Dismissed¶35

The State of West Bengal and Ors. v. Sanjay Pal and Ors.

Calcutta HC7 Jan 2026MAT/848/2025

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

Division Bench (Partha Sarathi Chatterjee & Tapabrata Chakraborty, JJ.), decided 07.01.2026 — condonation of delay; Sections 3 and 5, Limitation Act; 3,644 days delay; sufficient cause; excuse versus explanation; State as litigant on same footing as private party; gross negligence, deliberate inaction, casual indifference; vested rights; interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium; Assistant Teacher conversion (Work Education Group to Bio Science); WP 1377 (W) of 2007; contempt CPAN 422 of 2015; appeal dismissed as not admitted; no costs.

What did the court decide?

The busy schedule of a learned Advocate and the transfer of a functionary of the State cannot be regarded as a reasonable and acceptable explanation, and do not constitute sufficient cause to condone the delay and entertain the belated appeal. ¶33

The State of West Bengal and Ors. Vs Sanjay Pal and Ors. — Calcutta HC (2026) — LawSathi Research

What the court decided

AI extract

Outcome

Dismissed

¶35

Issue for consideration

Whether the delay of 3,644 days in preferring the appeal (MAT 848 of 2025) against the order dated 3rd June, 2013 in WP 1377 (W) of 2007 should be condoned. +1 more

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Court's answer

The application for condonation of delay, being CAN 1 of 2025, is dismissed; consequently, the proposed appeal, along with the connected application, is dismissed as not admitted, with no order as to costs.

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Ratio / Principle

¶33

Key takeaways

Considering the explanation offered, it is nothing more than a lame excuse and cannot be treated as sufficient cause or a valid explanation; the judgment relied upon by the appellants (Sheo Raj Singh) cannot come to their rescue.ratio¶33
Applying the propositions laid down in Shivamma (supra) and Bherulal (supra), the Court is not inclined to accept the explanation offered by the appellants to justify the delay in preferring the appeal.ratio¶34
Where delay results from negligence, default or inaction and a vested right has accrued in favour of the other party, it would be unreasonable to take away that right merely at the request of the applicant.

Detailed headnote1 paragraphs

Condonation of delay refused — 3,644 days' delay in filing appeal (MAT 848 of 2025) against order dated 3rd June, 2013 in WP 1377 (W) of 2007 directing conversion of the writ petitioner's appointment from Assistant Teacher (Work Education Group) to Assistant Teacher (Bio Science) with approval — explanation of busy schedule of earlier engaged Advocate and transfer of the District Inspector of Schools held not a reasonable and acceptable explanation, nothing more than a lame excuse, not sufficient cause — State as litigant not entitled to preferential treatment — propositions in Shivamma (2025 INSC 1104) and Bherulal ((2020) 10 SCC 654) applied; Sheo Raj Singh ((2023) 10 SCC 531) distinguished — CAN 1 of 2025 dismissed; proposed appeal with connected application dismissed as not admitted — no order as to costs.

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7 07.01.2026 Ct. No. 11 rrc

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MAT 848 of 2025 with IA No. CAN 1 of 2025 and IA No. CAN 2 of 2025

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(The State of West Bengal & Ors. Vs. Sanjay Pal & Ors.)

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Mr. Shamim Ul Bari

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…. For the appellants

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Mr. Siva Prasad Ghose Ms. Neha Roy

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….. For the respondents/writ petitioners

¶8

This proposed appeal has been filed to question the legality of the order dated 3rd June, 2013 passed in the writ petition being WP 1377 (W) of 2007. By the said order, the writ petition was disposed of, directing the competent authority to convert the petitioner’s appointment from Assistant Teacher (Work Education Group) to Assistant Teacher (Bio Science) and to grant approval to such conversion.

¶9

The writ petitioner was initially appointed as an Assistant Teacher in the Work Education Group. Subsequently, he improved his qualification by obtaining a postgraduate degree in Geology. The Managing Committee, by adopting a resolution, allotted six classes per week to the petitioner. After rendering service for a considerable period of time, he made an application for conversion of his appointment from Assistant Teacher in the Work Education Group to Assistant Teacher in Biology.

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Since his prayer was not ultimately accepted by the competent authority, he was constrained to file the writ petition. By the order sought to be assailed in the present appeal, the writ petition was allowed.

¶12

As indicated in the report of the Additional Stamp Reporter, there is a delay of 3,644 days in preferring the appeal; in addition thereto, certain other defects relating to the joinder of parties have also been pointed out in the report dated 13th June, 2025.

¶13

Liberty is granted to Mr. Bari, learned advocate representing the appellants, to remove the defects regarding the joinder of parties in the appeal, as indicated in the said report. As noticed earlier, there is a delay of 3,644 days in preferring the appeal. In justification thereof, it has been averred in the application for condonation of delay, being CAN 1 of 2025 (hereinafter referred to as the application), that the order was passed ex parte and was communicated to the State respondents in the month of September, 2013. The appellant/applicant applied for a certified copy of the said order on 3rd February, 2014. Subsequently, by a memo dated 18th May, 2015, Ms. Chaitali Bhattacharya, learned Advocate, was engaged to prefer an appeal challenging the order dated 3rd June, 2013.

¶14

In the meantime, a contempt petition being CPAN 422 of 2015 was filed alleging wilful violation of the said order dated 3rd June, 2013. However, the contempt petition was contested by the alleged contemnor.

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It was further averred in the application that due to the busy schedule of Ms. Bhattacharya, the appeal could not be preferred, and in the meantime, the earlier District Inspector of Schools was transferred. Lastly, there was a fresh engagement of Mr. Shamim ul-Bari, learned advocate, in the month of May, 2025, and a fresh application for a certified copy was made on 23rd May, 2025. Upon receipt of the said certified copy on 23rd May, 2025, the present appeal was preferred on 9th June, 2025. In the entire process of obtaining the certified copy, preparation of the memorandum of appeal, and its filing, there was a delay of 3,644 days.

¶17

Mr. Bari further submits that a degree of flexibility should be granted to the State respondents, taking into account the factors unique to their functioning, such as bureaucratic processes and procedural delays in decision-making. Moreover, he submits that, in accordance with law, the petitioner is not entitled to the benefit of such conversion.

¶18

Mr. Bari asserts that the appellant has a fair chance of success in the appeal and, according to him, such a meritorious matter should not be thrown out at the threshold of the temple of justice merely on the technical ground of its belated presentation. In support of this submission, he relied on the decision, reported at (2023) 10 SCC 531( Sheo Raj Singh (deceased) thr. Lrs. & Ors. vs. Union of India & Anr.).

¶19

In rebuttal, Mr. Ghose, learned advocate representing the writ petitioner, contends that the delay has not been properly explained. He submits that delay cannot be condoned merely upon request and that the sufficiency of the cause must be

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considered before granting such condonation. He further submits that the State respondents cannot be treated as preferred litigants and that, considering the facts and circumstances of the case, it would not be appropriate to condone the delay or to entertain the appeal. In support of his contentions, he relied upon the decisions reported in 2025 INSC 1104 ( Shivamma (Dead) by LRs vs. Karnataka Housing Board & Ors. and State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. vs. Bherulal) and (2020) 10 SCC 654 (State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. vs. Bherulal).

¶22

Indisputably, the law of limitation is founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim ‘Interest reipublicae up sit finis litium’ which means ‘it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation ’. There must be a life span for every legal remedy.

¶23

A court, while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, must maintain a balance between Sections 3 and 5 of the Limitation Act. Section 3 is mandatory in nature and creates a bar against entertaining any appeal or application beyond the prescribed period of limitation. However, Section 5 vests discretion in the Court to entertain such appeal or application if sufficient cause is shown.

¶24

Notably, the law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the right and obligation of a party. These principles must be applied appropriately, depending on the facts and circumstances of each case. Once a vested right accrues in favour of one party due to the failure of the other party to explain the delay with sufficient cause, or due to its own

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conduct, it would be unreasonable to take away such right merely at the request of the applicant, especially when the delay results from negligence, default, or inaction. It must be noted that justice must be done equally to both parties. Then only the ends of justice can be achieved. If an appellant has been grossly negligent in pursuing its rights and remedies, it would be equally unjust to deprive the other party of the accrued right which has come into existence in law as a result of its vigilance.

¶27

In the present case, the order sought to be assailed in this proposed appeal was passed way back in 2013, and the proposed appeal has been filed only in 2025, i.e., after 12 years. It has been stated that the appeal could not be filed within the prescribed period of limitation primarily due to the busy schedule of the learned Advocate engaged by the State respondents. Furthermore, it has been stated that due to the transfer of the District Inspector of Schools, appropriate steps could not be taken to prefer the appeal.

¶28

In the decision of Sheo Raj Singh (supra), the Supreme Court drew a clear distinction between an “excuse” and an “explanation”. An excuse is offered to evade responsibility when a party is under scrutiny, whereas an explanation seeks to clarify the circumstances surrounding an event and demonstrates that the occurrence was not attributable to the fault of the person concerned, provided such claim is genuine.

¶29

In Bherulal (supra), the Court held that the law of limitation binds everyone, including the Government, and that delay cannot be condoned unless a reasonable and acceptable

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explanation is furnished for each day’s delay, coupled with a bona fide effort to pursue the remedy.

¶32

In Shivamma (supra), it was held that the State, as a litigant, stands on the same footing as a private party. While courts may adopt a liberal approach where bona fides and due diligence are evident, delay cannot be condoned in cases of gross negligence, deliberate inaction, or casual indifference.

¶33

As noted previously, the busy schedule of a learned Advocate and the transfer of a functionary of the State cannot be regarded as a reasonable and acceptable explanation. Such an explanation cannot be held to constitute sufficient cause to persuade this Court to exercise its discretion in favour of the appellants/applicants, to condone the delay, and to entertain the belatedly filed appeal. Therefore, the judgment relied upon by the appellant/applicant cannot come to the rescue of the appellants/applicants and considering the explanation offered by the appellants to justify the delay, it can be held that it is nothing more than a lame excuse, and the same cannot be treated as sufficient cause or a valid explanation.

¶34

Therefore, applying the propositions laid down in the judgments of Shivamma (supra) and Bherulal (supra) , we are not inclined to accept the explanation offered by the appellants to justify the delay in preferring the appeal.

¶35

Accordingly, the application for condonation of delay, being CAN 1 of 2025, is dismissed. Consequently, the proposed appeal, along with the connected application, is dismissed as not admitted.

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There shall, however, be no order as to costs.

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All parties shall act on the server copies of this order duly downloaded from the official website of this Court.

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(Partha Sarathi Chatterjee, J.) (Tapabrata Chakraborty, J.)

The State of West Bengal and Ors. v. Sanjay Pal and Ors.

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

The State of West Bengal and Ors. v. Sanjay Pal and Ors.

Case brief

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What did the court decide?

What the court decided

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