} period^{ofdelayandthenatureofexplanationofferedbythe} petitioners, this Court is not inclined to examine the submissions on the merits of the case. Writ Petition (S) No.584/14 is, therefore, dismissed only on the ground^{of delayinlaches.}

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An incident happened in the intervening night of 17^- 18 September, 1996 in which a group of naxallites attacked Police Station- Manpur. The records reveal that in addition to those policemen who were on duty in the police^station,the petitioners^inW.P. (S)^{No.1825and1830of2005were} not in the police station, but in their respective residence. Even though these petitioners were not assigned duties in the police station at the time when the naxallites attack took place, departmental action was initiated

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against them by issuing a common charge sheet on 27.10.1996 on the charge that these petitioners did not arrive in the police station to combat naxallites attack and failed to exhibit brevity. The statement of allegation further alleged that these petitioners did not extent any help even after the incident or information of this incident was given to nearby police station. Common proceedings were initiated against all the petitioners which culminated in order of penalty passed by the Superintendent of Police Rajnandaon being the Disciplinary Authority on 24.10.1997. The charges were held proved and the petitioners were dismissed from service. All the petitioners filed appeal and their appeals were also dismissed by common order dated 13.3.1999 passed by the Appellate Authority. The»petitioners flled Original Application before the Tribunal and upon abolition of the Tribunal, these petitions were transferred to this Court.

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The order passed by the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority has beenasSailed by these petitioners in two writ petitions on the various grounds. Learned counsel for the petitioners contented that the Disciplinary Inquiry proceedings and the order of penalty are vitiated on account of serious violation of principles of natural justice. It is contented that firstly the Inquiry Officer was a person who was biased as he was earlier involved in an inquiry into incidentordered by the State Govt. and he had already prejudged the whole matter. The petitioners had raised serious objection to appointment of Shri Purushotam Gautam as the Inquiry Officer, but the Disdplinary Authority did not pay any heed to this objection which seriously prejudiced the petitioners' right to a fair inquiry into the charges. It is next contended that number of documents which were extremely essential for effective defence and to impeach the credibility of the prosecution case were demanded, but those documents were not supplied ^nd the prayer was rejected perfunctorily by stating that those documents are not necessary. It is then urged that the petitioners, looking tQ gravity of charges against them, moved application before the Inquiry Officer that they may be permitted to engage a defence assistant and specific name was also suggested, but the Inquiry Officer adopted

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peculiar approach and required the petitioners to give other details within three days and thereafter hastily proceeded to order that petitioners' prayer to engage defence assistant is rejected. Thus, the petitioners were prejudiced. The next submission to assail the inquiry proceedings is that the Inquiry Officer was so much prejudiced and proceeding in haste to somehow conclude the inquiry that he also rejected the application of the petitioners to examine defence witness by stating that the defence witness named by the petitioner were not relevant. Thus, it is stated, at every stage of inquiry, the delinquentemployees were subjected to unfair treatment which resulted in utter violation of principles of natural justice prejudicing the petitioners in their defence. Learned counsel for the petitioners went on to contepd that when the petitioner preferred appeals before the Appellate Authority, the Appellate Authority did not examine all these matters which he wa^ obliged under the law to examine in detail on each and every aspect but progeeded to pass a cryptic, laconic and mechanical order of dismissal of appeal. Relying upon the judgment of theSupreme Court in the case of Chairman, Life Insurance Corporation of India and ors. , it is submitted that the Appellate Authority being a quasi judicial authority was required to apply its mind to various grounds, examine the records and record his own finding instead of mechanically reproducing the nature of charges and what was recorded by the Disciplinary Authority. The petitioners' rights to seek indulgence of the Appellate Authority is an important right which entitles them to seek re-appreciation of oral and documentary evidence on record by the Appellate Authority. Therefore, for on these grounds, the impugned order of penalty, order passed inappeal are liable to be set aside.

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Per contra, learned counsel for the State submits that none of the grounds raised by the pet'rtioners are made out. He submits that the petitioners were issued detailed charge sheet and they were afforded opportunity to file reply; He further submits that thepetitioners only attempted to prolong

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(2013) 6 SCC 530

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the inquiry and, therefore, were raising frivolous objections. There was no basis for change of inquiry officer merely on the ground that in the past, he had been involved in administrative inquiry into the incident. He further submits that the petitioners have failed to establish as to what prejudice was caused to them by not supplying documents demanded by them. Relying upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Sanjay Kumar Singh Vs. Union of India & Ors. , it is contended that unless prejudice is shown, only on the ground that documents were not supplied, the departmental inquiry cannot be held to be vitiated. Learned counsel for the State further argues that the petitioners' application for engaging defence assistance was duly considered. The petitioners did not come out with a c^lear demand and despite petitioners being informed to suggest the name of officers, the petitioners did not come out with any specific name. Therefore, the Inquiry Officer was left with no option but to proceed with the inquiry. In so far as defence witness are concerned, the inquiry officer examined thisjDrayer in the light of the nature of accusation against the petitioners. He came to the conclusion that the witnesses proposed to be examined in defence were not relevant and, therefore, the prayer was rightly rejected. In so far as challenge to the order passed in appeal is concerned, learned counsel for the State submits that the Appellate Authority is not required to again record detailed findings as the Disciplinary Authority. The order passed by the Appellate Authority reflects that he had applied its find to the entire records of inquiry, the procedural aspects as well as merits both. A clear finding was recorded that the petitioners were police officers and at the time of naxallite attack, they did not come out to exhibit brevity by combating attack and extending help to the police offlcial who were on duty in the police station and, thereafter, also they did not take any steps. Therefore, the order of the Appellate Authority also does not suffer from any illegality.

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Challenge to the impugned order passed in appeal by the Appellate Authority rests mainly on the ground of non-application of mind to various

(2011) 14 SCC 692

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groundsraised by the petitioners in appeal before the Appellate Authority. The memo of appeal filed by one of the delinquent employee has been placed on record. In the appeal also, the petitioners have raised grounds which required serious consideration particularly grounds relating to supply of documents, engaging defence assistant, opportunity to lead defence witness. Present is not a case where the petitioners were actually on duty in the police station. The finding which have been recorded by the Inquiry Officer and the Disciplinary Officer itself proceed on admitted facts thatat the time of naxalliteattack, all the petitioners were in their residence, obviously, because at that time, they were not assigned duty in the police station, but another team of police official was in the police station. The gravamyi^{ofchargeagainstthese} petitioners^{isthattheydidnotcomeout} of their house. Some of the petitioners are stated to be residing in the police .guarters, whereas some of the petitioners are stated to be residing in private resid^nce in the locality. The petitioners have come out with defence of different nature in some cases [case of petitioner Subhash in W.P (S) 1830/05] that when he came out of his residence, he was apprehended by naxallite and tied down. It has also been found that the petitioners had made application for demand of document. The nature of documents which have been demanded by them per se related to incident only. They related to various inquiry made at different point of time by different officials, records of the police station, statement of various police personnel and other persons in different administrative inquiry. A long list of witness was also given. The Inquiry Officer has not recorded any specific reason why such witnesses were treated as irrelevant. The petitioners have come out with a specific case that they had submitted application for engaging one M.L. Gupta, retired DSP, as defence assistant, but that prayer was not accepted and for that ,certain reasons are assigned. Th'e fact, however, remains that the defence assistant suggested by the petitioners was not allowed to be engaged.

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In the background of the aforesaid circumstances, the appeal filed by the petitioners, who were subjected to an extreme penalty of dismissal from

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service, required serious consideration at the end of the Appellate Authority.

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Clause 213 of the Chhattisgarh Police Regulations provides that the provisions contained in C.G. Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules 1966 shall regulate penalty andappeal in respect of police officers. It has been held by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in the matter of Krishna Naravan Shivpyare Dixit Vs. State of IVI.P and others, 1985, M.P.L.J.. 343 that regulations 213 does not exclude the operation of M.P. Civil Service (Classification, Gontrol & Appeal) Rules, 1966. As no specific provisions had been madein Police Regulations to prescribe the manner in which the appeal against the order of punishment shall be decided^by the Appellate Authority, the provisions contained in C.G. Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1966 prescribing mode and m'Snner of exercise of appellate power by the Appellate Authority are applicable.- -.

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It is well settled that the Appellate Authority while considering the appeal acts in quasi-judicial capacity. Relevant provision contained in C.G. Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1966 for consideration of an appeal are as under:-

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"27. Consideration ofAppeal:-

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(1) In the case of an appeal against an order of suspension, the appellate authority shall consider whether in the light of the provisions of ruie 9 and having regard to the circumstances of the case, the order of suspension is justified or not and confirm or revoke the order accordingly. (2) In the case of an appeal against an order imposing any of th6 penalties specified in rule 10 or enhancing any penalty imposed under the said rule, the appellate authority shall consider:-

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(a) whether the procedure laid down in these rules has been complied with and if not, whether such non-

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compliance has resulted in the violation of any provisions of the Constitution of India or in the failure ofjustice;

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(b)

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whether the findings of the disciplinary authority are warranted by the evidence on the records; and whether the penalty or enhanced penalty imposed is adequate, inadequate or severe, and pass orders(i) confirming, enhancing, reducing or setting aside the penalty;or (ii) remitting the case to the authority which imposed or enhanced the penalty or to any other authogty with such direction as it may deem fit in the circumstances ofthe case."

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Appellate Authprity is therefore obliged under the law to exercise its statutory power of appeal in accordance with the provisions contained in Rules 27 ofthe Rules of 1966. Consequently, while exercising its appellate jurisdiction, Appellate Authority is duty bound to exercise the same in the manner prescribed in Rule 27 (2) ofthe Rules of 1966. Rules mandatorily require the Appellate Authority to consider whether the procedure laid down in the Rules has been complied with and if not whether such noncompliance resulted in violation of any provision of the Constitution of India or in the failure of justice; whether findings of the disciplinary authority are warranted by the evidence on record and whether the penalty imposed is adequate, inadequate or severe. The Appellate Authority is therefore under statutory obligations to consider the appeal in the manner as laid down in the Rules as aforesaid and then may confirm enhance, reduce or set aside the penalty or remit the case to the Authority which imposed or enhanced the penalty or to any other Authority with such direction as deem fit in the circumstances of the case. The scheme of Rule 27 therefore clearly implies that the Appellate Authority has to pass speaking order indicating that points raised by the petitioner has been considered. In case

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the objection of the petitioner is not acceptable he has to give the reasons for not accepting the same. It is thus the duty of Authority to apply its mind while deciding the appeal and he is obliged to give clear finding on the charges of the penalty. The powers of Authority being quasi-judicial in nature are required to be performed in all seriousness with a view to do justice with the appellant.

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Though it is now well settled proposition of law that an Appellate Authority or Revisional Authority is not required to give detail reasons while agreeing with and confirming order passed by the Disciplinary Authority, as held in the cases of Tara Chand Khatri Vs. Municipal Corporation of Delhi and others. 1977 (1) SCC 472: Divisional Forest Officer, Kothaaudem and others Vs. Wladhusudhan Rao, 2008 (3) SCC 469, but if in the scheme of the statutory rules governing terms and conditions of service such a duty is cast on Appellate Authority to give reasons even in the case of an order of affirmation, tFie Appellate Authority is obliged to give reasons by applying its mindwhile considering the appeal in the manner prescribed under the Rules.

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In the case of Ram Chander Vs. Union of India and others, 1986 (3) SCC 103 taking into consideration the Rule 22 (2) of the Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1968, which is quite similar to the rules applicablein the present case it was held as under:"4. The duty to give reasons is an incident of the judicial process. So, in R.P. Bhatt v. Union of India (1986 (2)SCC 651), this Court, in somewhat similar circumstances, interpreting R.27(2) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1965 which provision is in pari materia with R.22(2) of the Railway Servants (Discipline & Appeal) Rules, 1968, observed :

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"It is clear upon the terms of R.27(2) that the appellate authority is required to consider (1) whether the

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procedure laid down in the rules has been complied with; and if not, whether such non compliance has resulted in violation of any of the provisions of the Constitution of India or in the failure of justice ;(2) whether the findings of the disciplinary authority are warranted by the evidence on record ; and (3) whether the penalty imposed is adequate; and thereafter pass orders confirming, enhancing eto. the penalty, or remit back the case to the authority which imposed the same. It was held that the word 'consider' in Rule.27(2) of the 'due

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Rules implied application of mind'. The. Court emphasized that the Appellate Authority discharging quasijudicial functions in accordance with natural justice must give reasons for its decisions. There was in that case, as here, no indicgtion in the impugned order that the DirectorGeneral.Border Road Organization, New Delhi was satisfied as to the aforesaid requirements. The Court observed that he had not recorded any finding on the crucial question astowhether the findings of the disciplinary authority were warranted by the evidence on record. In the present case, the impugned order of the Railway Board is in these terms:

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"(1)1n terms of Rule 22(2) of the Railways Servants (Discipline & Appeal) Rules, 1 968, the Railway Board have carefully considered your appeal against the orders of the General Manager, Northern Railway, New Delhi imposing on you the penalty of removal from service and h'ave observed as under :

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(a) by th6 evidence on record, the findings ofthe disciplinary authority are warranted ; and

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(b) the penalty of removal from service imposed on you is merited.

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(2) The Railway Board have therefore rejected the appeal preferred byyou."

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To say the least, this is just a mechanical reproduction of the phraseology of R.22(2) of the Railway Servants Rules without any attempt on the part of the Railway Board either to marshall the evidence on record with a view to decide whether the findings arrived at by the disciplinary authority could be sustained or not. There is also no indication that the Railway Board applied its mind as to whether the act of misconduct with w^ich the appellant was charged together with the attendant circumstances and the past record of the appellant were such that he should have been visited with the extreme penalty of removal from service for a single lapse in a span of243/ears ofservice. Dismissal or removal from service is a matter of grave concern to a civil servant who after such a long period of service, may not deserve such a harsh punishment. There being non-compliance with the requirements of R.22(2) of the Railway Servants Rules, the impugned order passed by the Railway Board is liable to be set aside."

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In the same judgment, the Supreme Court, pointing out distinction based on scheme of statutory rules relating to consideration of an appeal explained as below:

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" 8. So also in Tara Chand Khatri v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi&Ors.. [1977]2 S.C.R. 198 this Court observed that there was a vital difference between an order of reversal by the appellate authority and an order of affirmance and the omission to give reasons for the decision may not by itself be a

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sufficient ground for passing such order, relying on the test laid down by Subba Rao, J. in Madhya Pradesh Industries Ltd.. v. Union of India [1966] 1 S.C.R. 466.

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"Ordinarily, the appellate or revisional authority shall give its own reasons succinctly; but in a case of affirmance where the original tribunal gives adequate reasons, the Appellate Tribunal may dismiss the appeal or the revision, as the case may be, agreeing with those reasons."

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These authorities proceed upon the principle that in the absence of a requirement in the statute or the rules, there is no duty cast on an appellate authoritytogive reasons where the order is one oT affirmance. Here, R. 22(2) of the Railway Servants Rules in express terms requires the Railway Board to record its findings on the three aspects stated therem. Similar are the requirements under R. 27(2) of the Central Civil Services(.CIassification, Control &Appeal)Rules, 1965. R. 22(2) provides that in the case of an appeal against an order imposing any of the penalties specified in R. 6 or enhancing any penalty imposed under the said rule, the appellate authority shall 'consider' as to the matters indicatedtherein. Theword 'consider' has different shades ofmeaning and mustin R.22(2), in the context in which it appears, mean an objective consideration by the Railway Board after due application of mind which implies the giving of reasons for its decision.

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Even in a case where there is no duty cast on Appellate Authority to give reasons in case of order of affirmation, Supreme Court held in the case of Divisional Forest Officer, Kothaaudem andothers (supra). "20.

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It is no doubt also true that an appellate or revisional authority is not required to give detaited reasons for agreeing and confirmihg an order passed by the lower forum but, in our view, in the interests ofjustice, the delinquent officer is entitled to know at least the mind of the appellate or revisional authority in dismissing his appeal and/or revision. It is true that no detailed

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reasons are required to be given, but some brief reasons should be indicated even in an order affirming the views of the lower

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forum."

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Recently in the case of Chairman, Disciplinarv Authoritv. Rani Lakshmi

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Bai Kshetriva Gramin Bank Vs. Jaadish Sharan Varshnev and others.

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2009 (4) SCC 240, Supreme Court has held as under:

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"5. In our opinion, an order of affirmation need not contain as elaborate reasons as an order of reversal, but that does not mean that the order of affirmation need not contain any reasons whatsoever. In fact, the said., decision in Prabhu Dayal Grover's case (supra) has itself stated that the appellate order should disclose application of mind. Whether there was an application of mind or not can only be disclosed by some reasons, at least in brief, mentioned in the order of the appellate authority. Hence, we cannotaccept the proposition that an order of affirmation need not contain any reasons at all. That order must contain some reasons, at least in brief, so that one can know whether the appellate authority has applied its mind while affirming the order of the disciplinary authority.

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The view we are taking was also taken by this Court in Divisional Forest Officer vs. Madhusudan Rao, JT 2008 (2) SC 253 (vide SCC para-20: JT para-19), and in Madhya Pradesh Industries Ltd. vs. Union of India.AIR 1966 SC 671, siemens Engineering & Manufacturing Co. of India Ltd. vs. Union of India, AIR 1976 SC 1785 (AIR para 6), etc.

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In the present case, since the appellate authority's order does

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not contain any reasons, it does not show any application of mind. "

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The purpose of disclosure of reasons, as held by a Constitution Bench ofthis Court in the case ofS.N.Mukherjee vs. Union of India reported in (1990) 4 SCC 594 :1990 SC (Cri.)669,

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is that people must have confidence in the judicial or quasijudicial authorities. Unless reasons are disclosed, how can a person know whether the authority has applied its mind or not? Also, giving of reasons minimizes the chances of arbitrariness. Hence, it is an essential requirement of the rule of law that some reasons, at least in brief, must be disclosed in a judicial^or quasi-judicial^{order,evenifitisanorderof affirmation.} 9. No doubt, in S.N.Mukherjee's case (supra), it has been observed ("SCC p 613, para 36)) that:

¶151

36 "..The appellate or revisional authority, if it affirms such an order, need not give separate reasons if the appellate or revisional authority agrees with'*the reasons contained in the order under challenge." The above observation, in our opinion, really means that the order of affirmance need not contain an elaborate reasoning as contained in the order of the original authority, but it cannot be understood to mean that even brief reasons need not

¶152

- be given in an order of affirmance. To take a contrary view would mean that appellate authorities can simply dismiss appeals by one line orders stating that they agree with the view of the lower authority.

¶153

10.For the same reason, the decision of this Courtin State of Madras vs. Srinivasan, AIR 1966 SC 1827 (vide AIR para 15)) has also to be understood as explained by us above."

¶154

If the orders, passed by the Appellate Authority and other Authorities are scrutinized by applying aforesaid principle of law laid down keeping in view statutery requirement as to the manner of consideration of an appeal, it leads to inevitable conclusion that the order passed by the Appellate Authority does not contain any reason whatsoever and is a mechanical affirmation without considering the appeal according to the statutory service rules much less application of mind to the specific grounds raised by the .petitioner in his appeal. Therefore, the orders passed by the Appellate Authority and other Higher Authorities affirming the order passed in appeal are unsustainable in law and liable to be set aside.

^".s fe®'

^S^ES.^'

-18-

In view of the above finding, 1 do not propose to go into other aspects of the matter relating to validity of the order of punishment recorded by the Disciplinary Authority on the ground raised by the petitioner in the petition as argued by learned counsel for the petitioner.

¶160

Relying upon the order of the Supreme Court in the case of Chairman, Disciplinary Authority, Rani Lakshmi Bai Kshetriya Gramin Bank (supra), Writ Petition (S) No.1825/05 and Writ Petition (S) No.1830/05 are partly allowed. Impugned common order dated 30.3.1999 passed by the

¶161

Appellate Authority in both Writ Petition (S) No. 1825/05 & an^ Writ Petition (S) No.1830/05 is hereby set aside. The matter is remanded back to the Appellate Authority to decide the appeal filed by the petitioners in Writ Petition (S) No. 1825/05 and Writ Petition (S) No. 1830/05 afresh in accordance with law.

¶162

Taking into consideration the fact that order of punishment was passed long back, it would be proper to direct the Appellate Authority to decide the appeal of the petitioners in Writ Petition(8) No. 1825/05 and Writ Petition (S) No.1830/05 afresh, as early as possible, within a period of 4 months from the date of receipt of copy of this order.

¶163

tn view of the statement made by learned counsel for the State that upon re-organization of the State, the Appellate Authority in the case of the petitioners in Writ Petition (S) No.1825/05 and Writ Petition (S) No.1830/05 shall now be DIG, Rajnandgaon, the direction to decide the appeal of the petitioners in Writ Petition (S) No. 1825/05 and Writ Petition (S) No. 1830/05 shall oblige the DIG , Rajnandgaon to decide the appeal in compliance of (he order which is now being passed by this Court.

¶164

Praveen

¶165

Sd/Manindra Mohan Shrivastava Judge

Smt. Kishori Devi and Ors. v. State and Others

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Smt. Kishori Devi and Ors. v. State and Others

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