Dismissed¶19

Hariyali Foods Co. Pvt. Ptd v. Nabanita Mukherjee Chakraorty and Ors.

Calcutta HC13 Jan 2026SAT/116/2025

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

Keywords: partition suit; preliminary decree of partition; minor's transfer deed (1994); representation as major; estoppel against minor; estoppel against law; Mohori Bibee v. Dharmodas Ghose (VII CWN 441) distinguished; infancy; Specific Relief Act discretion; damages as alternative remedy; Order XLI Rule 11 CPC dismissal; no substantial question of law; concurrent finding of fact; minority; Calcutta High Court; SAT appeal; Hariyali Foods Company Pvt. Ltd. v. Nabanita Mukherjee & Ors.; delay condonation (CAN 1 of 2025); CAN 2 of 2025 disposed; no costs.

What did the court decide?

None to the appellant; the appeal was dismissed and the impugned judgments and decrees of the Courts below were not set aside, leaving the preliminary decree of partition intact. ¶19

Hariyali Foods Co. Pvt. Ptd Vs Nabanita Mukherjee… — Specific Performance | Calcutta HC (2026)

What the court decided

AI extract

Outcome

None to the appellant; the appeal was dismissed and the impugned judgments and decrees of the Courts below were not set aside, leaving the preliminary decree of partition intact.

¶19

Issue for consideration

Whether Nabanita, having herself executed the 1994 transfer deed on the representation that she was a major, is bound by estoppel and cannot challenge the said deed, so that the appellant's objection to the decree declaring her 1/5th share must prevail. +1 more

¶9

Court's answer

The ratio laid down in Mohori Bibee v. Dharmodas Ghose is not applicable to the present case.

¶10

Ratio / Principle

There are two gross distinctions between the facts of Mohori Bibee and the present litigation.

¶11

Key takeaways

The doctrine of estoppel cannot be applied against Nabanita because both Courts below, on appreciation of evidence, found that she was a minor when the 1994 transfer deed was executed.ratio¶14
Law provides that a minor cannot enter into a contract and, consequentially, a transaction in respect of any immovable property.ratio¶15
Since there cannot be any estoppel against the law, the appellant's contention of estoppel operating against Nabanita cannot be accepted.

Detailed headnote1 paragraphs

SAT 116 of 2025, High Court at Calcutta (Appellate Side), decided 13.01.2026 by Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya and Supratim Bhattacharya, JJ. — Second appeal against the concurrent judgments of the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court confirming a preliminary decree of partition declaring respondent Nabanita Mukherjee's 1/5th share, dismissed under Order XLI Rule 11 CPC. The appellant, who purchased the suit property from Madhusudan in 2015 (the heirs, including Nabanita, having conveyed it to Madhusudan by a 1994 deed), contended that Nabanita, having executed the 1994 deed representing herself as a major, was estopped from challenging it. Held: (i) both Courts below found, on appreciation of evidence, that Nabanita was a minor when the 1994 deed was executed; (ii) a minor cannot enter into a contract or a transaction in respect of immovable property, and there can be no estoppel against the law, so the estoppel plea fails; (iii) Mohori Bibee v. Dharmodas Ghose, VII CWN 441, is distinguished — there estoppel operated against the paying party who knew of the infancy, and the infant had not represented himself as a major; (iv) the appellant's remedy, if any, lies in damages against Nabanita, to be adjudicated by the appropriate Court, including the Court where the partition suit is pending; (v) Nabanita's minority being a pure question of fact concurrently decided, no substantial question of law arises. Delay in preferring the appeal condoned (CAN 1 of 2025); CAN 2 of 2025 disposed of; no order as to costs.

¶1

13.01.2026

¶2

Item no.DL 35 Court No. 16 Asraf, A.R.(Ct.)

¶3

In the High Court at Calcutta

¶4

Civil Appellate Jurisdiction Appellate Side

¶5

Case No. SAT 116 of 2025 with

¶6

CAN 1 of 2025 CAN 2 of 2025

¶7

In the matter of :

¶8

HARIYALI FOODS COMPANY PVT. LTD.

¶9

…. Appellant

¶10

VS.

¶11

NABANITA MUKHERJEE & ORS.

¶12

….Respondents

¶13

For the Appellant :

¶14

Mr. Prosenjit Mukherjee Mr. Arghya Kamal Das Mr. Bhaskar Sengupta Ms. Babita Pramanik

¶15

….Advocates

¶16

In Re : I. A. No. CAN 1 of 2025

¶17

1. In view of sufficient explanation for the delay in preferring the appeal having been furnished, CAN 1 of 2025 is allowed on contest without costs, thereby condoning the delay in preferring SAT 116 of 2025.

¶18

2. The appeal is accordingly taken up for hearing under Order XLI Rule 11 of the Code of the Civil Procedure upon deeming that the defects therein to stand cured.

¶19

Page 2

¶20

In Re : SAT 116 of 2025

¶21

3. The certified copy of the judgment and decree of the First Appellate Court filed today be kept on record.

¶22

4. The present appeal has been preferred against a judgment of affirmance, whereby the Trial Court passed a preliminary decree of partition, which was confirmed by the First Appellate Court.

¶23

5. The backdrop of the case is that one Paresh Nath Mukherjee, the original owner of the suit property, left behind his wife Manasi and four children, namely, Ankrit, Moumita, Nabanita and Srabanti as his only heirs and legal representatives. A transfer deed was executed by Manasi, for herself and on behalf of her minor son and daughter Ankit and Moumita, and by Nabanita and Srabanti in the year 1994 in respect of the suit property in favour of one Madhusudan.

¶24

6. The said Madhusudan transferred the suit property in the year 2015 in favour of the defendant / present appellant.

¶25

7. Subsequently Nabanita filed the present suit for partition and also challenged the deed of transfer executed in favour of Madhusudan insofar as Nabanita’s share is concerned. Simultaneously,

¶26

Page 3

¶27

Ankit and Moumita also challenged the transfer deed on the ground that the same was executed on their behalf by their mother but not for their benefit and without any valid permission from a competent Court of law.

¶28

8. The Courts below, while turning down the challenge of Ankit and Moumita to the transfer deed on the ground that they challenged the same beyond the statutory period of three years from attaining majority, the Courts below upheld the challenge of Nabanita, despite she having executed the transfer deed in favour of Madhusudan as a major, on the ground that on the basis of the materials on record, Nabanita established that she was still a minor when the 1994 deed was executed by her. Accordingly, by the impugned judgment and preliminary decree, both the Courts below declared 1/5^th share of Nabanita in respect of the suit property, whereas did not disturb the title acquired in respect of the other 4/5^th share by the defendant / appellant by the deed of 2015.

¶29

9. Learned counsel for the appellant argues that insofar as Nabanita is concerned, in view of her having executed the transfer deed herself, on the representation that she was a major on that date, she is bound by estoppel from challenging the

¶30

Page 4

¶31

said deed long thereafter, particularly in view of the subsequent transfer deed having been executed by the transferee of Nabanita, namely, Madhusudan, in favour of the defendant / appellant in the year 2015. In support of his contention, learned counsel cites the judgment passed in the case of Mohori Bibee & Anr. vs. Dharmodas Ghose reported at VII CWN 441 .

¶32

10. Upon hearing learned counsel for the appellant, we find that the ratio laid down in Mohori Bibee (supra) is not applicable to the present case. In the said report, it was held that there can be no estoppel if the truth of the matter is known to both parties and a false representation made to a person who knows it to be false, which is not such a fraud as to take away the privilege of infancy. In the facts of that case, it was held that where money has been advanced to an infant with full knowledge of his infancy, a Court can in the exercise of discretion conferred on it under the relevant Sections of the Specific Relief Act, refuse to order its return by the infant to the other party.

¶33

11. However, there are two gross distinctions between the facts of the said case and the present litigation. First, in the said case, the principle of estoppel was held to operate against the person who had made payments in favour of the infant,

¶34

Page 5

¶35

and the infant had not represented himself as a major. Secondly, it was held that unless both parties had knowledge, there could not be any estoppel.

¶36

12. In the present case, the minor Nabanita, at the relevant point of time, is supposed to have had full knowledge of her minority but despite the same represented herself to be a major.

¶37

13. That apart, the question as to whether the principle of estoppel operates against the law was not discussed or adjudicated in the cited judgment.

¶38

14. In the present case, the principle of estoppel cannot be applied against Nabanita for the simple reason that at the relevant point of time when the transfer deed of 1994 was executed, Nabanita has been held by both the Courts below, on appreciation of evidence, to have been a minor.

¶39

15. Law provides that a minor cannot enter into a contract and consequentially a transaction in respect of any immovable property.

¶40

16. Hence, in order to apply the doctrine of estoppel against Nabanita, the said operation would be contrary to the law in respect of minors not being competent to enter into legal transactions. In view

¶41

Page 6

¶42

of the settled proposition of law that there cannot be any estoppel against the law, thus, the contention of the appellant on the premise of estoppel against Nabanita cannot be accepted.

¶43

17. At best, for Nabanita having executed the deed by giving out herself to be a major, although still a minor (though on the verge of attaining majority then), the relief of the defendant / appellant would lie in damages. Thus, there is nothing precluding the appellant to claim damages in that regard insofar as Nabanita is concerned and, if so sought, the same has to be adjudicated in accordance with law by the appropriate Court, including the Court where the partition suit is now pending. Yet, the transfer of her share by Nabanita, then a minor, cannot be held to be valid, being contrary to law.

¶44

18. Thus, fact remains that the impugned judgments and decrees of both the Courts below cannot be set aside on the ground as taken by the appellant. Accordingly, we do not find any substantial question of law involved, particularly since the question of minority of Nabanita at the relevant juncture is purely a question of fact, which has been adjudicated concurrently by both the Courts below in favour of such minority on the basis of the evidence on record.

¶45

Page 7

¶46

19. Hence, SAT 116 of 2025 is dismissed under Order XLI Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

¶47

20. Consequentially, CAN 2 of 2025 stands disposed of as well.

¶48

21. There shall be no order as to costs.

¶49

22. Parties to act on the basis of server copy of this order, duly downloaded from the official website of this Court.

¶50

23. Urgent Photostat certified copy of this order, if applied for, be supplied to the parties expeditiously after complying with all requisite formalities.

¶51

( Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J. )

¶52

(Supratim Bhattacharya, J.)

Hariyali Foods Co. Pvt. Ptd v. Nabanita Mukherjee Chakraorty and Ors.

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

Hariyali Foods Co. Pvt. Ptd v. Nabanita Mukherjee Chakraorty and Ors.

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

Why is it important?

What the court decided

Issues for consideration

Cases cited

Statutes considered

Procedural history

Parties & counsel

Coram

Case details

Similar cases

Propello Innovations Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. Vs South Indian Bank Ltd. and Anr.

Sarbani Mazumdar Alias Sarkar Alias Sarbani Sarkar Mazumdar Vs Prabhat Majumdar Alias Pravat Maazumdar

Dr Soma Mandal Debnath Vs Tanmoy Debnath

Sailen Kumar Sadhukhan Vs Sudama Pandit and Anr.

Chhaya Kurmi and Anr. (Nandalal Kurmi Since Deceased) Vs Ram Raj Das

Subir Kr Bose and Anr. Vs Prabir Some and Anr.