aforesaid Opposite Parties/ companies, including OP-1, used to exchange bid prices, share screen shots of financial bids uploaded by them on the IREPS portal and calculation of quantities shared/ allocated for different tenders of CBB as per the agreement amongst them, scheduled meetings, discussed other business related issues, RDSO technical issues, held discussion on common points to be raised with Railway/ RDSO, exchanged different formats and bid related documents, etc . Mr. Gadikar submitted that around April 2013, the officials of the manufacturers of CBB had met in Delhi in which meeting it was decided that a common e-mail ID be created for the purposes of communicating with each other for sharing/ discussing of price bids and allocation of quantities for the upcoming tenders of CBB floated by the Indian Railways. This common e-mail ID was used for a few months for discussions and comments and was then abandoned/ discontinued as Mr. Negi of OP-2 began sharing e-mails as drafts from the drafts folder of his personal account. Mr. Gadikar further stated that there were also other modes of communication available to the Opposite Parties and discussions on the aforesaid issues took place via such modes also specifically through other email IDs, SMSes, telephone calls, personal meetings, WhatsApp communications, etc . Mr. Gadikar further added that around 2014, OP-10 started manufacturing CBB and its proprietor, Mr. V.P. Sharma also became a part of this cartel arrangement. Mr. Gadikar also stated that till 2013, the arrangement used to take place under the supervision and guidance of Mr. Vinay Sarin. However, post that till December 2017, the arrangement with the Opposite Parties was continued by him and Mr. M.S. Raja Sekar. Specifically, Mr. Gadikar further admitted that in almost all the tenders of CBB floated since 2004 to Oct.-Nov. 2017 by different railway zones/ ICF/ Diesel Loco Works/ Diesel Maintenance, the Opposite Parties had quoted in collusion with each other after discussing/ exchanging and agreeing on the price bid and, accordingly, allocating quantities. The tenders involved in the present two cases were also part of the aforesaid cartel arrangement amongst the Opposite Parties.
