Single bench of N.K. Agarwal, J. dismissed defendant's second appeal under Section 100 CPC. The High Court held no substantial question of law arose as lower courts found plaintiffs entitled to possession based on being permanent lessee versus appellants being licensees.
Appeal dismissed. No order as to costs.
This page shows the compact analysis of this judgement. The full analysis — procedural history, issue-by-issue holdings with ratio and obiter, advocates, and paragraph-level evidence for every claim — is being added to the record in batches and will appear here when this judgement has been through it.
^
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
Sec^ndAl^peal , 20_of20 U
APPELLANTS Defendants
Both R/o near Pani Tanki, Indira Nagar, Rajnandgaon (CG).
VERSUS
RESPONDENT Plaintiff
Bihari S/o late Bodhan Yadav, aged about 60 years, R/o near Pani Tanki, Indira Nagar, Rajnandgaon (CG).
fAPPEAL UNDER SECTION 100 OF CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. 1908)
(Single Bench: Hon'ble Mr. N.K. Agarwal, J.)
Present : Shri HB Agrawal, Sr. Advocate with Smt. Meera Jaiswal, Advocate for the appellants. Shri Rakesh Thakur, Advocate for the respondent.
ORAL ORDER
(Passed on 06.08.2012)
Y-S^
plaintiff, appellants were livmg with him as his licensee, appellants have refusedto maintain him, therefore, he was forced to file instant sult.
^^•^^s^ ^^ •"s^ ^.'
"12. The phrase "substantial question of law", as occurring in the amended Section 100 is not defined in the Code. The word substantial, as qualifying "question of law", means —of having substance, essential, real, of sound worth, important or considerable. It is to be understood as something in contradistinction with- technical, of no substance or consequence, or academic merely. However, it is clear that the legislature has chosen not to qualify the scope of "substantial question oflaw" by suffixing the words "of general importance" as has been done in many other provisions such as Section 109 of the Code or Article 133(l)(a) of the Constitution. The substantial question of law on which a second appeal shall be heard need not necessarily be a substantial question oflaw ofgeneral importance. In Guran Ditta v. T. Ram Ditta (AIR 1928 PC 172),. the phrase "substantial question of law" as it was employed in the last clause ofthe then existing Section 110 CPC (since omitted by the Amendment Act, 1973) came up for consideration and their Lordships held that it did not mean a substantial question of general importance but a substantial question of law which was mvolved in the case as between the parties..........."
! 2001 (3) SCC 179
order as to costs.
Sd/N.K. Agarwal Judge
Sahu
2 issues framed by the court
Whether any substantial question of law under Section 100 of CPC arises in a second appeal where the lower courts found the plaintiffs entitled to possession as permanent lessee.
Whether the plaintiff, being permanent lessee of the suit land, and appellants being only licensees of the house, were entitled to possession of the house.
Colour shows how this judgement treated each authority
Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam TiwariRelied on¶31
Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari, 2001 (3) SCC 179 · Who else cites this
Guran Ditta v. T. Ram DittaReferred¶31
Guran Ditta v. T. Ram Ditta (AIR 1928 PC 172) · Who else cites this
2 provisions across 2 enactments
Yadav Kumar S/o Bihari
Gyaneshwar @ Chunti Yadav S/o Bihari Yadav
Bihari S/o late Bodhan Yadav
N.K. Agarwal
As recorded by the court registry
Judgements on the same questions, provisions and authorities, from every court
