Arijit Das Vs the State of West Bengal and Anr.

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IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA CIRCUIT BENCH AT JALPAIGURI (Criminal Revisional Jurisdiction) APPELLATE SIDE

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Present:

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The Hon’ble Justice Shampa Dutt (Paul)

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CRR 138 of 2026

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Arijit Das Vs The State of West Bengal & Anr.

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For the Petitioner	: Ms. Mr. Ms.	Suman Sehanabis, Salok Sah, Anwesha Chakraborty.
For the State	: Mr. Ms.	Avrojyoti Das, Ld. APP. Panchali Deb Sikdar.
Judgment reserved on	: 12.0	6.2026
Judgment delivered on	: 17.	06.2026
Shampa Dutt (Paul), J.:

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1. Affidavit of service filed be kept with the record.

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2. The revisional application has been preferred praying for quashing of the criminal proceeding being G.R. Case No.318 of 2024 arising out of Tufangang Police Station Case No.223 of 2024 dated 25.03.2024 under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 read with Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, now pending before the Court of the Learned Judicial Magistrate at Tufanganj, Cooch Behar.

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3. The case of the de facto complainant in the written complaint is as

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follows:-

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“On 08.12.2006, the marriage was solemnized by and between the petitioner and the opposite party no.2 as per Hindu rites and customs. The groom side was given Rs.2,27,000/- in cash alongwith furniture and gold ornaments during marriage. After the marriage, the opposite party no.2 started residing with the petitioner at her matrimonial house at Village - Andaran Fulbari (West), Police Station - Tufanganj, District Cooch Behar. Few days of the said marriage, the petitioner started to put pressure upon the opposite party no.2 to bring money for purchase of a motorcycle from her father, which he was given. But the petitioner in alliance with his other relatives started inflicting physical and mental torture upon the opposite party no. 2/complainant for further dowry. The opposite party no.2 gave birth to a male child, who is now aged about 11 years. The opposite party no.2 tolerated such physical and mental torture inflicted upon her by the petitioner with the hope for better future. On 06.03.2024, she was inflicted physical torture by the petitioner and got treatment from Tufanganj SubDivisional Hospital. However, she had again come back to her matrimonial house, but on 23.03.2024, she

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was driven out from her matrimonial house along with

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her son after being tortured by the accused/petitioner.”

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4. On hearing the learned counsels for the parties and on perusal of the materials on record and the case diary, it appears that the complaint in this case has been filed after 20 years of marriage and the allegations are general in nature.

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5. In Dara Lakshmi Narayana & Ors. vs State of Telangana & Anr., in Criminal Appeal No. ………… of 2024 (arising out of SLP (Criminal) No. 16239 of 2024, decided on December 10, 2024, the Supreme Court held:-

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“ 15. An offence is punishable under Section 498A of the IPC when a husband or his relative subjects a woman to cruelty, which may result in imprisonment for a term extending up to three years and a fine. The Explanation under Section 498A of the IPC defines “cruelty” for the purpose of Section 498A of the IPC to mean any of the acts mentioned in clauses (a) or (b). The first limb of clause (a) of the Explanation of Section 498A of the IPC, states that “cruelty” means any wilful conduct that is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide. The second limb of clause (a) of the Explanation of Section 498A of the IPC, states that cruelty means any wilful conduct that is of such a nature as to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman. Further, clause (b) of the Explanation of Section 498A of the IPC states that cruelty would also include harassment of the woman where such harassment is to coerce her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand.

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16. Further, Section 3 of the Dowry Act deals with penalty for giving or taking dowry. It states that any person who engages in giving, taking, or abetting the exchange of dowry, shall face a punishment of imprisonment for a minimum of five years and a fine of not less than fifteen thousand rupees or the value of the dowry, whichever is greater. Section 4 of the Dowry Act talks of penalty for demanding dowry. It states

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that any person demanding dowry directly or indirectly, from the parents or other relatives or guardians of a bride or bridegroom shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six months, but which may extend to two years and with fine which may extend to ten thousand rupees.

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18. A bare perusal of the FIR shows that the allegations made by respondent No.2 are vague and omnibus. Other than claiming that appellant No.1 harassed her and that appellant Nos.2 to 6 instigated him to do so, respondent No.2 has not provided any specific details or described any particular instance of harassment. She has also not mentioned the time, date, place, or manner in which the alleged harassment occurred. Therefore, the FIR lacks concrete and precise allegations.

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25. A mere reference to the names of family members in a criminal case arising out of a matrimonial dispute, without specific allegations indicating their active involvement should be nipped in the bud. It is a well-recognised fact, borne out of judicial experience, that there is often a tendency to implicate all the members of the husband’s family when domestic disputes arise out of a matrimonial discord. Such generalised and sweeping accusations unsupported by concrete evidence or particularised allegations cannot form the basis for criminal prosecution. Courts must exercise caution in such cases to prevent misuse of legal provisions and the legal process and avoid unnecessary harassment of innocent family members. In the present case, appellant Nos.2 to 6, who are the members of the family of appellant No.1 have been living in different cities and have not resided in the matrimonial house of appellant No.1 and respondent No.2 herein. Hence, they cannot be dragged into criminal prosecution and the same would be an abuse of the process of the law in the absence of specific allegations made against each of them.

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28. The inclusion of Section 498A of the IPC by way of an amendment was intended to curb cruelty inflicted on a woman by her husband and his family, ensuring swift intervention by the State. However, in recent years, as there have been a notable rise in matrimonial disputes across the country, accompanied by growing discord and tension within the institution of marriage, consequently, there has been a growing tendency to misuse provisions like Section 498A of the IPC as a tool for unleashing personal vendetta against the husband and his family by a wife. Making vague and generalised allegations during matrimonial conflicts, if not scrutinized, will lead to the misuse of legal processes and an

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encouragement for use of arm twisting tactics by a wife and/or her family. Sometimes, recourse is taken to invoke Section 498A of the IPC against the husband and his family in order to seek compliance with the unreasonable demands of a wife. Consequently, this Court has, time and again, cautioned against prosecuting the husband and his family in the absence of a clear prima facie case against them.

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29. We are not, for a moment, stating that any woman who has suffered cruelty in terms of what has been contemplated under Section 498A of the IPC should remain silent and forbear herself from making a complaint or initiating any criminal proceeding. That is not the intention of our aforesaid observations but we should not encourage a case like as in the present one, where as a counterblast to the petition for dissolution of marriage sought by the first appellant-husband of the second respondent herein, a complaint under Section 498A of the IPC is lodged by the latter. In fact, the insertion of the said provision is meant mainly for the protection of a woman who is subjected to cruelty in the matrimonial home primarily due to an unlawful demand for any property or valuable security in the form of dowry. However, sometimes it is misused as in the present case.

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30. In the above context, this Court in G .V. Rao vs. L.H.V. Prasad, (2000) 3 SCC 693 observed as follows:

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“12. There has been an outburst of matrimonial disputes in recent times. Marriage is a sacred ceremony, the main purpose of which is to enable the young couple to settle down in life and live peacefully. But little matrimonial skirmishes suddenly erupt which often assume serious proportions resulting in commission of heinous crimes in which elders of the family are also involved with the result that those who could have counselled and brought about rapprochement are rendered helpless on their being arrayed as accused in the criminal case. There are many other reasons which need not be mentioned here for not encouraging matrimonial litigation so that the parties may ponder over their defaults and terminate their disputes amicably by mutual agreement instead of fighting it out in a court of law where it takes years and years to conclude and in that process the parties lose their “young” days in chasing their “cases” in different courts.”

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31. Further, this Court in Preeti Gupta vs. State of Jharkhand (2010) 7 SCC 667 held that the courts have to be extremely careful and cautious in dealing with these

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complaints and must take pragmatic realties into consideration while dealing with matrimonial cases. The allegations of harassment by the husband’s close relatives who had been living in different cities and never visited or rarely visited the place where the complainant resided would have an entirely different complexion. The allegations of the complainant are required to be scrutinized with great care and circumspection.

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32. We, therefore, are of the opinion that the impugned FIR No.82 of 2022 filed by respondent No.2 was initiated with ulterior motives to settle personal scores and grudges against appellant No.1 and his family members i.e., appellant Nos.2 to 6 herein. Hence, the present case at hand falls within category (7) of illustrative parameters highlighted in Bhajan Lal. Therefore, the High Court, in the present case, erred in not exercising the powers available to it under Section 482 CrPC and thereby failed to prevent abuse of the Court’s process by continuing the criminal prosecution against the appellants.”

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6. The materials in the case diary also shows that the allegations are general in nature and the written complaint in the case has been filed after 20 years of marriage and permitting the case to proceed against the petitioner herein, will clearly be an abuse of the process of law.

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7. CRR 138 of 2026 is thus allowed.

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8. The proceeding being G.R. Case No.318 of 2024 arising out of Tufangang Police Station Case No.223 of 2024 dated 25.03.2024 under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 read with Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, now pending before the Court of the Learned Judicial Magistrate at Tufanganj, Cooch Behar, is hereby quashed in

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respect of the petitioner namely Arijit Das.

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9. All connected applications, if any, stands disposed of.

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10. Interim order, if any, stands vacated.

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11. Copy of this judgment be sent to the learned Trial Court for necessary compliance.

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12. Urgent certified website copy of this judgment, if applied for, be supplied expeditiously after complying with all, necessary legal formalities.

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(Shampa Dutt (Paul), J.)

Arijit Das v. the State of West Bengal and Anr.

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Arijit Das v. the State of West Bengal and Anr.

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