Dilip Kumar Agarwal Vs the State of West Bengal and Anr.

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IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA CIRCUIT BENCH AT JALPAIGURI CRIMINAL REVISIONAL JURISDICTION APPELLATE SIDE

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Present:

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The Hon’ble Justice Shampa Dutt (Paul)

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CRR 380 of 2025

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Sri Dilip Kumar Agarwal

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Vs

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The State of West Bengal & Anr.

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For the Petitioner : Mr. Hillol Saha Podder, Ms. Mousumi Das. For the Opposite Party : Mr. Nilay Chakraborty, Mr. Sourav Lohani. For the State : Mr. Avrojyoti Das, Ld. APP, Mr. Gobinda Ghosh. Judgment reserved on : 10.06.2026 Judgment delivered on : 12.06.2026

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Shampa Dutt (Paul), J.:

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1. The revisional application has been preferred praying for quashing of the proceeding, being PTN. Case No. 3045 of 2025, pending before the court of the Learned Chief Judicial Magistrate at Jalpaiguri, corresponding to Bhaktinagar Police Station Case No. 480 of 2025 dated May 26, 2025 under Sections 316 (2)/318(4)/351(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023.

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2. The petitioner have been arraigned as an accused persons on the basis of an application filed under section 175 (3) of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 by the opposite party no.2 herein, for alleged offences punishable under Sections 316 (2)/318(4)/351(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023.

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3. The de facto complainant’s case as stated in the written complaint is as follows:-

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“That the complainant's wife was in search of a commercial space for running of coaching center and the accused person offered to let out the same being Office Premises No. S-4 about 1500 sq ft. on the second floor of the building named "MILESTONE" situated at 2nd Mile, Checkpost, Opposite Bhaktinagar Police Station, Sevoke Rd, P.S: Bhaktinagar, Dist: Jalpaiguri, West Bengal 734001 Subsequently the complainant's wife accepted

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the proposal and occupied the same on 16th April 2023. That the monthly rent was agreed at Rs. 57,000 (Rupees Fifty-Seven Thousand Only). Additionally, the complainant paid Rs. 1,14,000 (Rupees One Lakh Fourteen Thousand Only) as a refundable security deposite, equivalent to two months' rent. That based on the accused person's assurances and the mutual agreement to rent and occupy the premises, the complainant invested Rs. 30,00,000 (Rupees Thirty Lakh Only) in interior works to make the premises suitable for its intended commercial purpose, namely, operating a coaching center i.e "Brilliant Coaching". That the accused person had represented to the complainant that the building in which the tenanted premises is situated is compliant with all necessary licenses and certificated like building and fire safety license as mandated by law and only on his assurance the complainant's wife occupied the premises and spent a hefty sum of Rs. 30,00,000 (Rupees Thirty Lakh Only) in interior works. Additionally, the accused person has agreed to enter into a registered deed of lease for a period of 36 months but he kept delaying that too and to date never entered into a written agreement. That the complainant dutifully paid the rent to

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the accused person as was agreed upon i.e Rs. 57,000/-

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per month for over 5 months subsequently and kept on insisting the accused person on providing the fire safety certificate and written agreement. More specifically the complainant notified the accused through WhatsApp on 19th January 2024 that fire certificate was required for running of the coaching center. But the accused could not supply the same as he had made a false promises only to cheat the complainant from the very inception. That despite numerous reminders and the timely payment of rent for over 5 months the accused person disregarded the complainant's requests. Consequently, the complainant was compelled to pause standers, considering the safety of children. Subsequently, the complainant sent a legal notice to the accused person on 30.05.2024 to supply copy of the fire safety compliance / license amongst other things but no reasonable response was received. That the accused person himself and also through his men and agents subsequently stared to threaten the complainant to evict the premises and threatened with demands for money.”

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4. Accordingly on the basis of the aforesaid complaint, Bhaktinagar Police Station Case No. 480 of 2025 dated May 26, 2025 under Sections 316

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(2)/318(4)/351(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 was started against the accused person.

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5. The petitioner’s case is that as per agreement the opposite party no. 2 started operation of her business from the tenanted premises and after sometime she became irregular in paying rent and then subsequently stopped paying rent.

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6. On 05.06.2024 the opposite party no. 2/ de facto complainant through her learned Advocate sent a legal notice dated 05.06.2024 to the petitioner, thereby stating that the lease deed was not registered and fire safety licence was not provided. That she had invested money for interior designing and for marketing. But she was unable to run the coaching Centre and was suffering loss of business. The petitioner was made liable and called upon to pay compensation to the tune of Rs. 50,00,000/(Rupes Fifty lakh).

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7. On 19.08.2024, the petitioner replied through his learned advocate stating that the opposite party no. 2 had made interior design at her own volition and she was unable to run the center, due to lack of students and that she was also a defaulter in payment of rent and that the fire safety license under process of renewal.

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8. On 26.08.2024 petitioner sent a notice for payment of due rent till 15.08.2024 amounting to total Rs. 6,27,000/ within 15.09.2024.

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9. On 25.11.2024 the petitioner through his learned advocate, sent a notice under section 6 (4) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, and stated

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that since October 2023, the opposite party no. 2 was a defaulter in payment of rent.

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10. The opposite party no. 2 then verbally gave assurance to the petitioner that she will make the payment of due rent but suddenly on 28.03.2025, she filed a criminal complaint before the learned magistrate with intent to save herself from paying the rent due.

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11. The petitioner states that dispute is purely civil in nature and the opposite party no.2 lodged this complaint with ulterior motive to harass the petitioner.

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12. Hence the revision, praying for quashing of the proceeding on the ground that no criminal offence has been made out against the petitioner herein.

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13. On hearing the parties and on perusal of the materials in the case diary, it appears that admittedly the complainant/opposite party no. 2 is a tenant under the petitioner and has defaulted in payment of rent and this criminal case has been initiated/filed after the petitioner issued the eviction notice for defaulter in payment of rent.

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14. The complainant allegations in the written complaint is on the ground that the petitioner was bound to provide fire licence, but failed to do so and as such the complainant could not operate her coaching class causing her severe financial loss.

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15. The State on placing the case diary and on admission of the above facts states that the accused petitioner and his associates allegedly threatened

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the complainant and obstructed the removal of their belongings on 10.03.2025 the accused person wrongfully locked the premises, restricting access to furniture, ACs, electronic items and other articles kept therein belonging to the complainant.

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16. From the said materials on record, it prima facie appears that the dispute between the parties is clearly a tenancy dispute, on the ground of outstanding rent, dispossession etc.

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17. All these issues are disputes, clearly civil in nature.

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18. The complainant’s grievance that fire licence was not acquired by the petitioner is a matter, which should have been verified by the complainant prior to entering into the tenancy agreement.

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19. Once having got possession of a premises at a prime location, the complainant on a flimsy pretext, which could have been verified earlier, cannot file a criminal case to avoid paying rent, which prima facie is clear abuse of the process of law.

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20. In Naresh Kumar & Anr. Vs The State of Karnataka & Anr., in Criminal Appeal No. ……….. of 2024 (arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.

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1570 of 2021), decided on March 12, 2024, the Supreme Court held:-

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“5. Under these circumstances, we are of the considered view that this is a case where the inherent powers should have been exercised by the High Court under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code as the powers are there to stop the abuse of the process and to secure the ends of justice.

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6. In the case of Paramjeet Batra v. State of Uttarakhand (2013) 11 SCC 673, this Court recognized that although the inherent powers of a High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal

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Procedure should be exercised sparingly, yet the High Court must not hesitate in quashing such criminal proceedings which are essentially of a civil nature. This is what was held:

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“12. While exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code the High Court has to be cautious. This power is to be used sparingly and only for the purpose of preventing abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure ends of justice. Whether a complaint discloses a criminal offence or not depends upon the nature of facts alleged therein. Whether essential ingredients of criminal offence are present or not has to be judged by the High Court. A complaint disclosing civil transactions may also have a criminal texture. But the High Court must see whether a dispute which is essentially of a civil nature is given a cloak of criminal offence. In such a situation, if a civil remedy is available and is, in fact, adopted as has happened in this case, the High Court should not hesitate to quash the criminal proceedings to prevent abuse of process of the court.”

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(emphasis supplied)

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Relying upon the decision in Paramjeet Batra (supra), this Court in Randheer Singh v. State of U.P. (2021) 14 SCC 626, observed that criminal proceedings cannot be taken recourse to as a weapon of harassment. In Usha Chakraborty & Anr. v. State of West Bengal & Anr. 2023 SCC OnLine SC 90, relying upon Paramjeet Batra (supra) it was again held that where a dispute which is essentially of a civil nature, is given a cloak of a criminal offence, then such disputes can be quashed, by exercising the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

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7. Essentially, the present dispute between the parties relates to a breach of contract. A mere breach of contract, by one of the parties, would not attract prosecution for criminal offence in every case, as held by this Court in Sarabjit Kaur v. State of Punjab and Anr. (2023) 5 SCC 360. Similarly, dealing with the distinction between the offence of cheating and a mere breach of contractual obligations, this Court, in Vesa Holdings (P) Ltd. v. State of Kerala, (2015) 8 SCC 293, has held that every breach of contract would not give rise to the

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offence of cheating, and it is required to be shown that the accused had fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of making the promise.”

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21. In Anukul Singh vs State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr., in Criminal

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Appeal No. 4250 of 2025 (arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 2682 of

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2020), decided on September 24, 2025, the Supreme Court held:-

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“11. Before adverting to the facts of the present case, it is necessary to recapitulate the settled legal principles governing the exercise of inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. It is well established that though the High Court possesses wide and plenary inherent jurisdiction, such power is not unbridled or unlimited, but circumscribed by self-imposed restraints evolved through judicial pronouncements.

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11.1. This Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal10 , at paragraph 102, laid down illustrative categories where quashing of proceedings is justified. These are: “(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.

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(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.

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(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.

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(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.

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(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.

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(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the Act concerned (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or, where there is a specific provision in the Code or the Act concerned, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.

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(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.”

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The categories in Bhajan Lal are illustrative and not exhaustive, but they provide guiding principles to balance two competing considerations – (a)preventing abuse of process of law, and (b)ensuring that criminal proceedings are not stifled at the threshold on disputed questions of fact.

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11.2. Equally, this Court has consistently cautioned that the High Court, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C., cannot embark upon a “minitrial” or weigh the sufficiency of evidence, which falls within the domain of the trial Court. The scope of enquiry is confined to whether, on a plain reading of the FIR / complaint and accompanying material, the ingredients of the alleged offence are disclosed. [See: Rajiv Thapar v. Madal Lal Kapoor 11 , HMT Watches v. Abida12, and Rathish Babu Unnikrishnan v. the State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) and others13].

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11.3. In Md. Allauddin Khan v. State of Bihar 14 , it was reiterated that appreciation of contradictions or inconsistencies in witness statements lies within the exclusive domain of the trial Court and not in proceedings under Section 482 Cr.P.C. Similarly, in CBI v. Aryan Singh15 , it was emphasized that the High Court had exceeded its jurisdiction by examining the merits of the prosecution’s case and holding that charges were not proved, which is a matter strictly for trial. 11.4. Nevertheless, an exception has been recognized where the defence relies upon unimpeachable, incontrovertible evidence of sterling quality – such as documents of undisputed authenticity – which ex facie demonstrate that continuation of criminal proceedings would be unjust and oppressive. This principle was recognized in Suryalakshmi Cotton Mills Ltd v.

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Rajvir Industries Ltd16, and followed in subsequent decisions.

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11.5. Thus, the cumulative principles that emerge are: while the jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C is extraordinary and must be exercised sparingly, it is the duty of the High Court to intervene where continuation of criminal proceedings would amount to an abuse of process of law, or where the dispute is purely of a civil nature and criminal colour has been artificially given to it. Conversely, where disputed questions of fact arise requiring adjudication, the matter must ordinarily proceed to trial.

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17. This Court has, in a long line of decisions, deprecated the tendency to convert civil disputes into criminal proceedings. In Indian Oil Corporation v. M/s. NEPC India Ltd. 17 , it was held that criminal law cannot be used as a tool to settle scores in commercial or contractual matters, and that such misuse amounts to abuse of process. The following paragraphs from the decision are apposite:

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“9. The principles, relevant to our purpose are:

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(i) A complaint can be quashed where the allegations made in the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out the case alleged against the accused. For this purpose, the complaint has to be examined as a whole, but without examining the merits of the allegations. Neither a detailed inquiry nor a meticulous analysis of the material nor an assessment of the reliability or genuineness of the allegations in the complaint, is warranted while examining prayer for quashing of a complaint.

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(ii) A complaint may also be quashed where it is a clear abuse of the process of the court, as when the criminal proceeding is found to have been initiated with malafides/malice for wreaking vengeance or to cause harm, or where the allegations are absurd and inherently improbable.

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(iii) The power to quash shall not, however, be used to stifle or scuttle a legitimate prosecution. The power should be used sparingly and with abundant caution. (iv) The complaint is not required to verbatim reproduce the legal ingredients of the offence alleged. If the necessary factual foundation is laid in the complaint, merely on the ground that a few ingredients have not been stated in detail, the proceedings should not be

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quashed. Quashing of the complaint is warranted only where the complaint is so bereft of even the basic facts which are absolutely necessary for making out the offence.

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(v) A given set of facts may make out: (a) purely a civil wrong; or (b) purely a criminal offence; or (c) a civil wrong as also a criminal offence. A commercial transaction or a contractual dispute, apart from furnishing a cause of action for seeking remedy in civil law, may also involve a criminal offence. As the nature and scope of a civil proceedings are different from a criminal proceeding, the mere fact that the complaint relates to a commercial transaction or breach of contract, for which a civil remedy is available or has been availed, is not by itself a ground to quash the criminal proceedings. The test is whether the allegations in the complaint disclose a criminal offence or not.

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10. While on this issue, it is necessary to take notice of a growing tendency in business circles to convert purely civil disputes into criminal cases. This is obviously on account of a prevalent impression that civil law remedies are time consuming and do not adequately protect the interests of lenders/creditors. Such a tendency is seen in several family disputes also, leading to irretrievable break down of marriages/families. There is also an impression that if a person could somehow be entangled in a criminal prosecution, there is a likelihood of imminent settlement. Any effort to settle civil disputes and claims, which do not involve any criminal offence, by applying pressure though criminal prosecution should be deprecated and discouraged.”

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18. Similarly, in Inder Mohan Goswami and another v. State of Uttaranchal and others18 , it was emphasized that criminal prosecution must not be permitted as an instrument of harassment or private vendetta. In Ganga Dhar Kalita v. State of Assam19 , this Court again reiterated that criminal complaints in respect of property disputes of civil nature, filed solely to harass the accused or to exert pressure in civil litigation, constitute an abuse of process.

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19. Most recently, in Shailesh Kumar Singh @ Shailesh R. Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others 20 , this Court disapproved the practice of using criminal proceedings as a substitute for civil remedies, observing that money recovery cannot be enforced

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through criminal prosecution where the dispute is essentially civil. The Court cautioned High Courts not to direct settlements in such matters but to apply the settled principles in Bhajan Lal. The following paragraphs are relevant in this context:

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“9. What we have been able to understand is that there is an oral agreement between the parties. The Respondent No.4 might have parted with some money in accordance with the oral agreement and it may be that the appellant – herein owes a particular amount to be paid to the Respondent No.4. However, the question is whether prima facie any offence of cheating could be said to have been committed by the appellant.

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10. How many times the High Courts are to be reminded that to constitute an offence of cheating, there has to be something more than prima facie on record to indicate that the intention of the accused was to cheat the complainant right from the inception. The plain reading of the FIR does not disclose any element of criminality. 11. The entire case is squarely covered by a recent pronouncement of this Court in the case of “Delhi Race Club (1940) Limited vs. State of Uttar Pradesh” reported in (2024) 10 SCC 690. In the said decision, the entire law as to what constitutes cheating and criminal breach of trust respectively has been exhaustively explained. It appears that this very decision was relied upon by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner before the High Court. However, instead of looking into the matter on its own merits, the High Court thought fit to direct the petitioner to go for mediation and that too by making payment of Rs. 25,00,000/- to the 4th respondent as a condition precedent. We fail to understand why the High Court should undertake such exercise. The High Court may either allow the petition saying that no offence is disclosed or may reject the petition saying that no case for quashing is made out. Why should the High Court make an attempt to help the complainant to recover the amount due and payable by the accused. It is for the Civil Court or Commercial Court as the case may be to look into in a suit that may be filed for recovery of money or in any other proceedings, be it under the Arbitration Act, 1996 or under the provisions of the IB Code, 2016. 12. Why the High Court was not able to understand that the entire dispute between the parties is of a civil nature. 13. We also enquired with the learned counsel appearing for the Respondent No.4 whether his client has filed any

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civil suit or has initiated any other proceedings for recovery of the money. It appears that no civil suit has been filed for recovery of money till this date. Money cannot be recovered, more particularly, in a civil dispute between the parties by filing a First Information Report and seeking the help of the Police. This amounts to abuse of the process of law.

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14. We could have said many things but we refrain from observing anything further. If the Respondent No.4 has to recover a particular amount, he may file a civil suit or seek any other appropriate remedy available to him in law. He cannot be permitted to take recourse of criminal proceedings.

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15. We are quite disturbed by the manner in which the High Court has passed the impugned order. The High Court first directed the appellant to pay Rs.25,00,000/to the Respondent No.4 and thereafter directed him to appear before the Mediation and Conciliation Centre for the purpose of settlement. That’s not what is expected of a High Court to do in a Writ Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution or a miscellaneous application filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 for quashing of FIR or any other criminal proceedings. What is expected of the High Court is to look into the averments and the allegations levelled in the FIR along with the other material on record, if any. The High Court seems to have forgotten the wellsettled principles as enunciated in the decision of this Court in the “State of Haryana & Others vs. Bhajan Lal & Others” Reported in 1992 Supp.(1) SCC 335.””

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22. The dispute in the present case is clearly a civil dispute and in such cases of alleged breach of agreement, it has to be prima facie shown that there was/is criminal intent present.

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23. The materials on record, herein including the case diary do not prima facie show presence of the ingredients required to constitute the offences alleged against the petitioners herein with absence of criminal intent and as such the proceeding in this case is thus liable to be quashed in the interest of Justice, to prevent an abuse of the process of law.

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24. CRR 380 of 2025 is thus allowed.

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25. The proceeding, being PTN. Case No. 3045 of 2025, pending before the court of the Learned Chief Judicial Magistrate at Jalpaiguri, corresponding to Bhaktinagar Police Station Case No. 480 of 2025 dated May 26, 2025 under Sections 316 (2)/318(4)/351(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita,

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2023, is hereby quashed in respect of the petitioner namely Dilip Kumar Agarwal.

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26. All connected Applications, if any, stand disposed of.

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27. Interim order, if any, stands vacated.

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28. Copy of this judgment be sent to the learned Trial Court for necessary compliance.

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29. Urgent certified website copy of this judgment, if applied for, be supplied expeditiously after complying with all, necessary legal formalities.

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(Shampa Dutt (Paul), J.)

Dilip Kumar Agarwal v. the State of West Bengal and Anr.

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Dilip Kumar Agarwal v. the State of West Bengal and Anr.

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