High Court at Calcutta, Appellate Side (Tapabrata Chakraborty & Partha Sarathi Chatterjee, JJ.), judgment dated 09.02.2026, dismissing four appeals (MAT 572 of 2025; MAT 2200, MAT 2201 and MAT 2202 of 2024, with connected CAN applications) preferred against learned Single Judge orders dated 05.08.2024 (WPA 12458, WPA 11670 and WPA 11669 of 2024) and 26.09.2024 (WPA 24243 of 2024), which had directed the respondents to treat the writ petitioners - hostel/mess (canteen) employees of Government and Sponsored Polytechnics - as permanent Government employees with Group-D status, pay scale, allowance, service and superannuation benefits from their respective dates of appointment. The appellants (Director of Technical Education and Training; State of West Bengal) argued that the Hostel Committee, not the Institutes, was the master controlling manner and mode of work; that the note-sheet dated 21.11.2014 and notification dated 28.10.2014 of the Principal Secretary, Higher Education Department had no statutory force and were not a reservoir of right to regularisation (relying on Nareshbhai Bhagubhai, (2019) 15 SCC 1); that State of West Bengal v. Prabir Chakraborty, (2007) 3 Cal LT 545(HC) 545 (SLP dismissed by the Supreme Court) supported their case; and that conflicting views of coordinate Division Benches (relying on Engineers India Limited, (2018) 12 SCC 593) warranted reference to a larger Bench. Held: substantial judicial time spent on references should not lead to references made casually; a larger Bench reference is warranted only where a proposition is contradicted by a subsequent judgment of the same Bench, has become unworkable, runs counter to a well-established principle, or where an irreconcilable conflict exists; no compelling or strong reason existed to depart from the Division Bench orders in Director of Technical Education and Training v. Chunilal Chakraborty and v. Madan Mohan Sarkar, whose reasoning received the Supreme Court's imprimatur upon dismissal of the SLPs, following the Special Bench disposal of the earlier reference on 26.11.2014 in view of the memo dated 28.10.2014; the judgments relied on by the appellants are distinguishable on facts; interference lay only if the order appealed was clearly wrong, and the Single Judge's finding that these petitioners stood on the same footing as already-benefited similarly placed employees involved no infirmity, especially as the earlier directions stood complied with per memoranda dated 11.07.2024, 02.04.2025 and 03.04.2025. Appeals and connected applications dismissed; no order as to costs.