"4.Before referring to the various decisions cited at the Bar and noted in the judgment appealed from, it may be useful to take mto consideration the relevant provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. So far as sales of immovable property are concemed, there are some special provisions in Order 21 begmning with Rule 82 and ending with Rule 103. If a sale had been validly held, an application for setting the same aside can only be made under the provisions ofRules 89 to 91 ofOrder 21. As is well known, Rule 89 gives ajudgment-debtor the right to have the sale set aside on his depositmg in court a sum equal to five per cent ofthe purchase money fetehed at the sale besides the amount specified in the proclamation of sale as that for the recovery of which the sale was ordered, less any amount which may, since the date of sale, have been received by the decreeholder. Under sub-rule (2) of Rule 92 the court is obliged to make an order setting aside the sale if a proper application under Rule 89 is made accompanied by a deposit within 30 days from the date of sale. Apart &om the provision of Rule 89, the judgment-debtor has the right to apply to the court to set aside the sale on the ground of a material irregularity or fraud in publishing or conducting it provided he can satisfy the court that he has sustained substantial injury by reason of such uregularity or fi-aud. Under Rule 91 it is open to the purchaser to apply to the coiirt to set aside the sale on the ground that the judgment-debtor had no saleable interest in the property sold. Rule 92 provides that where no application is made under any of the Rules just now mentioned or where such application is made and disallowed the court shall make an order confirming the sale and thereupon the sale shall become absolute. Rule 94 provides that where the sale of immovable property has become absolute, the court must grant a certificate specifying the property sold and the name of the person who at the time ofsale was declared to be the purchaser. Such certificate is to bear date of the day on which the sale becomes absolute. Section 65 of the Code of Civil Procedure lays down that where iinmovable property is sold in execution of a decree and such sale has become absolute, the property shall be deemed to have vested in the purchaser &om the time when it is sold and not from the time when the sale becomes absolute. The result is that the purchaser's title relates back to the date of sale and not the confirmation ofsale. There is no provision in the Code ofCivil Procedure of 1908 eitfaer under Order 21 or elsewhere which provides that the sale is not to be confirmed ifit be found that the decree under which the sale was ordered has been reversed before the
